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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
       
During the past two decades, innovations in the world of telecommunication 
and technology, the enlargement of the European Union and a growing 
integration of global markets for labour, capital and services have given rise 
to a steady increase in cross-border mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings.1 This increased propensity towards international corporate 
migration is facilitated by the freedom of establishment,2 the Regulation on 
the European Company,3 the Regulation on the European Cooperative 
Society4 and by the Directive on cross-border mergers.5 Most of these cross-
border operations are driven by companies’ needs to be able to compete in 
the ever globalising economy. Both the intensification of global competition 
and the establishment of the internal market have contributed to the 
aforementioned trends. Moreover, the Great Recession of 2008 highlighted 
the need for businesses to adopt a more dynamic attitude towards cross-
border corporate restructuring in order to remain competitive compared to 
other foreign and European companies. As such, reduced domestic 
competition has served as a catalyst for cross-border corporate activities, 
leaving developed market companies to seek corporate growth in emerging 
markets.6  Still, the economic downturn caused a decline in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in the period of 2008-2009, with a tepid recovery 
until 2014.7 In the aftermath of the recession, the continuing recovery of the 
global economy sparked a record-breaking high of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in 2015, due in part to stimulus measures undertaken by the 
European Central Bank.8 This rise in cross-border commercial dealings 
illustrates the relevance of and may reignite the debate on employment 
                                                          
1 Abramovsky & Griffith 2015, p.3; Farrell 2006, p. 2; Green paper ‘Building a Capital 
Markets Union’, COM [2015] 63 final. 
2 Art. 49 TFEU, Art. 54 TFEU. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company (SE) (OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 1) 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society (SCE) (OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 1) 
5 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
cross-border mergers of limited liability companies. 
6 Cf.  Farrell2006, p. 1-3; Zenner et al. 2008, p. 84;  
7 OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2015, p. 187. 
8 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, p. 6. 
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protection in situations involving cross-border corporate restructuring, an 
issue that lies at the heart of the present research. At a European plane, the 
Acquired Rights Directive9 provides for the safeguarding of employees 
rights in the event of a change in employer as a result of a legal transfer or 
merger. The prospect of increasing cross-border transfers of undertakings 
has been a consistent factor in the establishment and development of the 
Acquired Rights Directive which was originally enacted in 1977 to deal with 
the rise in international takeovers and amalgamations that would inevitably 
arise from the creation of a Common Market.10 Being a staple of 
employment protection, the directive secures the automatic transfer of the 
rights and obligations stemming from the existing employment contract or 
relationship to the new employer and provides protection against dismissal 
in the event of a transfer of undertaking. At its core, the directive seeks ‘to 
ensure that employees do not forfeit essential rights and advantages acquired 
prior to a change of employer’.11 Typical examples of transfers of 
undertakings include mergers, acquisitions, demergers,12 outsourcing 
transactions, transfers of production and the provision of ancillary services. 
The classification of any type of business restructuring as a transfer of 
undertaking triggers the application of the national provisions implementing 
the Acquired Rights Directive. These provisions tend to be geared towards 
domestic transfers of undertakings rather than dealing with a cross-border 
transfer scenario.13  Additionally, the national laws of the European Member 
States differ significantly, due in part to the Acquired Rights Directive 
facilitating only partial and minimum harmonisation. As such, any cross-
border transfer of undertaking may give rise to a plethora of questions of 
predominantly a private international law nature. From a legal perspective, 
any cross-border business relocation is tangent to several fields of law. A 
cross-border transfer of undertaking operates at the interface of corporate 
law, employment law, private international law and the European four 
                                                          
9 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16; This 
directive is included in the current research as Annex I. 
10 Nowadays frequently referred to as internal market. 
11 COM(74) 351, p. 3. 
12 Also known as divisions or spin-offs.  
13 Reiner 2010, p. 117. 
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freedoms.14 This research holds a primary focus on the private international 
law aspects of cross-border transfers of undertakings, dealing both with 
questions relating to the conflict of laws and international jurisdiction. Any 
discussion of private international law, especially where it concerns the 
determination of the proper conflict of laws path, requires knowledge and 
understanding of substantive law. As such, the present research goes beyond 
a mere discussion within the realm of private international law and extends 
to the area of substantive employment law. 
 
 
1. Research questions 
As outlined above, this research primarily concerns the private international 
law implications of cross-border transfers of undertakings. Akin to its 
primary research object, i.e. the Acquired Rights Directive, the main 
emphasis of the present work is on transfers of undertakings originating from 
a European Union Member State (hereinafter also referred to as Member 
State or European Member State)15 irrespective of the location of the 
transferred undertaking upon or immediately after the transfer. Therefore, a 
key factor in the present research is the cross-border relocation of the 
undertaking to be transferred. Once an undertaking or business is transferred 
from a Member State to another state that undertaking or business becomes 
part of a wholly new environment and it and its employees will likely be 
subject to new laws and regulations. Since the Acquired Rights Directive 
aims to protect employees in the event of a change in the natural or legal 
person responsible for carrying on the business a key question becomes 
whether this protection may be upheld within the new environment. As is its 
nature, the Acquired Rights Directive only brings about partial and minimum 
harmonisation, giving rise to differences in the employee protective regime 
throughout the Member States of the European Union. The question of 
whether the provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive 
(continue to) apply in situations involving a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking is therefore equally important in situations involving a transfer 
                                                          
14 I.e. the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, including the free movement 
of workers and the freedom of establishment. Cf. Reiner 2010, p. 117; Niksova 2014, p. 1-2. 
15 Throughout the present thesis, all references to Member States or European Member States 
are references to the Member States of the European Union; where this is not the case this will 
be explicitly mentioned, e.g. where it concerns the Member States of the European Economic 
Area.  
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from one European Member State to another, i.e. in intra-European transfer 
scenarios, as it is in situations involving a transfer from a Member State to a 
non-Member State, i.e. an outbound-transfer scenario. In any event, all 
actors involved in the transfer, whether it be transferor, transferee or the 
affected employees, are best served with an easily established an proper 
determination of their legal position both before and after the transfer of 
undertaking. In establishing this legal position it is vital to determine the 
applicable law to a transfer of undertaking both upon and after the transfer of 
the business to the transferee. A proper determination of the applicable law 
requires the use of a clear and preferably uniform conflict of laws provision. 
The primary focus of the present research therefore lies in assessing the 
existing conflict of laws regime for transfers of undertakings and in 
determining whether this approach should be upheld or is in need of 
revision. In essence, the aim of this research lies in considering the necessity, 
desirability and (possible) shaping of private international law provisions for 
transfers of undertakings. This research is not limited to the area of the 
conflict of laws but additionally deals with the area of jurisdiction.16 
Whereas the issue of the appropriate conflict of laws solution to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings is and has been the subject of ongoing debate,17 the 
issue of jurisdiction in relation to this area of law is one that is sparsely 
discussed. This is surprising, since it is important for all those involved in a 
transfer of undertaking to be aware of the court they can turn to in the event 
of a transfer-related dispute and more so, since the place of adjudication 
holds the key to determining the applicable law.18 As such, this thesis seeks 
to outline the rules on jurisdiction and the conflict of laws pertaining to 
                                                          
16 This research is limited to the private international law areas of conflict of laws and 
jurisdiction. As such it does not consider all aspects of private international law, leaving out 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; the area of private international law is 
generally considered to consist of three parts: jurisdiction, the conflict of laws and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
17 See e.g.  Haanappel-van der Burg 2016; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015; Niksova 2014, 
Henckel 2012; Junker 2012; Kania 2012; Gaul & Mückl 2011; Laagland 2011; Reiner 2010; 
Reichold 2008; Bittner 2000; Däubler 1994; Franzen 1994; Junker 1994; Mankowski 1994; 
Junker 1992; Richter 1992; Kronke 1989; Pietzko 1988; Däubler 1987; Birk 1982; 
Gamillscheg 1983; Kronke, 1981; Birk 1978; Gamillscheg 1959; Zweigert 1958; De Laat & 
Knipschild 2009; De Jong 2009; Franssen 2009.  
18 After all, the applicable law is determined on the basis of the private international law of 
the forum state. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
5 
 
cross-border transfers of undertakings, existing in the countries that have 
transposed the Acquired Rights Directive into their national law by reason of 
their membership to the European Union and intends to assess whether these 
rules are in need of revision. If such revision appears warranted an additional 
research aim lies in the determination of the most appropriate private 
international law path and the shaping of provisions relating to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. In shaping such provisions and assessing and 
valuing the existing private international law path it is important to consider 
the overall purpose of private international law. This purpose may be 
described in different ways, but is generally considered to amount to an 
efficient and equitable regulation of the international legal relationships 
complicated by legal diversity.19 Without setting a specific framework for its 
formation, any newly formed private international law provision should 
additionally do justice to the nature and purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive.  
As outlined above, the primary purpose of this thesis is to establish the 
necessity, desirability and (possible) (re)shaping of private international law 
provisions for (cross-border) transfers of undertakings. The present research, 
in essence, pursues three aims: 
 First, it seeks to analyse the existing  rules on international 
jurisdiction and the conflict of laws relating to (cross-border) 
transfers of undertakings and their deficiencies; 
 Second, its seeks to outline and critically evaluate the views on 
overcoming these deficiencies and their merits and demerits; 
 Third, it intends to suggest the most appropriate and desired private 
international law path, possibly by offering suggestions for the 
shaping of coherent legislative rules on private international law in 
relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings. 
In achieving these aims a plethora of additional research questions may 
arise, ranging from whether a transfer of undertaking can occur across 
national borders and whether the cross-border nature of such a transfer may 
prevent the undertaking from being transferred as a going concern and 
retaining its identity to whether the recent change in the scope of the 
                                                          
19 Strikwerda 2015, p. 2; Van Loon, 1993, p. 136; Asser/Vonken 10-I 2013/2; De Winter 
1962, p. 115; Cf. Knot 2008, p. 3 et seq.; Peters 2015. 
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Acquired Rights Directive, allowing its application to seagoing vessels, 
holds any implications for the conflict of laws. 
 
2. Research method 
Throughout legal doctrine, there has been a tendency to criticize the research 
methods utilised in legal research, questioning the scientific nature of the 
entire field of study.20  Without participating in this legal theoretical battle of 
methods, I will recognize that there exist different approaches to legal 
research, some of which are of value in achieving the proposed research 
aims.  In conducting my research in cross-border transfers of undertakings 
and the conflict of laws I have, akin to modern day private international law, 
made use of an eclectic approach. This eclectic approach is best described as 
a method of legal research that combines various approaches and 
methodologies depending on the aim of the research and the nature of the 
subject matter under discussion. In choosing the best available research 
method the principal consideration lies in whether a particular methodology 
will serve to fulfill the aims of the present research. To this end it should be 
noted that no singular method of legal science can fully succeed in 
answering any of the proposed research aims and questions. Only a 
combination of various methods of legal study combined with critical 
evaluation and interpretation can serve to fulfill the aims and purpose of this 
research. To this end, within the area of law there will always remain ‘an 
area where only sound judgment, common sense or even intuition can be of 
any help. For when it comes to evaluation, to determining which of the 
various solutions is the best, the only ultimate criterion is often the practical 
evidence and the immediate sense of appropriateness.’21 Still, any such 
evaluation deserves a firm basis in law and research and requires knowledge 
and understanding of the subject matter and its primary aim and purpose. 
The following subparagraphs will therefore discuss the various methods and 
approaches that, at least in part, have been utilized in this research.  
   
                                                          
20 Barendrecht et al. 2004, p. 1419-1428; Buruma 2007, p. 1043; Smits 2009; Van Gestel & 
Vranken 2007, p. 1448-1461; Taekema & van Klink 2011, p. 1-10; Vranken, 2003; Van 
Boom 2013, p. 7-84; Koningsveld 2006; Sternberg 1988; Winkler 1989; Cf. Zweigert & Kötz 
1998, p. 33 et seq.  
21 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 33. 
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2.1 Comparative approach 
A comparative approach is instrumental to the field of private international 
law. Such comparative approach or legal method not only aids the 
understanding of the nature and purpose of the conflict of laws but also helps 
to devise expedient, just and sensible solutions to problems of conflicting 
laws. As one of the primary prerequisites for the existence of private 
international law is legal diversity the charting of differences in national 
laws, first at a substantive level, demonstrates the need for private 
international law. Since the key purpose of the present research is to assess 
and identify the present conflict of laws regime in relation to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings and determine whether this regime should be 
upheld and if not, to decide on (and possibly devise) the most appropriate 
conflict of laws solution, a comparative approach is paramount to fulfilling 
this aim and establishing the workings of the present conflict of laws regime 
and illustrating and reiterating the need for the conflict of laws in relation to 
cross-border transfers of undertakings. In addition, comparative private 
international law is utilized to demonstrate the different conflict of laws 
approaches to cross-border transfers of undertakings that exist throughout 
the Member States of the European Union and to highlight the need for a 
unified European conflict of laws approach. After all, comparative private 
international law as a means by which the conflict rules of various countries 
are compared and foreign legal thought and doctrine is used to refine 
existing conflict of laws rules, is imperative to bridging gaps in the 
prevailing conflict of laws approach. An important consideration in the 
assessment of deploying a comparative method towards private international 
law lies in the notion that European private international law is, in several 
areas, still in the formative stage. The description of English private 
international law by Cheshire in 1935, now, roughly 80 decades onwards, 
perfectly characterizes the present state of European private international 
law, which is: 
 
‘at the moment fluid not static, elusive not obvious; it repels any 
tendency to dogmatism, and, above all, the possible permutations of the 
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questions that it raises are so numerous that the diligent investigator can 
seldom rest content with the solution that he proposes.’22    
In an area of law that is still very much in flux and plagued by legal 
disparity, a comparative approach produces key considerations towards 
unification. In essence, the function of a comparative method in private 
international law is twofold. First, the approach aides in understanding the 
nature and existence of private international law, whereas second, a 
comparative approach at a private international law level helps promote the 
development and unification of private international law.23 In researching the 
employment and conflict of laws effects of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings I have made use of both of these functions. First, in order to 
stress the existence of legal disparity and the need for private international 
law, the laws of the European Member States are compared at a substantive 
level. This comparison does not involve an extensive substantive level 
comparison of the laws of particular Member States, as such comparison 
would not serve to the benefit of displaying the need for private international 
law and fulfilling the proposed research aims. Thus, the ultimate purpose of 
utilizing such a comparative approach does not lie in providing a 
comprehensive and all-embracing overview of the possible substantive 
effects of a cross-border transfer of undertaking, but rather by employing 
examples of the substantive effects in the national laws of the Member States 
serves to cement the need for a clear and unified understanding of the 
conflict of laws in situations involving cross-border transfers of 
undertakings. Second, a comparative approach is operated at a conflict of 
laws level. In the determination of the existing and most appropriate conflict 
of laws path a comparison is made between the different conflict of laws 
approaches existing for transfers of undertakings throughout the Member 
States. Such comparison is paramount to answering the research questions 
on the existing conflict of laws approach(es) to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings and their efficiency.      
2.2 ‘Black letter approach’ 
The black letter approach to law and legal research generally counts as the 
most common and is considered the traditional approach in legal science and 
legal research.24 Under this approach the main sources of study are laws and 
                                                          
22 Cheshire,1935, preface.  
23 Kalensky 1971, p. 244. 
24 Morris & Murphy 2011, Chapter 3; Ashford & Guth 2016, p. 135. 
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case law, and to a lesser extent academic writings. In essence, the black letter 
approach entails a primary focus on the letter of the law and aims to describe 
legal rules and provisions and provide commentary on their adoption and 
significance. In elucidating and understanding existing laws a black letter 
approach is invaluable. More so, a black letter approach may produce a 
deeper understanding of the foundations of legal arguments, enabling a 
proper evaluation of such arguments and their merits and demerits.25 
Throughout this thesis, a black letter approach is primarily utilized to outline 
and describe the existing legislation in relation to transfers of undertakings, 
both in the area of private international law and in substantive law. In doing 
so this approach answers fundamental questions on the content and 
application of the law and on the purpose of existing legislation.  
 
2.3 Legal historical approach 
The valuing of existing legal provisions and the shaping of new provisions in 
private international law requires a proper understanding of the history of the 
law and the nature and purpose of existing provisions. In adopting a legal 
historical approach the spirit of the law is decisive. In this, past knowledge 
forms a prerequisite for present knowledge; to understand the legal theory of 
any particular period one needs to adopt a historical approach.26 Part of the 
present research therefore holds an overview of the historic development of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, the legislative process surrounding cross-
border transfers of undertakings and the conflict of laws solutions provided 
therein. The use and purpose of this research methodology is not to describe 
the Acquired Rights Directive or a transfer of undertaking as a historical 
piece of legislation or a historical phenomenon, rather the idea is to draw 
from the historic developments in law in order to assess the existing law and 
devise a standard for future legislative action.  
 
2.4 Empirical approach 
A research method that is relatively new and that has rapidly evolved  since 
the start of the 21st century is that which is known as empirical legal 
research.27 Within the area of labour law, empirical studies on the effects of 
employment and labour legislation have been conducted for several 
decades.28 Such studies however, are beyond the scope of this research. 
                                                          
25 Van Gestel et al. 2013, p. 7. 
26 Howe 1950, p. 346. 
27 Heise 2002, p. 819 et seq.; Cane Kritzer et al. 2010, p. 1. 
28 Deakin 2009.   
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Whilst the conduction of empirical study is generally considered to enhance 
the scientific nature of any particular research no independent empirical 
research in the narrow sense has been conducted in this dissertation as such 
research would not serve to directly benefit the realisation of the proposed 
research aims. In this narrow sense empirical research comprises of a study 
of statistical, quantitative, data.29 However, from a broader perspective, any 
form of legal study holds an inherent empirical component by reason of its 
focus on legislation and case law as a form of data.30 Additional empirical 
components in traditional legal research may be found in e.g. a historical 
approach or in views and ideas on the impact of existing legislation. A broad 
definition of empirical research is the one proposed by Epstein and King:   
   
‘(…) in this community, the word ‘empirical’ has come to take on a 
particularly narrow meaning – one associated purely with ‘statistical 
techniques and analyses,’ or quantitative data. But empirical research, 
as natural and social scientists recognize, is far broader than these 
associations suggest. The word ‘empirical’ denotes evidence about the 
world based on observation and experience. That evidence can be 
numerical (quantitative) or nonnumerical (qualitative); neither is any 
more ‘empirical’ than the other. What makes research empirical is that 
it is based on observations of the world – in other words, data, which is 
just a term for facts about the world. These facts may be historical or 
contemporary, or based on legislation or case law, the results of 
interviews or surveys or the outcome of secondary archival research or 
primary data collection. Data can be precise or vague, relatively certain 
or very uncertain, directly observed or indirect proxies, and they can be 
anthropological, interpretive, sociological, economic, legal, political, 
biological, physical or natural. As long as the facts have something to 
do with the world, they are data, and as long as research involves data 
that is observed or desired, it is empirical.’31 
Based on this broader definition of empirical research, the notion that the 
present research is absent of any empirical data or evaluation no longer holds 
true, as it involves many ‘facts about the world’, based in legislation, case 
law, legal history or economic and social impact studies. However, as the 
narrow view corresponds to the general perception of what is considered 
empirical, the above requires no further elaboration. It will suffice to state 
                                                          
29 Ludlow & Blackham 2015; IJzermans & van Schaaijk 2007, p. 29. 
30 Cf. Ludlow & Blackham 2015; Epstein & King 2002. 
31 Epstein & King 2002, p. 2-3. 
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that use is made of existing statistical empirical studies, especially where it 
concerns the economic background of cross-border transfers of undertakings 
and that such studies enrich this research,32 but cannot serve to displace 
traditional legal methodology.  
2.5 Eclectic approach 
As outlined above, the present research employs an eclectic approach or  
mixed methodology combining several approaches to law. By doing so the 
present research overcomes the limitations of utilizing a single legal 
approach, ensures that preexisting assumptions are less likely to pollute the 
final result and stimulates new pathways of insight. Research methods are 
chosen on the basis of their suitability in answering a specific research 
question and their contribution to the overall purpose of this research. In 
addition, different approaches may be appropriate for different phases in the 
research process. Since no single method can succeed in fulfilling the 
proposed research aims, only a combination of various methods of legal 
study can serve to satisfy the overall aims and purpose of this research.  
 
 
3. Research object 
The object of this dissertation is the Acquired Rights Directive. Giving rise 
to an excess of case law in the employment area, the Acquired Rights 
Directive is one of the key legislative instruments within the European social 
arena. From 1977 onwards, the rights of employees in the event of change in 
employer resulting from a transfer of undertaking have been protected at a 
European level. On 14 February 1977 the Council of the European 
Communities adopted Directive 77/87/EEC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the 
event of transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.33  This 
directive was amended in 199834 and subsequently consolidated in the 
present Acquired Rights Directive of 2001. Whenever an undertaking or 
                                                          
32 Cf. Baldwin & Davis 2003, p. 883; Gennet et al. 2006, p. 1. 
33 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses [1977] OJ L61/26. 
34 Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses [1998] OJ 
L201/88. 
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business is transferred to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or 
merger all rights and obligations arising from the existing employment 
contracts or relationships will automatically transfer to the transferee. The 
basic aim of the Acquired Rights Directive is to guarantee that employees 
continue to enjoy the rights they acquired prior to the transfer of undertaking 
taking effect. In other words the purpose of the directive is ‘to ensure, as far 
as possible, that the contract of employment or employment relationship 
continues unchanged with the transferee, in order to prevent the workers 
concerned from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result 
of the transfer’.35 Seeking to achieve this purpose, the directive secures the 
automatic transfer of the employment relationship from the former employer 
to the new employer along with protection against dismissal and the right to 
information and consultation. Additional safeguards include the preservation 
of status and function of employee representatives and the observance of 
terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements. The directive is 
directed at the Member States of the European Union.36 As the directive does 
not directly apply to individual actors within the Member States, the latter 
are required to transpose the provisions of the directive into their national 
legislation. Consequently, it is not the directive itself, but its national 
counterpart(s) that directly apply in the event of a change in employer 
resulting from a business transfer.  
 
To give some insight into the rights and obligations provided by the 
Acquired Rights Directive the below will provide a short, non-
comprehensive overview of the main provisions of the directive and their 
content: 
 
Definition of transfer – The directive, by means of Article 1(a) applies to any 
transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business to 
another employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger. This reference to a 
change in employer, rather than to a change in ownership, excludes transfers 
                                                          
35 Case 105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Danmols Inventar [1985] ECR 
2639. 
36 The directive equally applies to the EFTA  signatories to the European Economic Area 
(hereinafter occasionally referred to as EEA), i.e. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. See 
Article 68 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ [1994] L 1, p. 3, Annex 
XVIII, no. 32d. 
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of corporate control by reason of the mere acquisition of shares.37 The 
definition of a transfer, which was long absent from the directive, is included 
in Article 1(b), which reads that : ‘where there is a transfer of an economic 
entity which retains its identity, meaning an organized grouping of resources 
which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that 
activity is central or ancillary’. This phrase forms a reflection of the case law 
of the European Court of Justice regarding the definition of the concept of 
transfer.38 
 
Retention of identity – The European Court of Justice has set forth an ever-
growing set of guidelines to help determine whether an undertaking has been 
transferred. In this, the decisive factor is whether the business was disposed 
of as a going concern, indicated by the resumption or continuation of its 
operation (with the same or similar activities) by the new employer, 
oftentimes described as the retention of identity. In determining whether the 
transferred undertaking has retained its identity the court has to weigh a 
number of factors outlined by the European Court of Justice in the seminal 
judgment of Spijkers.39  In effect, the court has to take into account all the 
circumstances that characterise the undertaking in question such as the type 
of undertaking or business, the transfer of tangible assets, the value of 
intangible assets, the transfer of the majority of the employees, the transfer 
of customers as well as the degree of similarity between the activities carried 
on before and after the transfer and the period, if any, for which the activities 
were suspended.40 All of these circumstances are single factors in an overall 
assessment and cannot be considered in isolation.  It is for the national court 
to take these factors into account in its overall assessment of whether a 
transfer of undertaking has taken place. 
 
Automatic transfer – Article 3(1) of the directive provides for the automatic 
transfer of all rights and obligations, such as salary, leave entitlements and 
seniority, stemming from the employment contract or relationship on the 
date of the transfer. The transferee thus automatically assumes the status of 
                                                          
37 The original proposal for a directive of 1974 did not make such a distinction, it merely 
referred to the retention of employees rights in the case of mergers, take-overs and 
amalgamations; Jeffery 2003, p. 683. 
38 Case 287/86 Landsorganisationen i Danmark for Tjenerforbundet i Danmark v Ny Mølle 
Kro [1987] ECR 5465,  para. 19. 
39 Case 24/85 Spijkers v. Benedik [1986] ECR 1119. 
40 Case 24/85 Spijkers v. Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, para. 13. 
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new employer, in the sense that all affected employees automatically become 
employed by the transferee at the moment the transfer takes effect.41 
Although the Member States may provide otherwise, such automatic transfer 
does not apply to old-age, invalidity or survivor’s benefits that go beyond 
statutory security schemes.42 
 
Joint and several liability – On the basis of the directive, the Member States 
may opt to provide that liability is joint and several between transferor and 
transferee. Article 3(1) of the directive states that it is at the option of the 
Member States to provide that ‘after the date of the transfer, the transferor 
and transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of operations 
that arose before the date of the transfer from a contract of employment or an 
employment relationship existing on the date of the transfer.’  
 
Collective agreements –The Acquired Rights Directive in Article 3(3), to a 
certain extent, makes provision for the continuity of terms and conditions 
agreed in collective agreements. By reason of this Article ‘the transferee 
shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that 
agreement, until the date of termination or expire of the collective agreement 
or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement.’ In 
situations where collective agreements are concluded between workers’ and 
employers’ associations and where these have not been declared generally 
binding, the directive does require the transferee to become party to the 
collective agreement existing at the business or undertaking of the transferor 
as this would limit the transferee’s right to free association. Instead,  Article 
3(3) requires the transferee to uphold the terms and conditions agreed in the 
existing collective agreement.43 The directive allows the Member States to 
limit this period of observance of a collective agreement up to one year. 
 
Protection against dismissal – The directive, in Article 4, provides 
protection against dismissal in the event of a transfer of undertaking. Any 
                                                          
41 More so, it is as if their employment contract or relationship was originally concluded with 
the transferee. 
42 Article 3(4) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC); this also applies to the 
terms and conditions observed in collective agreements. 
43 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of the legislation of the Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations, COM (74) 351 final/2, p.6-7; Beltzer 2008, p. 116-117. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
15 
 
dismissal by the transferor or the transferee either before or after the transfer 
is automatically deemed unfair, where the sole reason for the dismissal lies 
in the transfer itself. The provision bars dismissal by reason of the transfer, 
but allows dismissals for economic, technical or organizational reasons, 
commonly referred to as ETO reasons.  
 
Substantial change – If a transfer of undertaking involves a substantial 
change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee, the 
employee may terminate the employment contract at the risk of the 
employer. In other words: if a transfer constitutes a substantial change in 
working conditions the employee is allowed to terminate the employment 
contract. By reason of Article 4(2) the employer will be regarded as having 
been responsible for such termination. According to the ECJ in the case of 
Europièces it is for the national court to determine (as is the case  with all 
factual assessments under the directive) whether the changes in employment 
proposed by the transferee constitute a substantial change in working 
conditions.44 Where this is assumed the national court is required to provide 
that the employer is to be considered responsible for the termination.45 
Whether a cross-border transfer of undertaking per se constitutes a 
substantial change in working conditions is discussed in Chapter 2. 
  
Insolvency – In principle, Articles 3 and 4 of the directive (which secure the 
automatic transfer of employment rights, terms and conditions agreed in 
collective agreements and protection against dismissal) do not apply to 
insolvency proceedings.46 Article 5(1) of the directive clearly excludes the 
                                                          
44 Still the concept of substantial change is introduced by the directive and guarded by the 
European Court of Justice, as is clear from Case C-175/99 Didier Mayeur v Association 
Promotion de l’Information Messine (APIM) [2000] ECRI-7780, para. 56, in which the ECJ 
holds that ‘ any obligation, prescribed by national law, to terminate contracts of employment 
governed by private law, such obligation constitutes, in accordance with Article 4(2( of 
Directive 77/187, a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee 
resulting directly from the transfer, with the result that termination of such contracts of 
employment must, in such circumstances, be regarded as resulting from the action of the 
employer.’; Similarly Advocate General Léger in Case C-175/99 Didier Mayeur v Association 
Promotion de l’Information Messine (APIM) [2000] ECRI-7780, Opinion of AG Léger, para. 
108. 
45 Case C-399/96 Europièces SA v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding 
Company SA [1998] ECR I- 6965, para. 44. 
46 Some Member States such as e.g. the Netherlands (Article 7:666(1)(a), Austria (§ 3(2) 
AVRAG), Malta (Article 38(4) EIRA) exclude insolvent undertakings from their national 
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application of the directive to the ‘transfer of an undertaking, part of an 
undertaking or business where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy 
proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings which have been 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and are 
under the supervision of a competent public authority.’ However, the 
Member States may decide to apply their national acquired rights provisions 
to the type of insolvency proceedings excluded in Article 5(1).47 Where they 
have opted to do so, Article 5(2) and 5(3) provide legislative options.  
 
Employee representatives – By reason of Article 6(1) of the directive the 
status and function of employee representatives is ensured on the same terms 
and conditions as existed before the transfer provided that the transferred 
undertaking preserves its autonomy. If the transferred undertaking’s 
autonomy has not been preserved measures must be taken to ensure that the 
transferred employees continue to be properly represented until such time as 
the reconstitution or reappointment of employee representation in 
accordance with national law has taken effect. In essence, Article 6 aims to 
ensure a continuity of employee representation.48 If, as a result of the 
transfer, the term of office of the representatives of the employees affected 
by the transfer expires, they shall ‘continue to enjoy the protection provided 
by the laws, regulations, administrative provisions or practice of the Member 
States’.49 
  
Information and consultation – Article 7 of the directive holds the 
information and consultation requirements. Article 7(1) obliges the 
transferor and transferee to inform the representatives of their respective 
employees affected by the transfer of: ‘the date or proposed date of the 
transfer, the reasons for the transfer, the legal, economic and social 
implications of the transfer for the employees and any measures envisaged in 
relation to the employees.’ All such information must be provided in good 
                                                                                                                                        
acquired rights provisions. However, in some cases, national acquired rights provisions may 
apply where a company is being rescued (such as in the Netherlands (Cf. Rb. Noord-
Nederland 22 August 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2014:4598)).   
47 Some Member States such as e.g. Portugal (Article 285 et seq. CTrab), Germany (§613a 
BGB) and Spain (Article 44 ET) do apply their national acquired rights provisions to 
undertakings subject to insolvency.  
48 Commission Services’ Working Document, Memorandum on rights of workers in cases of 
transfers of undertakings [2004], p. 10. 
49 Article 6(2) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
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time either before the date of the transfer50 or before the employees are 
directly affected by the transfer.51 In the absence of any employee 
representatives, through no fault of the employees, the affected employees 
shall be informed individually.52 If transferee and transferor envisage 
measures with regard to their employees, such as a reduction of the 
workforce, they are required to consult the representatives of these 
employees with a view to reaching an agreement.53  
 
 
4. Target countries and motives for transferring business abroad 
Any research regarding cross-border transfers of undertakings will surely 
benefit from some data on the frequency with which such cross-border 
transfers occur as such figures will underline the importance and relevance 
of such research. The same goes for some insight into the preferred target 
countries in international mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring 
activities such as outsourcing and offshoring. As such, this paragraph seeks 
to outline the economic background of cross-border mergers, acquisitions 
and other forms of corporate restructuring as well as summarise the main 
drivers for transferring business abroad or acquiring foreign companies. The 
majority of business transfers occurring within the European continent 
involve target businesses situated in other European countries.54 In 2015 
44% of the global number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involved 
a target company located within the European Union, whereas 37% of the 
acquiring companies was located within a European Member State.55 
Primary target and acquiring countries within the European Union include 
the United Kingdom, Germany and France.56 Main drivers for transferring 
business abroad or acquiring foreign businesses may be found in increased 
                                                          
50 Where it concerns the transferor. 
51 Where it concerns the transferee. 
52 Article 7(6) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
53 Article 7(2) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
54 Dachs et al. 2006, p. 5-6.UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, Annex Table 11, 12; 
CBS,‘Offshoring door Nederlandse bedrijven; een eerste grootschalig onderzoek in de 
industrie en dienstverlening’ [2008]; Kania 2012, p. 32; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 2-3. 
55 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, Annex Table 11, 12. 
56 Top five acquiring countries: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, Germany; Top five target countries: the Unites States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain. 
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competition, cost cutting considerations, the potential access to new and 
emerging markets and access to new technologies.57 Where it concerns 
cross-border corporate restructuring through offshoring the target countries 
may vary depending on the type of business that is involved. Target 
countries may be selected on the basis of several factors such as the 
availability of skilled workers, cultural similarity, geographical vicinity, 
language requirements and political stability.58 Throughout the European 
continent, in recent years, there has been a reversal from farshoring to 
nearshoring. Business activities are no longer predominantly offshored to 
distant countries such as China and India; instead offshoring frequently 
occurs within the same geographical region.59 Eastern Europe has become an 
important target region in production and services offshoring, whereas 
Western Europe is a popular target region for developing new technologies.60 
Nearshoring offers significant advantages over farshoring as it offers 
geographical proximity, easier transportation, cultural alignment, language 
similarities and the ability to relocate and retain staff.61 With European 
cross-border corporate mobility consistently gaining traction62 the question 
of employment protection in cross-border restructurings and the applicability 
of the provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive has become 
ever more important.      
 
 
                                                          
57 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, p. 6; CBS, ‘Offshoring door Nederlandse 
bedrijven; een eerste grootschalig onderzoek in de industrie en dienstverlening’ [2008], p. 12-
13; Berenschot 2005; Gorter et al. , p. 15-16; Dachs et al. 2006, p. 7-10; Butterworth et al. 
2013, p. 5. 
58 Dachs et al. 2006, p. 5. 
59 George, Frynas & Mellahi 2015, p. 269; Kania 2012, p. 32; Kvedaraviciene 2008, p. 563 et 
seq.   
60 Dachs et al. 2006,   p. 9-10; Daub 2009, p. 196. 
61 Daub, Wiesbaden & Gabler 2009, p. 196; George, Frynas & Mellahi 2015, p. 269; Carmel 
& Abbott 2007, p. 44-45; Elix-RR, ‘The rise of nearshoring. Can Manchester compete with 
Mumbai?’ [2015], p. 5. 
62 Kania 2012, p. 32, 33; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016; Deloitte’s 2014 Global 
Outsourcing and Insourcing Survey Report 2014. 2014 and beyond [available online at; 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/strategy/us-2014-global-
outsourcing-insourcing-survey-report-123114.pdf, date of access 18 August 2016]; Giddens et 
al. 2006, p. 75; Crino 2009; Cf. Neelankavil & Rai 2009 p. 230 (on the increase of offshoring 
to India). 
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5. The Acquired Rights Directive and cross-border transfers 
The Acquired Rights Directive was originally enacted in order to 
complement a surge in international takeovers and amalgamations 
accompanying the establishment of the Common Market. Hence, the 
directive was originally intended to accommodate cross-border transfers of 
undertakings. This is apparent from the proposal for a directive of 1974, 
which, in Article 10, provided a conflict of laws provision for the individual 
employment relationships affected by a transfer of undertaking.63 The 
revised proposal of 1975, although clearly applying to cross-border transfers 
of undertakings,64 did not comprise any conflict of laws provisions. The 
Commission eventually refrained from equipping the Acquired Rights 
Directive with provisions on the conflict of laws, as it was believed that this 
issue would be dealt with by the Regulation on the provisions of conflict of 
laws on employment relationships within the Community.65 This regulation 
however was never enacted, leaving the Acquired Rights Directive without 
the envisaged complementary conflict of laws provisions on employment 
matters.66 As such conflict of laws provisions, directly affirming which 
national acquired rights provisions apply in cross-border transfer situations, 
remain absent from the present Acquired Rights Directive until today as 
neither directive 77/187/EEC nor directive 98/50/EC implemented any 
conflict of laws provisions into the directive.67 Complementary conflict of 
laws provisions, indisputably applying to transfers of undertakings, also 
                                                          
63 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of the legislation of Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations, COM (74) 351 final/2; V/631/74-E. 
64 See COM (75) 429 final, Explanatory Memorandum p. 5-6. See Chapter 4, paragraph 2.1. 
65 Voorstel voor een verordening(EEG) van de Raad met betrekking tot het op 
arbeidsverhoudingen binnen de Gemeenschap toe te passen conflictenrecht, OJ [1972] C49/26 
(proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the provisions of conflict of laws on employment 
relationships within the Community); Raadpleging van het Economisch en Sociaal Comité 
inzake een voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad met betrekking tot het op 
arbeidsverhoudingen binnen de Gemeenschap toe te passen conflictenrecht, OJ [1972] C142/5 
(Consultation of the Economic and Social Committee with regard to a proposal for a 
Regulation of the Council on the provisions of conflict of laws on employment relationships 
within the Community); Amended proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the provisions 
of conflict of laws on employment relationships within the Community COM(75) 653 final; 
Hepple 1998, p. 7; Kronke 1989, p. 3. 
66 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 8. 
67 Directive 2001/23/EC mere consolidated Directive 77/187/EEC and Directive 98/50/EC 
and did not effectuate any actual changes. 
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remain inexistent. The issue of cross-border transfers of undertakings 
however, did not entirely disappear from the European social arena as the 
Commission ordered a study, completed in 1998,68 on the legal 
consequences of cross-border transfers of undertakings within the European 
Union. This study, conducted by Hepple, recognizes the difficulties that may 
arise from the absence of express conflict of laws provisions regarding 
transfers of undertakings and makes several recommendations for revising 
the directive. These recommendations however never made it into law. In 
recent years, the issue of cross-border transfers of undertakings regained the 
interests of the European Commission. Again, in 2006, a study was 
commissioned aiming to identify the main legal problems arising from the 
application of the provisions of the directive to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings.69 In a 2007 report70 the European Commission revealed its 
intentions to initiate a consultation of social partners with a view to 
amending the Acquired Rights Directive in order to better accommodate 
cross-border transfers of undertakings.71  Putting flesh on the bones of these 
intentions, the Commission launched a first phase consultation of social 
partners on 20th June 2007.72 In this first phase consultation the Commission 
recognized that ‘the applicability of Directive 2001/23/EC to cross-border 
transfers with a change in the place of work raises a few important questions 
that cannot be answered by either the Directive or the existing instruments of 
private international law.’ It therefore enquired whether social partners 
believed it necessary to amend the Acquired Rights Directive or to take any 
other type of Community action in order to deal with the issue of cross-
border transfers that are coupled with a (cross-border) relocation of the 
transferred undertaking. Since the social partners believed that the existing 
instruments of Community private international law adequately dealt with 
any problems of private international law, the Commission decided not to 
                                                          
68 Hepple 1998. 
69 Gaul et al. 2006 , hereinafter: CMS report. 
70 Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses [SEC(2007) 812].  
71 SEC(2007) 812, p. 10.  
72 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty concerning 
cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses; 
Pursuant to Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty the consultation of social partners is required 
before proposals in the social policy field are submitted. 
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continue its legislative efforts.73 The present research partly deals with the 
question of whether this cessation was justified and whether the present 
private international instruments do in fact adequately deal with the 
problems of private international law arising in relation to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. 
 
The most recent change to the Acquired Rights Directive involves the issue 
of seagoing vessels. Until recently seagoing vessels were excluded from the 
scope of the Acquired Rights Directive, leaving seafaring workers and their 
employment rights unprotected upon the transfer of a seagoing vessel. 
Whereas land-based workers and crews of inland navigation vessels74 
enjoyed the automatic transfer of the employment relationship from the 
transferor (i.e. the former employer) to the transferee (i.e. the new employer) 
as well as protection against dismissal and the right to information and 
consultation,75 seagoing workers frequently found themselves without 
employment as a result of the transfer of the undertaking in which they were 
engaged. In a preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of 
EU social legislation it was concluded that the transfer of a vessel often 
counts as grounds for redundancy.76 In 2011, the Task Force on Maritime 
Employment and Competiveness, established to, among others, develop 
recommendations on striking a just balance between the employment 
conditions of European seafarers and the competitiveness of the European 
fleet,77 concluded that the elimination of the exclusion of seagoing workers 
from several European social directives, including the Acquired Rights 
Directive would ‘help eliminate the impression that seafarers are less well 
                                                          
73 European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2008, p. 135. 
74 See, e.g., Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891, JAR 1996/198. 
75 These three aspects of a transfer of undertaking are considered the three pillars of the 
Acquired Rights Directive.  
76 MRAG, ‘European Commission. Preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the current exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of EU social 
legislation’, Framework Service Contract, No. FISH/2006/09-LOT2, April 2010, p. 54, para. 
313. 
77 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 1, available online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/seafarers/doc/2011-06-09-tfmec.pdf>. 
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protected by European Union labour law than other employees’78, 
‘particularly when no clear justification’79 for the exclusions exists. As such 
it proposed the elimination of the exclusion of seagoing workers from four 
European social directives, including the Acquired Rights Directive.80 This 
elimination took effect in 2015, when the final directive was adopted. 
Directive (EU) 2015/179481, which aims to improve the working conditions 
of seafarers and their information and consultation, in Article 5, alters the 
scope of the Acquired Rights Directive by ensuring its application to 
seagoing vessels. Part of the aim of the present research is to assess whether 
these recent changes to the Acquired Rights Directive have any bearing on 
the conflict of laws and the preferred conflict of laws path.82 
 
 
6. Existing academic knowledge and perspectives 
In establishing the necessity, desirability and (possible) (re)shaping of 
private international law provisions for (cross-border) transfers of 
undertakings, the present dissertation intends to contribute to the existing 
                                                          
78 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 14, available online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/seafarers/doc/2011-06-09-tfmec.pdf>. 
79 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 14. 
80 In addition the task force proposed the removal of exclusion provisions from Council 
Directive 2008/94 EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to the 
protection of employees in the event of insolvency of their employer; Council Directive 
2009/38/EC on European Works Councils and Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community. In its 2013 
proposal for a directive the European Commission extended this elimination to five social 
directives: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final. 
81 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, as regards 
seafarers, OJ [2015] L 263/1. 
82 A more recent development concerning the Acquired Rights Directive involves a possible 
consolidation of the directives in the area of information and consultation of workers. The 
European Commission has launched a first phase consultation of social partners to this effect: 
‘ First phase consultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on a consolidation of the 
EU Directives on information and consultation of workers’, C [2015] 2303 final. A detailed 
discussion of this development is beyond the scope of the current research.  
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academic debate as well as advocate legal reform. The research object and 
the essential research questions are approached from a private international 
law perspective. In achieving the research objectives a European gage is 
utilized, meaning that the point of departure is the Acquired Rights Directive 
itself rather than any national implementation provision. This choice for a 
European perspective is dovetailed with the aim of the present research 
which is to establish the necessity, desirability and (possible) shaping of 
private international law provisions for (cross-border) transfers of 
undertakings at a European level rather than at a purely national plane. 
 
The present research can rely on settled knowledge in legal doctrine as there 
exist, especially in German legal doctrine, a variety of legal materials on the 
conflict of laws perspective to be deployed in relation to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. In the past quinquennium several doctoral theses 
on the subject have emerged, notably by Kania, Niksova and Haanappel-van 
der Burg.83 The present research however, offers a new perspective in the 
sense that it approaches the problem of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings from a European perspective, rather than departing from the 
national implementation laws of a particular European Member State (in the 
case of Kania, Niksova and Haanappel-van der Burg respectively Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands).84 Additionally, instead of dealing 
predominantly with the employment implications of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, the primary focus of the present research lies in the area of 
private international law. Although research into the employment and 
conflict of laws effects of cross-border transfers of undertakings can rely on 
an assortment of legal knowledge, the present state of legal doctrine leaves 
several essential questions largely unanswered.  For example, there exist few 
literature on the interaction between the Acquired Rights Directive and the 
existing private international law instruments of the Rome I Regulation and 
the Rome Convention, on the status of the provisions stemming from the 
Acquired Rights Directive and whether they can be classified as overriding 
mandatory provisions and on the question of how scope rules in secondary 
                                                          
83 Kania 2012, Niksova 2014, Haanappel-van der Burg 2015. 
84 Although Kania’s doctoral thesis in its title clearly purports the use of a European 
perspective all reasoning concerning the Acquired Rights Directive departs from the German 
national acquired rights provision of  § 613a BGB.  
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European Union legislation relate to and fit in with the existing conflict of 
laws regime. Even fewer academic writings exist where it concerns the issue 
of jurisdiction and the conflict of laws effects of the inclusion of seagoing 
vessels into the Acquired Rights Directive. In fact, these are issues that have 
hitherto remained obscure from the existing academic debate.  
 
Consequently, the relevance85 and value of the present research lies in the 
fact that it broaches new developments such as the inclusion of seagoing 
vessels into the Acquired Rights Directive and the effects of such inclusion 
upon the conflict of laws. More so, it touches upon questions that have 
hitherto remained untouched in the academic debate, such as the issue of 
international jurisdiction in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings 
and the appropriateness of the existing jurisdictional approach. In addition, 
the present research offers a different opinion on the preferred conflict of 
laws solution. It breaks with the notion that a transfer of undertaking is, in 
principle, subject to a Statutenwechsel, i.e. a change in applicable law, upon 
the relocation of the undertaking and makes a plea for considering (cross-
border) transfers of undertakings as a separate conflict of laws category for 
which the location of the undertaking to be transferred is to be the deciding 




The main purpose of this book is to establish the necessity, desirability and 
(possible) shaping of private international law provisions for (cross-border) 
transfers of undertakings. In achieving this aim the book,  which consists of 
                                                          
85 Commenting on Haanappel-van der Burg’s doctoral thesis (Haanappel-van der Burg 2016), 
Duk considers any study on the conflict of laws relating cross-border transfers of undertakings 
to be of little practical relevance because the directive does not apply to a mere change in 
ownership, i.e. share deals. Duk 2016 ; Here Duk appears to forget that the Acquired Rights 
Directive although that the directive does apply to mergers and acquisitions structured as asset 
deals. More so, the directive does not solely apply to mergers and acquisitions, but also covers 
cross-border corporate restructurings, such as outsourcing and offshoring activities, which are 
frequently structured as asset deals. A fortiori share deals are not fully excluded from the 
application of national acquired rights provisions as some Member States, such as the United 
Kingdom, will apply their national acquired rights provisions to share deals where the new 
owner or shareholder takes over control of the transferred business [Cf. Millam v The Print 
Factory [2007] EWCA Civ 322].  
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six separate Chapters, including this introduction, starts with a further 
introduction into the overall subject matter in Chapter 2. As such, the second 
Chapter provides an overview of the employment effects of cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. It deals with some of the larger substantive 
problems that may arise in situations involving a cross-border corporate 
relocation. The Chapter seeks to define the notion of a cross-border transfer 
of undertaking and to establish whether and under which conditions such 
transfers are within the remit of the Acquired Rights Directive. It answers 
the question whether a transfer of undertaking may take effect across 
national borders. In doing so, it establishes whether the cross-border nature 
of the transfer prevents the undertaking from being transferred as a going 
concern and retaining its identity. The Chapter will demonstrate that the 
problems arising from or in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings 
are largely rooted in the differences existing in the laws of the Member 
States and the absence of a clear and universally accepted conflict of laws 
path. The Chapter provides the reader with a deeper understanding of the 
subject matter and its importance by outlining some of the main differences 
existing in the laws of the Member States and signaling the primary 
problems that exist in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings. In 
effect, Chapter 2 serves as a prelude to the nucleus of this research, i.e. the 
Chapters on jurisdiction and the conflict of laws.  
 
Chapter 3, which deals with the issue of international jurisdiction, serves a 
dual purpose: first, it seeks to outline the rules on jurisdiction pertaining to 
cross-border transfer of undertakings existing in the European Member 
States and second, it intends to assess whether these rules on jurisdiction are 
in need of revision. In establishing whether there is a need for such a 
revision the question is posed whether the problems that exist within the 
realm of the conflict of laws (Chapter 4) equally exist when it comes to 
establishing jurisdiction in matters relating to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings. The primary focus of this Chapter lies on the private 
international law instrument of the Brussels I bis Regulation,86 which holds 
                                                          
86 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), OJ [2012]  L 351/1.  
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the principal rules on international jurisdiction in civil and commercial 
matters.  
Chapter 4 forms the heart of the present research and concerns  the issue of 
the conflict of laws. Whereas Chapter 2 served to highlight the need for clear 
and uniform conflict of laws provisions regarding transfers of undertakings 
at a European plane, the fourth Chapter seeks to assess and define the rules 
that determine the applicable law in the event of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. In doing so, the Chapter critically evaluates the large variety of 
views and ideas on the method through which the law applicable to a transfer 
of undertakings is and should be obtained. Additionally, it establishes and 
identifies the existing method through which the law applicable to a cross-
border transfer of undertaking is to be determined. As the ultimate aim of 
this Chapter is to assess and identify the present conflict of laws regime in 
relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings and to determine whether 
this regime should be upheld or is in need of revision a strong emphasis lies 
on the existing conflict of laws path and its merits and demerits. One of the 
most important findings of this Chapter is that the Member States deal with 
the issue of the conflict of laws in different ways. Therefore a plea is made 
for the introduction of a new and uniform conflict of laws path for transfers 
of undertakings. The Chapter concludes with suggestions for changes to the 
Acquired Rights Directive and the introduction of a separate conflict of laws 
category for transfers of undertakings. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the inclusion of seagoing vessels into the Acquired 
Rights Directive and the effects of such inclusion upon the conflict of laws. 
In 2015, the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive was amended to include 
seagoing vessels that are part of a transfer of undertaking.87 The application 
of the directive to seagoing vessels is dependent upon the location of the 
transferee or the location of the undertaking upon completion of the transfer. 
As such, a different territorial scope exists for seagoing vessels then for land-
based undertakings. For the latter the location of the undertaking after the 
transfer is irrelevant, whereas in case of the former the location after the 
transfer holds an important consideration for the application of the directive 
                                                          
87 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, as regards 
seafarers, OJ [2015] L 263/1.  
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and its national counterparts. The primary purpose of Chapter 5 is to assess 
whether the special characteristics of the maritime sector, its inherent cross-
border and international features, combined with the recent revision of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, give rise to a special conflict of laws 
consideration of seagoing vessels in relation to transfers of undertakings. 
The Chapter concludes with a discussion on the preferred conflict of laws 
approach an critically assesses the recent changes to the Acquired Rights 
Directive. The ultimate conclusion holds that the inclusion of seagoing 
vessels into the Acquired Rights Directive requires a revision of the conflict 
of laws rule proposed for transfers of undertakings in Chapter 4. Suggestions 
for such a revision and the shaping of conflict of laws provisions for 
transfers of undertakings are made. 
 
The final Chapter concludes the present research by outlining the preferred 
private international law path for transfers of undertakings and by offering 
recommendations and suggestions for a conflict of laws provision to be 
included into the Acquired Rights Directive. In effect, the final Chapter 
brings together the conclusions of the previous Chapters and offers some 








The Acquired Rights Directive was originally created to deal with a rise in 
international takeovers and amalgamations that would inevitably arise from 
the creation of a Common Market.88 Since the directive’s inception in 1977, 
the number of cross-border mergers and takeovers have been consistently on 
the rise.89 Combined with the innovations in the world of 
telecommunication, the enlargement of the European Union and general 
globalization cross-border or international takeovers, mergers and 
outsourcing activities are likely to occur ever more often. This increased 
propensity towards international migration at a company level, which is 
facilitated by the freedom of establishment,90 the Regulation on the 
European Company,91 on the European Cooperative Society92 and by the 
Directive on cross-border mergers, raises questions as to the effects of this 
migration upon the position of the affected employees. To this end, the 
Acquired Rights Directive, throughout the Member States of the European 
Union93, provides for the safeguarding of the rights and obligations of 
employees upon a transfer of undertaking. However, as neither the Acquired 
Rights Directive nor its national counterparts provides for an express 
application to cross-border transfers of undertakings their application beyond 
national frontiers has on occasion been questioned.94 The absence of any 
explicit provisions regarding cross-border transfers of undertakings may 
therefore result in uncertainty on the part of employers and employees. This 
uncertainty was one of the main drivers behind the European Commission’s 
                                                          
88 Nowadays frequently referred to as internal market. 
89 Manchin 2004, p. 4, 6 et seq. ; Coeurdacier et al. 2009, p. 7. 
90 Art. 49 TFEU, Art. 54 TFEU. 
91 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company (SE) (OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 1) 
92 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society (SCE) (OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 1) 
93 The directive likewise applies to the EFTA signatories to the European Economic Area, i.e. 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
94 Radé 2006, p. 291. 
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consultation of social partners95 with a view to amending the Acquired 
Rights Directive in order to better accommodate cross-border transfers of 
undertakings.96 This Chapter deals with some of the larger substantive 
problems that may arise in situations involving a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. First however, it seeks to define what constitutes a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking and to establish whether and under what conditions 
these transfers are within the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
Second, it seeks to establish whether a transfer of undertaking can occur 
across national borders. In doing so, it is imperative to establish whether the 
cross-border nature of the transfer prevents the undertaking from being 
transferred as a going concern and retaining its identity. Once these first two 
issues have been addressed the Chapter turns to some of the substantive 
effects of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. Not all substantive 
employment effects are discussed. Only those effects that, compared to 
domestic transfers of undertakings, raise additional questions or cause 
additional problems due to the cross-border nature of the transfer are 
considered of interest. In dealing with the combined issues of this Chapter 
the intention is not to provide an in depth analysis of the legal systems of the 
Member States of the EU and their provisions transposing the Acquired 
Rights Directive. Instead, reference is made to the national acquired rights 
provisions in order to illustrate the differences in national transposition 
measures, highlighting the need for conflict of laws provisions at a European 
level. In addition, the present Chapter will show that the problems arising 
from or in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings are largely 
rooted in the differences between the laws of the Member States and the 
absence of a clear and universally accepted conflict of laws path. Thus, the 
aim of this Chapter is not to provide a comprehensive and all-embracing 
overview of the possible substantive effects of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, but rather to utilize the substantive effects to outline the need 
for a clear and unified understanding of the conflict of laws in situations 
                                                          
95 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty concerning 
cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, 
available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2442&langId=en>, 
96 See: Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, COM(2007)334 final, p. 10. 
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involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking. In this sense, the present 
Chapter constitutes a prelude to the heart of this research, i.e. the Chapters 




For the purposes of this research, it is important to establish a clear 
definition of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. As such, this paragraph 
seeks to define what is meant by the term cross-border transfer and, in doing 
so, intends to provide insight into several cross-border transfer of 
undertakings scenarios. Obviously a cross-border transfer of undertaking 
requires some foreign element as otherwise the transfer would be purely 
domestic in nature. In general, a cross-border transfer of undertaking is 
bound to transpire whenever the transferor and transferee97 are governed by 
the laws of different States, whether this is a Member State of the EU, the 
EEA or a third country.98 In addition, the foreign element may lie in the 
location of the transferred undertaking after the transfer. Thus, either the 
person of the transferee or the location of the transferred undertaking may 
constitute the foreign element in a cross-border transfer of undertaking. 
Frequently, the two will coincide, i.e. the transferred undertaking will 
relocate to the country of the (foreign) transferee upon or immediately after 
the transfer. As such, a variety of cross-border transfer of undertakings 
situations can be distinguished:  
 
1. The undertaking to be transferred is situated in an EU Member State.  
By reason of the transfer this undertaking is transferred to a foreign 
transferee (governed by the laws of either a Member State of the EU, 
                                                          
97 The terms transferor and transferee are clearly defined by Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. Transferor means ‘any natural or legal person who, by reason of a 
transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), ceases to be the employer in respect of the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business’; ‘transferee’ means ‘any natural 
or legal person who, by reason of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), becomes the 
employer in respect of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business’ 
98 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 3. Here it is important not to confuse the law governing the transferor 
(and transferee) with the location of the undertaking to be transferred, as an undertaking 
governed by a particular law does not necessarily operate only businesses in the state of its lex 
societatis. As such a French transferor may e.g. transfer part of an undertaking situated in 
Spain to a Portuguese transferee.  
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the EEA or a third country). The location of the transferred 
undertaking does not change as a result of the transfer;  
2. The undertaking to be transferred is situated in an EU Member State. 
As a result of the transfer, this undertaking is relocated to a different 
EU Member State, most likely the Member State of the transferee. 
For the purposes of this research, this type of transfer shall be 
referred to as an intra-European transfer;  
3. The undertaking to be transferred is situated in an EU Member State. 
As a result of the transfer this undertaking will transfer and be 
relocated to a third state. This type of transfer will henceforth be 
referred to as an outbound transfer; 
4. The undertaking to be transferred is situated in a third state. As a 
result of the transfer this undertaking is transferred and relocated to 
an EU Member State. These types of transfer situations, involving a 
transfer of undertaking from a third state to a Member State will, for 
the purposes of this research be characterized as inbound transfers.  
 
2.1 Transfer without relocation 
In the first scenario, where the foreign element is simply to be found in the 
person of the transferee both the actual and legal position of the employees 
will remain virtually unaffected upon the transfer of undertaking. Since the 
transfer of undertaking is not accompanied by a cross-border relocation, the 
location of the transferred undertaking will not change as a result of the 
transfer. As such, the employees will continue their employment with the 
transferee on the exact terms and conditions99 and in the exact location as 
existed with the transferor. For instance, a Luxembourg’ company may 
decide to acquire a production business previously operated by a Dutch 
company in the Netherlands. In order to properly continue the transferor’s 
operations the Luxembourg’ company takes over the entire business, 
including tangible and intangible assets, such as machinery, plants and 
intellectual property, the client base and the majority of the workforce. After 
the transfer, the Luxembourg’ company continues the business’ operations at 
the exact location previously operated by the Dutch company. In this 
scenario there will be little to no change in the working conditions of the 
affected employees due to the nationality (or lex societatis) of the transferee. 
                                                          
99 Cf. Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
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In fact, the transfer of undertaking does not substantially differ from a 
transfer to a domestic transferee100; the transferred employees will continue 
their employment on the exact terms and conditions that existed with the 
transferor, this includes the location of the performance of their obligations 
towards their employer, i.e. their place of work. For the purposes of this 
research this type of transfer therefore holds a similar position as a purely 
domestic transfer. Surely, a transfer between a transferor and transferee who 
are located within different countries is encompassed by the definition of 
cross-border transfer of undertaking.101 However, due to the minimal effects 
of such a transfer on the affected employees (compared to a domestic 
transfer of undertaking), the term cross-border transfer of undertaking, for 
the purposes of this research, refers to a transfer that is accompanied by a 
cross-border relocation of the undertaking. 
 
2.2 Intra-European transfer 
The second scenario involves the so-called intra-European transfer of 
undertaking. In this scenario an undertaking is transferred from an EU 
Member State to another EU Member State. In other words, upon or 
immediately after the transfer, the transferred undertaking is relocated to 
another Member State, i.e. a Member State other than its state of origin. 
Thus, the laws of both the state of origin and the state of destination will 
possess national provisions transposing the Acquired Rights Directive and 
are consequently equipped with a provision effectuating a transfer of 
undertaking.  In these situations the transferor and transferee are likely to be 
governed by the laws of a Member State, this however is not a prerequisite 
for the classification as intra-European transfer of undertaking. The deciding 
factor for this category is that the undertaking is situated in a Member State 
both before and after the transfer, provided that the transfer is coupled with a 
cross-border relocation to another Member State. In this situation, where all 
relevant foreign elements are based in a Member State, the Acquired Rights 
Directive undisputedly applies. All that rests is assessing which national 
acquired rights regime(s) apply or applies to the whole or part of the transfer 
of undertaking as surely the nature of the directive prevents the Acquired 
Rights Directive from being directly applicable to individual actors within 
                                                          
100 Loritz 1987, p. 84. 
101 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 458; Junker 1992, p. 236 et seq. 
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the Member States.102 There exist several examples in the case law of the 
European Member States that deal with intra-European transfers of 
undertakings. For instance, in 2008 the Dutch Kantonrechter of Eindhoven 
determined that the transfer of production activities from SMC BV in the 
Netherlands to a member of the same corporate group: SMC NV in 
Hooghalen, Belgium constituted a transfer of undertaking within the 
meaning of the Dutch acquired rights provisions, i.e. Art. 7:662 et seq. 
BW.103 In assessing whether a transfer of undertaking took place the court 
noted that given the European law background of the Dutch acquired rights 
provisions the application of Belgian law would most likely provide the 
same legal framework.104 A similar assessment is made by the German 
Landesarbeitsgericht of Hamburg in a case involving the transfer of (part of 
a) press agency from Hamburg, Germany to an Irish subsidiary in Ireland.105 
According to the LAG the Acquired Rights Directive, in case of a transfer of 
an undertaking or part of an undertaking from a German based transferor to a 
legal entity in another Member State, guarantees a minimum level of 
protection for the affected employees. This includes (transfers to) Ireland.106 
However, since the Acquired Rights Directive only intends to effectuate 
partial and minimum harmonisation, there exist differences in the level of 
protection offered to the affected employees throughout the Member States. 
Several key concepts of the Acquired Rights Directive, such as the notion of 
employee, are defined by national law. As such, it may be that a particular 
employee is protected under the laws of the country of origin whereas such 
protection does not exist under the laws of the country of destination. In 
addition, the directive ensures that the rights and obligations arising from an 
employment contract or relationship on the date of the transfer shall transfer 
to the transferee by operation of law.107 To this end, differences remain as to 
                                                          
102 See Chapter 4. 
103 Ktr. Eindhoven (Vzngr.) 31 October 2008,  ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD2408., JAR 2008/271. 
104 Ktr. Eindhoven (Vzngr.) 31 October 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD2408, JAR 2008/271 , 
para. 3.3.4. 
105 LAG Hamburg, 22 May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03, BeckRS 2003 30459179. 
106 LAG Hamburg, 22 May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03, BeckRS 2003 30459179, 
Entscheidungsgründe I.5: What is interesting in this case is that the plaintiff (one of the 
affected employees) was willing to transfer to Ireland and contested the termination of his 
employment contract or relationship. 
107 Article 3(1) Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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what these rights and obligations encompass.108 Another example is the right 
of the affected employees to object to the transfer of their employment 
relationship. Although the ECJ has clearly established that the employees 
possess these rights, the effects of such an objection are to be determined by 
national law.109 Surely, legal diversity is an inevitable result of partial and 
minimum harmonisation. In intra-European transfer scenarios the Acquired 
Rights Directive ensures a minimum level of protection for the employees 
affected by the transfer. Whenever an undertaking is transferred from one 
Member State to another Member State the rights and obligations stemming 
from the existing employment contracts and relationships automatically 
transfer to the transferee, as a result of which the affected employees become 
employed by the transferee. Thus, in summary, in intra-European transfer 
situations, the Acquired Rights Directive applies without fail. An assessment 
of which national acquired rights provisions apply in specific situations, 
when an undertaking or part of a business or undertaking is transferred from 
one Member State to another, is however still required.110 From an employee 
perspective, an additional advantage111 of an intra-European transfer is that, 
due to the existence of a regulation on judicial cooperation, i.e. the Brussels I 
Recast112, the national acquired rights provisions appear easily enforced, 
especially compared to transfers of undertakings to a non-Member State 
transferee, involving a relocation to a non-Member State, a scenario that will 
be discussed in the following subparagraph.  
 
2.3 Outbound transfer  
The third scenario involves the transfer of an undertaking from an EU 
Member State to a non-EU Member State. In other words, under this 
scenario, an undertaking situated in a Member State is transferred and 
relocated to a non-Member State, popular examples of which are outsourcing 
                                                          
108 Cf. Thoelen 2015, No. 115.  
109 Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos 
Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paets & Co. 
Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-06577, ECLI:EU:1992:517, para 37. 
110 See Chapter 4. 
111 The first advantage being that the rights and obligations of the affected employees are 
without fault safeguarded in the event of an intra-European transfer of undertaking. 
112 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Recast) OJ [2012] L 31/1. 
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to India or China. There have been few documented cases involving a 
transfer of undertaking from a Member State country to a third state, i.e. a 
state outside the European Union.113 It has, on occasion, been argued that the 
Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts do not apply to the 
particular situation in which an undertaking, business or part of a business or 
undertaking is transferred outside the European Union as a result of the 
transfer.114 This argument, however, as will be demonstrated in paragraph 3, 
is contrary to the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. The directive 
applies ‘where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial  
scope of the Treaty’.115 As such, the directive applies to a transfer of 
undertaking between Member States and to third countries alike. The 
decisive factor in determining the territorial scope of the directive is the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred. Thus, if prior to the transfer 
(regardless of its destination upon relocation) the undertaking is situated 
within a European Member State the Acquired Rights Directive applies.116 In 
                                                          
113 See e.g.: BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 792/09 BeckRS 2011, 76553; Holis Metal Industries 
Limited v. (1) GMB (2) Newell Limited [2008] IRLR 187, Appeal No. 
UKEAT/0171/07/CEA;; Cass. soc., 5 avr. 1995, n° 93-42.690; Cour de Lyon, Ch. Soc. 11 
May 1993, Dr. Soc. 1993, p. 650; Cf. Cour de Cassation (Ch. Soc.) 23 October 1974, 
opinion : Lyon-Caen RDIP 1976,  p. 87 et seq. (where no outbound transfer was assumed). 
114 Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 59-61, 67, 68; UAPME 2007, p. 2; CMS report 2006, p. 68-69; 
Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 81, 88. 
115 Art. 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC).  
116 As such, outside the European Union there will exist different or no rules on transfers of 
undertakings. On occasion an automatic transfer of the rights and obligations stemming from 
the existing employment contract will be provided for in the laws of a non-Member State. For 
example, Switzerland in Article 333 OR (The current phrasing of Article 333 OR is modelled 
on Directive 77/187/EEC. After a negative public referendum regarding the accession to the 
European Economic Area, the wording of the original Article 333 OR was altered  as part of 
the so-called Swiss-Lex-Vorlage, entailing more consistency with EU law; Cf. Oesch 2012, p. 
17; Lorandi 2000). Similar automatic transfer rules appear to exist in Brazil, with regard to 
transfers within corporate groups and transfers by acquisition (Martinius 2005, p. 25; 
Brancher et al. 2015). South Africa also provides that the transferee automatically enters into 
the position of the transferor with respect of the employment contracts existing on the date of 
the transfer. Art. 197 of the Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge, which is modelled on European law, 
i.e. the Acquired Rights Directive,  requires the transfer of a business, trade or undertaking or 
part thereof as a going concern.116 If such a transfer has occurred, the transferee automatically 
takes the place of the transferor with regard to the employment contracts existing on the date 
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outbound transfer scenarios, the coming into existence of a transfer of 
undertaking does not fail on the basis of the territorial scope of the directive. 
It may be however that a transfer of undertaking does not arise due to the 
absence of other factors, such as the retention of identity.117 The case 
Vidéocolor118 before the Chambre Social of the French Cour de Cassation 
involved the transfer of part of an undertaking, located in Lyon, to Brazil. 
Vidéocolor was a company part of the corporate group Thomson Tubes et 
Displays, and as such involved in the fabrication and marketing of picture 
tubes and their components to be used in colour televisions. The company 
operated from two locations, one in Genlis and one in Lyon (both located in 
France). In order to remain competitive it decided to reduce costs via 
corporate restructuring; the facility in Lyon was closed and part of its 
activities were moved to Genlis whereas the other part was transferred to a 
factory in Belo Horizonte, Brazil belonging to another company within the 
Thomson group. Of the 318 employees in employment at the site in Lyon, 
274 were transferred abroad whereas 47 transferred to the remaining 
establishment in France.119 The success of a social plan set up for the 
employees was limited as some of them even refused to transfer to Genlis 
roughly 200 km away from Lyon.120 As such, the company proceeded to 
collective redundancies. The Cour de Cassation stated that the employment 
contracts did not transfer to the transferee. Its reasons underlying this 
decision are minimal and appear to be largely founded in the fact that the 
company moved abroad to a ‘different environment’: 
 
                                                                                                                                        
of the transfer.116 The rights and obligations existing between the transferor and the employee 
continue to exist between the transferee and the employee.116 
117 The issue of retention of identity will be addressed in paragraph 4. To this end it will be 
questioned ‘whether it is possible to for an entity to retain its identity when that entity moves 
from one country to another’.  
118 Cass. soc., 5 April 1995, n° 93-42.690; Cour de Lyon, Ch. Soc. 11 May 1993, Dr. Soc. 
1993, p. 650; Cf. Cour de Cassation (Ch. Soc.) 23 October 1974, opinion : G. Lyon-Caen, 
Revue critique de droit international privé 1976, p. 87 et seq.  
119 Cour de Lyon, Ch. Soc. 11 May 1993, Dr. Soc. 1993, p. 651. 
120 In this regard, it should be stated that the transfer to Genlis, merely involves a change in 
the place of employment, it does not constitute a transfer of undertaking within the meaning 
of the Acquired Rights Directive or L. 122-12 CC, since it does not involve a change in (the 
person of the) employer. Cf. Savatier 1993, p. 648. 
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‘Qu'en statuant ainsi, alors que l'établissement de Lyon de la société 
Thomson Tubes et Displays avait été fermé et que l'activité s'exerçait 
sur d'autres sites, notamment à l'étranger, dans un milieu différent, ce 
dont il résultait que les emplois y avaient été supprimés, (…).’121  
 
In this sense, employment is not merely characterized by the task to be 
accomplished but also by the environment in which the employment is 
carried out.122 On the basis of the case in Vidéocolor, even though this 
conclusion is not drawn by the Cour de Cassation itself, it has on occasion 
been presumed that if an undertaking is transferred abroad, to a different 
environment, the undertaking to be transferred may not be able to retain its 
identity.123 Still, it has been considered possible for a transferred undertaking 
to retain its identity upon a transfer to a non-Member State transferee and a 
non-Member State country. An outbound transfer was assumed in the case of 
Holis before the United Kingdom’s Employment Appeal Tribunal, which 
involved a transfer from the UK to Isreal. The track and pole part of a track, 
pole and blind manufacturing business of a UK company operating from 
Tamworth, UK, was transferred to an Israeli based company as well as 
relocated to Isreal. The 107 employees employed in the part of the business 
to be transferred were informed of the transfer to the transferee. They were 
notified that unless they wished and agreed to move to Israel they would be 
made redundant following the transfer due to the transfer of the operation to 
Israel. None of the affected employees moved to Israel, leaving them to be 
dismissed by the transferee shortly after the transfer. A claim was 
consequently made by an employee representative organization on behalf of 
the employees for an alleged breach of the duty to consort on the basis of 
regulation 13 of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006 (TUPE) and the collective redundancy consultation 
obligations contained in section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (the 1992 Act).  With respect to the 
                                                          
121 Here the Cour de Cassation simply states that the site in Lyon has been closed and its 
activities transferred to different sites, in particular abroad, to a different environment, 
resulting in the loss of employment.  
122 J. Savatier, ‘Délocalisations d’activités et cause réelle et sérieuse de licenciement’, Dr. 
Soc. 1993, p. 648. 
123 CMS Report 2006, p. 17; Cf. Veldmaat & van Assendelft de Coningh 2012, p. 26; IDS 
2011, p. 498.  
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applicability of Member State acquired rights provisions in outbound 
transfer situations, Judge Ansell argued that:  
 
‘Set against the purpose of protecting the rights of workers in the event 
of change of employer it seems to me that a purposeful approach 
requires that those employees should be protected even if the transfer is 
to be across borders outside the EU.’124       
 
The Tribunal recognized that the enforcement in situations involving 
outbound transfers may give rise to certain difficulties. However, Judge 
Ansell stated that ‘in these days of multi-national corporations and economic 
interdependency I would regard the issue of enforcement as less difficult 
then it used to be.’125 Still, where the undertaking is physically relocated 
from a Member State to a third country issues of enforcement within that 
third country will be determined by the private international law of that 
particular country. It is unlikely that there will exist a mutual trust in the 
legal systems of the countries involved akin to that existing in the European 
Union with regard to judicial cooperation.126 Nonetheless, the absence of 
such mutual trust does not, under application of the laws of a Member State, 
displace the employees’ legitimate interests in and entitlement to the 
continuation of the rights and obligations stemming from their employment 
relationship.        
 
2.5 Inbound transfer 
The last transfer scenario is that of the inbound transfer, involving the 
transfer from a third state to an EU Member State. As paragraph 3 will show, 
the Acquired Rights Directive does not apply to a transfer from a non-
Member State to a Member State since it requires the transferring 
undertaking to be situated within Member State territory prior to the transfer 
(i.e. the undertaking to be transferred needs to be situated within EU territory 
for the Acquired Rights Directive to apply). Surely, as the Acquired Rights 
Directive only intends to provide partial harmonization the Member States, 
                                                          
124 Holis Metal Industries Limited v. (1) GMB (2) Newell Limited [2008] IRLR 187, Appeal 
No. UKEAT/0171/07/CEA, para. 41, p. 26. 
125 Holis Metal Industries Limited v. (1) GMB (2) Newell Limited [2008] IRLR 187, Appeal 
No. UKEAT/0171/07/CEA, para. 43, p. 27. 
126 Cf. Weller 2015; Kramer 2013, p. 343-373. 
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per Article 8 of the Acquired Rights Directive, are free to introduce rules and 
regulations that are more favourable to the affected employees and are 
therefore fully allowed to expand the scope of their national acquired rights 
provisions to include inbound transfer scenarios. For example, by reason of 
Article 1(4) of the Spanish Estatuto de los Trabajadores127 it appears that the 
Spanish national acquired rights provision of Article 44 Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores may also apply to businesses of undertakings outside Spanish 
territory, belonging to Spanish undertakings.128 Article 1(4) provides that 
Spanish labour law applies to Spanish workers hired in Spain to work for 
Spanish companies abroad, subject to the public policy of the workplace. 
These workers at least possess the economic rights that correspond to work 
performed within Spanish territory. By extension, if part of a Spanish 
undertaking operating in a third state and employing Spanish employees 
hired in Spain is transferred to a European Member State, according to 
Spanish law, Spanish acquired rights provisions appear to apply. Thus, Spain 
has not explicitly extended the application of its national acquired rights 
provisions to inbound transfers, but rather applies Spanish labour law to 
Spanish workers engaged in businesses operating abroad and belonging to 
Spanish undertakings. To summarize, inbound transfer scenarios are beyond 
the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. As such, national acquired rights 
provisions do not apply to transfers of undertakings from a non-Member 
State to a Member State of the European Union. The Member States may, 
however, decide to extend the application of their national acquired rights 
provisions to include these types of transfers ensuring the preservation of 
employees rights upon a transfer of undertaking from a non-Member State to 
the Member State in question.  
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
For the purposes of this research, a transfer of undertaking qualifies as being 
cross-border in nature when it is accompanied by a cross-border relocation 
of the undertaking, be it by acquisition, merger, outsourcing or other form of 
cross-border corporate restructuring involving a change in the person 
responsible for carrying on the business. As demonstrated above, in 
                                                          
127 Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995, de 24 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido 
de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Vigente hasta el 01 de Enero de 2016).  
128 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 5-6. 
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paragraph 2.1, a transfer of undertaking between a transferee and transferor 
that are merely located in different countries falls outside the scope of the 
present research since these transfers without relocation do not substantially 
differ from domestic transfers of undertakings. Thus, in effect, the present 
research discusses three types of cross-border transfer scenarios, two of 
which are captured by the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts. The Acquired Rights Directive, due to its reliance on the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred, applies to intra-European 
transfers and outbound transfers alike. Conversely, inbound transfers are 
outside the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. The Member States are 
however free to extend the scope of their national acquired rights directive to 
include these types of transfers. Regardless of the transfer scenario that is 
utilised, it is for the conflict of laws to decide which law applies to a cross-
border transfer of undertaking. Since the Acquired Rights Directive, as is its 
nature, is not directly applicable to individual actors within the Member 
States, it befalls on the conflict of laws to determine which national acquired 
rights provisions apply in a given case, even in situations where the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is evident. As the next 
paragraph, and Chapters, will show, the directive itself may offer some 
assistance in this regard.   
  
 
3. Cross-border application of Acquired Rights provisions 
In applying the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts it 
has, on occasion, been suggested that the Acquired Rights Directive or the 
national implementation provisions do not apply in cross-border 
situations.129 This is a curious and erroneous assertion, since, as emphasized 
in the previous Chapter, the Acquired Rights Directive was originally 
established to counter the social problems arising from international mergers 
and concentrations arising from the creation of the Common Market.130 To 
this end, the European Commission in its explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the initial 1974 proposal for a directive on the ‘harmonisation 
of the legislation of Member States on the retention of the rights and 
                                                          
129 Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 88; Loritz 1987, p.84; Cf. Feudner 1999, p. 1184; Deinert 
2013, p. 11; Olbertz & Fahrig 2012, p. 2045. 
130 Also see Chapter 4, paragraph 2. 
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advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and 
amalgamations’ noted that the protection of worker’s rights is necessary 
whether the transfer of undertaking takes place ‘within the territory of one 
Member State or the territories of several Member States’.131 More so, the 
initial proposal for the Acquired Rights Directive was intended not only to 
cover transfers of undertakings carried out within and between the Member 
States, but also between the Member States and non-Member States.132 In its 
proposal however, the Community recognized that it would be unable to 
impose Community legislation on non-Member States and as such appeared 
to opt against application of the Acquired Rights Directive to third countries: 
 
‘From the point of view of territorial application it appears necessary to 
protect the rights of workers whether the changes under consideration 
take place within the territory of one Member State or the territories of 
several Member States. For the same reasons it appears necessary to 
extend Community protection for workers to include changes which 
occur in undertakings situated within the territory of one or more 
Member States or one or more non-Member States. For legal reasons, 
however, it is not possible to impose the planned Community rules on 
non-member countries.’133 
 
Still, according to Article 1 indent 2 of the 1974 proposal the directive was 
to apply to a transfer of undertaking ‘irrespective of whether such merger or 
takeover is effected between undertakings in the territory of one or more 
Member States or it is effected between undertakings in the territory of 
Member States and undertakings in third countries.’134 As such, the proposed 
directive was to apply whenever the transferor or transferee was situated 
within a European Member State.135 The amended proposal of 1975 again 
demonstrates the Commission’s awareness of the inability to impose 
                                                          
131 Proposal for a directive of the Council ‘harmonisation of the legislation of Member States 
on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers 
and amalgamations’, COM (74) 351 Final/2,  p. 5. 
132 Ghosheh & Gill 2002, p. 50. 
133 Proposal for a directive of the Council ‘harmonisation of the legislation of Member States 
on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers 
and amalgamations’, COM (74) 351 Final/2,  p. 5. 
134 COM (74) 351 Final/2,  p. 18. 
135 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 5. 
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Community legislation on non-Member States. As such the explanatory 
memorandum shows that the directive is only to apply ‘insofar as 
establishments or undertakings situated within the territory of the EEC are 
affected’ by a transfer of undertaking.136 As per Article 1(3) of the amended 
proposal the directive was to apply ‘where and insofar as the transferring or 
dependent undertaking is situated in the territory of the Member States of the 
European Economic Community or the transfer or concentration affects an 
undertaking within that territory involved in such a transaction.’137 
Consequently, the amended proposal of 1975 proposed an even wider 
territorial scope than its predecessor, i.e. the proposal of 1974. The effects of 
the transfer within the European Community were to be the decisive factor 
in applying the directive.138 As such, the travaux préparatoires, more 
specifically the initial drafts, of directive 77/187/EEC clearly show(s) that 
the directive is intended to apply in situations involving a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking. This application is even more evident from the 
conflict of laws provision included in the proposal of 1974. Article 10 of this 
proposal held a conflict of laws provision which undoubtedly ensured the 
application of the directive to cross-border transfers of undertakings.139 The 
final directive however,140 as well as the amending directive 98/50/EEC and 
consolidating directive 2001/23/EC, merely states that the directive is to 
apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the 
European Community. Thus, whereas the initial proposals for the Acquired 
Rights Directive made clear that the directive was to be applied in cross-
border situations, due to the insertion of (limited) conflict of laws provisions 
as well as an extended territorial scope, the present directive, i.e. directive 
2001/23/EC, does not explicitly secure its application to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings nor does it differentiate between domestic and 
cross-border transfers.141 More recent developments at a European level 
                                                          
136 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of the legislation of 
Member States on the safeguarding of employees’ right and advantages in the case of 
mergers, takeovers and amalgamations’, COM (75) 429 final, p. 6. 
137 COM (75) 429 final, p. 17. 
138 Hepple 1998, p. 5. 
139 COM (74) 351 Final/2. The conflict of laws provisions were dropped from later versions 
of the directive because of the envisaged Draft Regulation on the Conflict of Laws in 
Employment Matters OJ 1972, C 49/26.. For more on this issue see Chapter 4. 
140 Directive 77/187/EEC.  
141 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 4; Veldmaat & Van Assendelft de Coningh 2012, p. 52.  
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show that the European Commission does believe the Acquired Rights 
Directive to apply to cross-border transfers of undertakings. The 
Commission ordered a report on the consequences of cross-border transfers 
of undertakings, completed by Hepple in May 1998142 and more recently a 
similar study was completed by the law firm CMS.143 In 2007 the 
Commission launched a first phase consultation with a view to amending the 
Acquired Rights Directive in order to clarify its application to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings.144 Since the social partners believed the existing 
instruments of Community and private international law to adequately deal 
with issues concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings, the 
Commission, in 2008, decided to abandon its efforts to revise the directive in 
this regard.145 Nevertheless, the application of the Acquired Rights Directive 
to cross-border transfers of undertakings has not been disputed at a European 
level.  
 
3.1 Territorial scope of Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
The Acquired Rights Directive applies whenever the business to be 
transferred is located within EU territory prior to its transfer. Article 1(2) of 
the 2001 directive states that it ‘shall apply where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial  scope of the Treaty’.146 Thus, the application 
of the directive is entirely contingent on the geographical situation of the 
undertaking to be transferred. In order for the directive to apply, this 
undertaking or business needs to be situated within the territorial scope of 
                                                          
142 Hepple 1998. This study was commissioned by the Directorate-General V, Employment, 
Industrial Relations and Social Affairs of the European Commission.   
143 CMS Employment Practice Area Group, Study on the application of Directive 2001/23/EC 
to cross border transfer of undertakings [2006] Study No VT/2005/101. This report is 
financed by and prepared for the use of the European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Employment Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.  
144 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning cross-border transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses 
145 European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2008, p. 135. 
146 The term Treaty refers to the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/47. At the time of its adoption the term Treaty in Art. 1(2) 
Directive 2001/23/EC referred to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated version), OJ 2006 C, 321E. 
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the Treaty on European Union147 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, as defined in Article 52 TEU and Article 355 TFEU.148 As 
Herren der Verträge, the European Member States have the sole power to 
define the territory of the EU. As a rule of thumb, EU law governs the entire 
European territory of the Member States.149 The Acquired Rights Directive 
consequently applies whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within the European territory of the Member States. According to the 
European Commission, the location of the economic entity to be transferred 
on the date of the transfer, regardless of whether the transferor and the 
transferee are governed by the laws of the same Member State, is the only 
relevant criterion for determining the territorial applicability of the Acquired 
Rights Directive.150 Accordingly, transfers of undertakings from one 
Member State to another Member State as well as transfers from a Member 
State to a non-Member State are covered by the directive.151 The wording of 
Article 1(2), which subjects the application of the directive to the 
geographical location of the undertaking ‘to be transferred’152 suggests that 
the present directive has a similar effect as the 1974 proposal, which applied 
to a transfer of undertaking ‘irrespective of whether such merger or takeover 
                                                          
147 The Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) OJ [2008] C115/13. 
148 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the territorial scope of the Treaties is 
defined by Article 355 TFEU. The directive additionally applies throughout the European 
Economic Area, see Article 68 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ [1994] 
L 1, p. 3, Annex XVIII, no. 32d. 
149 There are however some exceptions to this notion. For the special position of the overseas 
territories, i.e. the outermost regions and the overseas countries and territories see: Kochenov 
2011; Kochenov 2009, p. 201; Case C-300/04 M.G. Eman and O.B. Sevinger v. College van 
burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-8055, ECLI:EU:C:2006:545.  
150 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, p. 1,  available online at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2442&langId=en>.  
151 Cf. Fetsch, 2002, p. 306; ETUC, ‘The first phase consultation concerning cross border 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses’, SP 8/10/2007 
[2007], available online at: 
<http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/ARD_ETUC_answer_final2007_1.pdf>; 
Niksova 2014, p. 61-62; Krebber 1998, p. 124; Krebber 1997, p. 322. 
152 Cf. CMS report 2006, p. 1, Contra: Francq 2007, p. 363 who believes that the ‘directive 
applies only when the transferee is situated in a Member State’ and that the situation ‘where 
the transferee is localized in a third State and the transferor is localized in a Member State, 
does not fall into its scope of application.’ 
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is effected between undertakings in the territory of one or more Member 
States or it is effected between undertakings in the territory of Member 
States and undertakings in third countries’, since it applies whenever the 
undertaking or business to be transferred is located within EU territories, 
irrespective of the destination of the transferred undertaking.153 To my mind, 
the wording of Article 1(2) is clear and unequivocal when it comes to the 
application of the directive to cross-border transfers of undertakings. It is 
apparent from Article 1(2), that, by seeking connection to the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred, the directive undisputedly applies to both 
intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios. This strokes with the aim of 
the directive, which is primarily to secure the rights and obligations of 
employees working in EU based undertakings upon the transfer of the 
undertaking in which they are employed. Since the employees cannot 
themselves assert any influence over the relocation of the undertaking of 
their employment and the destination of the undertaking after the transfer, 
the exclusion of outbound transfer scenarios is contrary to such aim. 
Employees that are employed by an undertaking that is transferred 
domestically or to another Member State are and should  be equally entitled 
to the protection of their employment as employees that are employed by an 
undertaking that is transferred to a third country. Still, there appears to be 
some discussion as to whether the directive applies to the latter situation, 
which involves an outbound transfer, i.e. a transfer of undertaking to a non-
Member State.154  
 
The discussion of whether the Acquired Rights Directive applies to 
outbound transfer scenarios exists due to the absence of an express provision 
classifying cross-border transfers of undertakings as falling within the remit 
of the Acquired Rights Directive. For example, in its response to the 
Commission’s first phase consultation, UAPME155 expressed its desire for a 
clarification of the present scope of the directive with respect to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings, by stating: 
 
                                                          
153 IDS 2011, p. 496; CMS report 2006, p. 1.  
154 Against such application: Niksova 2014, p. 57-61, 67, 68; UAPME 2007, p. 2; CMS report 
2006, p. 68-69; Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 81, 88.  
155 Union Européene de l ‘artisanat et des petites et moyennes entreprises.  
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“The current definition of cross border transfers is relatively unclear. 
The Commission has the tendency to amalgamate the cross border 
transfer of undertakings within the European Union and outside of the 
EU. A more precise delimitation of the scope and definition of cross 
border 
transfer of undertakings would be desirable.”156    
 
To this end, the CMS Employment Practice Area Group in its study for the 
Commission, notes that the Acquired Rights Directive undoubtedly applies 
to a transfer from one Member State to another, but (in their belief) does not 
apply to a transfer to a non-Member State.157 The present wording of Article 
1(2) of the directive contradicts this view by subjecting the application of the 
directive to the location of the undertaking or business to be transferred. The 
CMS group therefore suggests an amendment of the Acquired Rights 
Directive by either adding the phrase ‘provided that the undertaking is 
transferred within the territorial scope of the Treaty’ or ‘from one Member 
State to another’ or, alternatively, by restricting the application of the 
directive to ‘transfers within a particular Member State’s territory’.158 In the 
latter situation, which restricts the application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive to domestic transfers of undertakings, they believe that specific 
rules relating to cross-border transfers of undertakings should be drawn up. 
The reasoning underlying the view that the directive should not apply to 
outbound transfers, i.e. transfers out of the European Union, remains absent 
from the report, which is curious at best since the suggestion of such a 
fundamental change to the scope of the directive to my mind requires 
substantial justification. In general, the main reasons against the application 
of the Acquired Rights Directive in situations involving a transfer to a non-
Member State lie in the inability to impose European legislation on non-
Member States,159 an assertion that shows little knowledge and 
understanding of private international law. Surely, the Member States are 
obliged to transpose the directive into their national legislation whereas that 
                                                          
156 UAPME’s reply to the first phase consultation concerning cross border transfers of 
undertakings, p. 1. 
157 CMS report 2006, p. 68. 
158 CMS report 2006, p. 69. 
159 Niksova 2014, p. 60; Teyssié 2010, p. 257; Haanappel – van der Burg 2015, p. 294; 
Haanappel- van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9. 
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obligation does not rest upon non-Member States. However, by reason of 
private international law Member State law, i.e. the national implementation 
provisions corresponding to the directive, may still be applied to e.g. third-
state nationals, companies and those residing and domiciled in third states.  
The question of the enforcement of such law, which due to the absence of 
mutual trust and international enforcement treaties existing in relation to 
non-Member States may prove more difficult, should not be confused with 
the application of the law itself.  
 
Those favouring the limitation of the application of the provisions stemming 
from the Acquired Rights Directive to domestic and intra-European transfers 
infer additional arguments from the reasons for establishing the Acquired 
Rights Directive which rely heavily on the harmonization of Member State 
legislation and the results of economic changes within the Common 
Market.160 For instance, recital 2 of the Acquired Rights Directive states that 
‘economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both national and 
Community level, changes in the structure of undertakings, through transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses to other 
employers as a result of legal transfers or mergers’.161 By applying an 
extended interpretation of this recital, it is, on occasion, argued that the 
application of the directive is limited to transfers of undertakings within the 
Member States and from one Member State to another.162 The same goes for 
recital 4 which emphasizes that ‘differences still remain’ in the Member 
States as regards the extent of protection of employees in this respect and 
these differences should be reduced. Thus, in this view, since the directive 
was originally established to promote the harmonisation of the relevant 
national laws ensuring the safeguarding of the rights of employees, the 
directive only applies to European Member States and as such should not be 
applied to the transfer of undertakings that are not within EU territory after 
the transfer.163 To this end, it is sometimes argued that the wording ‘where 
and in so far as’ in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive requires the 
undertaking to be transferred to be located within ‘the territorial scope of the 
                                                          
160 Riesenhuber 2009, p. 409; Malmberg 2006, p. 389; Morvan 2004, p. 589; Kania 2012, 72-
73. 
161 Cf. Riesenhuber 2009, p. 409. 
162 Cf. Malmberg 2006, p. 389; Morvan 2004, p. 589; Kania 2012, p. 72-73. 
163 Cf. Recital 6 Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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Treaty’ both before and after the transfer.164 In this sense, the words ‘in so 
far as’ are interpreted as ‘as long as’,165 which to me resembles wishful 
thinking rather than an accurate interpretation of the wording.  According to 
this view, the location of the undertaking to be transferred both before and 
after the transfer is decisive. The nationality or location of transferee and 
transferor are immaterial; the directive will apply regardless as long as the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU territory both before and 
after the transfer. However, this view and interpretation of Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive are hardly convincing. Not only is this view 
incompatible with the etymology of the phrase, it is also at odds with the 
legislative history of the directive. The words ‘in so far as’ may well have 
been intended towards parts of businesses or undertakings, the transfer of 
which is expressly covered by the directive.166 In this sense the words ‘in so 
far as’ in Article 1(2) could be interpreted as meaning that parts of 
businesses or undertakings are only covered by the directive if they are 
situated within the territory of the European Union.167 Consequently, the 
transfer of parts of businesses or undertakings that are situated outside EU 
territory are outwith the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive, even if 
these parts of businesses or undertakings are part of a European based 
business or undertaking. This view is supported by earlier drafts of the 
directive. In commenting on the territorial scope of the 1974 proposal the 
Commission states that ‘for legal reasons, however, it is not possible to 
impose the planned Community rules on non-member countries. In such 
cases, therefore, Article 1 provides for the application of this proposed 
directive only in so far as undertakings situated within the territory of the 
Common Market are involved. This can be of practical importance first and 
foremost when undertakings or establishments in non-Member States are 
incorporated in undertakings situated in the Community.’168 Thus, it appears 
from legislative history that the words ‘in so far as’ in Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive169 were primarily intended to exclude parts of 
                                                          
164 Von Alvensleben 1992, p. 157; Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 59. 
165 Kania 2012, p. 74. 
166 See Article 1(1)(a) et seq. Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
167 This view is first portrayed by Kania:  Kania 2012, p. 74. 
168 COM (74) 351 Final/2, p. 5; Kania 2012, p. 74-75. 
169 The words first appeared in Article 1(2) of Directive 77/187/EEC. The wording of this 
provisions has not changed since its inception in 1977..  
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businesses or undertakings located outside the Common Market, but part of 
EU based businesses or undertakings, from the scope of the directive. 
Conversely, parts of businesses or undertakings that are situated in the 
territory of the European Union and that are part of or incorporated in non-
European based undertakings are covered by the provisions of the directive. 
As outlined above, this is in line with the primary aim of the directive which 
is to safeguard the rights of workers within the Common Market (upon a 
transfer of undertaking). To this end, its seems that employees that are 
employed by an undertaking that is transferred domestically or to another 
Member State are equally entitled to the protection of their employment as 
employees that are employed by an undertaking that is transferred to a third 
country. This is confirmed by the phraseology of Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, which ensures that the directive applies 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territorial 
scope of the Treaty, i.e. within the Member States of the European Union. It 
does not require the undertaking to be transferred to be located within EU 
territory after the transfer. Since the application of the directive is limited to 
the geographical location of the undertaking ‘to be transferred’ an extensive 
interpretation of the words ‘where and in so far as’, requiring the transferred 
undertaking to be situated within the EU territory after the transfer, is 
contrary to the meaning and wording of the directive.170 The nationality or 
location of transferee and transferor as well as the location of the transferred 
undertaking after the transfer are of no consequence to the application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. This view is shared by ETUC171 which, in its 
response to the first phase consultation concerning cross border transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, emphasizes 
that ‘Article 1.2 of the directive clearly extends the scope of the directive to 
transfers outside the EEA. The 'triggering' factor for the application of the 
Directive is the country where the transferor is situated.’172 Thus, the only 
                                                          
170 Cf. Hepple 2005, p. 175; ETUC, ‘The first phase consultation concerning cross border 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses’, SP 8/10/2007 
[2007], available online at: 
<http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/ARD_ETUC_answer_final2007_1.pdf>;  
Niksova 2014, p. 61-62; Krebber 1998, p. 124; Krebber 1997, p. 322; Fetsch 2002, p. 306.    
171 European Trade Union Confederation.  
172 ETUC, ‘The first phase consultation concerning cross border transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses’, SP 8/10/2007 [2007], available online at:  
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requirement is that the undertaking is situated in a Member State prior to the 
transfer. In outbound transfer scenarios, the fact that the third state, i.e. the 
country of destination, does not possess any acquired rights provisions 
similar to those of the Acquired Rights Directive does not prevent the 
directive and its national counterparts from requiring application.173    
 
In summary, the Acquired Rights Directive applies to cross-border transfers 
of undertakings even though the directive does not expressly secure its 
application to either domestic or cross-border matters. The directive, which 
was originally enacted in an effort to counter the problems arising from 
intra-Community mergers, takeovers and amalgamations aims ‘to protect 
employees from losing acquired and future rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings or amalgamations by introducing provisions affording 
protection and safeguards’ 174 irrespective of whether such a transfer takes 
place within or across Member State borders.  Even though the directive 
does not expressly provide that it applies to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings the wording of Article 1(2) is decisive in determining when the 
directive and, more so, its national counterparts are to be applied. In this, the 
directive determines its own territorial scope by stating that it applies ‘where 
and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business to be transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the 
Treaty.’ Limiting the application of national acquired rights provisions to 
purely domestic transfers of undertakings would contradict the wording of 
Article 1(2) as well as the aims and rationale of the Acquired Rights 
Directive as would a limitation of their application solely to intra-European 
transfers of undertakings. The arguments supporting these views are of little 
validity and should be rejected in light of the aforementioned wording, aim 
and rationale of the directive, if for no other reason than upholding these 
views would seriously deprive those employed within EU territory from 
retaining their acquired rights upon a transfer of undertaking. By reason of 
                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/ARD_ETUC_answer_final2007_1.pdf>; Cf. 
Krebber 1997, p. 322; Fetsch 2002, p. 306.      
173 Niksova 2014, p. 62; Krebber 1998, p. 124; Thoelen 2015, No. 114, who states that the 
fact that the transferee is located outside the territoral scope is irrelevant, even though the 
enforcement of the provisions of the Directive may prove difficult those situations. Also see: 
Chapter 4. 
174 COM (75) 429 final, p. 3. 
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the wording of Article 1(2), the directive applies whenever the undertaking 
to be transferred is situated within the territory of a Member State. The 
application of the directive is thus dependent on the geographical location of 
the undertaking to be transferred. This means that the directive applies to 
transfers within and between Member States as well as to transfers from a 
Member State to a non-Member State, securing that workers employed 
within EU territory retain their employment rights upon a transfer of 
undertaking irrespective of whether that transfer occurs domestically or 
beyond Member State borders. However, the directive, as is its nature does 
not possess horizontal direct effect and is therefore not directly applicable to 
private individuals within the Member States. It is the Member States that 
are required to transpose the provisions of the directive into their national 
legislation thus ensuring the application of its provisions to employers and 
employees.  
 
3.2 Member State implementation 
As stated above, since the Acquired Rights Directive is addressed to the 
Member States,175 they are required to transpose its provisions into their 
national legislation. As per Article 288 TFEU directives are binding upon 
each Member State to which they are addressed. It follows from this 
provision that the Member States are not necessarily required to achieve 
implementation via legislative action.176 However, where a directive is 
intended to create rights for individuals the legal position arising from 
national implementation must be sufficiently precise and clear and the 
persons concerned must be fully aware of their rights and afforded the 
possibility of relying on them before the national courts.177 In addition, the 
Member States must guarantee the application and effectiveness of the 
provisions of the directive by taking effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalty measures, analogous to those applicable to infringements of national 
                                                          
175 Article 14 Directive 2001/23/EC. The Member States of the EU and the EEA are required 
to transpose the Directive into their national law.  
176 Case 29/84 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
[1985] ECR 1661, para. 23. 
177 Case 29/84 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
[1985] ECR 1661, para. 23. 
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law of a similar nature and importance.178 Since a directive, such as the 
Acquired Rights Directive, is not equipped with horizontal direct effect, 
private individuals are unable to rely directly on the provisions of the 
directive against other individuals.179 When a Member State has failed to 
(properly) transpose the provisions of a directive, individuals may rely on 
the doctrine of directive-compliant interpretation. This doctrine, developed 
by the European Court of Justice, requires national courts to interpret 
national law in light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve the result pursued by the directive.180 However, such directive-
compliant interpretation cannot go so far as to impose obligations on 
individuals in the absence of proper implementation in national law.181  
 
Since the Member States are required to transpose the provisions of the 
directive into their national legislation such implementation requirement 
(also) extends to Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive. Although the 
Member States are not necessarily required to transpose the provisions of the 
directive via legislative action, transferee, transferor and the affected 
employees must be aware of their rights and should therefore know or be 
able to determine when a transfer of undertaking takes effect. As such, it is 
important to establish the territorial scope of the national provisions 
implementing the Acquired Rights Directive. The directive, in Article 1(2), 
merely states that the directive applies ‘where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’. As such, it only states 
                                                          
178 Case C-382/92, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Nothern Ireland, [1994] ECR I 2435, para. 55; this case involved the UK’s failure 
to properly implement the (provisions of) the Acquired Rights Directive.  
179 Via the doctrine of direct effect private individuals are allowed to invoke the provisions of 
a directive against a State or a State body, provided that the provisions of the directive are 
unconditional and sufficiently precise and the state has failed to implement the directive in 
national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it fails to implement the directive 
correctly: Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
180 Case 14/84 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] 
ECR 1891, para. 26; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-456/98 Centrosteel Srl v 
Adipol GmbH [2000] ECR I 6019, para. 38. 
181 Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-456/98 Centrosteel Srl v Adipol GmbH 
[2000] ECR I 6018, para. 35. 
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when it itself applies and remains silent on the territorial scope of the 
national implementation provisions. There are essentially two views on how 
Article 1(2) should be translated into national law: either the scope set forth 
in the directive is equally applied to national law or the provision requires 
national law to apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is located 
within national territory.  
 
According to the first view, the territorial scope of Article 1(2) forms a 
requirement for application of national legislation that is to be applied 
second to resolving the conflict of laws.182 In this sense, Article 1(2) is 
interpreted as a rule without any direct conflict of laws implications.183 
According to this first view, the conflict of laws is to determine which 
national implementation measures are to be applied and as such takes 
precedence over the substantive provisions of the directive and national law, 
including Article 1(2).184 As per the second view the territorial scope of the 
directive translates to the Member States applying their national acquired 
rights provisions whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within their distinct territory. If all Member States were to adhere to this 
view the combined national implementation measures of the Member States 
would ensure the application of the directive ‘where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’. Regardless of which 
view should take precedence, the Member States have to take into account 
                                                          
182 Cf. Kania 2012, p. 76-77. 
183 Niksova 2014, p. 68. 
184 By contrast, it is sometimes argued that Article 1(2) of the Directive should not be overrun 
by rules of private international law (See Krebber 1998, p. 124, 139 and 161, Niksova 2014, 
p. 62, 66, Fetsch 2002, p. 306). Thus, when the result of the conflict of laws reference 
conflicts with the territorial scope of the directive and as such with European law, the 
domestic conflict of laws should not be applied due to the primacy or supremacy of European 
law. Here it is argued that if, for instance a choice is made for subsuming the transfer of 
undertaking to the law that applies to the individual employment contract, a correction should 
be made where this law is not the law of a European Member State and as such does not 
conform to Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive. In this sense, Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive does appear to possess some conflict of laws implications, a view 
which is akin to the second view on the implementation of Article 1(2) into national 
legislation. For more on the conflict of laws and the proper conflict of laws approach in 
relation to transfers of undertakings see Chapter 4.  
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the scope of the directive in their implementation as well as in the 
interpretation of national acquired rights provisions.185 The directive itself 
limits its application to the undertaking to be transferred being situated 
within EU territory and remains silent on the actual application of national 
acquired rights provisions. What is clear from Article 1(2) is that the laws of 
a Member State have to be applied whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within the territory of the European Union.186 In other 
words, even though the directive does not expressly state when, in cross-
border situations, the acquired rights provisions of a specific Member State 
shall apply, it does set forth that whenever the undertaking to be transferred 
is situated within EU territory, the directive and thus the national laws of a 
Member State should apply.187 Although the directive seeks to ensure that 
the rights of employees are safeguarded upon the transfer of an undertaking 
that is situated within EU territory prior to the transfer it does not provide 
according to which national transposition measures the safeguarding of these 
rights is to be guaranteed. In this, it appears that the aim of Article 1(2) of 
the directive is to achieve the substantive result of the retention of 
employment rights throughout Europe rather than to solve issues of 
conflicting laws. Despite the various views and ideas on the relationship 
between Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive and the conflict of 
laws,188 the Member States have to take into account the territorial scope 
contained in Article 1(2) in the implementation of the provisions of the 
directive as well as in the interpretation of existing national implementation 
measures. They therefore have to ensure that in cross-border transfer 
scenarios Member State acquired rights provisions are applied whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU territory upon or 
immediately prior to the transfer. The directive remains silent on the method 
by which this is to be secured.189 The fact that the directive itself contains no 
                                                          
185 Kania 2012, p. 77. 
186 Under this view, the directive is considered to contain an implicit preset for the conflict of 
laws. To this end, it has even been stated that Article 1(2) contains a Community conflict of 
laws provision (Cf. Kania 2012, p. 218; Schilling 2006, p. 56.  
187 Cf. Wimmer 1995, p. 207, 208;  Niksova 2014, p. 67; Fetsch 2002, p. 307; Cf. Müller 
2005, p. 396-397. 
188 For more on this see Chapter 4.  
189 On the basis of the principle of loyalty, enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, although 
subordinate to Article 288 TFEU, the Member States should not only transpose the provisions 
of the directive but take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the aims and 
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direct conflict of laws provisions leaves it to the private international law of 
the Member States to determine the law that applies to a given transfer of 
undertaking, an issue that is further addressed in Chapter 4. As such, even 
though this does not directly follow from the scope rule contained in Article 
1(2) of the directive, the Member States are surely free to make the 
application of the national acquired rights provisions contingent on the 
transferred undertaking being located within their territory prior to the 
transfer as long as this does not conflict with Article 1(2).190 Irrespective of 
the preferred territorial application of the Acquired Rights Directive, the 
Member States have not all transposed Article 1(2) of the directive in a 
similar manner. In fact, there are different approaches to the implementation 
of Article 1(2) throughout the Member States. The national transposition 
measures can generally be divided into three categories:  
 
1. those whose legislation contains no express mention of its 
territorial application;  
2. those that have explicitly limited the application of their national 
acquired rights provisions to undertakings to be transferred 
situated within their (own) territory and  
3. those that have literally transposed Article 1(2) of the directive 
into national legislation.  
 
3.2.1 Group 1 – no express territorial application 
The majority of the European Member States are part of the first group, 
which includes five out of six of the founding Member States to the 
European Communities, i.e. the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and 
Belgium.191 These Member States have either transposed the (larger part) of 
                                                                                                                                        
obligations stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive. For detailed considerations on the 
principle of loyalty in EU law, see: Klamert 2014.       
190 The absence of any conflict of laws provisions in the directive itself and other international 
and Community private international law instruments (In my belief a transfer of undertaking 
and the provisions corresponding to those of the Acquired Rights Directive are outwith the 
scope of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention as a transfer of undertaking occurs 
by operation of law rather than being contractual in nature)  means that the determination of 
the law that applies to a cross-border transfer of undertaking befalls the (domestic) private 
international law of the Member States.  
191 In addition Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden. Spain partly belongs to this group as it, in Art. 1(4) 
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the directive into their civil codes or labour codes or have issued a separate 
law pertaining to the transfer of undertakings. Although the perceived 
territorial scope of the national implementation provisions of the Member 
States in the first group may vary, the common denominator lies in the 
absence of any express provisions regarding the territorial scope of national 
acquired rights provisions. In other words, the members of the first group 
have conjointly failed to expressly implement Article 1(2) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive into their national legislation.   
 
The members of the first group are required to apply the so-called directive-
compliant interpretation by reason of the lack of an express provision 
regarding the territorial scope of their national acquired rights provisions. As 
mentioned above, the Member States are free not to achieve implementation 
via legislative action. However, where they choose to do so, transferee, 
transferor and the affected employees must be able to easily determine when 
a transfer of undertaking occurs in order to determine their legal position. 
After all, the application of the national acquired rights provisions is not 
spontaneously limited to any distinct territory. Thus, the Member States of 
the first group have to actively ensure that Article 1(2) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive is properly applied and transposed. In any event, they will 
have to ensure, possibly via directive-compliant interpretation, that a 
Member State’s national acquired rights provisions are applied whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU territory prior to the 
transfer. If their acquired rights provisions are not naturally applied in the 
aforementioned event, the Member States and national courts will have to 
apply directive-compliant interpretation to ensure compliance with the 
Acquired Rights Directive. Thus, for example, in the so-called 
Amerikanische Piloten-case192 in which the German Bundesarbeitsgericht 
famously ruled against the application of §613a BGB as overriding 
mandatory rule, the German acquired rights provisions should have been 
applied irrespective of the affected employees’ employment contract being 
subject to the laws of New York. The case involved the transfer of a Berlin 
                                                                                                                                        
Estatuto de los Trabajadores extends the application of  Spanish labour law to Spanish 
workers hired in Spain and engaged abroad by undertakings belonging to Spanish businesses. 
No additional mention of the territorial scope of Spanish acquired rights provisions is made.  
192 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
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based aviation business, involved in domestic German air travel, from Pan 
American World Airways to Berliner Lufthansa Airport. In this case, the 
BAG193 concluded that neither §613a BGB nor the national acquired rights 
provisions of another Member State were applicable, even though the 
undertaking transferred was situated in Germany both before and after the 
transfer.194 The ruling in this case abundantly conflicts with Article 1(2) of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, according to which the national acquired 
rights provisions of a Member State should always apply whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated in EU territory. Therefore the BAG 
should have utilized a directive-compliant interpretation ensuring the 
application of Article §613a BGB, irrespective of the employment contract 
being governed by the laws of the State of New York both by reason of 
choice of law and as applicable law in the absence of choice (due to the law 
of the habitual place of employment being set aside by reason of the 
circumstances of the case making the contract more closely connected with 
the State of New York). Surely, the result of the conflict of laws reference 
(in this case connection is sought to the employment contract) should not be 
able to set aside the mandatory provisions arising from the Acquired Rights 
Directive. A fortiori, Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive holds an 
inherent conflict of laws implication that national acquired rights provisions 
are to apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the 
territory of a Member State. As a result, national transposition measures 
should undoubtedly ensure the application of the laws of a Member State 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of 
the European Union. Where national implementation measures fail to do so, 
a conflict with Community law, i.e. Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, arises.195 This failure to properly implement the directive may be 
remedied first by legislative action and second by directive-compliant 
interpretation. In any event, where, upon the transfer of an EU based 
undertaking, application of Member State acquired rights provisions is not 
                                                          
193 This conclusion was based on Articles 30 and 34 EGBGB (the German provisions 
transposing Articles 6 and 7 of the Rome Convention 1980). 
194 BAG 29 October1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
195 Krebber 1998, p. 140; Fetsch 2002, p. 307. 
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guaranteed, a correction of the result of the conflict of laws reference should 
come to pass.196  
 
3.2.2 Group 2 – limitation to national territory 
Luxembourg, Malta, the United Kingdom and Romania197 belong to the 
second category and have limited the application of their national acquired 
rights provisions to their own territory. According to Article 3(1)(a) of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006198 
the United Kingdom’s acquired rights provisions, commonly known as 
TUPE, apply to ‘a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer in the 
United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an economic 
entity which retains its identity.’ This provision does not limit the 
application of TUPE to employees ordinarily employed in the United 
Kingdom. It is the location of the business or undertaking to be transferred 
that is decisive, not the place of employment of the employees engaged by 
that business or undertaking. ‘For example, if there is a transfer of a UK 
exporting business, the fact that the sales force spends the majority of its 
working week outside the UK will not prevent the Regulations applying to 
the transfer, so long as the undertaking itself (comprising, amongst other 
things, premises, assets, fixtures & fittings, goodwill as well as employees) 
is situated in the UK.’199 Article L127-1(2) of the Luxembourg Code de 
Travail contains a provision similar to that of the United Kingdom, which 
                                                          
196 Such correction mechanisms can generally be found in the doctrines of public policy and 
overriding mandatory rules. For more on this and the relation of these mechanisms to the 
transfer of undertakings see Chapter 4, paragraph 6. 
197 Art. 2 Law No. 67/2006, which states that the law applies to the transfer of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses located within Romanian territory; Olteanu 
& Kühl 2007, p. 295. 
198 As amended by the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. 
199 This example is provided by the UK’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills upon 
the review and amendment of TUPE 2006: BIS, ‘Employment Rights on the Transfer of an 
Undertaking. A guide to the 2006 TUPE Regulations (as amended by the Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2014) for employees, employers and representatives’, London: January 2014, p. 
13, available online at :  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/275252/bis-
14-502-employment-rights-on-the-transfer-of-an-undertaking.pdf> . 
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reads: ‘Le présent chapitre s’applique chaque fois que l’entreprise, 
l’établissement ou la partie d’entreprise ou d’établissement à transférer se 
situe sur le territoire national du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.’ Likewise, 
Article Article 3(1)(d) of the Maltese Transfer of Business (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations limits the application of the Maltese acquired 
rights provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being situated in 
Malta.200 Article 2 of Law No. 67/2006 confines the application of the 
Romanian acquired rights provisions to transfers of undertakings, businesses 
or parts thereof located in Romania, which may suggests a slightly wider 
territorial scope than the provisions in force in the United Kingdom, Malta 
and Luxembourg.201 
 
The members of the second group have limited the application of their 
national acquired rights provisions to the undertaking being transferred being 
situated within their territory. As a result, it has on occasion been stated that 
these Member States fail to comply with Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive by not equating the scope of national acquired rights provisions to 
that of the Acquired Rights Directive.202 However, Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive clearly states that the provisions of the directive 
‘shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial 
                                                          
200 Article 3(1) of the Transfer of Business (Protection of Employment) Regulations  reads: 
‘where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
transferred is situated in Malta.’ 
201 Article 2 Law No. 67/2006 reads: ‘Prevederile prezentei legi se aplică transferului de 
întreprinderi, unităţi sau părţi aacestora situate pe teritoriul României, indiferent de natura 
capitalului social.’ A literal reading of this provisions suggests that the Romanian acquired 
rights provisions are broader, or even narrower, in scope than the provisions existing in 
Luxembourg, Malta and the United Kingdom, since the Romanian legislator has limited the 
application of the Romanian acquired rights provisions, not merely to the undertaking to be 
transferred being situated in Romania, but to undertakings, businesses or parts thereof located 
in Romania. Unclear is whether Romanian legislation therefore also covers transfers of 
undertakings that are situated in Romania after the transfer (which would suggest a wider 
scope) or requires the transferred undertaking to be located in Romania both before and after 
the transfer (which would suggest a narrower scope).  
202 McMullen 2005, p. 298; Laagland 2011, p. 19, who commenting on the acquired rights 
provisions of the UK suggests that TUPE applies whenever the transferred undertaking is 
situated in the United Kingdom, while surely meaning that the undertaking to be transferred 
has to be situated within the United Kingdom for TUPE to apply.   
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scope of the Treaty’. This territorial scope could surely translate to the 
Member States applying their national acquired rights provisions where and 
insofar as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to 
be transferred is situated within their territory. As stated above, the 
‘territorial scope of the Treaty’ mainly comprises the combined European 
territory of the EU Member States and as such, the territory of the European 
Union forms the sum of its constituent parts. Thus, if each Member State 
were to apply its national acquired rights provisions whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is located within its territory, the combined 
application of the national acquired rights provisions of the European 
Member States will comprise the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights 
Directive itself. In other words, the proper application of Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive is ensured by the European Member States 
limiting the application of their national acquired rights provisions to the 
undertaking being transferred being located within their territory. Surely, the 
individual European Member States are unable to apply their national 
legislation outside their national borders, save for the situations where the 
conflict of laws, in international situations, points to the application of their 
law(s), to the same extent as the European Union is unable to impose 
Community legislation on non-Member States. Limiting the application of 
national acquired rights provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being 
located within the territory of the Member State in question will certainly 
result in the protection of employees involved in outbound transfers only, i.e. 
transfers from the Member State in question to another state. Building on the 
example of the United Kingdom, this means that a business transfer from the 
United Kingdom to a country outside the United Kingdom, whether an EU 
Member State or a third country will result in the application of the TUPE 
Regulations. In the reverse situation, involving an inbound transfer, i.e. 
where the business being transferred is transferred to the UK, the provisions 
of TUPE will not protect the affected employees.203 This situation is not 
irreconcilable with Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive since in the 
event of an inbound transfer under which a business or undertaking is 
transferred from a Member State to the United Kingdom, the national 
acquired rights provisions of the Member State of origin could apply, 
resulting in compliance with the Acquired Rights Directive. In summary, 
                                                          
203 McMullen 2005, p. 298-299. 
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although the territorial scope contained in Article 1(2) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive does not require the Member States to limit the application 
of their national implementation measures whenever the undertaking, 
business or part of an undertaking of business to be transferred is located 
within their territory, it neither precludes the Member States from doing so. 
As such, the national acquired rights provisions may take the form of a 
unilateral scope rule in the sense that the application of the national acquired 
rights provisions is dependent on the geographical location of the 
undertaking within the Member State concerned. Thus, in the example of the 
United Kingdom, its acquired rights provisions, which apply to a transfer of 
an undertaking situated immediately before the transfer in the United 
Kingdom, remain unapplied when, for example, a Dutch undertaking, 
situated in the Netherlands, is transferred from a Dutch transferor to an 
English transferee coupled with a simultaneous relocation to the United 
Kingdom. Article 3(1)(a) of the UK’s TUPE Regulations unilaterally sets 
forth when the Regulations themselves apply and remains silent on the 
application of foreign law. If the law applicable to such a transfer, from the 
Netherlands to the United Kingdom, is to be determined by the English 
court, it will have to decide, on the basis of its own rules of private 
international law, which law applies to the transfer of undertaking. It is 
unclear which law, according to English private international law, applies to 
a transfer of undertaking in the absence of the TUPE regulations being 
applicable. What is clear however, that in these circumstances the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within Member State territory prior 
to the transfer, thus requiring the application of the laws of a Member State, 
i.e. national implementation measures corresponding to the provisions of the 
directive. In the aforementioned example, Article 1(2) does not require the 
UK to apply its own implementation measures, rather Article 1(2) requires 
the application of Member State implementation measures irrespective of the 
method through which this is achieved. Thus, the provisions of the Member 
States of the second group, which have limited the application of national 
law to the undertaking to be transferred being situated within national 
territory is not incompatible with the directive as long as Member State 
acquired rights provisions are applied whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within EU territory.204 
                                                          
204 Cf. Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive. 
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3.2.3 Group 3 – no limitation to national territory 
The third group consists of Denmark205 and Greece. These countries have 
(almost literally) transposed Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
into their national legislation. According to Danish law the Danish law 
transposing the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive applies to the 
transfer of a business or part thereof whenever it is situated within the area to 
which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Area is applied. 
Greece, in Article 2(2) of Presidential Decree 178/2002,206 has literally 
transposed Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive by providing: ‘This 
decree shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of 
the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial 
scope of the Treaty.’   
 
As mentioned above, the third group, consisting of Denmark and Greece, 
limits the application of their national acquired rights provisions to the 
undertaking to be transferred being situated within the territorial scope of the 
Treaty207 or to the transfer of an undertaking whenever it is situated within 
the area to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Area is 
applied.208 By doing so, the members of the third group, in all appearances, 
comply with the Acquired Rights Directive and Article 1(2) contained 
therein. When compared to the implementation measures undertaken by the 
members of the second group, the application of Danish and Greek acquired 
rights provisions appears broader in nature. If a literal application of the 
scope rule in Article 1(2) is utilised to apply national legislation, which is the 
case in Greece, national acquired rights provisions will be applied whenever 
the undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU territory and the case 
falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State concerned. 
Thus, if Greek courts were to rule on a transfer of undertaking, Presidential 
Decree 178/2002 could apply even in situations where the undertaking to be 
                                                          
205 As per §1 of the Danish Virksomhedsoverdragelsesloven:  ‘ Loven finder anvendelse ved 
overdragelse af en virksomhed eller en del heraf, der ligger inden for det område, hvor 
traktaten om oprettelse af Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab finder anvendelse.’ 
206 ´Το παρόν διάταγμα εφαρμόζεται όταν και εφόσον η μεταβιβαστέα επιχείρηση, ή 
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transferred is not situated within Greek territory immediately prior to the 
transfer, for instance in situations where the Greek courts have obtained 
jurisdiction on the basis of the domicile of the employee or that of the 
transferee.209 A literal interpretation of the Danish transposition of Article 
1(2) suggests an even wider scope since it applies to the transfer of an 
undertaking whenever it is situated within the area to which the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Area applies. Since §1 of the Danish 
Virksomhedsoverdragelsesloven does not limit the application of Danish law 
to the geographical location of the undertaking to be transferred, it appears 
that Danish acquired rights provisions might also apply to the transfer of 
undertakings that are situated within the area to which the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Area applies after the transfer. As such, 
inbound transfers, i.e. transfers from a non-Member State to a Member State 
of the European Union or the European Economic Area might also become 
covered by the Danish acquired rights provisions. Utilising an extended 
territorial scope by applying national acquired rights provisions to transfers 
of undertakings from non-Member States to European Member States is 
surely permitted by the directive, which in Article 8 allows the Member 
States to ‘to apply or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
which are more favourable to employees’. Nonetheless, the differences in 
the (perceived) territorial scope of national acquired rights provisions may 
result in different national laws applying in different Member States. This, to 
some extent, negates the primary purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive 
which is to harmonise the laws of the Member States in order to safeguard 
the rights of employees upon a transfer of undertaking.  
           
3.3 Concluding remarks 
The primary purpose of this paragraph has been to determine whether the 
Acquired Rights Directive and the national provisions transposing the 
                                                          
209 This may not be a problem in situations involving the minimum protection afforded by the 
directive. After all, the directive seeks to ensure a minimum level of employment protection 
throughout the European Union. In order to achieve the application of such minimum 
standards it may not matter through which national implementation measures the minimum 
level of employment protection is secured. If becomes difficult however in situations where 
the laws of the Member States exceed the minimum protection offered by the directive. As 
such, where a Member State offers more or additional protection it becomes important to 
establish which Member State provisions are to apply in a given case.  
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directive apply in situations surpassing national borders. Although the 
applicability of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts 
to cross-border transfers of undertakings has been debated at times it is now 
widely accepted that the directive and national acquired rights provisions 
apply in cross-border situations. The notion that these provisions are limited 
to domestic situations by reason of the territorial application of domestic law 
or because of the practical difficulties arising from a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, has been defeated.  By virtue of an express scope rule in Article 
1(2) the Acquired Rights Directive applies ‘where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’. This means that the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred is decisive in determining when 
the directive and its national counterparts apply. What is clear from the 
wording of the directive is that it applies to transfers from one European 
Member State to another as well as transfers from a European Member State 
to a non-Member State. As such, the directive ensures that the rights of 
employees employed by an undertaking based in the EU are safeguarded 
whenever there is a change in the person of their employer by reason of a 
transfer of undertaking, irrespective of whether the undertaking is transferred 
to a foreign or domestic transferee or is coupled with a simultaneous 
relocation abroad. Although, the case law on cross-border transfers of 
undertakings is limited, the cross-border application of national acquired 
rights provisions has been confirmed by the jurisprudence of several 
Member States. Cross-border transfers of undertakings have, for example, 
been established in cases involving a transfer from e.g. the Netherlands to 
Belgium,210 Germany211 and France212; from Germany to France,213 Ireland214 
and Switzerland215 and from the United Kingdom to Isreal.216  
                                                          
210 Rb. Den Haag 26 August 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:9988; Ktr. Eindhoven 9 
September 2008, JAR 2008/271.  
211 Hof ’s Hertogenbosch 6 September 2016, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2016:4043. 
212 Ktr. Zaandam (Vzr.) 26 July 2007, JAR 2008/67.  
213 Cass. soc. 28 March 2006 n°03-43995; Cass. soc. 13 April 1999 RJS 1999, n°794 ; BAG 
20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88.  
214 LAG Hamburg, 22 May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03, BeckRS 2003 30459179. 
215 BAG 26 May 2011 8 AZR 37/10; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 December 2009 22 Sa 
45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 14 Ca 515/08.  
216 Holis Metal Industries Limited v. (1) GMB (2) Newell Limited [2008] IRLR 187, Appeal 
No. UKEAT/0171/07/CEA.  
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Whereas cross-border transfers of undertakings undisputedly fall within the 
remit of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts, the 
territorial application of national acquired rights provisions appears to differ 
among the Member States. In this, three modes of implementation can be 
distinguished: no express implementation, translation to national territory 
and literal implementation. Although either of these implementation 
measures could, if applied uniformly, in principle, fulfill the territorial scope 
of the Acquired Rights Directive, the existence of different approaches 
throughout the Member States is likely to result in issues of conflicting laws. 
After all, the differences in the (perceived) territorial scope of national 
acquired rights provisions may result in different national laws applying in 
different Member States, negating, to some extent, the harmonizing efforts 
of the Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
 
4.  Additional definitions 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive seeks to protect the employees affected 
by a transfer of undertaking, it is important to establish who qualifies as an 
employee under the directive, in other words it is important to confirm the 
application ratione personae of the Acquired Rights Directive. On the basis 
of Article 2(1)(d) Acquired Rights Directive an employee means ‘any person 
who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an employee under 
national employment law’. This provision, which forms a codification of the 
ECJ’s flagship case in Danmols Inventar,217 leaves the personal scope of the 
directive to be resolved by the national laws of the Member States. As such, 
despite a communitaurised definition of worker existing under the rights on 
free movement of workers,218 the notion of employee under the Acquired 
Rights Directive is to be defined by the Member States themselves.219 This is 
underlined by Article 2(2) Acquired Rights Directive which clarifies that the 
directive will not prejudice national law where it concerns the definition of 
employment contract or relationship. In Danmols Inventar, after considering 
that the Acquired Rights Directive only intends to effectuate partial 
                                                          
217 Case 105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar [1985] ECR 
2639, ECLI:EU:C:1985:331. 
218 Cf. Article 45 TEU.  
219 This view is opposed by Amandine Garde, who believes that the comminitaurised 
definition of workers under Art. 39 EC Treaty (now Art. 45 TEU) should equally apply within 
the Acquired Rights Directive: Garde 2004, p. 188. 
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harmonisation and that it does not aim to establish a uniform Community 
level of protection on the basis of common criteria, the Court held:  
 
‘It follows that the directive may be relied upon only by persons who are, in 
one way or another, protected as employees under the laws of the Member 
State concerned.’220  
 
As a result, employees are those who are protected as such under the laws of 
the Member State concerned.  Although this phraseology may appear broad 
in the sense that the directive applies to all those who in one way or another 
are protected as employees, the actual protection of employees is fully 
dependent on national law, with the sole reservation that Member States are 
not allowed to exclude employment contracts or relationships solely because 
of the number of working hours performed, the duration of the contract or 
the fact that it concerns temporary employment relationships within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/383/EEC.221 Leaving the concept of 
employee to be defined by national law may seem undesirable in light of the 
differences in national application of acquired rights provisions that will 
inevitably arise as a result.222 In cross-border transfer scenarios, the 
differences in employee definitions may therefore result in issues of 
conflicting laws, e.g. by the laws in force at the country of origin protecting 
a certain employee, who is deprived of any protection under the laws in 
force at the country of destination and vice versa. A uniform level of 
employment protection throughout the European Union effectuated by 
establishing a broad communitaurised definition of the notion of employee 
should therefore be preferred, especially in light of the Community 
definition existing for other concepts within the Acquired Rights Directive, 
such as ‘legal transfer’223 and ‘undertaking’.224  
                                                          
220 C‑105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar  [1985] ECR 
331, ECLI:EU:C:1985:331., para. 27-28. 
221 Article 2(2) (a), (b) and (c) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC) 
222 Cf. e.g. Garde 2004, p. 188; Micklitz 2015, no. 132, 133. 
223 Joined Cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Securicor [2005] ECR I-11237, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:778;  Case 324/86 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's 
Dance Hall A/S [1988] ECR 739, EU:C:1988:72. 
224 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127; Case C-13/95 
Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] ECR-I 1259, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:141. 
Case C-466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg v. Ferrotron Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-803; 
Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito & others v Estado Português [2015] 
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5. Retention of identity 
As clarified in the previous Chapter, the Acquired Rights Directive and its 
national counterparts apply whenever the ‘transfer of an undertaking, 
business, or part of an undertaking or business to another employer as a 
result of a legal transfer or merger’ occurs.225 In order for the provisions of 
the directive to apply there needs to be a transfer of an ‘economic entity 
which retains its identity, meaning an organised grouping of resources which 
has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that 
activity is central or ancillary’.226 The European Court of Justice has set forth 
an ever-growing, hitherto insufficiently clear,227 set of guidelines to help 
determine whether an undertaking has been transferred.228 In this, the 
deciding factor is whether the business was disposed of as a going concern, 
indicated by the resumption or continuation of its operation(s) (with the 
same or similar activities) by the new employer, described as the retention of 
identity. In its seminal case, Spijkers, the ECJ established that ‘the decisive 
criterion for establishing whether there is a transfer of undertaking for the 
purposes of the directive is whether the business in question retains its 
identity’.229 In the event of a transfer of undertaking that takes place across 
national borders, specifically where it concerns a transfer of undertaking that 
involves a cross-border relocation of the undertaking to be transferred, the 
question may arise as to whether that undertaking retains its identity. More 
so, it may be questioned whether it is possible for an entity to retain its 
identity once it moves from one country to another.230 To this end, it has 
been argued that a change in legal, economic and social environment due to 
                                                                                                                                        
ECLI:EU:C:2015:565; Case C-509/14 Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias 
(ADIF) v Luis Aira Pascual [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2015:781. 
225 Art. 1(a) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
226 Art. 1(b) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC); this definition was first 
included in the 1998 Acquired Rights Directive and is intended to codify the case law of the 
European Court of Justice with regard to the definition of the term ‘undertaking’.  
227 Cf. Beltzer 2009, p. 9-10; Riesenhuber 2009, p. 420. 
228 What constitutes an ‘ undertaking’ or a ‘ transfer’ in cross-border transfer situations does 
differ from domestic situations. For a more detailed overview of these concepts see the 
previous Chapter.  
229 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119.  
230 CMS report 2006, p. 17; Holis UKEAT/0171/07/CEA, p. 7; Veldmaat & van Assendelft de 
Coningh 2012, p. 23; Raif & Ginal 2013, p. 218; Deinert 2013, p. 342; Olbertz & Fahrig 
2012, p. 2046-2047. 
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a relocation abroad may result in the loss of identity of the transferred 
undertaking.231 Whether there is any truth to this assertion has to be 
established on the basis of several criteria, established by the ECJ in 
Spijkers, that determine whether an undertaking has been transferred. These 
factors apply in domestic and cross-border situations alike.232 In effect, the 
national court has to take into account all the circumstances that characterise 
the undertaking in question such as (a) the type of undertaking or business, 
(b) the transfer of tangible assets, (c) the value of intangible assets, (d) the 
transfer of the majority of the employees, (e) the transfer of customers as 
well as (f) the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before 
and after the transfer and (g) the period, if any, for which the activities were 
suspended. All of these circumstances are single factors in an overall 
assessment and cannot be considered in isolation.233 The absence of any one 
factor does not preclude a transfer from taking place. Thus, it is for the 
national court to take these factors into account in its overall assessment of 
whether a transfer of undertaking under the directive and its national 
counterparts has taken place.   
 
5.1 Type of undertaking or business 
As briefly outlined above, the type of undertaking to be transferred is one of 
the criteria of importance in determining whether a transfer of undertaking 
has transpired. Although all Spijkers factors are single factors in the overall 
consideration, the weight attributed to these factors may differ depending on 
the branch in which the undertaking to be transferred operates.234 As such, 
type of undertaking transferred bares weight on the other criteria to be 
considered in the overall assessment of whether a transfer of undertaking has 
                                                          
231 CMS report 2006, p. 17; Veldmaat & van Assendelft de Coningh 2012, p. 23. Both base 
this assumption on a decision by the French Cour de Cassation [Cass. soc., 5 April 1995, n° 
93-42.690]. However, in this decision the Cour does not specifically mention the loss of 
identity due to legal, economical and social changes; it merely states that employment has 
been cancelled due to a transfer of activities abroad and a change in environment. 
232 See e.g. Feudner 1999, p. 1188; Kania 2012, p. 36 et seq.; Raif & Ginal 2013, p. 218; 
Reiner 2010, p. 123. 
233 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, para. 13.  
234 Cf. Beltzer 2005, p. 52, who considers some factors, such as the type of undertaking being 
transferred  ‘more equal than others’; Cf. Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, para. 6.2.2, who 
believes that Dutch courts attribute to much weight to the factor of the type of undertaking by 
continuously distinguishing between asset-reliant and labour-intensive undertakings, p. 168. 
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occurred.235 According to the ECJ ‘It follows that the degree of importance 
to be attached to each criterion indicating a transfer within the meaning of 
Directive 2001/23 will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on, 
or indeed the production or operating methods employed in the relevant 
undertaking, business or part of a business’.236 A distinction may therefore 
be made between asset-reliant and labour-intensive undertakings.237 Where it 
involves an undertaking that is mostly asset-reliant the transfer of tangible 
and intangible assets, such as buildings, production machinery, tools, raw 
materials, finished and semi-finished products and transport equipment, is a 
predominant factor in determining whether a transfer of undertaking has 
occurred.238 In other types of undertakings however, such as businesses 
involved in the services sector and other labour-intensive sectors the 
workforce is of primary concern.239 Thus the type of undertaking being 
transferred, indicated by the activity carried on or the production or 
operating methods, forms a key factor in determining when the transferred 
undertaking retains its identity and in ascertaining which of the Spijkers-
factors forms a key component in the overall assessment. In this, it is 
                                                          
235 Cf. Franzen 2008, p. 140; Beltzer 2005, p. 52; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 II, p. 81. 
236 Joined cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Güney-Görres and Others [2005] ECR I-11255, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:778,para. 35; Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung 
GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 18; Joined cases 
C-173/96 and C-247/96 Hidalgo and Others [1998] ECR I-8237, ECLI:EU:C:1998:595, para. 
31.  
237 Joined cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Güney-Görres and Others [2005] ECR I-11255, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:778, para. 35; Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung 
GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 18; Joined cases 
C-173/96 and C-247/96 Hidalgo and Others [1998] ECR I-8237, ECLI:EU:C:1998:595, para. 
31; Case C‑466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-803, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:85; Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito & others v Estado Português 
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:565; Case C-509/14 Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias 
(ADIF) v Luis Aira Pascual [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2015:781. 
238 Gussen, BeckOK BGB § 613a, 2015, no. 19 ; Preis, Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht 
2015, § 613a, no. 13; BAG 14 July 1994 2 AZR 55/94 NZA 1995, 27; BAG 16 May 2007 8 
AZR 693/06, NZA 2007, 1296. 
239 Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice 
[1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 21; Joined cases C-127/96, C-229/96 and C-
74/97 Hernández Vidal [1998] ECR I-8179, ECLI:EU:C:1998:594, para. 32; Joined cases C-
173/96 and C-247/96 Hidalgo and Others [1998] ECR I-8237, ECLI:EU:C:1998:595, para 
32; Case C-172/99, Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-761, ECLI:EU:C:2001:59, para. 38; Gussen, 
BeckOK BGB § 613a, 2015, no. 20. 
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important to remember that there does not exist a strict dichotomy between 
asset-reliant and labour-intensive undertakings, as surely there exist plenty 
of undertakings that inhabit characteristics of both categories of 
undertakings. In such situations, it is entirely plausible that no special 
meaning is attributed to any of the Spijkers factors, allowing for more 
equality between the factors to be considered. As clearly stated by the 
Scottish courts, the case law of the ECJ must not be interpreted as ‘laying 
down an invariable requirement that, in the context of a claimed TUPE-
transfer, a given business must necessarily be characterized as either ‘asset-
reliant’ or ‘labour-intensive’, as if those were mutually exclusive categories 
that defined exhaustively the range of possibilities that could arise.’240 All in 
all, the Spijkers factors are single factors in the overall factual consideration 
of whether a transfer of undertaking has occurred. The weight attributed to 
any of these factors is entirely dependent upon the circumstances of the case, 
indicated by the type of undertaking being transferred and determined by the 
activity carried on or the production or operating methods.  
 
A special type of undertaking, that by its very nature may be prevented from 
being the subject of a cross-border transfer of undertaking is the location-
dependent undertaking. Where  the location of the transferred undertaking is 
vital to its identity, it is this very location that may prevent a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking from taking effect. The identity of a particular 
undertaking may be so closely related to its location that a cross-border 
relocation of the undertaking would result in a loss of identity. In this sense, 
where it concerns cross-border transfers of undertakings that involve a cross-
border relocation, a distinction has to be made between location-dependent 
undertakings and undertakings that will be able to function regardless of 
their location.241 Location-dependent undertakings will only be able to 
                                                          
240 Scottish Coal Ltd v McCormick and others [2005] CSIH 68; A test requiring the 
classification of a business entity as either asset-reliant or labour-intensive would encourage 
transferee and transferor to structure the transfer in such a way as to avoid application of 
national acquired rights provisions. In these cases the putative transferee in its decision on 
taking over the necessary assets or employees could decide on whether the undertaking retains 
its identity. Such a choice abundantly conflicts with the aim and purpose of the directive.  
Although the ECJ appears to be leaning more and more in this direction, a strict dichotomy 
between asset-reliant and labour-intensive undertakings should not readily be assumed; Cf.  
McMullen 2016, p. 464; Barnard 2012, p. 597. 
241 Niksova 2014, p. 20. 
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continue their economic purpose with the transferee if the location, e.g. the 
property or plot that the undertaking is situated upon, is transferred as well. 
In order for a transfer of undertaking to be established the transferee must be 
able to continue (the operations of) the undertaking in the same way as the 
transferor. The location of the undertaking is only essential if its 
continuation is dependent upon it.242 Examples of location-dependent 
undertakings are undertakings that rely heavily on (the exploitation of) 
natural resources such as quarries,243 mines244 and hydro power plants. Non-
location-dependent undertakings will surely be able to transfer to a foreign 
transferee at a foreign location. A cross-border relocation of such an 
undertaking will not prevent a transfer from taking place. In fact, in 
Merckx245 the ECJ confirmed that the relocation of the transfer undertaking 
upon or immediately after the transfer does not prevent a transfer of 
undertaking from taking effect.246 Even though this case did not involve a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, a similar approach should be decisive 
in cross-border situations.  
 
5.2 Transfer of tangible assets 
In its traditional view, the transfer of an undertaking relied heavily on the 
transfer of tangible and intangible assets. However, as the present case law 
of the ECJ shows, the transfer of tangible or intangible assets is one of 
multiple criteria that determine whether a transfer of undertaking has 
occurred. Surely in case of asset-reliant businesses, where a transfer of 
undertaking is accompanied by the transfer of tangible assets, it will be 
easier to establish whether a transfer of undertaking has occurred than in 
situations where it involves businesses that are mostly labour-intensive. As 
outlined above, all of the Spijkers-factors are part of an overall assessment 
and none of the individual factors can be considered in isolation, nor is the 
existence of every factor a precondition for the economic entity transferred 
                                                          
242 BAG 12 February 1987 – 2 AZR 247/86, NZA 1988,70; Franzen 1992, p. 42.  
243 E.g. stone, rock, rubble, stand, gravel or slate quarries. In BAG 12 February 1987 – 2 AZR 
247/86, NZA 1988,70, the Bundesarbeitsgericht stated that stone quarries are location 
dependent undertakings.  
244 E.g. oil, uranium, coal, salt, kalium, clay or metal mines.  
245 Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94  Albert Merckx and Patrick Neuhuys v. Ford Motors 
Company Belgium SA [1996] ECR I – 1267, ECLI:EU:C:1996:87 
246 IDS 2011, p. 497. 
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to retain its identity.  In certain, mostly labour-intensive, sectors a business 
may be able to function even without any significant tangible assets. As is 
apparent from the case law established by the ECJ, it is possible for an 
economic entity to be transferred even in absence of any assets being 
transferred to the transferee.247 In labour-intensive undertakings, the absence 
of any assets being transferred cannot, in those cases, justify the preclusion 
of the existence of a transfer.248 In asset-reliant undertakings the transfer of 
assets, whether tangible or intangible, is still a substantive consideration in 
the overall assessment of whether a transfer of undertaking has occurred. To 
this end it must be noted that in situations that involve a cross-border transfer 
of undertaking that is accompanied by a cross-border relocation the transfer 
of intangible assets is mostly immaterial. If an asset-reliant undertaking, 
such as a business involved in the manufacturing process, is transferred 
abroad (as indicated in Chapter 1 the offshoring of production activities is 
mostly cost driven) it is the transfer of tangible assets, such as production 
machinery and other production systems that is essential to the transfer and 
to the continuation of the undertaking.249 An important factor in the overall 
consideration is whether the tangible assets are essential to the continuation 
of the business or undertaking to be transferred and its economic aim. In 
some cases involving asset-reliant undertakings, the simple transfer of 
production elements may constitute a retention of identity even if the 
organisational autonomy of the transferred undertaking is not preserved. In 
Klarenberg the ECJ held that the Acquired Rights Directive ‘applies to a 
situation where the part of the undertaking or business transferred does not 
retain its organisational autonomy, provided that the functional link between 
the various elements of production transferred is preserved, and that that link 
enables the transferee to use those elements to pursue an identical or 
                                                          
247 As was the case in Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94  Albert Merckx and Patrick 
Neuhuys v. Ford Motors Company Belgium SA [1996] ECR I – 1267, ECLI:EU:C:1996:87 
where only involved the partial transfer of staff and a recommendation of the new undertaking 
to the existing client base. 
248 Case C-392/92 Christel Schmidt v, Spar- und Leihkasse der früheren Ämter Bordesholm, 
Kiel und Cronshagen [1994] ECR I- 1326, ECLI:EU:C:1994:134, para. 16; Case C-13/95 
Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] ECR-I 1259, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 18. 
249 Kania 2012, p. 42. 
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analogous economic activity.’250 Consequently, in some cases, the 
preservation of a functional link is sufficient for the transferred undertaking 
to retain its identity, provided that this link enables the transferee to pursue 
activities similar to those pursued by the transferor.   
 
5.3 Value of intangible assets 
Intangible assets, such as know-how, intellectual property and goodwill can 
form an important part of the business to be transferred. In fact, the value of 
these assets may be of such importance that their transfer or non-transfer 
determines the existence of a transfer of undertaking. Thus, the transfer of 
e.g. intellectual property will further the assumption that the transferred 
undertaking has retained its identity, whereas their non-transfer might 
preclude the undertaking from retaining its identity. In cross-border transfer 
situations, the transfer of intangible assets, will generally be easily 
established, especially where it involves the transfer of such assets within the 
same corporate group, and as such does not differ from their domestic 
transfer.   
 
5.4 Transfer of the majority of employees 
In cross-border cases the retention of the identity of the undertaking to be 
transferred may very well hinge on the transfer of the majority of the 
employees. As is clear from the case law of the ECJ, in labour-intensive 
sectors, a grouping of employees who are permanently engaged in a joint 
activity can constitute an economic entity.251 ‘Such an entity is capable of 
maintaining its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer 
does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major 
part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially 
assigned by his predecessor to that task.’252 In such cases, the employees are 
characterized as a body of assets capable of continuing the activities pursued 
by the transferor. Especially where it concerns a business primarily involved 
in the provision of services, such as cleaning services, IT-services or security 
                                                          
250 Case C‑466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-803, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:85, para. 53. 
251 Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice 
[1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 21. 
252 Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice 
[1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 21. 
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services, the transfer or non-transfer of a majority of the employees is 
decisive in determining the existence of a transfer of undertaking. Thus, in 
labour-intensive sectors, the non-transfer of the employees to the transferee 
speaks against the retention of the identity of the transferred undertaking 
since the qualification and know-how of these employees forms the essence 
of said undertaking.253 The sector in which the transferred business or 
undertaking operates forms an important consideration in determining the 
weight that is attributed to the transfer of the workforce. Surely in businesses 
that are able to function even without any significant tangible or intangible 
assets the transfer of the majority of the workforce is an invaluable 
component to the existence of a transfer of undertaking. Conversely, in 
businesses that are mostly asset-driven, such as businesses involved in the 
manufacturing sector, the transfer of the workforce is of lesser to no 
importance, especially in comparison to the transfer of tangible and 
intangible assets.254  
 
Here, it should be noted that prior to the existence of any case law of the 
European Court of Justice on this aspect, although it was mostly considered 
that the transfer of tangible assets was a conditio sine qua non for the 
existence of a transfer of undertaking,255 in actuality there existed two 
different approaches on the concept of undertaking and the conditions 
required for a successful transfer of undertaking. According to the so-called 
entreprise-activité approach long favoured by the French courts, a transfer of 
undertaking solely required the continuance of the same or a similar activity, 
allowing the mere transfer of the workforce to constitute a transfer of 
undertaking.256 According to the opposing entreprise-organisation approach, 
                                                          
253 Kania 2012, p. 45; BAG 11 September 1997 8 AZR 555/95, NZA 1998, 31; Rolfs/ Giesen/ 
Kreikebohm/ Udsching, BeckOK BGB § 613a, Note. 33. 
254 Kania 2012, p. 45. Cf. Case C-172/99, Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-761, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:59; Case C-340/01 Carlito Abler and Others v Sodexho MM Catering 
Gesellschaft mbH [2003] ECR I-14023, CLI:EU:C:2003:629. 
255 Beltzer 2007 p. 142. 
256 Touati 2008, p. 66; Mouly 2008, p. 142; Cormier le Goff & Bénard 2006, p. 18, 19; Cass. 
Civ. 27 Febuary 1934, DH 1934, 252 (Goupy v Société hydroélectrique de l’Ouest 
constantinois): A reflection of this approach can be found in the famous case of Goupy, 
dating from 1934, which involved a service provision change for the village lighting in the 
city of Sélif, here the Cour de Cassation held:‘Attendu que ce texte destiné à assurer aux 
salariés des emplois plus stables doit recevoir son application dans tous les cas où la même 
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preferred by German law, the actual transfer of employees was not a 
criterion in establishing whether a transfer had occurred or in establishing 
whether the undertaking had retained its identity. It was considered that the 
transfer of the employment contracts or relationships to the transferee were 
the legal consequence of and not a precondition for the existence of a 
transfer of undertaking.257 According to this approach, a transfer of 
undertaking could not take effect without the transfer of tangible assets. 
When the ECJ first addressed the issue, in a case involving the transfer of 
cleaning contracts, it appeared to embrace the entreprise-activité approach 
by explicitly rejecting the entreprise-organisation approach put forward by 
the German and British governments: 
 
‘The arguments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and of the United Kingdom based on the absence of any transfer of 
tangible assets cannot be accepted either. The fact that in its case-law 
the Court includes the transfer of such assets among the various factors 
to be taken into account by a national court to enable it, when assessing 
a complex transaction as a whole, to decide whether an undertaking has 
in fact been transferred does not support the conclusion that the absence 
of these factors precludes the existence of a transfer. The safeguarding 
of employees' rights, which constitutes the subject-matter of the 
directive, as is clear from its actual title, cannot depend exclusively on 
consideration of a factor which the Court has in any event already held 
not to be decisive on its own.’258  
 
                                                                                                                                        
entreprise continue à fonctionner sous une direction nouvelle ; qu'il suit de là que le nouveau 
concessionnaire d'un service public qui, à l'expiration d'un précédent contrat de concession 
passé avec une autre personne, est chargé par l'autorité compétente de continuer le 
fonctionnement du même service public doit être considéré comme un nouvel entrepreneur, au 
sens du texte susvisé, tenu, dès lors, de respecter les contrats de travail en cours.’ This view 
as eventually abandoned and from the mid-1980s onwards the French courts adopted a more 
stringent approach, requiring a legal link or connection (lien de droit) between the transferor 
and transferee. 
257 BAG 12 February 1987 – 2 AZR 247/86, NZA 1988,70; BAG 22 May 1985 - 5 AZR 
30/84, NZA 1985, 775; Preis, Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht, 613a BGB 2015, Note. 
24. 
258 Case C-392/92 Christel Schmidt v, Spar- und Leihkasse der früheren Ämter Bordesholm, 
Kiel und Cronshagen [1994] ECR I- 1326, ECLI:EU:C:1994:134., para. 16. 
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In Süzen the ECJ did not revert this judgment, but provided a more nuanced 
definition of the concept of entity, apparently moving more towards the 
entreprise-organisation approach. In this case, which also involved the 
transfer of cleaning contracts, the ECJ argued that the concept of entity 
‘refers to an organized grouping of persons and assets facilitating the 
exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific objective.’259 
Consequently, the transferee is to acquire an organized grouping of persons 
and assets allowing him to continue the economic activities of the 
undertaking, business or part thereof.260 Even though the court seemed to 
expressly prescribe the transfer of both employees and assets, it reiterated its 
ruling in Schmidt that a transfer does not presuppose a transfer of assets. In 
labour-intensive sectors the employees form the heart of the business to be 
transferred and are consequently a factor in establishing whether the 
business transferred has retained its identity. Here, the workforce forms the 
very essence of the undertaking and provides the business with its identity. 
According to the ECJ, in these sectors, the transferee has to take ‘over a 
major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially 
assigned by his predecessor’, in order for the undertaking to retain its 
identity.261 The existence and introduction of this criterion has been met with 
resistance; many find it difficult to reconcile the employee-criterion with the 
purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive, which is to ensure a continuance 
of employment of the affected employees in the event of a transfer of 
undertaking.262 More so, the ECJ, by establishing the transfer of the 
workforce as a criterion for the existence of a transfer of undertaking has 
utilized a circular rhetoric, according to which the transfer of the workforce 
to the transferee is dependent on the factual transfer of the workforce. In this 
regard, Beltzer speaks of a reversal of cause and effect263; the transfer of the 
employment contracts or relationships to the transferee form the effect of 
                                                          
259 Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice 
[1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 13. 
260 Or to pursue similar activities.  
261 Case C-13/95 Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice 
[1997] ECR-I 1259, ECLI:EU:C:1997:141, para. 21. 
262 HR 30 January 2004, SR 2004, 31 note Sagel, note 2; Beltzer 2000, p. 20; Barrett 2005; 
McMullen 2003; McMullen 2001 p. 397; Barret 2009; Davies 2001, p. 231-234; Pochet 1994, 
p. 934; Sagel 2004,  p. 161; Opinion Advocate General Cosmas Hernández Vidal, Joined 
cases C-127/96, C-229/96 and C-74/97 [1998] ECR I-8181,  para. 80. 
263 Beltzer 2000, p. 20.   
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and not a precondition for the existence of a transfer of undertaking.264 To 
my mind, for reasons of employee protection, a transfer of undertaking is 
effectuated by operation of law and should not be made dependent on 
whether the employees actually transfer to the transferee. Doing so would 
defeat the entire purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive as this would 
allow the transferor and transferee to carefully structure the transfer of 
undertaking in such a way as to avoid application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts. Recognising that in labour-intensive 
sectors the workforce forms the very essence of the undertaking, this 
workforce is a vital element to be taken into consideration in deciding 
whether an undertaking retains its identity. As such, where there exists a 
group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis that 
constitutes an economic entity, that entity will retain its identity if the 
transferee continues the undertaking. In this, it must be noted that the 
subjective intent of the transferee should play no part in this consideration, it 
is the continuation of the business that is decisive. Thus where there exists a 
workforce that constitutes an economic entity and the transferee decides to 
continue the undertaking transferred,  the rights and obligations stemming 
from the employment contracts of those working within the transferred 
undertaking will transfer to the transferee by operation of law. I share the 
view portrayed by Advocate General Cosmas in his opinion in Hernández 
Vidal265 who argues that it would be absurd to consider that ‘the result 
achieved by applying the directive becomes a condition determining whether 
it is to apply.’266 As such, the Advocate General postulates that where it 
concerns a labour-intensive business it is the presence of ‘a  group of 
workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis — a group that is 
taken over by the transferee or contractor —‘ that ‘is of decisive 
importance.’267 In this sense it is considered unimportant whether a certain 
                                                          
264 Cf. BAG 12 February 1987 – 2 AZR 247/86, NZA 1988,70; BAG 22 May 1985, NZA 
1985, 775; Preis, Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht, 613a BGB 2015, Note 24. 
265 Opinion Advocate General Cosmas Hernández Vidal, Joined cases C-127/96, C-229/96 
and C-74/97 [1998] ECR I-8181 
266 Opinion Advocate General Cosmas Hernández Vidal, Joined cases C-127/96, C-229/96 
and C-74/97 [1998] ECR I-8199, para. 80: in an effort to avoid this vicious circle the United 
Kingdom has expressly included the services provision change in its national acquired rights 
provisions.  
267 Opinion Advocate General Cosmas Hernández Vidal, Joined cases C-127/96, C-229/96 
and C-74/97 [1998] ECR I-8199, para. 80, para. 84.  
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number or even a majority of employees becomes engaged by the 
transferee.268 One could argue that the criterion should be that where there 
exists a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis 
that constitutes an economic entity, that entity retains its identity if the 
transferee is intent on continuing the undertaking.269 Such an additional 
motive criterion however comes with its own problems as there will surely 
be cases where it is difficult if not impossible to establish whether or not a 
potential transferor has legitimate reasons for not taking over the existing 
workforce.270 More so, although this argumentation may seem plausible in 
theory, it is difficult to reconcile with the stringent and mechanical test 
stemming from Süzen. The practical reality therefore remains that in labour-
intensive sectors an undertaking can only retain its identity if the transferee 
takes over a major part of the transferor’s workforce.271 This reasoning was, 
once again, underlined by the ECJ in CLECE in 2011, where it argued that 
the identity of an economic entity that is ‘essentially based on manpower, 
cannot be retained if the majority of its employees are not taken on by the 
alleged transferee.’272 As such, even though this leaves room for an 
intentional circumvention of acquired rights provisions, the retention of 
identity of (especially) labour-intensive undertakings requires the actual 
transfer of a major part, in terms of number and skill, of the workforce.273  
                                                          
268 Opinion Advocate General Cosmas Hernández Vidal, Joined cases C-127/96, C-229/96 
and C-74/97 [1998] ECR I-8199, para. 80, para. 84.  
269 Rb. Utrecht (ktr.) 22 October 2008, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BG1311; Similar judgments 
exist in the United Kingdom: ECM (Vehicle Delivery Service) v Cox [1999] IRLR 599; ADI 
(UK) Ltd v Willer and others [2001] IRLR 542; RCO Support Services and another v Unison 
and others [2002] IRLR 401. 
270 Cf. McMullen 2001, p. 400;  McMullen 2014, p. 151, 152; Barnard 2012, p 597. 
271 McMullen 2016, p. 456. 
272 Case C-463/09 CLECE SA v María Socorro Martín Valor, Ayuntamiento de Cobis [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:24, para. 41. 
273 In this regard Beltzer notes that even though the possibility of circumventing the 
application of acquired rights provisions is undesirable a better definition or criterion of 
undertaking is difficult to imagine [Case C-463/09 CLECE SA v María Socorro Martín Valor, 
Ayuntamiento de Cobis [2011] JAR 2001/57, opinion: Beltzer]; The Dutch district court of 
Utrecht however portrays a different opinion: in a case involving the transfer of a shop lease 
agreement the court held that in determining whether the undertaking retained its identity the 
original intentions of the parties were decisive as the court has the impression that inventory 
and staff have deliberately not been transferred to the new lessee: Rb. Utrecht (ktr.) 22 
October 2008, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BG1311. Similar judgments exist in the United 
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In cross-border transfer scenarios, employees will generally be unwilling to 
change their living environment upon a transfer of undertaking.274 As such, 
the likelihood that the (majority of the) workforce will actually transfer 
abroad with the undertaking is small. This will only be different in situations 
where the transfer takes place in areas near national borders, enabling the 
existing employees to maintain their place of residence and involving a 
minimum to no increase in travel time. In any case, the actual transfer of 
employees, both in international situations and domestically, will contribute 
to the presumption that a transfer of undertaking has taken place. 
Conversely, where the employees from the very essence of the undertaking 
to be transferred, the non-transfer of the workforce speaks against a transfer 
of undertaking. Even though it seems likely that a majority of employees 
will be reluctant to continue its employment abroad, the acquisition of an 
essential part of the workforce is still conceivable, especially where it 
concerns transfers in areas near national borders.275 The closer the (location 
of) the transferred undertaking after the transfer, the more likely it is that a 
majority of employees, in terms of numbers and skill, will be willing to 
transfer to the transferee.276  
 
5.5 Transfer of the client base 
In addition to the transfer of the workforce, the transfer of the client base 
forms one of the criteria that contribute to the transferred undertaking 
retaining its identity. There are some types of undertakings where the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred, for example, shops and 
restaurants, largely determines the client base. If such an undertaking were 
transferred to a new location the client base would change. In such a case, 
the transfer to a new location would speak against a continuance in client 
base and as such against the retention of identity. On the other hand, the 
client base of undertakings that are less reliant on location, such as 
                                                                                                                                        
Kingdom: ECM (Vehicle Delivery Service) v Cox [1999] IRLR 599; ADI (UK) Ltd v Willer 
and others [2001] IRLR 542; RCO Support Services and another v Unison and others [2002] 
IRLR 401; Critical in this regard is McMullen (McMullen 2001, p. 397).  
274 Cf. McMullen 2005, p. 299; Hepple 2005, p. 175; On the rights of the employees in the 
event of a change in the place of employment see paragraph 4. 
275 BAG 26 May 2011 AP BGB § 613 a Nr. 409, opinion Deinert. 
276 Preis, Erfurter Kommentar 2015, §613a BGB, note. 34; BAG 26 May 2011 AP BGB § 613 
a Nr. 409, opinion Deinert; Hepple 2005, p. 172; CMS report 2006, p. 18. 
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undertakings in the production and manufacturing sectors and undertakings 
involved in IT-services is unlikely to change when the undertaking is 
transferred to a new location, possibly abroad. As Kania remarks given the 
increased fading of national borders and the multiple modi and possibilities 
of transportation it has become easily possible to serve the same clientele 
from abroad.277 This applies to a variety of undertakings and holds true for 
both asset-reliant, such as factories,  and labour-intensive undertakings, such 
as call-centers, which are easily offshored. The same goes for businesses 
involved in online services, for which the location of the undertaking is 
utterly irrelevant.278 In situations involving outsourcing and offshoring the 
outsourcing undertaking is deemed to be the client, in such cases a transfer 
of client base may therefore generally be assumed.   
 
5.6 Degree of similarities between activities before and after the transfer 
The degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the 
transfer is one of key importance. As stated above, ‘the retention of identity 
is inter alia indicated by the actual continuation or resumption by the new 
employed of the same or similar activities.’279 However, the fact that similar 
activities are carried on after the transfer does not warrant the conclusion that 
the transferred undertaking has retained its identity.280 According to the ECJ 
‘an entity cannot be reduced to the activity entrusted to it. Its identity 
emerges from several indissociable factors, such as its workforce, its 
management staff, the way in which its work is organised, its operating 
methods or indeed, where appropriate, the operational resources available to 
it’.281 Thus, a substantive change in the organization of the transferred 
undertaking can preclude the retention of identity.282 A mere relocation of 
the undertaking does constitute such a substantive change and as such does 
                                                          
277 Kania 2012, p. 47. 
278 Preis, Erfurter Kommentar 2015, §613a BGB, note 34. 
279 Case C-392/92 Christel Schmidt v Spar- und Leihkasse der früheren Ämter Bordesholm, 
Kiel und Cronshagen Para. 16 [1994] ECR I- 1326, para. 17. 
280 Preis, Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht 2015, §613a BGB, note 32. 
281 Case C-463/09 CLECE SA v María Socorro Martín Valor, Ayuntamiento de Cobisa [2011] 
ECR I-00095, ECLI:EU:C:2011:24. 
282 BAG 4 May 2006 - 8 AZR 299/05, NZA 2006, 1096; BAG 17 December 2009 - 8 AZR 
1019/08,  NZA 2010, 499. 
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not prevent an undertaking from retaining its identity, even if it is transferred 
abroad.283 
     
5.7 Period of suspension of activities 
The suspension of activities must be distinguished from a transfer of 
undertaking, since these are mutually exclusive. In Ny Mølle Kro the 
European Court of Justice established that the temporary closure of an 
undertaking, and the absence of employees during the time of closure, is a 
factor to be taken into account in determining whether the undertaking is 
transferred as a going concern and as such has retained its identity.284 Where 
the undertaking ceases to operate for a short period of time this does not 
preclude a transfer of undertaking from coming into existence.285 More so, 
where the other factors of the Spijkers-test have been fulfilled, such as the 
pursuit of similar activities and direction towards the same clientele, the 
period of suspension of activities may no longer be entirely decisive. Thus, 
the fewer of the other criteria have been fulfilled, the more likely it is that a 
short suspension of activities constitutes a closure of the undertaking.286 
With respect to cross-border transfers of undertakings it should be noted that 
a relocation abroad generally takes more time and as such, the suspension of 
activities in the country of the transferor (or the original location of the 
undertaking where these do not coincide) may take longer. In those cases, a 
closure of the undertaking should not readily be assumed. As such a longer 
suspension of activities should not preclude a transfer of undertaking from 
taking effect.287 As stated by the Commission ‘a transfer of an undertaking is 
a complex legal and practical operation which may take some time to 
complete’.288 The Acquired Rights Directive itself remains silent on the 
period for which activities may be suspended. This period may vary 
depending on the type of undertaking to be transferred and the complexity of 
                                                          
283 BAG 26 May 2011- 8 AZR 792/09 NZA 2011, 1143; BAG 26 May 2011 - 8 AZR 792/09, 
AP BGB § 613 a Nr. 409, opinion Deinert; Kania 2012, p. 48. 
284 Case 287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 5465, ECLI:EU:C:1987:573. 
285 Case 101/87 P. Bork International A/S, in liquidation, and Others v Foreningen af 
Arbejdsledere i Danmark acting on behalf of Birger E. Petersen and Junckers Industrier A/S 
[1988] ECR 3073, ECLI:EU:C:1988:308, para. 16. 
286 Preis, Erfurter Kommentar 2015, §613a BGB, note 35. 
287 Niksova 2014, p. 24; Kania 2012, p. 48. 
288 Case C-234/98 G.C. Allen and Others v Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd [1999] ECR I-
8664, ECLI:EU:C:1999:594, para. 32. 
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the transfer itself. Thus, it is to be assessed on a case by cases basis, bearing 
in mind the fulfillment of the other Spijkers-factors, whether a transfer of 
undertaking has occurred.289    
 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
The Spijkers-factors equally apply to cross-border and domestic transfer 
scenarios.290 The above shows, that although cross-border transfers of 
undertakings are, on occasion, presented with more challenges, it is possible 
for an undertaking to retain its identity upon a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking that is accompanied by a cross-border relocation. As such, 
employees will be entitled to the protection afforded by the Acquired Rights 
Directive even in situations where upon or after a transfer of undertaking 
they are ‘obliged’ to continue their employment at a foreign location. Still, in 
cross-border transfer situations it will be more difficult to satisfy the factors 
concerned in the retention of the transferred businesses’ identity. It is 
considered that in situations involving a cross-border relocation of the 
undertaking to be transferred, several key factors are likely to be amiss, such 
as the transfer of tangible assets or employees. Even though the Spijkers 
factors are applied to domestic and cross-border transfer situations alike, it 
appears that there might be additional criteria that have to be taken into 
account in determining whether a cross-border transfer of undertaking has 
taken place. To this end, it has been suggested that an undertaking may not 
retain its identity if upon relocation of the undertaking abroad the 
undertaking is placed in a different ‘environment’. The CMS report states 
that ‘it could be possible to consider that a change in the “environment”, i.e. 
the linguistic, legal, economic and social environment resulting from a 
relocation of operations abroad, would cause the transferred entity to lose its 
identity.’291 This view, which is difficult to reconcile with the existing 
‘retention of identity’–test, is derived from the Vidéocolor-case292 before the 
Chambre Social ofthe French Cour de Cassation. In this case, which 
involved the transfer of part of an undertaking, located in Lyon, to Brazil, 
                                                          
289 Franzen 1994, p. 42. 
290 See e.g. Deinert 2013, p. 342; Gaul & Mückl 2011, p. 1322; Haanappel-van der Burg 
2015; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I; Henckel 2012; Kania 2012, p. 36 et seq.  
291 CMS report 2006, p. 17.  
292 Cass. soc., 5 April 1995, n° 93-42.690; Cour de Lyon, Ch. Soc. 11 May 1993, Dr. Soc. 
1993, p. 650.  
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the Cour de Cassation stated that the employment contracts did not transfer 
to the transferee. The reasons for such non-transfer appear to be founded in 
the fact that the company moved abroad to a ‘different environment’. Surely, 
a change in the linguistic, legal, economic and social environment resulting 
from a relocation of operations abroad could be to the detriment of the 
affected employees. However, it seems to me that a ‘change in 
environment’–test is uneasily reconciled with the existing Spijkers-factors. 
More so, the Acquired Rights Directive does not presently give rise to a 
distinction between domestic and cross-border transfers of undertakings 
resulting in the establishment of additional tests for cross-border transfer 
scenarios. It appears inequitable to deprive the affected employees of the 
protection afforded by the directive simply due to the fact that the transfer 
takes place across national borders. If the Spijkers-factors have been 
fulfilled, there is a transfer of a going concern and the undertaking 
transferred retains it identity. Surely, as a result of the transfer the affected 
employees may, to their detriment, become subject to a different 
environment. In these situations, the employees should be able to rely on 
Article 4(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, which is discussed below, in 
paragraph 6.3.  
 
The relocation abroad does not form a factor in considering whether, in 
situations involving cross-border transfers of undertakings, the transferred 
undertaking has retained its identity. The location of the transferred 
undertaking may however, in specific cases, be considered in weighing the 
seven Spijkers-factors. For instance, where the undertaking to be transferred 
is location-dependent, a cross-border relocation will likely deprive the 
undertaking from retaining its identity. Still, the location of the undertaking 
to be transferred does not constitute an independent factor in the ‘retention 
of identity’-test.293 The ‘retention of identity’-test, as developed by the ECJ, 
applies equally to domestic and cross-border transfers of undertakings. 
 
 
6 Employee mobility  
An essential question when it comes to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking that involves a cross-border relocation, is whether the 
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employees are required to transfer abroad with the undertaking. Are the 
employees allowed to object to the transfer of their employment 
relationship? And what are the effects of the employees’ decision not to 
continue their employment with the transferee? As outlined above, 
employees will generally view expatriation as an insurmountable obstacle to 
continuing their employment with the transferee at a foreign location. Few 
employees will be willing to leave their homes to change their place of 
employment over (possibly) several hundred kilometers without any 
protection against future dismissal. Yet, according to the European 
Commission today’s global economy requires employees to accept a greater 
mobility of their employment.294 As such the Commission encourages 
greater job mobility and increased mobility between regions and Member 
States:  
 
´In a Europe with no internal borders, and competing in a global 
economy, the changing demands of an ageing society and a labour 
market in constant evolution demand much greater levels of mobility. 
Worker mobility is a key instrument for an efficiently functioning 
single market and is essential for allowing more people to find better 
employment.´295 
 
According to the Commission, the place of work constitutes a vital part of 
the employment relationship or employment contract. In most countries, the 
employee has the right to oppose a one-sided modification of his 
employment contract, especially where it concerns vital elements of the 
employment contract such as remuneration, working hours and the place of 
employment. By reason of a transfer of undertaking the employment 
contracts or relationships existing with the transferor on the date of the 
transfer will transfer to the transferee by operation of law. As such, the new 
employer, i.e. the transferee, is regarded by law as the employer ab initio. 
This means that the transfer of undertaking does not involve any change to 
the rights and obligations stemming from the employment contract. 
                                                          
294 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Mobility, an 
instrument for more and better jobs: The European Job Mobility Action Plan (2007-2010), 
COM(2007) 773 final. 
295 COM(2007) 773 final, p. 2. 
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However, in those situations where the transfer of undertaking is 
accompanied by a cross-border relocation this (frequently) involves a 
substantial modification of the employment contract or relationship as the 
place of employment is set to change due to the transfer of undertaking. As 
such, the question arises as to the effects of such a transfer on the workforce.  
 
6.1 Obligation to work 
Fundamental to the employer-employee paradigm are the correlative 
obligations stemming from the employment contract or relationship: these 
involve the employee’s obligation to work and the employer’s obligation to 
pay wages upon the performance of work.296 The employment contract or 
employment relationship forms the basis for determining the extent of the 
employee’s obligation to work. On the rare occasion that the employment 
contract explicitly specifies the place of performance, it will generally be 
difficult for the employer to alter the terms of the employment contract one-
sidedly, unless the employment contract gives the employer the express right 
to do so.297 Surely, the effects and validity of a one-sided alteration of the 
employment contract will differ depending on the terms of the employment 
contract, the rights and obligations stemming from collective agreements and 
the law that governs the employment contract or relationship.298     
                                                          
296 As specified in the previous Chapter, there is no uniform European definition of employee 
or employment contract or relationship. In his opinion in Case 105/84 [1985] ECR 2642 
Opinion Advocate General Slynn commented that a possible definition of employee on the 
European plain could read: ‘one who in return for remuneration agrees to work for another 
and who can as a matter of law be directed as to what he does and how he does it, whether 
pursuant to a contract of employment or an employment relationship.’ The definition of 
employment contract in Article 7:610 BW (of the Dutch Civil Code) lists similar elements to 
characterize the existence of an employment contract, being the personal performance of work 
for a specified period of time (1), against pay (2) in subordinate capacity (3).  
297 In Dutch law, in Article 7:613 BW, provision has been made for limiting the operation of 
the so-called one-sided modification clause. Such a clause, incorporated in the individual 
employment contract, enables the employer to make a one-sided modification to the 
employment contract. The one-sided modification clause is based on consensus; at a certain 
point the employee did consent to enabling his employer, mostly for economic and 
organizational reasons, to alter certain parts of the employee’s employment contract.  
298 In addition, on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation, in the event that the 
employment contract holds a choice of law clause, the mandatory provisions of the law that 
governs the employment contract in the absence of such a choice also bear weight on the 
ability of the employer to single handedly alter the place of employment. 
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In most cases, the employment contract does not expressly stipulate a place 
of performance. In the absence of such an express place of performance, the 
place of work is determined by other sources, such as the existing collective 
agreement299 or the circumstances of the case.300 To this end, it must be 
borne in mind that since the employer has the right to provide the employee 
with instructions, these instructions may also relate to the place of work.301 
There are differences in the laws of the Member States with regard to the 
one-sided change of the employment contract and whether the place of work 
may be one-sidedly changed by the employer even in the absence of any 
express provisions regarding the place of employment. In Belgium, for 
instance, the place of employment is, in principle, considered an essential 
part of the employment contract.302 The parties, i.e. employer and employee, 
are however free to conclude that the place of work is not essential to the 
employment contract or relationship. This could also be established on the 
basis of the circumstances of the case. A transfer within a business, from one 
part of the business to another, will generally not be considered a one-sided 
change of a substantial employment condition.303 In both the Netherlands 
and Belgium an employer appears to be precluded from one-sidedly 
changing substantial employment conditions by utilizing his right of 
instruction.304 On the contrary, in Germany, the transfer of the location of the 
undertaking in which the employee is employed is a one-sided legal act 
which is rooted in the employer’s right to provide the employee with 
                                                          
299 A collective agreement may also hold an express clause stipulating the place of work, See 
Preis, Erfurter Kommentar Arbeitsrecht 2015, § 611 BGB note 806; Graf von Westphalen & 
Thüsing 2014 , para. 246. 
300 Franzen 1994, p. 149. 
301 BAG 29 October 1997, 5 AZR 573/96; Rb. Midden-Nederland 19 December 2014, Prg. 
2015/41 in which the court held that the transferee did not provide unreasonable demands or 
that the work assigned to the employee could not reasonably be expected of her when the 
place of employment changed and resulted in an  increase of travel time (one way) of 1 to 2 
hours; Franzen 1994, p. 149. 
302 Cass. 1 December 1980, RW 1980-81, 1782; Cass. 27 June 1988, J.T.T. 1988, p. 492; 
Arbrb. Brussel 12 oktober 1998, Soc. Kron. 2002, p. 338; Van Eeckhoutte 1996, p. 27; 
Croimans & de Laat 2008, p. 60. 
303 Buelens & Stroobants 2014, p. 286. 
304 Croimans & de Laat 2008, p. 60. 
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instructions regarding his employment.305 To this end the German 
Bundesarbeitsgericht has ruled: 
 
‘Aufgrund seines Weisungsrechts (Direktionsrechts) kann der 
Arbeitgeber einseitig die im Arbeitsvertrag nur rahmenmäßig 
umschriebene Leistungspflicht des Arbeitnehmers nach Zeit, Ort und 
Art der Leistung näher bestimmen. Er kann auch einen Wechsel in der 
Art der Beschäftigung vorschreiben oder den Arbeitsbereich 
verkleinern.’306   
 
Thus, where the place of work is not (clearly) specified in the employment 
contract, under German law, the employer typically has the right to clarify 
and change the place of performance (of employment). However, this differs 
in cases involving a transfer of undertaking. In a case involving a transfer of 
undertaking from Berlin to Lyon, the Bundesarbeitsgericht, ruled that in 
situations where an undertaking is transferred and relocated to a place, at 
which the employees, according to the substance of their employment 
contract, are not obliged to perform their employment, the transferee only 
enters into the rights and obligations of the employment contracts and 
relationships, existing at the time of the transfer, of the employees who are 
willing to perform their employment at the new location.307 The proposed 
relocation of the undertaking could not be carried out on the basis of the 
right of the employer (in this case the transferee) to provide the employees 
with instructions.308 Thus it appears, that in cases involving a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking, the employees are not obliged to continue their 
employment at a foreign location if their employment contract does not 
explicitly allow such a change in the place of work. Still, the employee is 
typically incorporated into the business organization of the employer causing 
the place of business of the employer to constitute the place of work. If the 
place of work changes due to a change in the location of the undertaking in 
which the employees are to carry out their employment, the employees are 
generally obliged to perform their work at the new location. Whether this 
also involves an obligation to perform their duties towards their employer at 
                                                          
305 BAG 20 January 1960 – 4 AZR 267/ 59. 
306 BAG 27 March 1980 – 2 AZR 506/78. 
307 BAG 20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88. 
308 BAG 20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88, AP BGB § 613a Nr. 81, opinion Kreitner. 
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a foreign location will depend on the individual employment contract.309 For 
instance, some employment contracts include a mobility clause. Such a 
clause either specifies the geographic zone in which the employee is required 
to operate or, within group structures, requires the employee to fulfill his 
employment, upon instruction, in the various companies belonging to the 
group. In the latter situation however, it seems unlikely that the transferor 
will be able to ask the employee to become employed in a part of the group 
structure that was not in existence at the time when the employment contract 
was signed. As stated by Touati, in situations involving a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking, involving a change in the geographic location of the 
workplace, the employee may, in the absence of a mobility clause in the 
original contract of employment, dispute the modification of his employment 
contract to the extent that the transfer results in a dismissal on behalf of the 
transferee: 
 
‘Dans les faits, le transfert transfrontalier entraine une modification 
géographique du lieu de travail, en sorte que, en l’absence de clause de 
mobilité très adaptée dans le contrat de travail d’origine, le salarie 
pourra légitimement s’ oppose à  la modification de son contrat de 
travail du fait du transfert de sorte que le licenciement sera imputable 
au nouvel employer chez qui se trouve la modification.’310 
 
Thus, in situations involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking, the 
individual employment contract will determine whether the employee is 
required to perform his duties at the new location. Generally however, it 
appears that a one-sided modification of the place of employment is not 
accepted, especially where the place of employment is set to change between 
countries. The right of the employer to provide the employees with 
directions and instructions regarding their employment does not go so far as 
to require the employees to perform their duties towards their employer at a 
foreign location on a permanent basis. The transfer of a (part of) the 
undertaking of business abroad surely involves a substantial modification of 
the employment contract or employment conditions which cannot occur 
without the employees’ consent. The employer, i.e. the transferor, only has 
                                                          
309 Raif & Ginal 2013, p. 219; BAG 20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88, NZA 1990, 32. 
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the freedom to alter the place of employment by agreement with the 
transferee, in situations where a so-called mobility clause has been inserted 
into the employment contract. In addition, the sector in which the 
undertaking to be transferred operates might contribute to the admissibility 
of the alteration of the employment location. In certain types of businesses, 
especially those in the transport sector, such as undertakings involved in air 
travel and seagoing vessels, employees will be more easily required to 
accept a change in the location of the undertaking. 
 
In conclusion, the transfer of the employment contract or employment 
relationship of the employees involved in a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking is likely unfeasible without the consent of the affected 
employees. Employees who do not consent to changing their place of 
employment are not required to fulfill their employment abroad and as such 
are unlikely to transfer to the transferee. This unwillingness to transfer to the 
transferee does not prevent a transfer of undertaking from taking effect.311 
After all, once a transfer of undertaking is concluded the rights and 
obligations stemming from the employment contract or relationship transfer 
to the transferee by operation of law. As such, the employees’ unwillingness 
to perform their employment at the new location is viewed either as an 
objection to the transfer itself or as a breach of the employment contract or 
relationship and a reason for (collective) dismissal by the transferee.312 In 
some cases however, a cross-border relocation of the undertaking resulting 
in a change of work may result in a substantial change in working conditions 
to the detriment of the affected employees, an issue that is discussed below, 
in paragraph 6.3.  
 
6.2 Increase in travel time 
It is sometimes argued, that a cross-border transfer of undertaking does not 
take effect due to the increase in travel time and that as such a cross-border 
                                                          
311 There exist an exception to this notion: in labour-intensive undertakings the unwillingness 
of the majority of employees to transfer to the transferee may prevent the undertaking in 
question from retaining its identity thus preventing a transfer of undertaking from taking 
effect, see above paragraph 4.4.  
312 In any case, regardless of the cross-border relocation of the undertaking in which they are 
employed, the employees have the right to object to the transfer of their employment contract 
or relationship to the transferee, See Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 – Cross-border issues (substantive effects) 
90 
 
transfer of undertaking will only be feasible if the transfer takes place in 
areas nearing national borders. For instance, according to German case law 
the transfer of the business or undertaking over several hundred kilometers 
might, on its own, prevent the transferred entity from retaining its identity.313 
In this, special consideration is given to the distance between the transferred 
undertaking both before and after the transfer. In a recent judgment, the 
Dutch court of Midden-Nederland held that an increase of travel time from 
ten minutes by bike to two hours via public transport or one hour by car due 
to a transfer of undertaking did not form an insurmountable obstacle for the 
employee, nor could such an increase be characterized as a substantial 
change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee.314 It was not 
considered unreasonable for the transferee to demand that the employee 
carried out her employment at the new location.315 In its Explanatory 
Memorandum to Article 7:665 BW, the Dutch national transposition 
provision of Article 4(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, the Dutch 
legislator held that an increase in travel time could amount to a 
(substantial)316 change in working conditions to the detriment of the 
employee. What constitutes a reasonable travel time will vary depending on 
the employees function and the type of work involved. It seems to me that if 
an increase in travel time of up to two hours passes the test of reasonableness 
in domestic situations, the same holds true in situations where the employees 
are required, after the transfer, to perform their duties abroad. Thus the fact 
that a cross-border transfer of undertaking may be accompanied by a 
relocation that will result in an increase of travel time for the affected 
employees is not an issue that is limited to cross-border transfer scenarios. 
Surely, in cross-border transfer situations travel time is more likely to 
increase than it is in domestic situations, depending on the size of the 
country of the transferor, i.e. the country where the transferred undertaking 
was situated prior to the transfer. A change in travel time may amount to a 
change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee and may as 
                                                          
313 BAG 25 May 2000 – 8 AZR 335/99. 
314 Rb. Midden-Nederland 19 December 2014, Prg. 2015/41. 
315 MvT Kamerstukken II 1979-1980 15 940, nr. 3-4, p. 10; Gremmen & Duijm 2002, p. 28; 
Meulenbelt 1998, p. 6. 
316 In its previous wording, Article 7:665 BW did not include the word ‘substantial’ and 
appeared not to comply with the Acquired Rights Directive. The new Article 7:665 BW, 
which entered into force in 2015, does away with these issues.    
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such result in the employer being regarded as having been responsible for 
the termination of the contract of employment or of the employment 
relationship. What constitutes an unreasonable increase of travel time will 
have to be determined on the basis of the circumstances of the case, taking 
into account the rights and obligations stemming from the individual 
employment contract, the type of work and the function of the employee. To 
this effect, cross-border transfers of undertakings do not differ from 
domestic transfers, apart from the fact that travel time is likely to 
(exponentially) increase where it concerns transfers of undertakings that 
involve a cross-border relocation of the transferred undertaking.  
 
6.3 Substantial change in working conditions 
As demonstrated above, the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts apply to cross-border transfers of undertakings in situations 
involving an intra-European or outbound transfer. The rights and obligations 
of the affected employees are automatically secured in the event of the cross-
border transfer of the undertaking in which the are engaged. The cross-
border nature of the transfer does not preclude the undertaking from 
retaining its identity and may as such not prevent a transfer of undertaking 
from taking effect.317  Since the employees cannot exert any influence over 
the transfer of undertaking and the location at which they are to continue 
their employment there exist the question of which remedies are available to 
them in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. After all, a cross-
border transfer of undertaking may result in a change in the legal, linguistic, 
fiscal and social  environment. Surely the employees are allowed to object to 
the transfer of their employment contract or relationship when they do not 
wish to become employed by the transferor.318 This right is derived from the 
fundamental right of free work, according to which employees are allowed 
to freely choose their employer and cannot be obliged to work for an 
                                                          
317 However, as is clear from the previous paragraphs, the individual employment contract 
itself may prevent the employees from being forced to transfer to the transferee. Unless the 
individual employment contract contains an express mobility clause, the employees can 
generally not be forced to continue their employment at the new location.  Cf. McMullen 
2005, p. 300, who speaks of a serious breach of contract on the part of the transferee. 
318 Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos 
Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paets & Co. 
Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-06577, ECLI:EU:1992:517. 
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employer whom they have not freely chosen.319 The directive does not 
preclude the employees from objecting to the transfer of their employment 
relationship.320 The effects of such objection are to be determined by the 
laws of the Member States.321 As such, some Member States, such as 
Germany and Austria, allow the employees to maintain their employment 
contract or relationship with the transferee, whereas in other Member States 
such objection results in a termination of the employment contract.322 
Although the effects of an employee’s objection to the transfer of the 
employment contract or relationship may have different effects throughout 
the Member States, the reality is that in most cases where an employee 
decides on his own accord not to continue his employment with the 
transferee he will not be entitled to any damages or redundancy payments. 
The question therefore remains whether there are any other remedies 
available to employees in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking 
which they perceive to be to their detriment.  
 
If the reason for an employee’s refusal to transfer to the transferee lies in the 
fact that a transfer of his employment contract would constitute a detrimental 
substantial change in working conditions, the employment contract is 
                                                          
319 Cf. Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos 
Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paetz & Co. 
Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-6577, para. 32; In some countries this is even a 
constitutional right; Cf. Article 19 of the Dutch constitution (Grondwet); Article 12(1) first 
sentence of the German constitution (Grundgesetz); BAG 2 March 2006 - 8 AZR 124/05; 
BAG 25 January 2001 - 8 AZR 336/00, NZA 2001, 840; BAG 18 March 1999 - 8 AZR 190/98 
NZA 1999, 870; BAG 19 March 1998 - 8 AZR 139/97 NZA 1998, 750; BVerfG 24 April 
1991, 1 BvR 1341/90, BVerfGE 84, 133; BVerfG 10 March 1992, 1 BvR 454/91, BVerfGE 
85, 360.  
320 Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos 
Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paetz & Co. 
Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-6577, para. 37. 
321 Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos 
Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paetz & Co. 
Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-6577, para. 37. 
322 In the Netherlands for example the employment contract or relationship is considered to 
have terminated by operation of law once the employee unequivocally expresses his 
objection. See: Holtzer 2003, p. 54; Van Straalen 1999, p. 149; HR 26 May 2000, JAR 2000, 
152 (Veenendal/ van Vuuren); HR 24 December 1993, NJ 1994, 419 (Wijnens/ Haarlems 
Dagblad).  
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considered terminated by the employer. On the basis of Article 4(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, if a transfer of undertaking involves a substantial 
change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee, the 
employee may terminate the employment contract at the risk of the 
employer. In other words: if a transfer constitutes a substantial change the 
employee is allowed to terminate the employment contract. By reason of 
Article 4(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive the employer will be regarded 
as having been responsible for such termination. Where a detrimental 
substantial change is assumed the national court is required to provide that 
the employer is to be considered responsible for the termination.323 
According to the Belgian employment appeal tribunal of Luik, which ruled 
on this matter in a case involving a transfer from Belgium to the 
Netherlands, such a change in working conditions can only be invoked 
against the transferee, since the transferee is (primarily) responsible for the 
change in working conditions.324 
 
In cross-border transfer scenarios, the question is not whether there may be a 
substantial change to the detriment of the affected employees but rather 
whether a cross-border transfer of undertaking per se should be considered 
to cause such detriment. As stated by the Dutch Kantonrechter of Tilburg in 
a case involving a transfer from the Netherlands to Belgium, the ultimate 
question is whether, in the event of a transfer of undertaking, according to 
the specific circumstances of the case, the relocation to another country 
entails a substantial detriment to the working conditions of the employee :  
 
‘Uiteindelijk gaat het er om of de vestiging in een ander land en de 
overname van die onderneming in de concrete omstandigheden van dit 
geval een aanmerkelijk nadeel meebrengt voor de arbeidsomstandigheden 
van deze werknemer. Kortom, of de omstandigheden voor verzoekster zozeer 
wijzigen dat het billijk is de arbeidsovereenkomst te ontbinden en het risico 
daarvan bij de werkgever te leggen. Natuurlijk zijn de verschillen op het 
terrein van de sociale verzekeringen, belastingen, gezondheidszorg en 
andere terreinen van het maatschappelijk leven objectief beschouwd tussen 
                                                          
323 Case C-399/96 Europièces SA v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding 
Company SA [1998] ECR I- 6965, ECLI:EU:C:1998:532, para. 44. 
324 CT Liège 10 June 1993, JTT 1993, 371. 
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Nederland en België niet zodanig substantieel dat kan worden gezegd dat 
reeds daarom sprake is van aanmerkelijk nadeel (…).’325  
 
In this case, it appears that the Kantonrechter considers that differences in 
social insurance and benefits, taxation, health care and other areas of social 
life are factors that may attribute to the existence of a substantial change in 
working conditions to the detriment of the employee. However, between the 
Netherlands and Belgium differences in these factors are not considered 
sufficiently substantial to per se cause such detriment. Nonetheless the 
Kantonrechter did assume the existence of a detrimental change in working 
conditions due to the change in employment conditions, (which over time 
would have to be adapted to the Belgian collective bargaining system) and 
the increase in travel time. Of additional interest were the limited 
compensation for travel expenses, the absence of any compensation for the 
increase in travel time, the changes in working time and the associated 
(lower) surcharges.326 In a different case before the Dutch courts, involving a 
transfer of part of an undertaking from the Netherlands to Belgium, the 
employees considered the transfer to precipitate detrimental employment, 
social and fiscal effects and claimed employment by the transferor on the 
basis of the principles of reasonableness and fairness.327 This claim is 
rejected on the basis that the transfer to Belgium, which in this case did not 
involve a substantial increase in travel time, is not unreasonable. All in all, it 
seems that the question whether and under what conditions a change in the 
location of the undertaking will amount to a detrimental change in working 
conditions is to be decided according to the facts of the case and does not 
preclude the transferred undertaking from retaining its identity. Whereas 
some believe that there is no doubt that a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking will generally amount to a substantial change in working 
                                                          
325 Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259, para.. 2.23, 2.24. 
326 Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259, para. 2.25. Even though the court considers there 
to be a substantial change in working conditions this does not lead to the application of a 
different amount of damages compared to a regular procedure for dismissal.  
327 Since the employees wished to remain employed by the transferor it appears they based 
their claim on the principles of reasonableness and fairness and rather than on Article 7:665 
BW, which transposes Article 4(2) Acquired Rights Directive. In the Netherlands, the 
employees do not have a so-called Widerspruchsrecht, which allows them to remain 
employed by the transferee once they object to the transfer of their employment contract.   
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conditions328 it must be remembered that a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking per se does not amount to a substantial change in working 
conditions to the detriment of the affected employees.  
 
 
7 Collective effects 
This paragraph deals with the collective effects of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. The Acquired Rights Directive in Article 3(3), to a certain 
extent, makes provision for the continuity of terms and conditions agreed in 
collective agreements. The issue of the continuation of collective bargaining 
agreements upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking is one of vast 
complexity since the systems of industrial relations vary greatly.329 
Differences mainly regard the level of representation and the degree of 
autonomy of social partners. The differences in collective bargaining 
systems and practices throughout the Member States are so severe that these 
differences and variations have on occasion been considered ‘virtually 
insurmountable.’330 This situation is aggravated, especially where it concerns 
a possible cumulative application of collective bargaining agreements, such 
as in situations involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking, by the lack 
of unified rules on the conflict of laws for collective bargaining agreements 
and collective employment matters. To this end, in situations involving a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking the primary question is not which law 
governs a particular collective bargaining agreement but rather which 
collective bargaining agreement applies to the employment contracts or 
employment relationships of the employees directly affected by the cross-
border transfer.331 Thus if an undertaking is transferred to a foreign 
transferee coupled with a relocation abroad, the question arises whether the 
existing collective agreement enjoys continued application when both the 
work and the undertaking involved have transferred abroad. The law that 
applies to the collective agreement itself therefore plays an important part in 
determining which collective agreement applies in cross-border transfer 
situations. It is this law that determines the territorial scope of the collective 
                                                          
328 H. Fehér (Hungary) in: Kirchner et al. 2016, p. 256.  
329 Glassner & Keune 2010,  p. 5. 
330 Garcia Blasco 2004, p. 17 
331 Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 178; Junker 1992, p. 409 et seq. 
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bargaining agreement concerned. As such, the scope of a particular 
collective agreement may e.g. be limited to the location of employment, the 
location of the employer or the person of the employer. For example, the 
application of the Dutch collective bargaining agreement for haulage 
services by road and the rental of mobile cranes332 is limited both to the 
location of employment and the location of the employer; it applies first to 
all employees and employers established in the Netherlands who are 
required to obtain a license according to the Wet wegvervoer goederen333 and 
second, to all employers and employees of crane rental companies, meaning 
all companies providing services involving the rental of mobile cranes in the 
Netherlands.334  The application of collective agreements may also be limited 
to the person of the employer, where collective bargaining agreements have 
been concluded at the enterprise level. For example, Enexis, a Dutch energy 
network operator, applies a company-wide collective agreement to all its 
employees. Collective bargaining agreements may be concluded at an 
intersectoral, sectoral or enterprise level.335 The preferred structure of 
collective bargaining agreements varies throughout the Member States as do 
the rules governing the different structures:336  
 
‘The structure of collective bargaining also differs considerably from 
one country to the next. Although most of these structures gives 
preference to the sectoral and national level, there has been a 
pronounced shift in recent years toward the company level. Despite the 
fact that in all the Member States the usual bargaining parties are the 
                                                          
332 Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst Opleidings- en Ontwikkelingsfonds 
Beroepsgoederenvervoer over de weg en de verhuur van mobiele kranen, Stcrt. 2014, Nr. 
16315.  
333 The transport of goods by road act, Stb. 2013, 233; According to Art. 1(a) the collective 
agreement appies to: Alle werkgevers en werknemers van in Nederland gevestigde 
ondernemingen die vergunningplichtig vervoer krachtens de Wet wegvervoer goederen 
(hierna Wwg), zoals deze laatstelijk is gepubliceerd op 28 juni 2013 (staatsblad 233), 
verrichten, en/of die tegen vergoeding geheel of ten dele vervoer verrichten anders dan van 
personen, over de weg of over andere dan voor het openbaar verkeer openstaande wegen.  
334 According to Art. 1(b) the collective agreement applies to: Werkgevers en werknemers in 
het kraanverhuurbedrijf, waaronder wordt verstaan alle in Nederland werkzame 
ondernemingen, waarin het bedrijf wordt uitgeoefend van het verhuren van mobiele kranen. 
335 The growing decentralization of collective bargaining processes at an enterprise and plant 
level is a fairly recent development; Institut des Sciences du Travail 2002,  p. 15. 
336 CMS report 2006, p. 72. 
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trade unions and employers’ associations or the employers themselves, 
a clear evolution can also be seen in some countries geared toward 
permitting an “opening” for bargaining with works committees and 
other more specific representative subjects.’337  
 
Still, there appears to be one common factor in the sense that most European 
Member States provide mechanisms that extent the application of collective 
bargaining agreements to a certain sector limited to the territory of the 
Member State involved. These mechanisms ensure that collective bargaining 
agreements are legally binding for all employers and employees in that 
particular sector or territory.338 In summary, as stated by the CMS report ‘the 
application of collective bargaining agreements is even more problematic on 
a cross border transfer than on a transfer entirely within national 
boundaries.’339 This difficulty first arises from the infinite dissimilarities in 
national systems of industrial relations, giving rise to varying definitions of 
the notion of ‘collective bargaining agreement’ as well as differences in the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive. Second, the complexity of 
issues involving collective bargaining agreements is intensified by the lack 
of any specific unified conflict of laws provisions concerning collective 
bargaining agreements and collective employment matters. As this paragraph 
seeks to outline the collective effects of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, it therefore deals with issues of substantive law as well as the 
conflict of laws.    
 
7.1 Conflict of laws 
As stated above, a cross-border transfer of undertaking gives rise to two 
conflict of laws questions regarding collective bargaining agreements. The 
Acquired Rights Directive, in Article 3(3) obliges the transferee to, to a 
certain extent, observe the terms and conditions agreed in collective 
                                                          
337 Garcia Blasco 2004, p. 18 
338 ‘Extension of collective bargaining agreements in the EU. Background paper’ , Eurofound 
2011, p. 1, available online at:  
<http://eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_files/pubdocs/2011/54/en/1/EF1154EN.pdf> 
accessed: 11 October 2016; A commonly mentioned exception is the United Kingdom which 
has only recently established laws and regulations ‘enabling unions to gain recognition and 
bargaining rights’, See CMS Report 2006, p. 72.  
339 CMS report 2006, p. 72. 
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agreements as applicable to the transferor. In cross-border transfer situations 
the question therefore arises whether the existing collective agreement may 
be applied across national borders, when the cross-border transfer of 
undertaking has been accompanied by a simultaneous or subsequent cross-
border relocation of the transferred undertaking. In other words if an 
undertaking is transferred from country A to country B, will the collective 
agreement that is applied (between the transferor and the employees) in 
country A continue to apply in country B (between the transferee and the 
employees)? This involves a question in into the scope of applicability, i.e. 
the territorial scope of the affected collective bargaining agreements, a 
question which has to be answered by the law that applies to the agreement 
itself. In other words, one of the conflict of laws questions arising in 
situations involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking is which law 
applies to the collective agreement(s) existing with the transferor? In 
answering this question one must bear in mind that the Acquired Rights 
Directive, in Article 3(3) requires the transferee to continue to observe the 
rights and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms 
applicable to the transferor under that agreement. In this sense a strict 
application of the collective agreement existing with the transferor is not 
required as long as the transferee commits to observing the terms and 
conditions stemming therefrom. The first conflict of laws question relating to 
the territorial scope of collective bargaining agreements, although important 
in considering the actual continuance of such agreements, is trivial when it 
comes to establishing the rights and obligations that require protection upon 
a transfer of undertaking. A second, more important, conflict of laws 
question is which collective bargaining agreement is to prevail in situations 
involving a conflict between applicable collective bargaining agreements. 
For example, collective bargaining agreements existing with the transferee, 
or the mandatory laws in the country of the transferee or the new country of 
employment, may require application to the transferred employees.  
 
7.1.1 Application of collective bargaining agreements 
As for the first question, the territorial scope of collective bargaining 
agreements is determined by the collective agreements themselves and the 
law to which they are subject. As stated above, the application of collective 
bargaining agreements may e.g. be limited, depending on the structure and 
type of collective bargaining agreement, to the location of employment or 
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the nationality, person or location of the employer.340 To this end, 
internationally operating undertakings or sectors are more likely to include 
provisions on the territorial scope in the collective bargaining agreement 
itself.341 The application of collective bargaining agreements generally 
appears limited to a particular national (or regional) territory or sector within 
national territory. As such, if an undertaking is transferred to another 
country, e.g. another Member State, the transferee will not be operating 
within the territorial scope of the collective bargaining agreements in force 
prior to the transfer. In addition, in cross-border transfer situations, it appears 
unlikely that a foreign transferee will be party to the employers organizations 
active in the country of the transferor or the country in which the 
undertaking to be transferred is located. As such, a foreign transferee is not, 
on its own, bound by the collective agreements that exist with the transferor 
nor does the Acquired Rights Directive force the transferee to become party 
to the collective agreement in place at the business or undertaking of the 
transferor. Requiring the transferee to become party to the existing collective 
agreement would limit the transferee’s right to free association. Instead,  
Article 3(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive requires the transferee to 
uphold the terms and conditions agreed in the existing collective 
agreement.342 As such, the transferee does become bound by the terms and 
conditions stemming from the collective bargaining agreement that existed 
prior to the transfer of undertaking.343 He does not become party to the 
collective bargaining agreement on a collective basis, but by reason of 
Article 3(3) has to uphold the terms and conditions agreed in the existing 
collective agreement. Therefore, it has been questioned whether upon a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking the transferee still applies the existing 
collective bargaining agreement on a collective basis, a question which 
                                                          
340 Van Hoek distinguishes another category of atypical scope rules commonly used in 
shipping according to which the flag of the vessel and the domicile of the employee are 
important criteria, See: Van Hoek 2000, p. 503. 
341 Van Hoek 2000, p. 515. 
342 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of the legislation of the Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations, COM (74) 351 final/2, p.6-7; Beltzer 2008, p. 116-117. 
343 Beltzer 2008, p. 122. 
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according to the CMS report curiously has to be answered, on the basis of 
Article 6(2) Rome Convention, by the national law of the transferee:344  
 
‘To this extent a CBA will regularly not be applicable collectively as its 
application is generally restricted to the original national law under 
which it has been concluded. (…) Furthermore, an application on a 
collective basis is excluded, if the form of the CBA, e.g. as a works 
council agreement, is not a concept to the domestic law of the 
transferee. If a collective application of a CBA is excluded after a 
transfer of business, the terms and conditions provided for in this 
agreement must be observed on the basis of the individual employment 
contract. The possibility to extend the Directive and provide for a 
collective application of a CBA would raise difficult questions as this 
extension would require a uniform understanding of CBA within the 
Member States.’345 
 
To my mind, the application of collective agreements, the determination of 
their territorial scope and the question whether they, upon a transfer of 
undertaking continue to apply on a collective basis does not necessarily fall 
within the purview of Article 6 of the Rome Convention or Article 8 of the 
Rome I Regulation. In fact, the Guiliano/ Lagarde report makes clear that 
Article 6 of the Rome Convention does not apply to collective agreements; 
the same goes for Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation.346 The various forms 
and systems of collective bargaining make that there are different views and 
ideas on the conflict of laws rule that is to apply where questions concerning 
the application of collective bargaining agreements arise. For instance, 
where collective bargaining agreements have been declared universally 
                                                          
344 CMS report 2006, p. 72.  Here the report seems to disregard that Article 6 Rome 
Convention and Article 8 Rome I Regulation address the individual contract of employment 
and do not determine the applicable law to collective bargaining agreements. In addition, the 
CMS report appears to equate the national law of the transferee to the location of the 
undertaking after the transfer (i.e. the new place of habitual employment). Although these 
may on occasion be equal, the national law of the transferee does not per se equate to the 
location of the transferred undertaking after relocation.   
345 CMS Report 2006, p. 72-73; the –s has been added by me, since the report contains an 
obvious spelling error.   
346 Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ [1980] C 
282/25. 
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applicable or where their application stems from national law, it is generally 
considered that they, subject to their territorial scope, form part of the 
‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, 
in the absence of choice, would have been applicable’ to the individual 
employment contract, which generally coincides with the laws in force at the 
habitual place of employment.347 The declaration of universal application 
does not alter or preclude the application of the rules regarding the territorial 
scope incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement.  
 
The assimilation of collective bargaining agreements under the law that 
applies to the individual employment contract is often met with resistance.348 
A collective bargaining agreement is not concluded between the individual 
employee and the employer, but every so often between employers’ and 
employees’ organizations with similar bargaining power. The aim of 
protecting the weaker party, which is contained in Article 8 Rome I 
Regulation and Article 6 Rome Convention, is therefore incompatible with 
the nature of collective bargaining agreements. In addition, the reference rule 
for individual employment contracts in an effort to fulfill the aim of 
protecting the weaker party generally seeks connection to the habitual place 
of employment of the individual employee, rather than the place of 
employment of a collective of employees.349 Accommodating these 
observations there exists the view that collective bargaining agreements that 
have been declared universally applicable should apply irrespective of the 
laws in force at the habitual place of employment, the location of the 
employer, the nationality of the employer or the choice of law made in the 
                                                          
347 Art. 8(1) Rome I Regulation; Bloemarts 2004, 37 et seq.; Rb. (ktr.) Midden-Nederland 18 
March 2015, JAR 2015, 83; Günther & Pfister 2014, p. 347; In Germany however, it is 
generally considered that German collective bargaining agreements apply at least when the 
individual employment contract is governed by German law. Where the individual 
employment contract is governed by foreign law, the application of German collective 
agreements is not as easily assumed since in those situations and with regard to those specific 
employees the social partners lack the competence to complete a collective agreement: Cf. 
BAG 9 July 2003, AP TVG para. 1 Tarifvertrage: Bau Nr. 261; Oetker, Münchener Handbuch 
zum Arbeitsrecht 2009, § 11 Arbeitskollisionsrecht, para. 123. 
348 Thüsing 2003, p. 1311; Niksova 2014, p. 181; Junker 1992, p. 417; Rehberg 2013, p. 76; 
Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ [1980] C 
282/25. 
349 Niksova 2014, p. 181. 
Chapter 2 – Cross-border issues (substantive effects) 
102 
 
individual employment contract, and as such, qualify as overriding 
mandatory rules under Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation and Article 7 of 
the Rome Convention.350 Collective bargaining agreements that are not 
considered universally binding or that do not apply by reason of law are 
generally considered, in the absence of a choice of law,351 subject to the 
general rule of Article 4 Rome I Regulation and since in collective 
bargaining agreements it appears unmanageable to identify the person 
required to effect the characteristic performance the agreement is to be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected 
pursuant to Article 4(4) Rome I Regulation.352 In deciding on the closest 
connection, the place of establishment of social partners or the location of 
the undertaking are offered as decisive factors.353 Contrarily, it is sometimes 
considered that collective bargaining agreements cannot as a whole be 
assimilated under one of the conflict of laws categories existing under the 
Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention due to the various types of 
rules and regulations of which they are comprised.354 Collective bargaining 
agreements may encompass several types of provisions, such as individual 
normative provisions and collective normative provisions.355 In this view, 
individual normative provisions, which are incorporated in the individual 
employment contract by reason of their direct normative effect, become part 
of the law that governs the individual employment contract.356 Collective 
normative provisions govern the relation between the employer and the 
employee representative body or the relation between the employer and 
                                                          
350 Stichting van de Arbeid, Advies ‘Enkele aspecten van de sociale dimensie van Europe 
1992’, 5 februari 1991, Publikatienr. 1/91, p. 12; Hönsch 1988, p. 117; BAG 12 January 2005 
– 5 AZR 617/01, EZA no. 7 (with regard to posted workers); Schaub, Arbeitsrechts 
Handbuch, 2013, § 7. Internationales Arbeitsrecht, para. 17.  
351 It is generally considered that the social partners have the ability to include a choice of law 
into the concluded collective bargaining agreement, since the collective agreement is based in 
consensus: Cf. Schlachter 2000, p. 64.  
352 Zilinsky 2009, p. 1031-1037; Rehberg 2013, p. 76-77; Staundiger, VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 
8 Individualarbeitsverträge, para. 11 in: Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski u.a., Internationales 
Vertragsrecht 2011. 
353 Rehberg 2013, p. 77; Niksova 2014, p. 186. 
354 Niksova, 2014, p. 186-187. 
355 Even 2008, p. 750-754. 
356 Even 2008, p. 750. 
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employee vis-à-vis third collective entities.357 These issues may be governed 
by the law to which they are most closely connected or may even fall 
outwith the material scope of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome 
Convention.358 To this end it has been argued that collective bargaining 
agreements do not just establish rights and obligations between the 
contracting parties, but also confer rights on third parties and as such, these 
agreements cannot be classified as contractual obligations within the 
meaning of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention.359 The above 
shows that there is no unified view or theory on the law that is to be applied 
to collective bargaining agreements. The variety of views and ideas in this 
regard makes the issue of the conflict of laws regarding collective bargaining 
agreements one of vast complexity. Yet, the relevance of the conflict of laws 
with regard to collective bargaining agreements in situations involving a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking appears limited. It is generally 
recognized that the collective bargaining agreement itself determines its 
territorial scope, which is commonly limited to the territory of a specific 
Member State. Thus, in general, collective bargaining agreements are 
characterized by the principle of territoriality and as such are unlikely to 
require direct application once the affected undertaking is transferred 
abroad.360 In addition, a foreign transferee is not be easily bound by the 
existing collective agreement. He will generally not have been party to the 
collective bargaining process, either by himself or as a party to an 
employers’ organization. Even where it concerns collective bargaining 
agreements at the enterprise level, the transferee is not to be considered party 
to the existing collective bargaining agreement: the acquired rights 
provisions only ensure his continued position as employer in relation to the 
individual employment contracts and relationships, they do not effect the 
transferee becoming party to the existing collective bargaining 
agreements.361 As such, in cross-border transfer situations it appears unlikely 
                                                          
357 Even 2008 p. 751-753. 
358 Niksova 2014, p. 181-182.  
359 Niksova 2014, p. 276.  
360 Staundiger, VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 8 Individualarbeitsverträge, para. 11 in: 
Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski u.a., Internationales Vertragsrecht 2011; Reinhart, Münchener 
Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung, Band 3 2014, 
InsO § 337 Arbeitsverhältnis, para. 10. 
361 Kania 2012, p. 114.  
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that a collective bargaining agreement will continue to exist on a collective 
basis. The CMS report therefore considers the terms and conditions 
stemming from collective agreements to be incorporated into the individual 
employment contract upon a (cross-border) transfer of undertaking.362 The 
incorporation into the individual contract of employment, however, is not as 
obvious as the CMS report portrays. (Terms and conditions agreed in) 
collective bargaining agreements that cease to be applicable on their own 
merit, e.g. because they do not apply to a foreign transferee or at a foreign 
location, still require application by reason of Article 3(3) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive and its national counterparts. There exist two views to 
establishing this continued application: either the terms and conditions are 
incorporated into the individual employment contract or the terms and 
conditions are granted continued application by Article 3(3) itself, similar to 
the continued and after effects given to collective agreements on the national 
plane.363 The Acquired Rights Directive itself is not clear on whether the 
terms and conditions of collective agreements are to be upheld by the 
transferee on the basis of the individual contract of employment, or, by 
reason of Article 3(3), on a collective basis. Such collective basis cannot be 
explicitly derived from the Acquired Rights Directive itself, nor can the 
incorporation into the individual employment contract. What is clear is that 
the directive only ensures the continuation of the rights and obligations 
stemming from collective agreements with respect to the individual 
employee. The directive does not give rise to the safeguarding of rights and 
obligations awarded in collective bargaining agreements to third parties, 
such as employee representative bodies. In its explanatory memorandum to 
the 1974 proposal, the Commission stated that although the directive does 
not require the transferee to become party to a collective agreement against 
his will, the terms of employment embodied in the collective agreement 
should be respected: 
 
‘(…) in order to prevent the workers losing their terms of employment 
reached through collective agreements, paragraph 3 intends to provide a 
compromise: although the status of a party to any collective agreement 
is not imposed on the transferee, he shall respect existing terms of 
                                                          
362 CMS report 2006, p. 72. 
363 Kania 2012, p. 115-116.  
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employment reached through collective agreements and shall, in the 
case of collective agreements of limited duration, respect the terms of 
employment laid down in the collective agreement up to the end of its 
period of validity and, in the case of collective bargaining agreements 
for unlimited duration, for a period of one year.’364  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the ‘terms of employment’ 
reached through collective agreements are to be upheld. Terms and 
obligations stemming from collective agreements that do not have an effect 
on the terms of employment and that, as such, confer rights on others than 
the affected employees are not safeguarded by the directive. The argument 
that terms and conditions stemming from collective agreements cannot be 
incorporated into the individual employment contract because they are 
collective normative provisions that cannot be continued on an individual 
basis therefore does not hold true.365 This also follows from the phrasing of 
Chapter II of the directive, which is entitled ‘Safeguarding of employees' 
rights’ and the systematic coherence with Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, which is intended to guarantee the rights and obligations 
stemming from the individual employment contract or relationship.366 Still, 
the Acquired Rights Directive in Article 3(3) only ensures the continuance of 
the terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements on the same terms 
existing with the transferor and remains silent on the method through which 
such continuance is to be achieved. The importance of the difference 
between the two views lies in the manner in which the application of terms 
and conditions agreed in collective bargaining agreements are secured. If the 
terms and conditions stemming from a collective bargaining agreement are 
incorporated into the individual contract of employment, their continuance is 
required on the basis of Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive, whereas if 
continuance exists on a collective basis such continuance is considered to 
befall Article 3(3) Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
In light of the above one might ask whether the incorporation of formerly 
collective terms and conditions into the individual employment contract by 
operation of law, without the consent of the parties involved constitutes an 
                                                          
364 COM(74) 351 final/2, p. 6. 
365 Cf. BAG 26 September 1979 - 4 AZR 819/77, AP BGB § 613a Nr. 17 opinion Willemsen.  
366 As stated by Kania 2012, p. 120. 
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unauthorized interference with party autonomy.367 A compromise between 
the two views appears to be found in German law. According to the German 
Bundesarbeitsgericht the terms and conditions agreed in collective 
agreements are, by reason of the German acquired rights provision(s), 
incorporated into the employment relationship upon a transfer of 
undertaking. This however, does not mean that they lose their collective 
basis. In fact, the collective character of the incorporated terms and 
conditions continues to exist with the transferee and these terms do not 
become equal to the rights and obligations stemming from the individual 
employment contract.368 In any event, regardless of whether terms and 
conditions stemming from collective bargaining agreements are continued 
on an individual or collective basis, the Acquired Rights Directive requires 
the transferor ‘to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that 
agreement, until the date of termination or expire of the collective agreement 
or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement’, 
regardless of whether it involves a domestic or cross-border transfer of 
undertaking.    
 
7.1.2 Conflicting collective bargaining agreements 
The second conflicts question of importance is which collective bargaining 
agreement is to be applied in case of a conflict between collective bargaining 
agreements. For instance, upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking, it 
seems unlikely that the foreign transferee is bound by the same collective 
agreements as the transferor. In most cases, as outlined above, the transferee 
will not be party to the collective agreement in existence with the transferor 
prior to the transfer. The transferee is more likely to be party to a different 
collective bargaining agreement, either by reason of law or employers’ 
representation. Upon the relocation of the undertaking to the country of the 
transferee, these collective bargaining agreements may require application to 
the transferred employees. In its Opinion on the 1974 proposal for a 
Directive the Economic and Social Committee stated: 
 
                                                          
367 Cf. Kania 2012, p. 122; contra Niksova 2014, p. 276.   
368 BAG 22 April 2009 – 4 AZR 100/08, AP BGB § 613a Nr. 371, para. 61. 
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‘(…) a collective agreement should also continue to apply temporarily 
if the transferee is bound by another collective bargaining agreement 
which also covers the undertaking that has been transferred. Otherwise, 
if the collective agreement governing the transferee were less 
favourable than that hitherto applicable to the employees, there would 
be a risk that the change of employer would automatically result in less 
favourable terms of employment for the transferred staff.’369 
 
In the view of the Committee the affected employees should be entitled to 
the rights and obligations arising from the collective agreement existing with 
the transferor for a set period of time. The change of employer should not 
immediately result in the affected employees being subject to less favourable 
terms of employment. For this reason the Committee considered that the 
Acquired Rights Directive should include that ‘where the rights and 
obligations arising from the employment relationship are based on plant or 
company collective agreements concluded by the transferor, these rights and 
obligations shall be automatically transferred to the transferee and shall 
continue in force until such time as another collective agreement has been 
concluded between the parties concerned.’370 In addition, with regard to a 
transferee that is unbound by the collective bargaining agreement of the 
transferor, the Committee proposed that the transferee shall ‘respect the 
terms of employment laid down in the collective agreement concluded by the 
transferor until such time as another collective agreement has been 
concluded between the parties concerned. Should no other collective 
agreement be concluded between the parties within a period of one year from 
the date of the entry of the transferee into the employment relationship, the 
trade association's collective bargaining agreement, if any, by which the 
transferee is bound shall apply.’371 Upon instigation of the Economic and 
Social Committee, the Commission in its 1975 revised proposal for a 
directive in Article 3(2) concluded that the rights and obligations arising out 
of a collective agreement to which both transferor and transferee are party 
shall transfer to the transferee and continue to exist until a new collective 
                                                          
369 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on harmonization of the legislation of 
Member States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of 
mergers, takeovers and amalgamations, OJ [1975] C255/28. 
370 OJ [1975] C255/28.  
371 OJ [1975] C255/28. 
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agreement has been created.372 In addition the Commission proposed in 
Article 3(3) that where the transferee is not party to the collective agreement, 
the conditions of employment agreed in the trade association collective 
agreement in force with the transferor shall continue to be valid until a new 
agreement has been concluded, for a maximum of one year following the 
transfer. Once this period has lapsed, the collective agreement(s) in force 
with the transferee shall be applied. These provisions however, did not make 
it into the final directive. Directive 77/187/EEC concluded in Article 3(2) 
that ‘following the transfer within the meaning of Article 1 (1), the transferee 
shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that 
agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement 
or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement’, the 
phrasing of which has not been altered since. On the basis of the wording of 
this provision, it is often assumed that the transferee is able to directly apply 
its own collective bargaining agreement to the transferred employees.373 The 
obligation of the employer to uphold the terms and conditions agreed in 
collective agreements seizes to exist when a new collective agreement enters 
into force. As such, the transferor may be able to conclude a new collective 
bargaining agreement with the transferred employees or may be able to 
apply the collective agreements already in force at the undertaking of the 
transferee. With regard to the general applicability of collective bargaining 
agreements and the rights and obligations contained therein and their 
application in time the CMS report argues that after a cross-border transfer, 
the laws in force in the country of the transferee374 should apply, although it 
is aware that this proposal may be difficult to reconcile with the idea that the 
transferred employees should retain the rights that exist at the time of the 
transfer.375 As such, they consider that the Acquired Rights Directive would 
benefit from a rule determining which law applies to the rights and 
obligations stemming from a collective agreement. To this end, I believe it 
should be remembered that the directive does not require the continuance of 
actual collective agreements, but rather the continuance of rights and 
                                                          
372 OJ [1975] C255/28; COM (75) 429 final. 
373 Beltzer 2014, p. 76; Niksova 2014, p. 277. 
374 Obviously meaning the country of destination.  
375 CMS report, p. 73.  
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obligations stemming from collective agreements. Since the Member States 
are required to transpose the provisions of the directive into their national 
law, the continuance of terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements 
is safeguarded throughout the Member States. Thus, in intra-European 
transfer scenarios, regardless of whether the laws at the location of the 
transferor (i.e. the original location of the transferred undertaking) or that of 
the transferee (i.e. the location of the transferred undertaking after 
relocation) apply, the transferee is obliged to continue to observe these terms 
and conditions until such time that the collective agreement is terminated, 
expired or a new agreement has entered into force. Indeed, the terms and 
conditions arising from collective agreements in force with the transferor 
that exist on the date of the transfer shall continue to be observed by the 
transferee. To this end, even when the collective effect of the terms and 
obligations stemming from collective agreements has been terminated, the 
transferee has to observe the terms and conditions stemming from those 
agreements, subject to a possible one year ban on modifications. The 
transferee is, in principle, free to subject the affected employees to a new or 
amended collective agreement under foreign law.376 In practice however, this 
may prove difficult since the affected employees will generally not 
(immediately) be members of a foreign or transnational workers 
organization.          
 
7.2 Observance of terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements 
The rights and obligations related to an employment contract or employment 
relationship may be based in law, the individual employment contract, 
collective agreement(s), company (collective) agreement(s) or the everyday 
practice established between employer and employee. In classifying these 
rights, unlawful collective agreements, i.e. agreements that are not based in 
law or collective bargaining rights, and rights and obligations stemming 
from every practice are considered part of the rights and obligations 
stemming from the individual employment contract, insofar as they are 
individually negotiated or have otherwise become incorporated into the 
individual employment contract.377 These rights and obligations will 
consequently transfer to the transferee as rights and obligations arising from 
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377 Schima 2004, p. 103. 
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a contract of employment or from an employment relationship on the basis 
of Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
7.2.1 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund   
On the basis of Article 3(3) paragraph 1 of the Acquired Rights Directive 
‘the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in 
any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor 
under that agreement, until the date of termination or expire of the collective 
agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective 
agreement.’ In situations where collective agreements are concluded 
between workers’ and employers’ associations and that have not been 
declared generally binding, the directive does not force the transferee to 
become party to the collective agreement in place at the business or 
undertaking of the transferor as this would limit the transferee’s right to free 
association. Instead,  Article 3(3), which is modelled on French law, requires 
the transferee to uphold the terms and conditions agreed in the existing 
collective agreement.378 The directive allows the Member States to limit the 
period of observance of a collective agreement up to one year. The 
implementation of Article 3(3) will therefore differ throughout the Member 
States. As such, there exist different national rules and regulations on the 
extent of preservation of terms and conditions agreed in collective 
agreements. Whereas some Member States allow collective agreements to be 
substituted by  similar agreements, others provide for a strict compliance 
with the collective agreements existing on the date of the transfer. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the adherence to rights and obligations stemming 
from collective agreements is not restricted by time. To this end, the 
protection of employees appears unlimited due to the continued and after 
effects of collective agreements.379 As such, employment conditions in 
                                                          
378 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of the legislation of the Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations, COM (74) 351 final/2, p.6-7; Beltzer 2008, p. 116-117. 
379 See Article 14a Wet CAO. According to paragraph 2 of this provision the transferee is to 
adhere to the rights and obligations regarding employment conditions stemming from 
collective agreements until the expire of the collective agreement or entry into force of 
another collective agreement (either by law or collective bargaining). Also see Art. 2a Wet 
AVV;  Case C-328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich 
– Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen [2014] JAR 2014/263, 
opinion Beltzer. 
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collective agreements may continue to apply even after expiration of the 
collective agreement or entry into force of a new collective agreement.380 
This continued effect is derived either from law, on the basis of Article 12 
and Article 13 Wet CAO, or from incorporation into the employment 
contract. To this end, terms and conditions incorporated into the employment 
contract by express agreement between the parties have hitherto been 
considered to transfer to the transferee on the basis of Article 7:663 BW, the 
Dutch provision transposing Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may however 
shine a different light on this consideration. The case of the Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund involved the continued effect given to collective 
agreements established at enterprise level, i.e. company agreements, by 
Austrian law.381 The case involves an enterprise level collective bargaining 
agreement concluded for a group of companies in the air transport sector as 
well as a collective agreement in force only at a subsidiary of the group. 382 
For economic reasons, the parent company decided to transfer its aviation 
activities to the subsidiary, aiming to subject the employees to less 
favourable employment terms and conditions under the subsidiary’s 
collective agreement. The collective agreement in force at the parent 
company, as well as the subsidiary’s collective agreement, was terminated 
with effect from the date of the transfer. However, by reason of §13 
                                                          
380 In this sense, until such time as a new collective bargaining agreement has been concluded, 
the provisions oft he former collective agreement are considered to require continued 
application on an individual basis. As such, the former collective agreements are incorporated 
into the individual contract of employment. See Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba  5 July 1977, NJ 1978/134; HR 8 April 2011, JAR 2011/135, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP0580, in this case the Hoge Raad rules that the amaneded provisions of 
an employment agreement may continue to apply after expiration oft he collective bargaining 
agreement. More so, when these provisions are more beneficial tot he employee than those of 
a successive collective agreement, they continue to apply on the basis of the individual 
employment contract; Rayer 2011, p. 30 et seq.  
381 Case C-328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich – 
Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen [2014]  
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2197.  
382 The facts of the case are clearly stated in the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón 
in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — Fachverband 
Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen Case C‑328/13 [2014] – 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:909, para. 8-12. 
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ArbVG383, the terms and conditions agreed in the collective agreement were 
given continuing effect until the conclusion of a new collective agreement or 
an individual agreement between the parties. Following the rescission of the 
parent company’s collective agreement the transferee, i.e. the subsidiary, 
began applying unilaterally adopted internal guidelines resulting in a 
deterioration of employment conditions and a significant reduction of salary 
to the detriment of the transferred employees. The union representing the 
employees disputed the actions of the transferee and claimed that the effects 
of the terminated collective agreement should continue as a result of its 
continuing effect. The representative of the transferee however, believed that 
the agreement with continuing effect does not constitute a ‘collective 
agreement’ within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23/EC. To 
this end, the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof posed the following preliminary 
question: 
 
‘Is the wording of Article 3(3) of Directive [2001/23], according to 
which the “terms and conditions” agreed in any collective agreement 
and applicable to the transferor must continue to be observed “on the 
same terms” until the “date of termination or expiry of the collective 
agreement”, to be interpreted as also covering terms and conditions laid 
down by a collective agreement which have continuing effect 
indefinitely under national law, despite the termination of the collective 
agreement, until another collective agreement takes effect or the 
employees concerned have concluded new individual agreements?’384 
 
In answering this question the ECJ, echoing the words of Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón, states that the directive does not require the continuation of 
the existing collective agreement, but rather the continuation of the terms 
and conditions agreed in collective agreements, ‘without the specific origin 
                                                          
383 Bundesgesetz vom 14. Dezember 1973 betreffend die Arbeitsverfassung 
(Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz - ArbVG) 
StF: BGBl. Nr. 22/1974, last altered by BGBl. I Nr. 71/2013. 
384 In fact, the Austrian court posed two preliminary questions, the second question being: ‘Is 
Article 3(3) of Directive [2001/23] to be interpreted to the effect that “application of another 
collective agreement” of the transferee is to be understood as including the continuing effect 
of the likewise terminated collective agreement of the transferee in the abovementioned 
sense?’. Since the CJEU saw no need to answer the second question, only the first question is 
discussed above. 
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of their application being decisive.’385 As such, the method utilised in 
applying the terms and conditions stemming from collective agreements to 
the transferred employees remains irrelevant. On the basis of this 
consideration, the Court held that Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23/EC 
includes ‘terms and conditions laid down in a collective agreement, which, 
pursuant to the law of a Member State, despite the rescission of that 
agreement, continue to produce their effects as regards the employment 
relationship which was governed by them before the agreement was 
terminated,’ ‘so long as that employment relationship is not subject to a new 
collective agreement or a new individual agreement is not concluded with 
the employees concerned.’386 Thus, terms and conditions arising from 
rescinded, discontinued or expired collective agreements that are given 
continuing effect by law are considered ‘terms and conditions agreed in any 
collective agreement’ under Article 3(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
The fact that this continued effect originates from law is immaterial to this 
consideration. The mechanisms of providing continuing or after-effect to a 
collective agreement exist in a variety of Member States. For example, in 
addition to Austria and the Netherlands, Belgium, to a certain extent 
provides continued effect in situations where the collective bargaining 
agreement is wholly or partly incorporated into the individual employment 
contract. According to Article 23 Wet CAO387 the individual employment 
contract that was tacitly altered by a collective agreement remains 
unchanged when the collective agreement ceases to have effect, unless 
agreed otherwise in the agreement itself.388 In situations involving a cross-
border transfer of undertaking the transferee is unlikely to be bound by any 
legal provision extending the application of collective bargaining 
agreements, except in those situations where the transferee decides to carry 
                                                          
385 Case C‑328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — 
Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen [2014]   
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2197, para. 24. 
386 Case C‑328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — 
Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen [2014]   
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2197, para. 31. 
387 Wet van 5 December 1968 betreffende de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten en paritaire 
comités.  
388 ‘De individuele arbeidsovereenkomst die door een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst 
stilzwijgend werd gewijzigd, blijft onveranderd, wanneer de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst 
ophoudt uitwerking te hebben, tenzij het anders wordt bedongen in de overeenkomst zelf.’ 
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on the transferred business or undertaking at the location operated by the 
transferee. In other words, where a cross-border transfer of undertaking is 
not accompanied by a cross-border relocation the transferee will be bound by 
any provision granting continuing effect to an existing collective bargaining 
agreement to the same extent as the transferor would have. To a certain 
extent, it seems immaterial whether the transferee is bound by provisions 
granting continuing or after effects to a rescinded, discontinued or expired 
collective agreement as the transferee is obliged to continue the rights and 
obligations stemming from collective agreements that are in force at the time 
of the transfer. In that sense the transferee does not become bound by the 
legal provisions existing in the country of the transferor, but is rather 
required to uphold the terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements. 
Here, the case law provided by the ECJ makes clear that the specific origin 
of the applicable collective bargaining rights is irrelevant to the continuation 
of these rights and obligations by the transferee. As such, the terms and 
conditions stemming from collective agreements are considered to require 
continuation on the basis of Article 3(3) Acquired Rights Directive.389 
 
7.2.2 Definition of collective agreement 
The definition of collective agreement is not specified by the directive. As 
such, the preservation of terms and conditions applies to various types of 
collective agreements, depending on national transposition measures. Surely, 
the traditional collective agreement, the application of which is generally 
limited to those involved, either directly or indirectly, in the collective 
bargaining process is covered by Article 3(3) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts. In this sense a collective agreement 
applies only to those employers and employees that are members of the 
employers’ and employees’ organizations that are party to concluding the 
collective agreements. Yet, public authorities may decide to extend the scope 
of (parts of)  such a collective agreement and declare it generally binding, for 
instance by stating that the collective agreement concerned applies to all 
those involved in a specific sector or geographic area. In addition to the 
                                                          
389 With regard to Dutch collective agreements Haanappel-van der Burg notes that Dutch 
collective bargaining law is insufficiently aligned with the Acquired Rights Directive and as 
such makes a plea for the creation of a separate law for transfers of undertakings, independent 
from the existing collective bargaining laws: Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 282; Cf. 
Houweling 2014; Jansen 2014, p. 119-120. 
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classic collective agreement some Member States apply their national 
legislation transposing Article 3(3) to specific collective agreements 
restricted to the business or undertaking to be transferred. In these Member 
States, the transferee is required to observe the terms and conditions of in-
house or works council agreements and company (collective) agreements.390 
For instance, in Germany 391 §613a(1) BGB explicitly states that the rights 
and obligations stemming from the employment relationship, which are 
based in a company agreement (Betriebsvereinbarung) will become part of 
the employment relationship between the new employer, i.e. the transferee, 
and the employee and cannot be changed to the detriment of the employee 
for at least one year after the date of the transfer.  In Austria, a mere transfer 
of undertaking does not alter the application of the existing company (wide) 
agreements. The simple transfer of the person responsible for carrying on the 
business does not alter the identity of the transferred business or undertaking 
and as such cannot alter the company agreements in force at the time of the 
transfer.392 § 31 (4) ArbVG393 clearly states:  
 
‘Die Geltung von Betriebsvereinbarungen wird durch den Übergang 
des Betriebes auf einen anderen Betriebsinhaber nicht berührt.’ 
 
Conversely, in the Netherlands these type of company agreements are not 
classified as collective since the rights and obligations stemming from such 
agreements only become part of the employment relationship by reason of 
                                                          
390 E.g. France, Germany and Austria, See CMS Report 2006, p. 72.  
391 §613a(1) second sentence et seq. BGB reads: ‘Sind diese Rechte und Pflichten durch 
Rechtsnormen eines Tarifvertrags oder durch eine Betriebsvereinbarung geregelt, so werden 
sie Inhalt des Arbeitsverhältnisses zwischen dem neuen Inhaber und dem Arbeitnehmer und 
dürfen nicht vor Ablauf eines Jahres nach dem Zeitpunkt des Übergangs zum Nachteil des 
Arbeitnehmers geändert werden. Satz 2 gilt nicht, wenn die Rechte und Pflichten bei dem 
neuen Inhaber durch Rechtsnormen eines anderen Tarifvertrags oder durch eine andere 
Betriebsvereinbarung geregelt werden. Vor Ablauf der Frist nach Satz 2 können die Rechte 
und Pflichten geändert werden, wenn der Tarifvertrag oder die Betriebsvereinbarung nicht 
mehr gilt oder bei fehlender beiderseitiger Tarifgebundenheit im Geltungsbereich eines 
anderen Tarifvertrags dessen Anwendung zwischen dem neuen Inhaber und dem 
Arbeitnehmer vereinbart wird.’ 
392 Schima 2004, p. 129. 
393 Bundesgesetz vom 14. Dezember 1973 betreffend die Arbeitsverfassung 
(Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz - ArbVG) 
BGBl. Nr. 22/1974 
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the express consent of the employee. To this end, the consent of the 
employee effectuates the incorporation of rights and obligations stemming 
from company agreements into the individual employment contract. 
Consequently, rights and obligations based in company agreements are 
classified as individual in nature and transfer to the transferee by reason of 
Article 7:663 BW, the national provision implementing Article 3(1) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive.394 The diversity of collective agreements that 
require preservation throughout the Member States is, once again, an effect 
of partial harmonization. Accordingly, the directive only seeks ‘to ensure 
that the employee is protected in his relations with the transferee to the same 
extent as he was in his relations with the transferor under the legal rules of 
the Member State concerned’.395 In the case of the Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund Advocate General Cruz Villalón questioned whether the 
term ‘collective agreement’ in Article 3(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
is an autonomous concept of EU law or a concept subject to definition by the 
Member States.396 He goes on to consider that due to the fact that the 
directive is set to achieve partial rather than complete harmonization, the 
provisions of the directive are not always interpreted in an autonomous 
manner. To this end, the directive makes a distinction between the formation 
and effects of the employment relationship: whereas the directive leaves it to 
national law to define how an employment relationship is formed, it does 
ensure that there are common, minimum rules relating to the effects of the 
employment relationship upon a transfer of undertaking.397 The primary aim 
of the directive is to ensure the safeguarding of the rights of the employees 
affected by a transfer of undertaking, the origin of those rights is but of 
                                                          
394 Article 14a Wet CAO only references collective agreements and makes no mention of 
company agreements; Beltzer 2008, p. 118; Jansen 2014, p. 119. 
395 Case 324/86 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S [1988] 
ECR 739, EU:C:1988:72, paragraph 16;  Case C‑4/01 Serene Martin, Rohit Daby and Brian 
Willis v South Bank University [2003] ECR I-12859,  EU:C:2003:594, paragraph 41; and Case 
C‑396/07 Mirja Juuri v Fazer Amica Oy [2008] ECR I-8883, ECLI:EU:C:2008:656, 
paragraph 23. 
396 Opinion Advocate General Cruz Villalón Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und 
Schifffahrtsunternehmungen Case C‑328/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:909, para. 34.  
397 Opinion Advocate General Cruz Villalón Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und 
Schifffahrtsunternehmungen Case C‑328/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:909 para. 37, 38.  
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secondary concern. As such, it is considered that the Acquired Rights 
Directive does not encompass an autonomous concept of collective 
agreement; the existence of a collective agreement is to be determined on the 
basis of national law.398  
 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
Upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking the effects to be given to a 
collective agreement will largely depend on the applicable law, both to the 
transfer of undertaking itself and to the collective agreement in dispute.399 
Since the application of collective bargaining agreements, due to their semi-
public nature, is mostly subject to principles of territoriality, the actual 
application of collective agreements may seize once the transferred 
undertaking is relocated abroad. In addition, the freedom of association 
prevents the transferee from being forced to become party to existing 
collective agreements. As such, it seems unlikely that the collective 
agreements in force with the transferor will per se be applicable once the 
undertaking transfers abroad to the transferee. The directive does not require 
the continuance of actual collective agreements, but rather the continuance 
of rights and obligations stemming from collective agreements. In intra-
European transfer scenarios, regardless of whether the laws at the original 
location of the transferred undertaking or the location of the transferred 
undertaking after relocation apply, the transferee is obliged to continue to 
observe these terms and conditions.400 In this sense, terms and conditions 
stemming from collective agreements befall Article 3(3) Acquired Rights 
Directive, irrespective of the method used to effectuate their application.401 
Indeed, on the basis of Article 3(3) Acquired Rights Directive, the terms and 
conditions arising from collective agreements in force with the transferor 
that exist on the date of the transfer shall continue to be observed by the 
                                                          
398 Opinion Advocate General Cruz Villalón Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und 
Schifffahrtsunternehmungen Case C‑328/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:909, p. 43. 
399 The applicable law to the transfer and its collective effects are dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
400 Depending on the applicable law to the transfer of undertaking different rules may exist 
with regard to in- and outbound transfer scenario’s. See Chapter 4.  
401 Case C‑328/13 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — 
Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen [2014]  
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2197, para. 25.  
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transferee. To this end the transferee is required to observe the terms and 
conditions stemming from those agreements until the date of termination or 
the expiry of those collective agreements or the entry into force or 
application of another collective agreement. The Member States are free to 
limit the period of observance, provided that this period is not less than one 
year. The optional character of this mandatory period of observance may 
give rise to issues of conflicting laws in situations where e.g. the Member 
State of origin (mostly that the transferor) has chosen to utilize this option, 
whereas the Member State of destination (mostly that of the transferee) has 
not. In such situations it is important to determine the applicable law to (to 
the continuing of collective effects under) a transfer of undertaking. As such, 
the issue of the continuance of collective bargaining agreements in situations 
involving a transfer of undertaking is one that gives rise to questions that are 
to be resolved by conflict of laws rules. Still, at least in intra-European 
transfer scenarios, it is clear that where transferor was bound by a collective 
agreement according to the laws of Member State A, the transferee is 
obliged to apply the terms and conditions of that collective agreement to the 
employees who transfer with the (part of a) business or undertaking to 
Member State B.402 Thus, the terms and conditions arising from collective 
agreements in force with the transferor that exist on the date of the transfer, 
under the laws in force in the country of the transferor or the country in 
which the undertaking to be transferred is situated, on the basis of Article 
3(3), shall continue to be observed by the transferee.       
  
 
8. Pension rights 
Article 3(4)(a) of the Acquired Rights Directive provides that ‘unless 
Member States provide otherwise, paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply in 
relation to  employees' rights to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits 
under supplementary company or intercompany pension schemes outside the 
statutory social security schemes in Member States.’ Thus, it is left to the 
Member States to either apply their national acquired rights provisions to 
employees' rights to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits or to refrain 
from doing so. As such, even though the  application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive itself does not extend to pension rights, it does not require the 
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Member States to uphold such exclusion. As a result, differences exist in the 
national application of these rights throughout the Member States. The rights 
to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits and the application thereof and 
eligibility therefore differ as well. In addition, these rights and benefits are 
generally closely connected to a Member State’s social security system, 
which makes their application across national borders even more difficult. In 
order to facilitate the free movement of pension schemes there exist 
Directive 98/49/EC403 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of 
employed and self-employed persons and Directive 2014/50/EU on the 
acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights.404 The first 
directive ensures that the vested pension rights of a person leaving a pension 
scheme due to his relocation to another Member State must be preserved to 
the same extent as for a person who remains in that Member State. In 
addition, employees, as beneficiaries of a supplementary pension scheme are 
entitled to receive their benefits in any Member State. The latter directive, 
which has to be transposed by the Member States by 21 May 2018,405 
ensures several minimum standards for the protection of pension rights of 
employees who move between Member States. Thus, pension rights are 
irrevocably vested after three years of employment and an employee’s 
personal contributions to his pension scheme cannot be lost. When leaving a 
pension scheme, employees are entitled to keep their vested pension rights in 
the scheme. In addition, employees are entitled to information on how 
potential mobility might affect their pension rights. Whereas the directives 
on the free movement of pension schemes protect the employees involved in 
an intra-European transfer of undertaking, their application does not extend 
to employees who move to a third country. Thus in outbound transfer 
                                                          
403 Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension 
rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community OJ [1998] L 
209/46. 
404 Directive 2014/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
minimum requirements for enhancing worker mobility between Member States by improving 
the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights OJ [2014] L128/1. 
405 According to Article 8(1)of Directive 2014/50/EU states that: ‘Member States shall adopt 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 
21 May 2018, or shall ensure that the social partners introduce the required provisions by way 
of agreement by that date. Member States are required to take the necessary steps enabling 
them to guarantee the results imposed by this Directive. They shall immediately inform the 
Commission thereof.’  
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situations the directives do not assist in the preservation of vested pension 
rights of the employees affected by the transfer, albeit the national acquired 
rights provisions in force in the Member State where the undertaking is 
situated may provide for the transfer of rights to old-age, invalidity or 
survivors' benefits under supplementary company or intercompany pension 
schemes. In cross-border transfer situations, the question arises which 
national acquired rights provisions are to prevail in situations involving a 
transfer of undertaking from a Member State that excludes the application of 
national acquired rights provisions to supplementary pension schemes to a 
Member State that does not uphold this exclusion and vice versa; a question 
that is to be  resolved by the conflict of laws.406 In addition, there is the 
question as to the cross-border transferability of these pension rights, an 
issue that is not dealt with in Directive 2014/50/EU. Pension transferability 
is considered vital to worker mobility and Member States should endeavour 
to improve the transferability of vested pension rights.407 There is, at present, 
no European legislation on the transferability of supplementary pension 
rights; whether these rights are able to be transferred across national borders 
is for the Member States to decide. Upon a transfer of undertaking however, 
the employees do not lose their vested pension rights simply by reason of the 
cross-border nature of the transfer, since Directive 2014/50/EU ensures ‘that 
the vested pension rights of outgoing workers can remain in the 
supplementary pension scheme in which they were vested.’408  In situations 
involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking supplementary pension 
schemes in force with the transferor could possibly conflict with the 
mandatory laws of the country of the transferee or the location of the 
transferred undertaking after the transfer. The CMS report therefore suggests 
that the directive, in order to protect the rights of the transferred employees, 
should refer to the national law of the Member State in which the transferor 
                                                          
406 See Chapter 4.  
407 Recital 24, Directive 2014/50/EU; European Commission, ‘Call for advice to EIOPA 
regarding transferability of supplementary pension rights’, p. 2, available online at: 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Requests%20for%20advice/140520_DG_Letter_to_EIOP
A_on__call_for_advice_portability.doc.pdf, Cf. EIOPA, ‘Consultation paper on a Report on 
Good Practices on individual transfers of supplementary occupational pension rights’, 
EIOPA-CP-15/001 [2015], available online at:  
<https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/EIOPA-CP-15-
001_Pensions_Transferability_Final.pdf> accessed: 9 October 2016. 
408 Article 5(1) Directive 2014/50/EU.  
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is located409 or alternatively, that the directive could provide that it is not 
applicable to the rights to old-age, invalidity or survivor’s benefits in cases 
of cross-border transfers.’410 As is apparent from the proposed conflict rule 
for transfers of undertakings in paragraph 8 of Chapter 4, I agree with the 
report that the location of the transferor or the undertaking to be transferred 
is best suited to apply in order to safeguard the rights of the affected 
employees. If employees, under the national law existing in the country of 
the transferor or the country where the undertaking to be transferred is 
located, have the right to continue their rights to old-age, invalidity or 
survivor’s benefits, those rights should not seize to exist simply because the 
undertaking in which they are employed is transferred across national 
borders. This is in line with the aim of the directive, which is to safeguard 
the rights and obligations stemming from the employment relationship that 
exists at the time of, i.e. immediately prior to, the transfer. I see no point in 
expressly excluding the transfer of rights to old-age, invalidity or survivor’s 
benefits under supplementary company or intercompany pension schemes 
with respect to cross-border transfers of undertakings. After all, the Member 
States are still free to introduce laws that are more favourable to the affected 
employees, which will then give rise to the same conflict of laws questions 
as presently under discussion. For intra-European transfers of undertakings, 
the introduction of Directive 2014/50/EU will help to preserve the acquired 




As per Article 5(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive ‘unless Member States 
provide otherwise, Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to any transfer of an 
undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business where the 
transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous 
insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the 
liquidation of the assets of the transferor and are under the supervision of a 
competent public authority (which may be an insolvency practioner 
authorised by a competent public authority).’ Thus, the directive leaves it to 
the Member States to decide whether they apply their national acquired 
                                                          
409 CMS report 2006, p. 74. 
410 CMS report 2006, p. 75. 
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rights provisions to the transfer of insolvent undertakings. Some Member 
States have chosen to extend the application of their national acquired rights 
provisions to insolvent undertakings whereas others have not.411 In cross-
border transfer situations, the question thus arises which national acquired 
rights provisions are to prevail in situations involving a transfer of 
undertaking from a Member State that excludes the application of Article 3 
and 4 to a transferor that is subject to bankruptcy proceedings to a Member 
State that does not uphold this exclusion as well as the reverse situation.412 A 
transfer of undertaking was assumed in the case of a transfer of an insolvent 
undertaking from Germany to France.413 In this particular case however, 
there was no major difference between the acquired rights provisions of the 
affected laws, since both countries have opted to apply their acquired rights 
provisions to a transferor that is subject to bankruptcy proceedings. Still, 
given the differences in the laws of the Member States on insolvency 
proceedings the CMS report feels that there may be conflicts of law in cases 
involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking.414 The European 
Commission is aware of the differences in national insolvency proceedings 
and encourages corporate restructuring in an effort to avoid insolvency: 
 
‘National insolvency rules vary greatly in respect of the range of the 
procedures available to debtors facing financial difficulties in order to 
restructure their business. Some Member States have a limited range of 
procedures meaning that businesses are only able to restructure at a 
relatively late stage, in the context of formal insolvency proceedings. In 
other Member States, restructuring is possible at an earlier stage but the 
procedures available are not as effective as they could be or involve 
varying degrees of formality, in particular in relation to the use of out-
                                                          
411 A 2007 report shows 11 Member States that have applied their national acquired rights 
provisions to transfers of undertakings against 13 that have not: Commission report on Coucil 
Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employmees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, COM [2007] 334 final. 
412 Cf. CMS report 2006, p. 77. 
413 Cass. soc. 28 March 2006 n°03-43995; Cass. soc. 13 April 1999 RJS 1999, n°794 ; BAG 
20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88. 
414 CMS report 2006, p. 54. 
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of-court processes.415 (…)A restructuring framework should enable 
debtors to address their financial difficulties at an early stage, when 
their insolvency could be prevented and the continuation of their 
business assured. However, in order to avoid any potential risks of the 
procedure being misused, the financial difficulties of the debtor must be 
likely to lead to its insolvency and the restructuring plan must be 
capable of preventing the insolvency of the debtor and ensuring the 
viability of the business.’416  
 
If insolvency is averted via corporate restructuring, a transfer is within the 
scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. In countries where national acquired 
rights provisions do not apply to a transferor that is subject to bankruptcy 
proceedings there is the risk that the ‘tool’ of bankruptcy is utilized in order 
to circumvent the application of the Acquired Rights Directive and its 
national counterparts.417 For example, the so-called pre-pack, according to 
which the continuation of an economically troubled undertaking is pre-
planned with the help of the intended trustee in bankruptcy, who upon the 
undertaking being declared insolvent, in his formal role as trustee realizes 
the continuation of the undertaking, is sometimes considered an intentional 
circumvention of acquired rights provisions and may therefore, on occasion, 
be covered by the directive.418 In any event, Article 5(4) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive requires the Member States to take ‘appropriate measures 
with a view to preventing misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as 
to deprive employees of the rights provided for in this directive.’ Thus, 
where the main reason for the institution of insolvency proceedings is based 
                                                          
415 Commission Recommendation of 12.2.2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final, Recital 2, p. 2. 
416 Commission Recommendation of 12.2.2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final, Recital 16, p. 4. 
417 Cf. In the Netherlands there is currently much ado about the phenomenon of the so-called 
pre-pack (similar sentiments exist in the United Kingdom). If the pre-pack, and subsequent 
bankruptcy is deployed in order to reorganize in silence, the undertaking to be transferred 
could fall within the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive: See: Beltzer 2014 II, p. 360 et 
seq.; Beltzer 2015, p. 32-43; Wetsvoorstel continuïteit van ondernemingen I, 22 October 
2013; Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33695, 5.  
418 Cf. Rb. Noord-Nederland, (ktr. Leeuwarden) 22 August 2014, JAR 2014/234, 
ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2014:4598; Peters 2014; Paauw 2015, p. 119 et seq.; Beltzer 2014 III, p. 
22 et seq.; Verburg 2014, p. 26 et seq. ; Hufman 2014, p. 32 et seq.  
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in the evasion of the transferor’s and transferee’s obligations under the 
directive, regardless of the non-uniformity of insolvency proceedings 
throughout the Member States, it appears that the provisions of the directive 
should apply to a transfer that involves a transferor that is subject to 
insolvency proceedings. Given the differences in national insolvency 
proceedings and the various applications of national acquired rights 
provisions to insolvent undertakings, a cross-border transfer of an insolvent 
undertaking will almost inevitably result in problems of conflicting laws. In 
summary, with regard to the cross-border transfer of insolvent undertakings 
it may be concluded that due to the Acquired Rights Directive effectuating 
only partial harmonization, the laws of the Member States regarding the 
transfer of insolvent undertakings naturally vary. In cross-border transfer 
situations this issue appears even more complicated by the variances existing 
in national insolvency proceedings throughout the Member States.419 Thus, 
cross-border transfers of insolvent undertakings are naturally characterized 
by problems regarding the conflict of laws. To this end, it seems unjustified, 
in cross-border transfer situations, to deprive the affected employees of the 
rights to which they are due on the basis of the national law of the location 
of the undertaking to be transferred.420 A discussion of the appropriate 
conflict of laws path, however, is an issue that is reserved for Chapter 4 of 




The initial aim of this Chapter was to outline the potential substantial effects 
of a cross-border transfer of undertaking in order to highlight the need for a 
clear an unified conflict of laws path with regard to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings. For the purposes of this research cross-border transfers of 
                                                          
419 Proceedings that have as their object the continuation of the undertaking or business in 
liquidation are generally not considered insolvency proceedings under Article 5 of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. In Dethier/ Dassy the ECJ held that the directive applies to an 
undertaking that continues to trade while its being wound up. Since the continuity of the 
business is assured when the undertaking is transferred there is no justification for depriving 
the employees of the rights which the directive guarantees them: Case C-319/94 Jules Dethier 
Équipement SA v Jules Dassy en Sovam SPRL [1998] ECR I-1061, ECLI:EU:C:1998:99 para. 
31.   
420 For more on the conflict of laws, see Chapter 4. 
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undertakings are characterized as transfers of undertakings, (most probable) 
to a foreign transferee, involving a cross-border relocation of the transferred 
undertaking upon or immediately after the transfer. To this end, three types 
of cross-border transfer scenarios can be distinguished: the intra-European 
transfer, the outbound transfer and the inbound transfer. In these scenarios,  
due to the cross-border relocation that is intrinsically connected to the  
transfer of undertaking the affected employees are likely to become subject 
to a different legal, economic and social environment after the transfer. Upon 
a transfer of undertaking, the Acquired Rights Directive seeks to safeguard 
the rights of employees (previously) employed in EU-based undertakings; 
undertakings that transfer from a third state to a European Member State are 
outside the remit of the Acquired Rights Directive. Thus, the territorial scope 
of the directive ensures that its provisions apply to transfers of undertakings 
from one Member State to another and from a Member State to a third state. 
As such, the directive secures the automatic transfer of the rights and 
obligations stemming from the employment contract or relationship in both 
intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios. Since inbound transfers of 
undertakings fall outside the realm of the Acquired Rights Directive the 
employees of these undertakings will not be subject to the rights that the 
directive ensures when the undertaking in which they are employed is 
transferred and relocated to a Member State. As such, in considering the 
application of the directive, the location of the undertaking to be transferred 
is paramount. If the undertaking to be transferred is located within European 
territory421 the Acquired Rights Directive will yield application. As is its 
nature however, the directive is not directly applicable to individual actors 
within the Member States. The application of the directive is ensured 
through transposition in the Member States; it are the national acquired 
rights provisions that factually apply in situations involving a transfer of 
undertaking. In cross-border situations it therefore has to be determined 
which national acquired rights provisions are to apply, a question that is 
extensively dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
Whether it is substantially possible for the Acquired Rights Directive and its 
national counterparts to apply to the transfer of an undertaking or part of an 
undertaking or business to a different social, economic and legal 
                                                          
421 See Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 20001/23/EC).   
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environment is to be assessed on the basis of the same factors that apply in 
domestic transfer situations. Relying on the so-called Spijkers factors, it has 
to be determined whether the business or undertaking was transferred as a 
going concern and has retained its identity after the transfer. The cross-
border nature of a transfer of undertaking may, on occasion, in establishing 
whether the undertaking has retained its identity, provide additional 
challenges compared domestic transfers of undertakings. For example, 
where an undertaking is location-dependent the cross-border relocation of 
the undertaking will by that very reason prevent the retention of identity. The 
same goes for undertakings that rely heavily on a particular client base that is 
inextricably linked to the location of the undertaking. In those cases, the loss 
of that client base may prevent the undertaking from retaining its identity. 
Even though the retention of identity-test applies to domestic and cross-
border transfer scenarios alike, it appears that it will be more difficult to 
satisfy the Spijkers factors upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking, since 
the transfer of tangible assets or employees is likely to be amiss. Still, once a 
retention of identity has been assumed, which is not unlikely in cross-border 
transfer scenarios, the employees will be entitled to the protection afforded 
by the directive and its national counterparts.      
 
The Acquired Rights Directive only aims to effectuate partial and minimum 
harmonisation and is not ‘intended to establish a uniform level of protection 
throughout the Community on the basis of common criteria’.422 ‘The 
directive can be relied on only to ensure that the employee is protected in his 
relations with the transferee to the same extent as he was in his relations with 
the transferor under the legal rules of the Member State concerned.’423 As 
such, since there may exist differences in the laws of the Member States 
when it comes to the application of directive there also exist issues of 
conflicting laws in situations involving a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. After all, if all acquired rights provisions were uniformly and 
equally applied there would be no conflict of laws issues to resolve. The 
                                                          
422 C‑105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar  [1985] ECR 
331, ECLI:EU:C:1985:331, para. 16. 
423 Case 324/86 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S [1988] 
ECR 739, EU:C:1988:72, para. 16; Case C‑4/01 Serene Martin, Rohit Daby and Brian Willis 
v South Bank University [2003] ECR I-12859,  EU:C:2003:594, para. 41; Case C‑396/07 
Mirja Juuri v Fazer Amica Oy [2008] ECR I-8883, ECLI:EU:C:2008:656, para. 23. 
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present Chapter has shown that by means of partial and minimum 
harmonisation it is the Acquired Rights Directive itself that facilitates the 
differences in Member State laws where it concerns the protection of 
employees in the event of a transfer of undertaking. As is clear from the 
present Chapter  differences may exist e.g. in the definition of employee, the 
effects awarded to the employees’ objection to transfer, to the terms and 
conditions existing in collective agreements, to rights stemming from 
supplementary pension schemes and to the application to insolvent 
undertakings. Consequently, a question of primary concern is which national 
acquired rights provisions are to prevail in situations involving a conflict 
between the acquired rights laws existing in the country of origin, at the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred and in the country of the 
destination. Upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking the main problems 
identified by this Chapter stem from the existence of partial and minimum 
harmonisation. For problems arising from cross-border transfers of 
undertakings to be solved, it needs to be clearly established which law 
applies to a transfer of undertaking when that transfer is accompanied by a 




Chapter 3 – Jurisdiction 
 
1. Introduction 
A problem intrinsically linked with the issue of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings is the matter of international jurisdiction. Which (international) 
courts can those involved in a cross-border transfer of undertaking, i.e. 
employees, employee representatives, transferor and transferee, turn to in the 
event of a dispute arising from or connected to the transfer? Cross-border 
transfers of undertakings, not unlike any other international transaction or 
legal relation, are inevitably accompanied by international disputes raising 
questions pertaining to jurisdiction, conflict of laws424 and the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.425 In most cases, both the plaintiff 
and the defendant will prefer litigation in their home country, i.e. their 
country of domicile, as international litigation can be particularly 
burdensome for either of the parties. The burdens imposed on the parties for 
litigating abroad are manifold: in addition to large costs foreign litigants may 
have to overcome cultural, trust and language barriers and may encounter 
differences in procedural rules and rules on choice-of-law.426 It is the court 
(first) seised of the matter that, on the basis of its own rules of private 
international law, determines the law applicable to the dispute. As such, it is 
particularly important for the plaintiff to choose the jurisdiction that will 
apply the law that is most beneficial to his situation. Since, at a European 
level, the rules pertaining to transfers of undertakings are rooted in the 
Acquired Rights Directive it would appear that application of the national 
acquired rights provisions of any of the European Member States would 
yield application of largely the same framework. However, due to the nature 
of the directive, being one of minimum harmonization, differences still 
remain within the national rules on the transfer of undertakings existing 
                                                          
424 See Chapter 4. 
425 Beyond the scope of this research. At a European level the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters, including the transfer of undertaking, is 
regulated by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Recast) OJ 20.12.2002 L 31/1. 
426 De Winter 1968, p. 275 et seq.  
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throughout the Member States.427 Consequently, it is of particular 
importance for the plaintiff to, from his perspective, be able to secure 
adjudication in the courts of the Member States that will provide to most 
advantageous outcome to the dispute. Since the Acquired Rights Directive 
bestows a variety of rights and obligations on those affected by a transfer of 
undertaking a large array of claims may possibly result from a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking. All those directly (or indirectly) affected by the 
transfer will be able to initiate legal proceedings. This includes a variety of 
actors such as employees, trade unions, employee representatives, transferor 
and transferee. 
 
This Chapter exclusively deals with the issue of jurisdiction (in matters) 
relating to cross-border transfers of undertakings. It first provides a general 
introduction into the matter of jurisdiction in relation to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. In doing so, paragraph 2 gives a rendition of the 
history and present situation under the Acquired Rights Directive. Since the 
cause of action, as a primary indicator for the subject matter of the dispute, 
forms a crucial variable in understanding and classifying the matter of 
jurisdiction this Chapter, in paragraph 4, reiterates the various claims that 
may arise from a transfer of undertaking. The aim of this Chapter is twofold: 
first, it seeks to outline the rules on jurisdiction pertaining to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings throughout the Member States of the European 
Union; second, it intends to assess whether these rules on jurisdiction are in 
need of revision.  
 
2. Acquired Rights Directive   
The Acquired Rights Directive itself is absent of any rules on international 
jurisdiction. It simply states in Article 9 that the:  
 
‘Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such 
measures as are necessary to enable all employees and representatives 
of employees who consider themselves wronged by failure to comply 
                                                          
427 This is apparent from the previous Chapter, which is intended to highlight the differences 
in the national laws of the Member States in order to outline the importance of private 
international law. 
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with the obligations arising from this Directive to pursue their claims by 
judicial process after possible recourse to other competent authorities.’ 
 
Consequently, the Member States are obliged to offer those employees and 
employee representatives adversely affected by a failure to comply with 
(obligations arising from) the Acquired Rights Directive recourse to the 
((inter)national) courts. The obligation of enabling employees and employee 
representatives ‘to pursue their claims by judicial process’ applies 
throughout the Member States. Accordingly, the obligation is not limited e.g. 
to the Member State in which the undertaking to be transferred is situated428 
or the Member State in which the employee habitually carries out his work. 
All jurisdictions involved in a cross-border transfer of undertaking are 
required to offer those negatively affected by a failure to comply with the 
directive recourse to the courts, provided those jurisdictions are required to 
give effect to the Acquired Rights Directive.429 Employees and employee 
representatives should be able to pursue their claims before a Member State 
court whenever they ‘consider themselves wronged by’430 a ‘failure to 
comply with the obligations arising from’431 the directive. An inability for 
employees and employee representatives to access an internationally 
competent court would conflict with the primary aim of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, being the safeguarding (of the rights) of employees in the event of 
a change in employer.432 As such, with a view to cross-border transfer of 
undertakings, it would be preferable if the Member States would shape their 
rules on international jurisdiction in such a way as to avoid negative 
conflicts of jurisdiction. 
  
Article 9 of the Acquired Rights Directive facilitates the aim of the directive, 
which intends to safeguard the rights employees upon a transfer of 
undertaking, by requiring the Member States to facilitate access to justice for 
all employees and employee representatives ‘who consider themselves 
wronged by the failure to comply with the obligations arising from the 
directive’.433 This intertwines with the generally accepted purpose of rules on 
international jurisdiction being to facilitate justice in the sense of, among 
                                                          
428 Hepple 1998. 
429 Surely, states not bound by the directive, i.e. third states, are in no way obliged to comply 
with any of the provisions, including Article 9, of the directive or the obligations contained 
therein.     
430 Article 9 Acquired Rights Directive. 
431 Article 9 Acquired Rights Directive. 
432 Cf. Recital 3 Directive 2001/23/EC; Recital 2 Directive 77/187/EEC. 
433 Article 9 Acquired Rights Directive. 
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others, legal certainty. It is in the interests of the parties that they are able to 
access an internationally competent court.434 As such, rules allocating 
jurisdiction should be unambiguous, easily accessible and direct the dispute 
towards the most appropriate jurisdiction,435 thus ensuring a predictability of 
result(s).436 On the basis of these jurisdictional rules all those involved in a 
transfer of undertaking, whether employees, employee representatives, 
transferee or transferor, should be able to determine which (international) 
forum has jurisdiction over their dispute, e.g. by application of the Brussels I 
Recast. Once they have determined the appropriate forum the parties will be 
able to predict the law that will govern their dispute and, to some extent, the 
outcome of litigation. 
 
In situations involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking issues of 
international jurisdiction are generally considered437 to be covered by the 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast)438 
(hereafter: Brussels I Recast).   
 
The possibility of amending the Acquired Rights Directive to include special 
provisions of private international law in cases of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, including provisions on jurisdiction was recently assessed and 
subsequently forsaken. Aiming to identify social and technical problems 
arising from cross-border transfer of undertakings a report was prepared with 
a view to consider possible options for a revision of the directive as early as 
                                                          
434 Strikwerda 2012, p. 214 
435 In is in the interest of both the parties and the State that there is a sufficient connection 
between the dispute and the forum.   
436 See e.g.:  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ [2008] L177/6, 
Recital 6 and 16; Kagami 2006, p. 15-16;  Michaels 2006, p. 143 et seq.; Gilles 2008, p. 48. 
437 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses; CMS report 2006; Laagland 2011, p. 8 et seq.; Veldmaat & van Assendelft de 
Coningh, 2012, p. 24; IDS 2011, p. 505 et seq.   
438 OJ 20.12.2002 L 31/1; The Brussels I Recast is applicable in all 28 European Member 
States, including Denmark. On 20 December 2012 Denmark notified the Commission of its 
decision to implement the contents of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, see Agreement 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ 21.3.2013 
L79/4. 
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1998.439 This report considered Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, the 
predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast, to 
adequately deal with issues of jurisdiction in case of employment matters 
and thus saw no need to amend the Acquired Rights Directive in this 
regard.440 A 2004 memorandum on the rights of workers in cases of transfers 
of undertakings by the Commission revived the issue by identifying certain 
problems of private international law likely to accompany an increase in 
cross-border transfers.441 An ensuing study conducted to review the ‘main 
legal and technical problems’442 arising from a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking and the solutions provided by private international law 
underlined the findings of the 1998 report: the issue of jurisdiction in case of 
a cross-border transfer of undertaking was deemed sufficiently covered by 
the Brussels I Regulation.443 A consultation of social partners pursuant to 
Article 138(2) of the Treaty with a view to clarifying the directive with 
respect to cross-border transfer of undertakings provided a similar 
opinion.444 As such, there exists, both on a European level and in legal 
                                                          
439 Hepple 1998, p. 26-27. 
440 Hepple 1998, p. 26-27. 
441 Commission services’ working document. Memorandum on rights of workers in cases of 
transfers of undertakings 2004, p. 11-12, available online (18.12.2013) at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2444&langId=en>.  
442 CMS report 2006,  p. 1. 
443 CMS report 2006, p. 58-60, 80. However, the report differs from the 1998 report in the 
sense that the reporters made one small suggestion with regard to the issue of jurisdiction: the 
directive should provide that in determining jurisdiction on the basis of the Brussels I 
Regulation the term ‘habitual place of work’ should be ‘the place of work where the employee 
has effectively and regularly rendered his services (Member State A)’ or ‘if the employee 
actually starts to work at the transferee’s site (Member State B) then this place.’ [CMS report 
2006, p. 80]  
444 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, available online at: <ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2442&langId=en> 
[accessed: 9 October 2016]; A 2007 Commission report signaled the problems regarding 
cross-border transfer of undertakings and announced a consultation of social partners: 
Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, COM(2007) 334 final. For a response of social partners see: UEAPME ‘s reply to 
the first phase of consultation concerning cross border transfers of undertakings [2007] 
available online: www.ueapme.com/docs/pos_papers/.../070801_pp_1st_consult_transfer.pdf 
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literature, a certain consensus that issues of jurisdiction in relation to a cross-
border transfer of undertaking are to be assessed on the basis of. the Brussels 
I Recast. This Chapter will adhere to this assumption by providing an 
overview of the rules on jurisdiction under this private international law 
instrument, affecting those wanting to initiate legal proceedings in disputes 
relating to a cross-border transfer of undertaking. 
 
 
3. Jurisdictional classification 
Determining which (international) court has jurisdiction over a dispute 
arising from or connected to a cross-border transfer of undertaking requires 
the use of one of the basic tools of private international law, known as 
jurisdictional classification or characterisation. The aim of jurisdictional 
classification is to identify the court that has jurisdiction over the issue in 
dispute.445 Rules on jurisdiction frequently differ depending on several 
variables, such as the subject matter of the dispute. In essence, there exist 
various jurisdictional categories providing different rules on jurisdiction for 
(disputes over) different matters of substantive law. In endeavoring to 
ascertain which jurisdictional rules apply in a dispute concerning a cross-
border transfer of undertaking one can therefore wonder whether issues 
concerning a transfer of undertaking are subsumed by the Brussels I 
Recast446, which in the European Member States generally applies in civil 
and commercial matters,447 or whether these issues amount to a separate 
jurisdictional category. The latter question of whether claims arising from a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking are to be classified as a whole, covered 
by an independent jurisdictional category, in deciding on the matter of 
jurisdiction is one that is rarely addressed.448 As outlined above, the Brussels 
                                                                                                                                        
[accessed: 9 October 2016]; ETUC First phase consultation concerning cross border transfers 
of undertakings, business, or parts of undertakings or businesses [2007], available online at < 
http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/ARD_ETUC_answer_final2007_1.pdf> 
[accessed: 9 October 2016]. 
445 See e.g. Rogerson 2001, p. 406; Mankowski 2009, p. 22. 
446 A similar subsumption may be envisaged under the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
447 Article 1 Brussels I Recast. Likewise, rules on jurisdiction in cases of a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking may be covered by a different private international law instrument, 
such as the 2007 Lugano Convention where it concerns the EFTA signatories to the EEA.  
448 This issue or question is related to the question whether the Acquired Rights Directive as 
such would benefit from its own rule(s) on jurisdiction. 
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I Recast (along with its predecessors) are commonly viewed as providing the 
jurisdictional rules used to determine which court has jurisdiction in matters 
concerning a cross-border transfer of undertaking.449 In applying the 
provisions of these private international law instruments there appears to be 
a general consensus that the cause of action as a primary indicator for the 
subject matter in dispute, separate from the transfer of undertaking as a 
whole, is decisive in determining jurisdiction.450 Yet, one can wonder 
whether any and all claims arising from or connected to a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking should fall under the same jurisdictional category, 
even within the realm of the existing private international law instruments 
such as the Brussels I Recast. The question may arise whether all claims 
arising from a transfer of undertaking should be subsumed under e.g. the 
special jurisdictional category for individual employment contracts. 
Admittedly, the primary purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive being the 
continuation of the employment relationships upon a transfer of undertaking 
is rooted in the protection of the individual employee.451 A transfer of 
undertaking is predicated on the existence of an employment relationship 
between the transferor and the employee(s). Without the presence of such an 
employment relationship a transfer of undertaking would not take effect.452 
As such, disputes concerning a cross-border transfer of undertaking are, 
                                                          
449 Veldmaat & van Assendelft de Coningh 2012, p. 52;  Laagland 2011, p. 8; CMS report, p. 
58-60, 80; Hepple 1998, p. 26-27; When compared to the matter of the conflict of laws the 
acquiescence in the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation appears somewhat odd in the 
sense that where it concerns the classification under the conflict of laws the question of 
whether the cross-border transfer of undertakings amount to an independent reference 
category, are overridingly mandatory in nature or are subsumed by the Rome I Regulation is 
one of constant debate. For more on this matter see Chapter 4.   
450 Laagland 2011, p. 8; CMS report 2006, p. 58-60, 80; Hepple 1998 p. 26-27. 
451 At its core, the directive seeks ‘to ensure that employees do not forfeit essential rights and 
advantages acquired prior to a change of employer’; COM(74) 351, p. 3. 
452 Only those employees protected as employees under national law are affected by the 
Acquired Rights Directive.452 Article 2(1)(d) Directive 2001/23/EC. A contractual 
relationship with the transferor is not required in all circumstances: the directive also protects 
permanently posted workers within a group (of undertakings). Case C-242/09 Albron 
Catering BV v FNV Bondgenoten en John Roest [2010] ECR I-10309, ECLI:EU:C:2010:625;  
HR 5 April 2013, JAR 2013/125, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ1780. For the specific problems 
created by the use of a national employee definition in respect of cross-border transfer of 
undertakings or a more detailed definition of the concept of employee see Chapter 3. 
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almost without fail, rooted in (or at least marginally connected to) the 
individual employment contract or relationship.  
 
The approach where connection is sought to the special private international 
law category for individual employment contracts is not uncommon where it 
concerns the cross-border transfer of undertakings. In determining the 
applicable law to (the effects of) a transfer of undertaking connection is 
regularly sought to the individual employment contract.453 In fact, it is the 
prevailing view in both literature and case law that the applicable law to a 
transfer of undertaking (as a whole) is determined by the reference rule 
existing for individual contracts of employment.454  A transfer of undertaking 
essentially effectuates the transfer of the existing employment relationship(s) 
to the transferee. It is this close connection to the employment contract or 
relationship that may justify, under the Savignian conflicts approach, the 
conflict of laws connection to the law applicable to the employment contract. 
The connection to the employment contract is additionally rationalised by 
the justified reliance of the employee on his continued employment. The 
employment contract undoubtedly provides the employee with an assured 
legal position, which includes the right to transfer to the transferee. His 
interests in maintaining this position take precedence over the need to protect 
the transferee against unforeseen obligations, such as those resulting from an 
employment contract. The connectedness with the employment contract or 
relationship is additionally illustrated by the fact that issues concerning 
transfer of undertakings repeatedly arise in procedures for (unjustified) 
dismissal, which under the conflict of laws undeniably belong to the purview 
of the conflict rule for individual employment contracts. In those cases, the 
question whether or not a transfer of undertaking has taken place, causing 
the employee to become employed by the transferee, forms the very essence 
of proceedings. Consequently, connecting the transfer of undertaking as a 
whole to the individual employment contract under the conflict of laws is 
deemed justified by the intrinsic connectedness of the transfer to the 
                                                          
453 Cf. BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 18/10; BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92; LAG 
Baden-Württemberg 17 September 2009 – 11 Sa 40/09; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 
December 2009 – 22 Sa 45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 – 14 Ca 516/08; LAG 
Hamburg 22 May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03; Kantonrechter Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, JAR 
2008/271, ECLI:NL:KTGEIN:2008:BG3811. 
454 See e.g. Article 8 Rome I Regulation. 
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employment relationship. This raises the question whether the same holds 
true where it concerns the allocation of international jurisdiction. Does the 
allocation of jurisdiction for any and all claims arising from a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking require these claims to be subsumed under the 
jurisdictional category for individual employment contracts?  
Admittedly, the inherent protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive 
aligns with the fundamental principle of employee protection that exists 
within private international law in the areas of jurisdiction and the conflict of 
laws. The notion that certain parties, including employees, require protection 
due to their weaker legal, contractual and socio-economic position is one 
that permeates the area of private international law.455 As such, rules on 
jurisdiction (and choice of law) are generally structured favor laboratoris. 
These rules are intended to provide adequate protection for the socially 
weaker contractual party, i.e. the employee, as can be demonstrated by the 
judgment of the European Court of Justice in Mulox IBC v. Geels pertaining 
to the rules on jurisdiction for employment contracts as established under a 
predecessor of the Brussels I Recast, i.e. the Brussels Convention: 
“Proper protection of that kind is best assured if disputes relating to a 
contract of employment fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
place where the employee discharges his obligations towards his 
employer. That is the place where it is least expensive for the employee 
to commence, or defend himself against, court proceedings.”456 
 
The forum loci laboris, as the place of habitual employment457, is deemed 
best equipped to ensure the proper protection of the employee(s). The place 
where the employee habitually carries out his work is generally the place 
where it is least expensive for the employee to be engaged in legal 
proceedings.458 The interests of the employee are additionally protected by 
                                                          
455 Polak 2004, p. 323; Lein 2009, p. 186. 
456 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:306, para. 19; Cf.: C-437/00 Giulia Pugliese v Finmeccanica SpA, 
Betriebsteil Alenia Aerospazio [2003] para. 18; Case 32/88 Six Constructions Ltd v Paul 
Humbert  [1989] para. 13. 
457 This wording which is currently enshrined in Article 21(1)(b) of the Brussels I Recast. 
458 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC v Geels [1993] para. 19; Cf.: C-437/00 Giulia Pugliese v 
Finmeccanica SpA, Betriebsteil Alenia Aerospazio [2003] ECR I-3573, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:219, para. 18; Case 32/88 Six Constructions Ltd v Paul Humbert  [1989] 
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the existence of a particularly close connection between the forum loci 
laboris and the employment dispute. Surely, the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work under the employment contract, as the place 
where the employment relationship is centered, will generally have the most 
sufficient connection to the employment dispute. Any disputes arising from 
or connected to the employment relationship appear therefore best 
adjudicated, at least from a geographic perspective, by the court closest to 
the place of habitual employment, i.e. the forum loci laboris. Where 
adequate protection of the employee on the private international law plane 
requires the rules on jurisdiction and the conflict of laws to be (at least 
marginally) tailored to the needs of the individual employee this may often 
lead to a certain convergence between the rules on jurisdiction and the 
conflict of laws.459 This so-called ‘Gleichlauf’ results in the court taking 
cognizance of the dispute applying its own law(s). As outlined above, for 
reasons of procedural efficiency and fairness the geographic proximity of a 
court to the dispute may be a principal consideration to establishing the rules 
on jurisdiction in employment matters or matters relating to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. This principle of geographic proximity bears great 
resemblance to the principle of the closest connection that exists under the 
conflict of laws.460 As such, the reasons underlying the connection to the 
individual employment contract under the conflict of laws may be of equal 
value when it comes to establishing international jurisdiction. Where in 
relation to the conflict of laws it is considered sensible to subject the transfer 
of undertaking in its entirety to the conflict of laws category for individual 
employment contracts, due to the inherent connection existing between a 
transfer of undertaking and the employment relationship, a similar 
subsumption may seem plausible within the area of international jurisdiction. 
However, under the conflict of laws, the connection to the individual 
employment relationship is not the only conflict of laws solution 
                                                                                                                                        
para. 13; Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, para. 40.  
459 Cf. De Boer 2012, p. 16;  J.B. van de Velden argues that the existence of similar objectives 
or a ‘similar focus’ underlying provisions for jurisdiction and choice of law, Gleichlauf is a 
likely result: Van de Velden 2003, p. 8.  
460 De Boer 2012, p. 16. 
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advocated;461 there exist various views, theories and practices on the 
applicable law to a transfer of undertaking. In this sense it is worth 
examining whether, in determining the most appropriate rule for designating 
the competent court in issues relating to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings there might be a different nexus to which the geographic 
proximity of a court should be tailored. 
For example, where it concerns the issue of cross-border transfer of 
undertakings it could also be argued that the rules pertaining to the 
individual contract of employment (under the Brussels I Recast and the 2007 
Lugano Convention) should not determine which court takes cognizance 
over a transfer related dispute. Reasons for opposing subsuming the transfer 
of undertakings under the jurisdictional category for individual employment 
contracts equate to the reasons provided for rejecting the conflict of laws 
connection to the individual employment contract in the debate on the 
appropriate conflict of laws rule for transfers of undertakings. When it 
comes to the conflict of laws, the notion that the transfer of undertaking is to 
be connected to the employment contract is frequently and deservedly 
rejected in favour of the law of the seat of the undertaking (to be) 
transferred.462 Compared to the applicable law to the employment contract, 
the geographic centre of the undertaking is easily determined. Because the 
undertaking to be transferred is pivotal to the Acquired Rights Directive, the 
seat of this undertaking embodies the most natural connecting factor.463  In 
this view, the lex laboris, when applied to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, does not sufficiently take into account the interests that lie 
                                                          
461 The idea of Gleichlauf combined with the interests of employee protection do not 
necessarily dictate that the rule allocating jurisdiction in matters relating to a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking invariably provides jurisdiction to the courts whose laws govern the 
dispute in substance. However the lack of similar (reference) rules for jurisdiction and choice 
of law in employment matters has led to a recent motion for a European Parliament resolution 
on improving private international law; jurisdiction rules applicable to employment 
(2013/2023(INI)). As will be discussed below in paragraph … this is not the case where it 
concerns the Brussels I Recast and the 2007 Lugano Convention.   
462 See Chapter 4, specifically paragraph 4.8 in which the preferred conflict of laws path for 
transfers of undertakings is outlined.  
463 This effect is supported by Article 1(2) of the directive, which causes it to apply ‘where 
and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty [emphasis added KCH]’. 
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beyond individual employment rights. The effects of a transfer of 
undertaking do not solely encompass the individual employment 
relationship, but also concern operational, economic and collective 
employment interests. Hence, it is assumed faulty to subject all of these 
rights and interests, such as employee participation rights and the right to the 
observance of terms and conditions agreed upon in collective agreements, to 
the law governing the individual employment contract. If one were to align 
the rules on jurisdiction (as far as possible) with the rules on the applicable 
law, acceptance of the above view would likely result in the existence or 
creation of an independent jurisdictional category for the transfer of 
undertakings on the basis of which jurisdiction is awarded to the courts of 
the place where the undertaking to be transferred is located. Awarding 
jurisdiction to these courts would result in geographic proximity between the 
competent court and the heart of the transfer of undertaking, i.e. the 
undertaking to be transferred. In addition, utilising the place where the 
undertaking to be transferred is located in order to determine international 
jurisdiction would dovetail with the perception that the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred is key in determining when the provisions of 
the Acquired Rights Directive require application. In support of the latter 
perception some European Member States, such as the United Kingdom, 
Malta and Luxembourg, apply their national acquired rights provisions on 
the basis of a distinct scope rule whenever the undertaking to be transferred 
is located within their territory.464 Subjecting disputes resulting from the 
transfer of undertaking (in its entirety) to a separate jurisdictional category 
on the basis of which jurisdiction is awarded to the court(s) of the place 
where the undertaking to be transferred is situated would, in those Member 
                                                          
464 The UK’s Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
(hereinafter: TUPE)  contain a written scope rule in Article 3(1)(a)  that qualifies as a 
unilateral conflict rule indicating the international scope of the UK’s acquired rights 
provisions. Accordingly, TUPE applies whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within the territory of the UK immediately prior to its transfer, regardless of the law 
applicable to the (effects of the) transfer or the law that governs the employment contracts. 
Article 3(1)(c) of Transfer of Business (Protection of Employment) Regulations  of Malta 
contains a provision similar to that of the UK for Maltese territory as does Luxembourg 
legislation where it concerns the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Art. L 127-
1(2) of the Luxembourg Code du Travail states that ‘le présent chapitre s’applique chaque 
fois que l’entreprise, l’établissement ou la partie d’entreprise ou d’établissement à transférer 
se situe sur le territoire national du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg’.   
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States, ultimately result in a convergence between the rules on jurisdiction 
and those on the applicable law, thus achieving the perceived ideal of 
Gleichlauf. Yet, without legislative intervention, the existing legal 
instruments such as the Brussels I Recast and the 2007 Lugano Convention 
or the Acquired Rights Directive itself do not presently offer a basis for the 
assumption or creation of an independent jurisdictional category for transfers 
of undertakings. Surely, in the interests of legal certainty and a proper 
administration of justice rules providing jurisdiction should have a firm basis 
in law. As such, although welcome in theory, the idea of an independent 
jurisdictional category for the transfer of undertakings is, at present, merely 
pie in the sky. In the absence of legislative intervention, in practice, there 
exist three options for determining jurisdiction in matters relating to a cross-
border transfer of undertaking:  
1. subsuming the transfer as a whole under the jurisdictional category 
for individual employment contracts;  
2. subsuming the entire transfer of undertaking under the general rule 
of actor sequitur forum rei or;  
3. dividing the transfer of undertaking among several jurisdictional 
categories depending on the subject matter in dispute.  
 
Within the realm of the existing private international law instruments, all 
disputes arising from a cross-border transfer of undertaking may possibly be 
subsumed under the special jurisdictional category for individual 
employment contracts or under the general rule awarding jurisdiction to the 
place of domicile of the defendant by mere means of classification. Both the 
Brussels I Recast and the 2007 Lugano Convention, to a large extent, require 
an independent denomination without recourse to national law of the legal 
concepts contained therein. As such, the problem of classification which 
usually lies therein that different legal systems offer different, sometimes 
diametrically opposite, classifications is negated. If one were to agree, at a 
European level, that under the Brussels regime, all claims arising from or 
related to a cross-border transfer of undertaking are to be classified as arising 
from an individual contract of employment or that all claims arising from a 
transfer of undertaking do not equate to the individual contract of 
employment, these claims would either be subsumed under the jurisdictional 
category existing for employment contracts or under the general rule 
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providing jurisdiction to the courts of the place in which the transferee or 
transferor is domiciled. As outlined above, under the views and theories 
existing under the conflict of laws the idea of subsuming all claims relating 
to a transfer of undertaking under a single rule on the applicable law is 
hardly a novelty. Where it concerns international jurisdiction however, albeit 
a subject matter that is scarcely discussed, it appears that dividing the 
transfer of undertaking among several jurisdictional categories depending on 
the subject matter in dispute is the most commonly proposed solution in 
claims arising from cross-border transfers of undertakings.465 Before 
proceeding to a discussion on the existing Member State rules on 
jurisdiction,466 the following paragraph will therefore outline the various 
claims that may arise in conjunction with a transfer of undertaking.  
 
 
4. Claims arising from a transfer of undertaking 
The existing instruments of private international law, such as the Brussels I 
Recast and the 2007 Lugano Convention, all depart from the premise that the 
cause of action as an indicator for the subject matter in dispute is an 
important factor in determining jurisdiction as these instruments, in part, 
provide different rules of jurisdiction on the basis of subject matter. As 
outlined above, the allocation of jurisdiction over any dispute arising from a 
transfer of undertaking is to be assessed, in line with the existing views, on 
the basis of the claim instituted by the plaintiff. It is this claim that is 
decisive in determining the issue of international jurisdiction. Several legal 
claims may arise from a transfer of undertaking. All those directly (or 
indirectly) affected by the transfer will be able to initiate legal proceedings. 
This includes a variety of actors such as employees, trade unions, employee 
representatives, transferee and transferor. A brief, non-exhaustive overview 
of the claims that may arise from a transfer of undertaking, usually initiated 
by the employee or his representative(s), is provided below.467   
 
 
                                                          
465 See e.g. Laagland, 2011, p. 8-11 ; Veldmaat & van Assendelft de Coningh 2012, p. 24-25 ; 
Malmberg 2006, p. 392-393.  
466 See below, paragraph 5. 
467 For examples of claims (possibly) arising from a transfer of undertaking see Chapter 2. 
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4.1 Transfer of rights and obligations   
By reason of a transfer of undertaking all rights and obligations arising from 
individual contracts of employment shall automatically transfer to the 
transferee. On the basis of Article 3(1) subparagraph 1 of the directive ‘the 
transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or 
from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by 
reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.’ The transfer is 
effectuated by operation of law irrespective of the consent of the affected 
employees: (the rights and obligations stemming from) their employment 
contract or employment relationship shall transfer to the transferee 
regardless of their will or acceptance.468 Unless the Member States have 
provided otherwise, the employee cannot continue his employment with the 
transferor by a mere refusal to transfer to the transferee. The purpose of the 
directive is to safeguard the rights of the employees affected by the transfer 
of undertaking by enabling them to continue their employment with the 
transferee under the same terms and conditions as agreed with the transferor. 
The directive does not provide for the continuance of the employment 
contract or relationship with the transferor if the employees do not wish to 
transfer to the transferee or, after the transfer, remain in his employ.469 In 
fact, by reason of the transfer the transferor is, in principle, discharged from 
all obligations towards the employee(s).470 Still, the affected employees may 
wish to oppose the transfer of the rights and obligations arising from their 
employment relationship to the transferee. Their need to challenge the 
transfer to the transferee is likely to increase in situations where the transfer 
entails a cross-border component. If the transfer merely involves a foreign 
transferee the legal, social and economic position of the employee(s) is 
                                                          
468 See Joined Cases 144 and 145/87 Harry Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria Busschers v 
Ivo Martin Besselsen [1988] ECR 2559, ECLI:EU:C:1988:236; Case 324/86 Foreningen af 
Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S [1988] ECR 739, EU:C:1988:72, para. 
15. 
469 Joined Cases 144 and 145/87 Harry Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria Busschers v Ivo 
Martin Besselsen [1988] ECR 2559, ECLI:EU:C:1988:236; para. 12. 
470 This release of the transferor applies unless the Member States have availed themselves of 
the possibility to provide for joint and several liability of the transferor and the transferee. As 
per Article 3(1) subparagraph 2 of the Acquired Rights Directive the ‘Member States may 
provide that, after the date of the transfer the transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and 
severally liable in respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer from a 
contract of employment or an employment relationship existing on the date of the transfer.’ 
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unlikely to deteriorate. After all, in those situations the employee is to 
continue his work as he has done thus far: no change occurs in work, 
workplace or applicable law(s). Still, an employee may mistrust a foreign 
transferee and fear for a change in work culture, (social) policies and an 
overall deterioration of his legal and social position over time, driving him to 
oppose the transfer of the rights and obligations arising from his employment 
contract. The need to challenge the transfer of the employment contract or 
relationship (or even the transfer of undertaking as a whole) will become 
even more pressing where the transfer of undertaking is accompanied by a 
simultaneous or subsequent cross-border relocation of the undertaking. In 
those situations, the employees generally will have little inclination to 
continue their employment with the transferee.471 Although this may be 
different in situations where the transfer occurs in close proximity to national 
borders such a transfer of undertaking involves a change in workplace, social 
security and mandatory (employment) law. In addition, the law(s) applicable 
to the employment contract, collective labour relations and collective labour 
law(s) could all presumably change.472 In the abovementioned situations 
where the employee wishes to challenge the transfer of the rights and 
obligations stemming from his employment contract or employment 
relationship he is likely to ask for a declaratory judgment providing that no 
transfer has taken place in addition to a claim that the transferor is to honour 
all rights and obligations arising from the employment contract, including 
providing access to work and payment of salary.473  
                                                          
471 This may be different in situations where the transfer occurs in close proximity to national 
borders. 
472 In situations where the transfer is accompanied by a cross-border relocation, such a 
relocation may well involve a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the 
employee, see Chapter 2, paragraph 5.3 and below paragraph 4.4. 
473 In this context it should be noted that the employee might also explicitly object to the 
transfer of his employment contract or employment relationship while admitting to the 
validity of the transfer of undertaking as such. However, where the employee decides on his 
own accord not to continue his employment with the transferee, Article 3(1) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive does not apply.  An idea fundamental to employment law is that an employee 
is free to choose (the person of) his employer and that he cannot be forced to continue his 
employment with an employer whom he has not freely chosen. As is clear from the ECJ’s 
judgment in Katsikas it is for the Member States to determine the effects of an employees’ 
objection to the transfer of his employment contract or relationship. The directive neither 
mandates nor precludes the Member States from providing that the employment contract or 
employment relationship with the transferor should be maintained upon the employees’ 
Chapter 3 – Jurisdiction  
144 
 
Not only does Article 3(1) effectuate a transfer regardless of the will of the 
affected employees, the same goes for the transferee and transferor. They 
cannot themselves decide that the transfer of a business, e.g. by merger or 
acquisition, takes place without a transfer of the employment contracts. 
From time to time, the transferee will be reluctant to take over the entire 
workforce. As a result of this reluctance the transferee and transferor might 
endeavour to structure the acquisition of the undertaking to be transferred in 
such a way as to avoid application of the Acquired Rights Directive and its 
national counterparts, e.g. by staging a discontinuance of the undertaking to 
be transferred. In cases where the employee has been made redundant due to 
a supposed discontinuance of the business of the transferor, the employee is 
likely to asks the court for a declaration of law that a transfer has taken place 
in addition to claiming payment of salary and possible access to work from 
the transferee.474  
Disputes based on Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive or its 
equivalent in national law are likely to provide a broad array of claims, 
ranging from a mere declaration of law that a (or no) transfer has taken place 
to salary claims. More often than not, these claims will be directed at the 
transferee. However, there are surely situations perceivable in which the 
transferee or transferor relies on the acquired rights provisions in claims 
against an employee or an employee representative, e.g. in situations 
involving the enforcement of a non-compete clause by the transferee.    
 
                                                                                                                                        
objection. As such e.g. German law in § 613a para. 6 BGB (Der Arbeitnehmer kann dem 
Übergang des Arbeitsverhältnisses innerhalb eines Monats nach Zugang der Unterrichtung 
nach Absatz 5 schriftlich widersprechen. Der Widerspruch kann gegenüber dem bisherigen 
Arbeitgeber oder dem neuen Inhaber erklärt werden) explicitly provides for a so-called 
Widerspruchsrecht, allowing the employee to remain employed by the transferee if he objects 
to the transfer of his employment contract. See Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-
139/91 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos Konstantinidis and Uwe Skreb and Günter Schroll v 
PCO Stauereibetrieb Paets & Co. Nachfolger GmbH [1992] ECR I-06577, 
ECLI:EU:1992:517., para. 33-37 and ruling; Case 324/86 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i 
Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S [1988] ECR 739, EU:C:1988:72, para. 16; Hof ‘s 
Hertogenbosch 15 April 2014, HD 200.128.946-01, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:1072;  For a 
more detailed discussion of this matter see Chapter 2. 
474 Hof ‘s Hertogenbosch 4 April 2014, HD 200.105.666-01, JAR 2014/101, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:588. 
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4.2 Collective agreements 
Upon a transfer of undertaking, the continuity of terms and conditions 
agreed in collective agreements is safeguarded to a certain extent. On the 
basis of Article 3(3) paragraph 1 of the Acquired Rights Directive ‘the 
transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any 
collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under 
that agreement, until the date of termination or expire of the collective 
agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective 
agreement.’ Employees or their representatives wishing to enforce the 
observance of terms and conditions stemming from a collective agreement 
will consequently have to address their claim to the transferee.  
 
The directive allows the Member States to limit the period of observance of 
a collective agreement up to one year. The implementation of Article 3(3) 
will therefore differ throughout the Member States. Diverse national rules 
and regulations, particularly on the extent of preservation of terms and 
conditions agreed in collective agreements after the transfer, exist. Whereas 
some Member States allow the collective agreement to be substituted by a 
similar agreement other provide for a strict compliance with the collective 
agreements existing on the date of the transfer. Upon a cross-border transfer 
of undertaking the effects to be given to a collective agreement will therefore 
largely depend on the applicable law, both to the transfer of undertaking 
itself and to the collective agreement in dispute.   
4.3 Protection against dismissal 
The aim of the Acquired Rights Directive, which is to safeguard the rights of 
employees in the event of a change in employer, would be frustrated if the 
transferor or transferee would be able to dismiss the workforce on the 
occasion of a transfer of undertaking.475 As such, Article 4(1) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive offers the affected employees protection against 
dismissal by reason of the transfer. Article 4(1) reads: 
 
“The transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the 
                                                          
475 Proposal for a Directive on the harmonisation of the legislation of Member States on the 
retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and 
amalgamations, COM (74) 351, p. 7. 
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transferor or the transferee. This provision shall not stand in the way of 
dismissals that may take place for economic, technical or organisational 
reasons entailing changes in the workforce.”    
 
Thus, the transfer of undertaking itself, e.g. by means of merger or 
acquisition, does not constitute grounds for dismissal. The continuance of 
the employment contract or employment relationship would be endangered if 
the transferor and transferee could circumvent the provisions of the Acquired 
Rights Directive and their national counterparts by simply dismissing the 
workforce. As mentioned above, in paragraph 4.1, it frequently occurs that 
the transferee is not inclined to take over the (entire) workforce. 
Consequently, transferee and transferor may seek to structure the transfer in 
such a way as to exclude the workforce from transferring to the transferee, 
e.g. by staging a discontinuance of the business to be transferred. Claims for 
unjust dismissal (usually accompanied by salary claims, claims for dismissal 
compensation and claims for (re)employment) by reason of the transfer of 
undertaking represent the vast majority of cases in the area of employment 
protection and are uniformly initiated by the employees or their 
representatives.       
 
4.4 Substantial change in working conditions 
If the contract of employment or the employment relationship is terminated 
due to a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the 
employee by reason of the transfer, the employer, on the basis of Article 4(2) 
of the Acquired Rights Directive, is considered to have been responsible for 
the termination of the employment contract or employment relationship. It is 
left to the forum state to determine whether the contract of employment, as 
proposed by the transferee, involves such a substantial change. Once a 
substantial change to the detriment of the employee has been established, 
Article 4(2) requires the Member States to provide that the employer is to be 
considered responsible for the termination.476 
 
Where the transfer involves a cross-border transfer of undertaking the 
employee may wish to terminate his employment contract or relationship on 
                                                          
476 Case C-399/96 Europièces SA v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding 
Company SA [1998] ECR I- 6965, ECLI:EU:C:1998:532,  para. 44. 
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the grounds that a transfer to the transferee will amount to a substantial 
change in working conditions to his detriment. The ECJ case law shows that 
the Acquired Rights Directive does ‘not preclude a worker employed by the 
transferor at the date of the transfer of an undertaking from objecting to the 
transfer of his contract of employment or employment relationship to the 
transferee, provided he decides to do so of his own accord.’477 Surely, a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking will become more detrimental to an 
employee if the transfer involves a cross-border relocation. Examples can be 
found in Dutch case law, which occasionally assumes that the cross-border 
relocation of the transferred undertaking results in a substantial change to the 
detriment of the affected employees. In a case before the district court of 
Tilburg,478 which involved a transfer of undertaking accompanied by a cross-
border relocation to Belgium, the court assumed such a substantial change in 
working conditions to the detriment of the employee:  
 
“Daarbij neemt de kantonrechter niet alleen in aanmerking de 
voorgenomen aanpassing van de huidige arbeidsvoorwaarden (die 
immers op termijn aan het Belgische (cao-) systeem zullen moeten 
worden aangepast) en het gestelde met betrekking tot de niet 
onaanzienlijke reisduur. Van belang zijn ook de beperkte 
reiskostencompensatie die wordt geboden (voorlopig slechts voor 1 
jaar), het ontbreken van enigerlei (tijdelijke) compensatie voor de 
reisduur, de te verwachten andere werk- en ploegentijden en de 
daarmee samenhangende (lagere) toeslagen.”479 
 
According to the court, the detriment existed in a change in employment 
conditions due to the application of Belgian collective agreements over time 
as well as in the absence of any provisions relating to the increase in travel 
time (to and from work). In addition, the employees were likely to be 
subjected to different work and shift times resulting in a difference in 
remuneration.  
 
                                                          
477 Case C-399/96 Europièces SA v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding 
Company SA [1998] ECR I- 6965, ECLI:EU:C:1998:532, para. 44. 
478 Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2007:BB7066. 
479 Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2007:BB7066, para. 2.25. 
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By contrast, in a case before the provisional court of Eindhoven480 which 
likewise involved a transfer of undertaking accompanied by a cross-border 
relocation to Belgium, a change in working conditions to the detriment of the 
employees was not assumed. The employer, SMC BV, within the meaning 
of the Dutch acquired rights provisions, transferred part of its undertaking to 
its Belgian subsidiary, SMC NV. The affected employees, who did not wish 
to continue their employment in Belgium, despite the increase in travel time 
(to and from work) not being insurmountable, contested the transfer of the 
rights and obligations arising from their employment contract or relationship 
to the transferee and claimed (re)employment from the transferor.  In their 
view, the transfer of their employment relationship to the transferee would 
result in a detrimental change of labour, social and tax conditions. The 
employees’ claim was dismissed as the court did not consider the transfer 
contrary to (the principles of) good faith and fair dealing.481  
 
In summary, an employee or his representatives may upon a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking institute a claim for a declaration of law (and an 
accompanying claim for redundancy payments) that the transfer of 
undertaking involves a substantial change in working conditions to the 
detriment of the employee causing the employer to be responsible for the 
termination of the employee, even if the employee, on its own accord, 
decides not to continue his employment with the transferee.  
 
4.5 Preservation of status and function employee representatives 
Article 6 (1) of Acquired Rights Directive stipulates that if the transferred 
undertaking preserves its autonomy, ‘the status and function of the 
representatives or of the representation of the employees affected by the 
transfer shall be preserved on the same terms and subject to the same 
conditions as existed before the date of the transfer by virtue of law, 
                                                          
480 Ktr. Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, JAR 2008/271,  
ECLI:NL:KTGEIN:2008:BG3811. 
481 In Dutch; ‘redelijkheid en billijkheid’. Notable in this context is that the employees based 
their claim on the principles of good faith and fair dealing instead of referring to the national 
acquired rights provisions pertaining to a substantial change in working conditions. In Dutch 
law: Article 7:665 BW. It is possible that the employees did not base their claim on Article 
7:665 BW because they did not want to be considered dismissed as their claim involved a 
claim for (re)employment with the transferor. 
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regulation, administrative provision or agreement, provided that the 
conditions necessary for the constitution of the employees’ representation 
are fulfilled.’ As such, the preservation of the status and function of the 
employee representatives largely depends on the transferred entity 
preserving its autonomy. According to the ECJ in UGT-FSP, a transferred 
economic entity preserves its autonomy:  
 
‘provided that the powers granted to those in charge of that entity, 
within the organisational structures of the transferor, namely the power 
to organise, relatively freely and independently, the work within that 
entity in the pursuit of its specific economic activity and, more 
particularly, the powers to give orders and instructions, to allocate tasks 
to employees of the entity concerned and to determine the use of assets 
available to the entity, all without direct intervention from other 
organisational structures of the employer, remain, within the 
organisational structures of the transferee, essentially unchanged. The 
mere change of those ultimately in charge cannot in itself be detrimental 
to the autonomy of the entity transferred, except where those who have 
become ultimately in charge have available to them powers which 
enable them to organise directly the activities of the employees of that 
entity and therefore to substitute their decision-making within that 
entity for that of those immediately in charge of the employees.’482  
Thus, if an economic entity retains its identity, and is transferred in its 
entirety, the representation of the employees will remain virtually 
unaffected. In cross-border situations, where the transferred undertaking 
becomes part of the legal entity of the transferee or where the transfer of 
undertaking involves a cross-border relocation it may be difficult to ensure a 
proper preservation of the employee representation as the laws pertaining to 
employee representation will generally not equate to the laws applying prior 
to the transfer. However, this not necessarily results in an insurmountable 
detriment to the employees and their representatives as the Member States 
are to make every effort ‘to ensure that the employees transferred who were 
represented before the transfer continue to be properly represented during the 
                                                          
482 Case C-151/09 Federación de Servicios Públicos de la UGT (UGT-FSP) v Ayuntamiento 
de La Línea de la Concepción, María del Rosario Vecino Uribe en Ministerio Fiscal [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:452, para. 56. 
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period necessary for reconstitution or reappointment of the representation of 
employees in accordance with national law or practice.’483  Employee 
representatives losing their status by expire of their term of office as a result 
of the transfer ‘shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions or practice of the Member States.’484 
Consequently, claims for the preservation of status and function of employee 
representatives may be initiated against the transferee by individual 
employee representatives, trade unions and other employee representative 
bodies. 
4.6 Information and consultation 
A fundamental social right enshrined in Article 27 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union485 is that of the employees’ right 
to information and consultation (which must be guaranteed within the 
undertaking). According to Article 7 of the Acquired Rights Directive both 
the transferor and transferee are required to inform the representatives of the 
affected employees of the date of the transfer, the reasons for the transfer, 
the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer and any measures 
envisaged in relation to the employees. The transferor has to inform the 
employee representatives of the affected undertaking prior to the transfer, 
whereas the transferee is required to inform the ‘representatives of his 
employees before his employees are directly affected by the transfer as 
regards their conditions of work and employment.’486 Consequently, actions 
for a failure to comply with information and consultation requirements may 
be directed, by their respective employees (or their representatives), at both 
the transferor and the transferee.487  
 
4.7 Concluding remarks    
The above shows that a (cross-border) transfer of undertaking may give rise 
to a plethora of legal actions instituted by a variety of actors such as the 
                                                          
483 Article 6(1) Acquired Rights Directive.  
484 Article 6(2) Acquired Rights Directive.  
485 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 18.12.2000 C 364/1. 
486 Article 7(1) Acquired Rights Directive. 
487 Some Member States, such as Germany and Austria, impose a common duty on the 
transferor and transferee to inform the individual employees of the undertaking to be 
transferred. In those countries actions for a failure to comply with these requirements may be 
directed at both the transferor and the transferee. 
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employee, employee representatives, trade unions, transferor and transferee. 
The majority of these claims are likely to be directed against the transferee, 
who as the new employer by operation of law is required to uphold all rights 
and obligations arising from a contract of employment or employment 
relationship with the transferor. Still, the affected employees will often seek 
to sue both transferee and transferor in composite proceedings, especially in 
those cases where the lex causae allows for the joined liability of transferor 
and transferee.488  
 
 
5. Member State jurisdiction 
This paragraph will address the issue of jurisdiction in cases where the 
plaintiff seeks enforcement of a claim relating to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking in the courts of a European Member State. As outlined in the 
previous Chapter, the present research addresses three types of cross-border 
transfer scenarios, i.e. the intra-European transfer, the inbound transfer and 
the outbound transfer.489 For example, there is the situation where transferee, 
transferor and the undertaking to be transferred are all governed by and 
situated in a European Member State, there is the situation where transferee 
and transferor are, although principally governed by the laws of a non-
Member State, situated in a European Member State and there may be 
situations where the transfer involves a simultaneous relocation to another 
state, either a Member State or a foreign nation. Where all parties to and 
effects of a transfer of undertaking are governed by or situated within a 
single Member State no conflict of jurisdiction will arise. These national 
transfers of undertakings are therefore, due to their lack of internationality, 
beyond the scope of the present research.490  
                                                          
488 On the basis of Article 3(2) Acquired Rights Directive the ‘Member States may provide 
that, after the date of the transfer the transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and severally 
liable in respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer from a contract of 
employment or an employment relationship existing on the date of the transfer.’ 
Consequently, the Article limits the claims against the transferor to claims arising from a 
contract of employment for obligations in existence on the date of the transfer. 
489 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2. 
490 Although both European Member States and Member States of the European Economic 
Area are to apply the Acquired Rights Directive, there has to be a distinction between the two 
when it comes to the matter of jurisdiction as the solutions to a conflict of jurisdiction are to 
be found in different instruments. For the EFTA signatories to the European Economic Area 
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5.1 Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
Within the European Union, the issue of jurisdiction is largely regulated by 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast)491, 
commonly known as the Brussels I Recast. This Regulation, which applies to 
legal proceedings instituted as from 10 January 2015,492 is intended to 
facilitate legal certainty, a sound administration of justice and a free 
circulation of judgments throughout the European Union.493 Serving a dual 
purpose, the Regulation provides rules on both jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of Member State judgments. The Brussels I 
Recast applies in civil and commercial matters with exception of the issues 
mentioned in Article 1(2) of the Regulation.494 As such, it covers a wide 
variety of matters within the spectrum of private law. The defendant must, in 
principle495, be domiciled in a Member State for the Regulation to apply. The 
nationality of the parties does not form a prerequisite for application. As 
such, the regulation applies to civil and commercial matters whenever the 
defendant is domiciled within a Member State, irrespective of the nationality 
of the parties. The same goes for companies and legal persons: they are 
considered domiciled in the European Member State where their statutory 
seat, central administration or principal place of business is located.496 As 
such, it is possible for the regulation to apply in cases where the defendant is 
a company governed by the laws of a non-Member State. As per Article 4, 
                                                                                                                                        
(i.e. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) jurisdiction is governed by the Lugano 2007 
Convention. A discussion of this Convention is however beyond the scope of the current 
research, as is a discussion of the national acquired rights provisions of these countries.  
491 OJ 20.12.2002 L 31/1; The Brussels I Recast is applicable in all 28 European Member 
States, including Denmark. On 20 December 2012 Denmark notified the Commission of its 
decision to implement the contents of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, see Agreement 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ 21.3.2013 
L79/4. 
492 As per Article 66 Brussels I Recast. 
493 Preamble 6, 15, 16 Brussels I Recast. 
494 Article 1(1) Brussels I Regulation.  
495 There are a few exceptions to this so-called formal scope of the Regulation, one of which 
applies to employees and will be discussed below. 
496 Article 63(1) Brussels I Recast. 
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jurisdiction under the regulation generally follows the time-honoured maxim 
of actor sequitur forum rei, which guards the defendant against being sued in 
a court outside his domicile.497 There are only a few distinct exceptions to 
this basic principle, which are set out in sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of the 
regulation.498 According to the preamble, the situations set forth in sections 2 
to 7 require a different connecting factor on the basis of their distinct subject 
matter or the autonomy of the parties. Where there is a close connection 
between a specific court and the instituted claim these sections provide 
(alternative) grounds for jurisdiction.499 For example, section 5 of the 
regulation exclusively deals with jurisdiction over individual contracts of 
employment. Employees, as weaker parties, are deemed to require protection 
by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to their interest than the general 
rules.500   
 
5.2 Civil and commercial matters 
In applying the specific provisions of the regulation to determine the matter 
of jurisdiction, it is imperative to establish whether the cause of action is 
covered ratione materiae by the Brussels I Recast; i.e. whether the issue 
amounts to a civil and commercial matter within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Brussels I Recast. Although in most cases it will be easily established 
whether a matter constitutes a civil and commercial matter, in some cases 
such classification will prove more difficult. One of the subject matters 
where such classification may prove challenging relates to the issue of 
transfers of undertakings. After all, a transfer inhabits both individual501 and 
semi-public502 components, complicating its classification as a mere civil 
and commercial matter. It is therefore imperative to establish whether a 
transfer of undertaking is covered by the substantive scope of the Brussels I 
Recast. The regulation itself provides neither a definition of the term civil 
and commercial matters nor a method for its classification; it merely holds ‘a 
                                                          
497 Jenard report 1979, p. 18, 19.  
498 Preamble recital 15, 16. Cf. Article 5(1) Brussels I Regulation.  
499 Preamble recital 15, 16. Cf. Article 5(1) Brussels I Regulation.  
500 Preamble recital 18 Brussels I.  
501 E.g. the transfer of rights and obligations stemming from the individual employment 
contract or relationship. 
502 E.g. the preservation of status and function of employee representatives; information and 
consultation requirements and the ope legis transfer to the transferee.  
Chapter 3 – Jurisdiction  
154 
 
negative stipulation’ ‘that the nature of the court or tribunal is immaterial’503 
and excludes revenue, customs or administrative matters and acta iure 
imperii. As such, the regulation applies in disputes between a public 
authority and a private person where the authority is not ‘acting in the 
exercise of public powers’.504  
 
In determining whether the cause of action falls within the substantive scope 
of the Brussels I Recast, classification of such cause of action,505  as being 
either a civil and commercial matter or not, is required. The unique problem 
or conflict of such classification lies therein that various legal orders often 
offer different classifications.506 In order to ensure equal and uniform 
application throughout the Member States the term ‘civil and commercial 
matters’ has a meaning that is independent to the regulation.507 Such 
independent explanation should generally negate any problem of 
classification as the term does not hold a reference to the internal law of the 
Member States.508 Accordingly, the interpretation of the concept ‘civil and 
                                                          
503 See Opinion Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer Lechouritou Case C-292/05 [2007] 
ECR I-01519, ECLI:EU:C:2006:700, para. 20. 
504 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, para. 4 and 5; Case 814/79 Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer 
[1980] ECR 03807, para. 8, 16; Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth 
Waidmann en Stefan Waidmann [1993] ECR I-01963, ECLI:EU:C:1993:144, para. 20-21. 
505 In its traditional meaning the tool of classification, characterization or qualification is 
utilized in determining the applicable law. Classification of a cause of action entails the 
allocation of a factual situation to the correct legal category, thus ensuring the application of 
the correct connecting factor and ensuing (applicable) law. In determining whether the cause 
of action falls within the substantive scope of the Brussels I Regulation, classification of the 
cause of action (as being either a civil and commercial matter or not) is required.   
506 See for instance Opinion Advocate General Darmon Marc Rich & Co. AG v Società 
Italiana Impianti P Case C-190/89 [1991] ECR I-3855, ECLI:EU:C:1991:58, para. 1, who 
states that, notwithstanding its inherent complexity, the interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention raises numerous difficulties due to the use of concepts which are defined 
differently by the laws of various Member States, resulting in the risk of irreconcilable 
decisions.  
507 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, para. 3. 
508 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, para. 3; If no reference to the internal law of the Member States 
is made, there can be no conflict of classification as there is no longer any significance to the 
legal orders having diametrically opposite views or offering dissimilar classifications.   
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commercial matters’ should not be dictated by the internal law of the court 
seised (lex fori) or the law that applies to the legal relationship in dispute (lex 
causae).509 According to the European Court of Justice, it is to be 
interpreted, first, in light of the ‘objectives and scheme’510 of the regulation 
and, second, on the basis of the ‘general principles which stem from the 
corpus of national legal systems’.511 Yet, the ambiguity and lack of direct 
applicability prevent this proposed methodology from offering an immediate 
solution to the problem of classification. The latter suggested, comparative 
approach is reminiscent of the approach proposed by Rabel512 during the 
classic classification debate and is hampered by the fact that there exist few 
general principles of universal application.513 Moreover, since the national 
laws of the Member States are not all rooted in the same legal tradition, it 
appears unfeasible to derive any general principles of sufficient meaning in 
determining whether a cause of action amounts to a civil and commercial 
matter under the regulation.514 Although the need for a comparative approach 
is deeply rooted within private international law,515 the application of such 
an approach in defining the concept of civil and commercial matters appears 
more likely to reveal differences between the laws and classifications of the 
Member States than it is to resolve them.516  
 
Legislative history shows that the term civil and commercial matters, as first 
included in the 1968 Brussels Convention,517 although not expressly defined 
in the convention itself or the Jenard report, was originally intended to 
                                                          
509 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, para. 3; Also See: Hausmann 2011, p. 4; Hausmann 2012, p. 76-
77; Geimer 2003, p. 512, 514. 
510 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137 para. 3. 
511 ECJ  Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol [1976] 
para. 3. 
512 Rabel 1931, p. 241 et seq. 
513 This is true even for the Member States that share on the same legal heritage, such as the 
Roman tradition. 
514 Rogerson 2012, p. 53; Hausmann 2012, p. 77.   
515 Kalenský 2013, p. 158-157; Basedow 2007; Bogdan 2012, p. 175-177.  
516 See Allarouse 1991, p. 488.  
517 Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, consolidated version OJ [1998] C 27/1.  
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exclude all matters relating to public law. As stated in the Schlosser report: 
‘the distinction between civil and commercial matters on the one hand and 
matters of public law on the other is well recognized in the legal systems of 
the original Member States518 and is, in spite of some important differences, 
on the whole arrived at on the basis of similar criteria.’519 However, the 
dichotomy existing between private and public law, which on the European 
continent dates back to Roman times, is unknown to common law legal 
systems.520 As such, in order to provide additional clarity to the meaning of 
civil and commercial matters, the negative stipulation that ‘revenue, customs 
or administrative matters’ do not amount to civil and commercial matters 
within the meaning of the convention was added to Article 1(1) Brussels 
Convention upon the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom to the Brussels Convention.521 This addition does not, however, 
(entirely) resolve the problem of classification or help to provide a common 
understanding of the concept of civil and commercial matters. In practice, 
the concept of civil and commercial matters is still largely defined by the 
distinction existing between private and public law.522 As a general rule, 
disputes between private individuals, except in matters which are excluded 
                                                          
518 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, signed in Rome [1957]. 
519 P.Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the 
Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ [1979] C 59/82. 
520 Hess 2007, p. 34; P. Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice [1979], OJ 5.3.1979 
C59/82, para. 23. This dichotomy between civil (private) and public law dates back to Roman 
times. As per Ulpianus: “Huius studii duae sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. publicum 
ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem 
pertinet”, Inst. 1.1.1, 4; D. 1.1.1.2. 
521 Article 3 Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  signed in Brussels on 
9 October 1978 (78/884/EEC); Schlosser report 1979, OJ [1979] C 59/82; Rogerson 2012, p. 
51. 
522 This is clear from the case law of the European Court of Justice in: and the 2007 
Heidelberg report, p.34. 
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on the basis of subject matter,523 fall within the ambit of the regulation. In 
addition, it is settled case law that disputes between a public authority and a 
private individual are outwith the scope of the Brussels I Recast and its 
predecessors, insofar as the public authority is acting in the exercise of 
public powers.524 Where a government body or state authority is party to 
legal proceedings the subject matter of the action must not concern (liability 
for)525 the exercise of public powers where these derogate from the rules of 
law applicable to relations between private individuals.526 Hence, the private 
nature of the legal relationship existing between the parties is a decisive 
factor in classifying a dispute as a civil and commercial matter under the 
regulation. Thus, disputes between private individuals and state authorities 
acting in a private capacity amount to civil and commercial matters within 
the meaning of the regulation.   
 
Admittedly, the classification of a cause of action as being either a civil and 
commercial matter or not will rarely pose any problems. Whether a cause of 
action amounts to a civil and commercial matter will generally be easily 
determined and straight-forward. Still, problems of classification are likely 
to occur in disputes that border on public law. When it comes to claims 
related to a transfer of undertaking the applicability of the Brussels I 
Regulation and its various rules on jurisdiction is largely contingent on the 
nature of the instituted claim. For some matters regulated by the Acquired 
                                                          
523 Recital 10 of the Regulation makes clear that the substantive scope of application is to 
‘cover all the main civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-defined matters. 
Recital 10 highlights the exclusion of maintenance obligations which are beyond the scope of 
the Brussels I Recast due to the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 
December 2008 on jurisdiction applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ 10.1.2009, L7/1 
524 Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 
1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, operative part, para. 2; Case 814/79 Netherlands State v 
Reinhold Rüffer [1980] ECR 03807 operative part; Case C-172/91 Sonntag [1993] ECR 1-
1963, para. 20; Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel, 
[2002] ECR I-8111, ECLI:EU:C:2002:555, para. 26. 
525 See e.g. C-292/05 Lechouritou [2007] ECR I-01519, ECLI:EU:C:2007:102 in which the 
ECJ held that the plaintiffs could not seek damages for crimes committed against them or 
their ancestors during World War II under the Brussels I Regulation as ‘operations conducted 
by armed forces are one of the characteristic emanations of State sovereignty’.   
526 Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel, [2002] ECR I-
8111, ECLI:EU:C:2002:555, para. 30. 
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Rights Directive it will be easy to determine whether they amount to a civil 
and commercial matter under the regulation, whereas with regard to other 
matters this might prove more difficult. As such, claims based on a false 
dismissal will undoubtedly be classified as a civil and commercial matter 
whereas claims based on the employer’s failure to preserve the status and 
function of employee representatives may show more difficult to classify. 
With regard to the latter issue the problem of classification can be depicted 
by a report provided by the CMS Group for the European Commission. The 
report states: 
“As to the effect of a cross-border transfer on the status and function of 
employee representatives of the business transferred, it must be 
established whether in the country of the transferor, State A, employee 
representation is a “civil and commercial matter”  within the meaning of 
the Regulation (art 1(1)) (…). This is the case in countries where the 
information and consultation obligations can be enforced before the 
employment courts (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands, Italy).”527  
The idea that it is for the Member States to determine whether the 
preservation of the status and function of employee representatives upon a 
transfer of undertaking (or any other acquired right) amounts to a civil and 
commercial matter under the Brussels I Recast suggests little understanding 
of this private international law instrument and its approach to classification. 
As outlined above, the definition of civil and commercial matters under the 
regulation requires an independent or autonomous interpretation without 
redress to national law.528 Thus, it is for the court taking cognizance of the 
matter to determine, by reference ‘to the objectives and scheme of the 
regulation, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the 
national legal systems’ and in line with the case law provided by the 
European Court of Justice, whether the preservation of the status and 
function of employee representatives upon a transfer of undertaking is 
covered ratione materiae by the Brussels I Recast. It is for the forum to 
decide whether the abstract cause of action qualifies as a civil and 
commercial matter. The national law and perceptions of the state where the 
                                                          
527 CMS report 2006, p. 59. 
528 See e.g. Case 29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol 
[1976] ECR 1541, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137, para. 3. 
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undertaking to be transferred is located, as a possible lex causae, should not 
be featured in this consideration. It is to be considered whether the 
preservation of the status and function of employee representatives as a 
general cause of action, irrespective of e.g. the views existing in lex fori or 
the lex causae, amounts to a civil and commercial matter. Contrary to what 
appears to be suggested in the CMS report, the nature of the court or tribunal 
deciding on the matter is also irrelevant to this consideration.529 Application 
of the Brussels I Recast is not barred by the public nature that, in some 
Member States, is awarded to employee representation and other matters of 
collective labour law. In situations where a private entity, such as an 
employee representative or an employee representative body (e.g. a works 
council or trade union) seeks enforcement of national acquired rights 
provisions these claims are likely to fall within the concept of civil and 
commercial matters as they (mainly) involve the enforcement of private law 
rules. Surely, the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive are largely 
aimed at protecting the individual employee.530 The central purpose of the 
provision effecting the automatic transfer of the employment relationship to 
the transferee is to secure that individual employees are protected against the 
loss of employment.531 Ensuring a continuance of the legal position of the 
employee, in the sense that his position is not adversely affected by the 
transfer of undertaking, requires the transfer of the rights and obligations 
stemming from collective as well as individual labour laws or provisions. As 
such, the directive ensures, among others, the continuance of terms and 
conditions established in collective bargaining agreements and the 
preservation of the status and function of employee representatives.532  The 
                                                          
529 Article 1(1) Brussels I Recast. 
530 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 2 a; also see BAG 24 August 1989, 
IPRax 1991, 407. This judgment, which mainly deals with the classification of the national 
(German) acquired  rights provision, para. 613a BGB, under the conflict of laws has been 
strongly criticised in legal literature. Some authors applaud the denial of overriding effect in 
view of the interests that the provision aims to protect, whereas others profusely disagree with 
the decision. They opine that provisions protecting employees often originate from public 
interests, which makes these provisions particularly suitable for application as overriding 
mandatory rules. 
531 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 2 a; also see BAG 24 August 1989, 
IPRax 1991, 407; COM (74) 351 final/2, p. 3, 6. 
532 COM (74) 351 final/2, p.6: It should be noted that the directive does not provide for an 
automatic transfer of all rights and obligations stemming from collective agreements. Where 
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directive seeks to secure that those required to protect the interest of the 
employees vis-à-vis the employer are able to continue their work after the 
transfer has been completed. In addition, those employees who as 
representatives enjoy a certain protection under the laws, regulations, 
administrative provisions or practice of the Member States have a right to 
the continuance of this protection even if, as a result of the transfer, their 
position as an employee representative cannot be maintained.533  
The above shows that the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive and 
their national counterparts are mainly based in private law and founded in 
private interests. Still, it may be argued that provisions aiming to protect 
employees often originate from a public interest or embody some form of 
public policy. In that sense, claims based in public interests made by private 
parties, such as employee representatives or employee representative bodies, 
could (hypothetically) be excluded from the substantive scope of the 
Brussels I Recast.534 However, the Brussels I Recast and the interpretation 
given to the concept of civil and commercial matters by the European Court 
of Justice leave very little room for a derogation from the perception that 
claims between private parties are generally covered by the regulation: only 
in situations where a private party seeks to exercise rights or powers that are 
beyond the rules applicable to relations between private individuals will it be 
possible for such disputes to be excluded from the scope of the regulation.535 
                                                                                                                                        
the transferor has concluded or established a collective bargaining agreement designed 
specifically for the business or undertakings to be transferred it seems only logical that the 
transferee is obliged to continue the rights and obligations existing under such agreement. 
Yet, in situations where collective agreements have been concluded between various (workers 
and employers) associations, which are not binding on the transferee and have not been 
declared generally binding the tight of free association prevents the transferee from being 
obliged to uphold the terms and conditions stemming from these agreements. As such, the 
directive, in Article 3(2) imposes on the transferee the obligation to observe the terms and 
conditions agreed in collective agreements on the same terms applicable to the transferor 
under that agreement until such time as the agreement expires or a new agreement enters into 
force. For more on the preservation of terms and conditions agreed in collective bargaining 
agreements see Chapter 2, paragraph 6. 
533 Article 5(2) Acquired Rights Directive. 
534 Cf. Van Hoek & Hendrickx 2009, p. 8. 
535 Case C-265/02 Frahuil SA v Assitalia SpA, [2004] ECR I-01543, ECLI:EU:C:2004:77, 
para. 21; Case C-266/01, Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der Nederlanden, [2003] 
ECR I-04867, ECLI:EU:C:2003:282, para. 36. 
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In other words, disputes concerning private parties can only escape 
application of the Brussels I Recast when the plaintiff seeks to enforce 
certain rules or rights that are strongly based in public law and go beyond the 
private legal relationship, examples of which are hard to come by.536 The 
mere fact that the plaintiff acts as an employee representative or employee 
representative body does not disqualify the dispute from being classified as a 
civil and commercial matter.537 Moreover, claims relating to specific issues 
of collective labour law, such as e.g. rights and obligations stemming from a 
collective agreement, are not excluded per se from the substantive scope of 
the regulation.538 Generally, such claims do not pertain to the exercise of 
public powers and are thus covered by Article 1(1) of the Brussels I 
Recast.539 Yet, where it concerns claims specifically relating to issues of 
employment representation there appears to be some discussion, especially 
in German legal literature, as to whether these claims amount to a civil and 
commercial matter within the meaning of Article 1(1).540 The fact that these 
claims, similar to the majority of claims in the area of collective labour law, 
do not concern the exercise of public powers or authority speaks in favour of 
their classification as civil and commercial matters.541 However, one may 
contend that the issue of employment representation is at odds with the 
intention of the Brussels I Recast, which seeks to allot jurisdiction in 
disputes involving parties between whom a direct legal relationship exists. 
As such, it is argued that by its very nature, being one of third party 
representation, the issue of employment representation cannot be placed 
                                                          
536 Cf. Van Hoek & Hendrickx  2009, p. 8. 
537 The same applies to consumer representation: Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress COM(2008) 794 final, p.13-14. 
538 Cf. BAG 15 February 2012 - 10 AZR 711/10; Schömann et al. 2012, p. 226; Eichhorst et 
al. 2011,  p. 73. 
539 Case C-420/07 Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams en Linda Elizabeth Orams 
[2009] ECR I-3571, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271 para. 43, 44, 45. 
540 Thus the idea portrayed in the CMS report (cited above) that there is some uncertainty as 
to whether claims relating to employee representation are considered civil and commercial 
matters does have some merit. Yet, the uncertain position of these claims is not based on the 
reasons provided in the report. 
541 Geimer/Schütze EuZVR 3. Aufl. 2010 A 1 Art. 1 Note 71; LAG Berlin-Brandenburg 8 
February 2011 - 7 TaBV 2744/10. 
Chapter 3 – Jurisdiction  
162 
 
within the strait-jacket that is the Brussels I Recast.542 Yet, this argument 
does not prove cogent given the fact that the Brussels I Recast does not 
prevent (employee) representatives from acting as a plaintiff nor is this a 
decisive factor in determining the substantive scope of the Regulation.543 
Any claim by a private individual or entity aimed at the enforcement of rules 
and obligations based in private law against another private individual will 
under the Brussels I Recast be classified as a civil and commercial matter.544 
In situations where an individual employee, upon a transfer of undertaking, 
seeks to ensure the preservation of his status and function as an employee 
representative this criterion is undoubtedly met. Moreover, there exists a 
direct legal relationship between the employee and the transferor: being the 
employee-employer relationship. The transferee, due to the transfer regarded 
as the employer ab initio, is required to preserve the status and function of 
the employee representatives on the basis of the acquired rights provisions. 
He is merely obliged to ensure the continuance of the position of the 
employment representatives and cannot afford them a position that they are 
not entitled to under the laws, regulations, administrative provisions or 
practice of the Member States. As such, he is not exercising public powers 
by endeavouring to preserve the status and function of the employee 
representatives, whether they are individual employees or employment 
representative bodies. 
In summary, all claims arising from or related to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking are covered ratione materiae by the Brussels I Regulation, as 
long as they do not pertain to the exercise of public powers. As all actors, 
such as the employees, employee representatives, transferor and transferee, 
who possibly have a claim relating to a cross-border transfer of undertaking 
are likely to be private individuals or private entities these claims are 
generally classified as civil and commercial matters within the meaning of 
Article 1(1) Brussels I Recast.  
 
                                                          
542 LAG Berlin-Brandenburg 8 February 2011 - 7 TaBV 2744/10; ArbG Cottbus 29 
November 2010 - 4 BV 86/10; Cf. OGH Wien, 2 June 2009 - 9 ObA 144/08d. 
543 The same applies to consumer representation: Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress COM(2008) 794 final, p.13-14; Van Hoek & Hendrickx 2009, p. 6. 
544 Van Hoek & Hendrickx 2009, p. 6, 9. 
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5.3 General rule 
As a general rule jurisdiction under the Brussels I Recast follows the time-
honoured maxim of actor sequitur forum rei, which guards the defendant 
against being sued in a court outside his domicile.545 Thus, on the basis of 
Article 4 of the regulation, jurisdiction is commonly awarded to the courts of 
the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, irrespective of the 
nature or subject matter of the claim instituted against him.546 For reasons of 
legal certainty and because it makes it easier for the defendant to provide a 
proper defense, the place of the defendant´s domicile embodies the most 
natural forum.547 However, the Brussels I Recast does not directly allot 
jurisdiction to the courts of the place of domicile of the defendant; it merely 
grants jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State in which the defendant 
is domiciled. It is left to the rules on the internal jurisdiction of that Member 
State to determine which court is to take cognizance of the dispute.548  
 
Article 4 Brussels I Recast does not itself provide a definition of the concept 
of domicile: specific rules on the notion of domicile for natural and legal 
persons are provided  in Articles 62 and 63 of the Brussels I Recast.549 As 
per Article 62(1) the Member State court seised of the matter is to apply its 
internal law, i.e. the lex fori, in order to determine whether a natural person, 
as a defendant, is domiciled in that Member State. If the court determines 
that the defendant is not domiciled within the forum state, it must apply the 
laws of another Member State in order to determine whether the defendant is 
domiciled within that specific Member State.550 Whereas the regulation 
leaves the definition of domicile for natural persons to the national laws of 
the Member States, it provides an autonomous definition of domicile for 
legal persons. Article 63(1) Brussels I Recast provides that the domicile of a 
                                                          
545 Jenard report 1979, p. 18, 19.  
546 Preamble Recital 15 Brussels I Recast. 
547 Case C-412/98 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance 
Company (UGIC) [2000] ECR I-5925, ECLI:EU:C:2000:399, para. 35; Case C-26/91 Handte 
v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces [1992] ECR I-3967, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268, 
para. 14; Jenard report 1979, p. 18. 
548 Jenard report 1979, p. 18, 19; Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p.71. In most countries, the 
court awarded jurisdiction on the basis of the rules on internal jurisdiction will be the court of 
the place of domicile of the defendant.  
549 These provisions equate to Articles 59 and 60 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
550 Article 62(2) Brussels I Recast. 
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company or other legal person can alternatively be based on the place where 
the company has its statutory seat, central administration or principal place 
of business. As such, the regulation tailors to the differences in private 
international law (systems) pertaining to companies that exist within the 
European Member States.551 
The nationality of the parties or state of incorporation of a company, whether 
plaintiff or defendant, does not have any effect on the application of the 
Brussels I Recast. Where it concerns the defendant, Article 4(1) specifies 
that ‘persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, 
be sued in the courts of that Member State.’ As such, the regulation applies 
to civil and commercial matters whenever the defendant is domiciled within 
a Member State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties. Thus, it is 
possible for the regulation to apply in disputes against a third state national 
or a company governed by the laws of a non-Member State. With respect to 
the transfer of undertaking, the employees or their representatives will 
therefore be able to sue a non-EU incorporated transferee or transferor in the 
courts of a Member State on the basis of the Brussels I Recast, if the 
transferee’s or transferor’s principal place of business or central 
administration is located within a Member State.552 The same holds true in 
disputes initiated by the transferor or transferee, they will, on the basis of the 
general rule awarding jurisdiction to the forum rei, be able to present their 
claim against a third state national employee or employee representative in a 
Member State court whenever the employee is domiciled within the territory 
of the forum state.  
Jurisdiction pertaining to those who are not considered domiciled in a 
Member State under the regulation is determined in accordance with the 
national laws of the Member States.553 Thus, it is for the national rules on 
jurisdiction of the forum state to decide whether the court seised of the 
matter has jurisdiction over those domiciled in a third state. As such, e.g. 
companies having their main establishment outside the European Union 
                                                          
551 According to the Preamble Recital 15 Brussels I Recast: ‘the domicile of a legal person 
must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid 
conflicts of jurisdiction.’;  Van Hoek & Hendrickx 2009, p. 45.  
552 Article 63(1) Brussels I Recast. 
553 Article 6(1) Brussels I Recast. 
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cannot be sued on the basis of the Brussels I Recast. In case of a cross-
border transfer of undertaking this may prove particularly burdensome, 
where the transferee, taking over (part of) a European based undertaking, has 
its main establishment outside the European Union. The transferee, as a third 
state legal entity, may operate several establishments which do not possess 
separate legal personality, including the undertaking that is transferred, in 
the European Union. In those cases, the employees or their representatives 
cannot rely on the general rule of jurisdiction provided by the Brussels I 
Recast. Yet, in cases where the transfer related dispute is founded in the 
individual contract of employment the regulation, in Article 20(2), offers a 
solution:  
‘Where an employee enters into an individual contract of employment 
with an employer who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a 
branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States, the 
employer shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, 
agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that Member 
State.’  
Thus, those employees whose transfer related claim is based in the 
individual contract of employment or whose claim, under the Brussels I 
Recast, is classified as one pertaining to an individual contract of 
employment can sue the transferee in the courts of the place where the 
transferred undertaking is located, irrespective of the location of the 
transferee’s statutory seat, central administration or principal place of 
business. For example, if an American company having is primary 
establishment in the United States of America takes over (part of) an 
undertaking based in the Netherlands, resulting in the transferred 
undertaking becoming part of the transferee’s legal entity, the employees (or 
their representatives), in disputes pertaining to the transfer of undertaking, 
will not be able to sue the transferee on the basis of the general rules 
provided in the Brussels I Recast as the American company does not have its 
statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business within a 
Member State. Nevertheless, employees wishing to sue the transferee for 
issues (which are to be classified as) relating to their individual contract of 
employment, e.g. claims relating to (the continuity of) rights and obligations 
stemming from the employment contract or relationship such as salary, 
pension and work claims and claims for unfair dismissal, will be able to sue 
Chapter 3 – Jurisdiction  
166 
 
the American transferee in the Dutch courts on the basis of Article 20(2). 
Indeed, claims relating to the transfer of undertaking will most likely 
constitute ‘disputes arising out of a branch, agency or other establishment’, 
causing the transferee to be deemed domiciled in the Member State of the 
transferred undertaking. However well this solution may work for claims 
pertaining to the individual contract of employment, the Brussels I Recast 
does not provide a fictitious European domicile in cases of employee 
representation, disputes relating to a failure to comply with collective 
information and consultation requirements and disputes relating to collective 
(bargaining) agreements. In those cases, the employees and their 
representatives can only rely on the national rules on jurisdiction of the 
Member States. In this context, the fact that the Brussels I Recast does not 
cover the abovementioned claims against non EU-domiciled defendants 
having a secondary place of establishment within a European Member State, 
does not necessarily prevent a Member State court from assuming 
jurisdiction over such claims. Although differences exist in conditions, legal 
basis and scope, most Member States, in their national laws on jurisdiction, 
provide a jurisdictional basis in case of the presence of a secondary 
establishment within their territory.554 Similar to Article 7(5) Brussels I 
Recast,555 the majority of Member States restrict jurisdiction in such cases to 
disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or other 
establishment.556 As such, under the national laws pertaining to jurisdiction 
existing in the Member States, the employees and employee representatives 
will generally be able to sue a non-EU domiciled transferee who has 
acquired an EU based (part of an) undertaking, in the courts of the European 
Member State in which the transferred undertaking is located, insofar as the 
dispute pertains to the operations of the transferred undertaking.  
                                                          
554 Nuyts et al. 2007, p. 36-37. The study shows that of the European Member States, Poland 
and Greece do not extent jurisdiction to the place of secondary establishment. In the majority 
of the Member States the jurisdiction of the court seems to be restricted to ‘operations arising 
out of the secondary establishment, whereas the Czech Republic, England, Finland, Malta and 
Portugal do not provide such restrictions, see p. 37. 
555 Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast, which equates to Article 5(5) Brussels I Regulation reads: 
‘A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: as regards a 
dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts 
for the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated’. 
556 Nuyts et al. 2007, p. 36-37. 
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Whereas the employees and employee representatives, in cases that are 
beyond the scope of the individual employment contract, will have trouble 
suing a non EU-domiciled transferee on the basis of the Brussels I Recast, 
transferor and transferee will encounter similar problems in trying to sue an 
employee that is domiciled outside the European Union. In fact, where 
transferor and transferee have employed a non-EU domiciled employee, they 
will, in transfer related disputes, be unable to sue the employee on the basis 
of the Brussels I Recast. While employees, as socially and economically 
weaker parties, when acting as plaintiffs, are provided with additional rules 
of jurisdiction that apply irrespective of the defendant’s domicile, transferee 
and transferor are bound by the general rule awarding jurisdiction to the 
forum rei.557 The lack of a unitary definition of the concept of domicile for 
natural persons causes the existence of a certain divergence throughout the 
Member States of when a person is considered domiciled within a certain 
territory. Some Member States equate the concept of domicile to habitual 
residence or place of stay whereas others apply a more strict concept of 
domicile. As such, whether a person is deemed domiciled outside the 
European Union may differ according to the laws of the Member States.  
There are only a few distinct exceptions to the general rule, which are set out 
in sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of the regulation.558 This includes section 5, 
which deals with individual contract of employment. 
5.4 Disputes arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other 
establishment 
On the basis of the general rule provided in Article 4, in cases relating to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, the transferee and the transferor may be 
sued in the courts of the place where they have established their domicile in 
accordance with Article 63 Brussels I Recast. As such, these legal entities 
may be sued in the courts of the place where they have their statutory seat, 
central administration or principal place of business. As outlined above, the 
                                                          
557 Even where it concerns the individual contract of employment, as is most likely the case in 
situations where transferee or transferor wishes to sue an employee or employee 
representative for reasons relating to the transfer of undertaking, Article 22(1) Brussels I 
Recast reiterates the general rule: ‘An employer may bring proceedings only in the courts of 
the Member State in which the employee is domiciled.’ For more on this see paragraph 2.4. 
558 Preamble recital 15, 16. Cf. Article 5(1) Brussels I Recast.  
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place of domicile of transferee and transferor may on occasion not coincide 
with the location of the transferred undertaking, especially in situations 
where their business is structured as a group of undertakings operating 
within one legal entity. In such cases, where the transferred undertaking is to 
be classified as a secondary establishment within the legal entity of the 
transferor or transferee, Article 7(5) provides for jurisdiction at the location 
of the transferred undertaking. In other words, Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast 
provides for alternative jurisdiction in the courts of the place where a branch, 
agency or other establishment is situated, insofar as the dispute arises out of 
the operations of this branch agency or other establishment. Thus, in order 
for a Member State court to assume jurisdiction at the place of secondary 
establishment the dispute should relate to the operation of that secondary 
establishment. In situations where the dispute stems from or is related to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking the dispute may relate to the transferred 
undertaking as a branch, agency or other establishment. However, if the 
dispute does not relate to the branch, agency or other establishment, but to 
e.g. the primary establishment, the plaintiffs should avail themselves of the 
general rule provided in Article 4. 
  
The effects of a transfer of undertaking are not limited the individual 
employment relationship, but also concern operational, economic and 
collective employment interests. These rights and interests, such as 
employee participation rights cannot be subsumed under the special rules of 
jurisdiction existing for disputes relating to individual employment contracts. 
Of the transfer related claims that do not stem from the individual contract of 
employment, claims relating to the preservation of the status and function of 
employee representatives as well as claims relating to collective information 
and consultation requirements could possibly be subsumed under Article 
7(5).559 In situations where the transferred undertaking constitutes a branch, 
agency or other establishment, disputes of employment representation could 
be classified as disputes arising out of the operation of the transferred 
undertaking. In this sense, both claims for the preservation of the status and 
function of employee representatives, whether instituted by the employee 
representatives or trade unions and claims relating to the information and 
                                                          
559 See the paragraph on individual employment contracts for a more elaborate portrayal of 
claims classified as related to individual employment contracts. 
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consultation of employee representatives constitute disputes of employment 
representation. The employee representatives, on the basis of their distinct 
legal position possess a right to the preservation of their status and function 
by the transferee. Similarly, their distinct position as employee 
representatives provides them with a right of information and consultation 
upon a transfer of undertaking. In the majority of situations, the plaintiffs in 
these cases would have to make due with the general rule on jurisdiction 
pertained in Article 4 providing jurisdiction to the courts in the place of 
domicile of the transferee or transferor. However, where the transferred 
undertaking, due to the transfer has become a part of the legal entity of the 
transferee situated outside the transferee’s place of domicile Article 7(5) 
allows the employee representatives to present their claim in the courts of 
the place where the transferred undertaking is situated. Similarly, in 
situations where the transferred undertaking, prior to the transfer constituted 
a secondary establishment of the transferor, the employees could by reason 
of Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast be able to pursue their claim against the 
transferor in the courts of the place where the transferred undertaking is 
situated prior to the transfer.     
As outlined above, if the (transferred) undertaking is to be considered a 
secondary establishment the employee representatives, the employee 
representative body and trade unions will be able to pursue their claim 
against transferee or transferor before the courts of the place where the 
(transferred) undertaking is situated. This court will only have jurisdiction if 
the transferred ‘economic entity’ can be considered a ‘branch, agency or 
other establishment’. These concepts are to be given an autonomous 
meaning within the realm of the Brussels I Recast. To this end, case law 
suggests that a ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ ‘implies a place of 
business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a 
parent body, has management and is materially equipped to negotiate 
business with third parties to the extent that the latter, although knowing that 
there will if necessary be a legal link with the parent body, the head office of 
which is abroad, do not have to deal directly with such parent body but may 
transact business at the place of business constituting the extension.’560 
                                                          
560 Case 33/78, Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183, ECLI:EU:C:1978:205, 
para. 12. 
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Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast only requires application if the claim 
concerning the operations of the branch, agency or other establishment. 
Examples of such claims are claims regarding ‘the situation of the building 
where such entity is established or the local engagement of staff to work 
there.’561 Although claims concerning the status and function of employee 
representatives appear to logically befall this category, the question may 
arise whether the notion of ‘operations’ can be stretched to such an extent 
that it includes typical (collective) employment interests such as the 
preservation of the status and function of employee representatives. On a 
broader note however, the rights and obligations of employee representatives 
in the event of a transfer of undertaking stem from the operational decision 
to transfer or acquire the undertaking in which the specific employee 
representative is engaged. If succumbing the notion that it stretches too far to 
include collective employment interests in Article 7(5) due to the operation 
of an undertaking not including the undertaking’s decisions vis-à-vis specific 
employees and their representatives, the employee’s, employee 
representatives and trade unions in these cases will have to resort to Article 
4. In light of Article 20(2) Brussels I Recast, however, this notion does not 
appear to have much merit, as under this provision disputes over individual 
employment rights may potentially be classified as disputes arising from the 
operation of a branch, agency or other establishment. 
5.5 Individual employment contract 
As mentioned in paragraph 1, an employee may wish to initiate legal 
proceedings against either the transferor or the transferee for a variety of 
reasons ranging from unfair dismissal to a failure to comply with 
information and consultation requirements. This paragraph seeks to discuss 
issues of jurisdiction in situations where the claim related to or originating 
from the cross-border transfer of undertaking is rooted in (or classified as 
pertaining to) the individual contract of employment. First, the situation 
where the employee or his representative, upon a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, seeks to initiate legal proceedings against the transferor or 
transferee in the courts of a European Member State will be addressed, after 
which attention is paid to the reverse situation, i.e. the claims initiated 
                                                          
561 Case 33/78, Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183, ECLI:EU:C:1978:205, 
para. 13. 
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against the employee by the transferee or transferor. Employees may seek 
enforcement of several articles of the Acquired Rights Directive (and their 
equivalent in national law) by initiating legal proceedings against the 
transferor or the transferee. Claims based on some of these Articles may 
result in actions which are to be classified as matters relating to individual 
contracts of employment under the Brussels I Recast. Such actions may 
involve the continuity of contractual rights and obligations (Article 3(1) 
Acquired Rights Directive), protection against dismissal (Article 4(1) 
Acquired Rights Directive), a substantial change in working conditions 
(Article 4(2) Acquired Rights Directive) and  information and  consultation 
requirements (Article 7 Acquired Rights Directive).562  
 
5.5.1 Claims initiated by the employee 
In derogation from the general rules, section 5 of the Brussels I Recast 
provides rules of special jurisdiction in disputes relating to the individual 
contract of employment.563 In addition to the forum rei, the employee is 
entitled to sue the employer in the court of the place (from) where he 
habitually carries out his work or the place of business through which he was 
engaged. On the basis of Article 21(1) Brussels I Recast an employer, being 
either the transferor or the transferee, may thus be sued: 
 
a. in the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled; or 
b. in another Member State: 
(i) in the courts for the place where or from where the 
employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts 
for the last place where he did so; or 
(ii) if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his 
work in any one country, in the courts for the place where 
                                                          
562 The issue of classification as individual employment matters is dealt with more elaborately 
below, e.g. there is some question as to the applicability of section 5 of the Brussels I Recast 
with regards to information and consultation requirements.  
563 The inclusion of a special section on jursdiction in employment matters is fairly recent: it 
was first introduced at the inception of the Brussels I Regulation. Under the Brussels 
Convention jurisdiction in matters relating to employment contracts was dealt with according 
to the general rules on contract. 
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the business which engaged the employee is or was 
situated.564 
 
This section utilizes an extended concept of domicile in the sense that per 
Article 20(2) employers domiciled outside the European Union are deemed 
domiciled in a Member State if they operate a branch, agency or other 
establishment within that Member State and the dispute arises out of the 
operations of the secondary establishment, i.e. the aforementioned branch, 
agency or other establishment.565 As outlined above, in paragraph 4, in 
proceedings relating to the individual contract of employment the extension 
of the concept of domicile in Article 20(2) enables employees to bring 
proceedings before the courts of a Member State against an employer 
domiciled outside the European Union if the employer has a secondary 
establishment within that Member State. As an inevitable result of economic 
globalization, the increase of situations in which an employer is domiciled 
outside the combined territory of the European Member States created a 
need for predictable and uniform European rules on jurisdiction preventing 
the employee having to resort to the Member States’ national rules on 
jurisdiction relating to non-EU domiciled employers. In the absence of 
communal rules, the employee would have to resort to the national rules on 
jurisdiction existing in the Member States, which might result in an inability 
to sue a non-EU domiciled employer in the European Union. In order to 
properly protect the employee as a weaker contractual and economic party 
the extended notion of employer’s domicile was thus included in the 
Brussels I Regulation, the predecessor of the Brussels I Recast.566 As such, 
Article 20(2) enables employees to, in disputes relating to a transfer of 
undertaking, sue a non-EU domiciled transferee in the courts of the Member 
State where the transferred undertaking is located, if by reason of the transfer 
the transferred undertaking has become a dependent branch or establishment. 
For example, as discussed above in paragraph 4, if an American company 
having is primary establishment in the United States of America acquires 
(part of) an undertaking based in the Netherlands, resulting in the transferred 
undertaking becoming part of the transferee’s legal entity, the employees (or 
                                                          
564 Article 21(1) Brussels I Recast. 
565 Cf. Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast. 
566 Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 330. 
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their representatives), in disputes relating to the transfer of undertaking, will 
thus be able to sue the transferee in the Dutch courts whenever their claim is 
based on the individual contract of employment or classified as such. 
Likewise, employees that are part of a dependent branch operated by a 
transferor that is domiciled outside the European Union will be able to sue 
the transferor, for reasons relating to the transfer of said branch, in the courts 
of the Member State where the branch is located.  
The employee, as a plaintiff, will surely seek to bring proceedings in a court 
that, from his position, offers the most advantageous solution to the dispute. 
Since it is left to the plaintiff to decide in which court to enter his claim, the 
existence of a plurality of jurisdictional bases will serve to his benefit. A 
comparison between the Brussels regime and the national rules on 
jurisdiction existing in the Member States shows that the latter on occasion 
provide more and alternative bases for jurisdiction in employment disputes. 
The additional or alternative fora include the place where the employee is 
domiciled or has his habitual residence,567 the place where the employment 
contract was made or signed,568 the place of citizenship of the parties,569 and 
the place where the remuneration is or should have been paid.570 As such, the 
question may be raised as to whether the inclusion of an extended concept of 
domicile for non-EU employers in the Brussels I Recast serves to the benefit 
of the individual employee. In fact, it can be argued that although the 
inclusion of an extended concept of domicile for non-EU domiciled 
employers with a secondary or ancillary establishment in the European 
Union is intended to provide legal certainty and protect employees as weaker 
parties, the inclusion actually results in the employees having obtained a 
position worse than the one that exists for non-protected plaintiffs.571 Surely, 
if the employees were not provided with jurisdictional protection due to their 
weaker legal, social and contractual position they would not be able to sue a 
third state employer with a secondary establishment in the EU on the basis of 
the Brussels I Recast. On the basis of Article 6(1) Brussels I Recast, they 
                                                          
567 Austria, Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden, as per Nuyts et 
al. 2007, p. 46. 
568 Finland, France, Greece and Spain, as as per Nuyts et al. 2007, p. 46. 
569 Spain, Nuyts et al. 2007, p. 46. 
570 Austria, as per Nuyts et al. 2007, p. 46. 
571 See e.g. Grusic 2012, p. 119.  
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would have to resort to the rules on residual jurisdiction existing in the 
Member States and thus have recourse to the additional national bases for 
jurisdiction. The use of a specific notion of domicile for employers secures 
that the employee is at all times able to sue a non-EU domiciliary with 
ancillary establishments in the EU in the courts of a European Member State. 
On occasion, when applying the national rules on jurisdiction for employers 
domiciled outside the European Union, an employee will not be able to sue 
the employer in a Member State, even though the employer operates a 
branch, agency or other establishment within that Member State, e.g. in the 
courts of Malta and Poland. In these cases the employees will surely benefit 
from the legal certainty provided by placing non-EU domiciliaries on equal 
footing with EU based employers.  
In addition to the forum rei, Article 21 Brussels I Recast grants jurisdiction 
to the courts of the place in which, or from which, the employee habitually 
carries out his work, i.e. the forum loci laboris. If the proper forum cannot be 
determined on this basis, i.e., when the employee does not habitually carry 
out his work in or from one (Member) state, the court of the place of 
business through which the employee was engaged is awarded 
jurisdiction.572 Hence, it must first be examined whether the employee 
principally carries out his work in or from one or several countries.573 An 
employee works in one single country if the centre of his activities is located 
within the sovereign territories of that country.574 In the absence of a centre 
of activities,575 the place where the employee carries out the majority of his 
activities will suffice for determining the proper forum.576  
 
Upon the entry into force of the Brussels I Recast the ambit of the 
Regulation was partially extended to non-EU defendants. In employment 
law matters, this means that employees may bring proceedings against an 
employer domiciled outside the European Union even if the employer does 
                                                          
572 Article 21(1)(b)(ii) Brussels I Recast. 
573 Cf. Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-
1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151. 
574 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23. 
575 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23. 
576 Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, paragraph 42;Cf. Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-
Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 45. 
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not operate a secondary establishment within a Member State (or the dispute 
does not relate to the operation of such an establishment). In this, non-EU 
domiciliaries are placed on equal footing with EU based employers in the 
sense that an employee will be able to initiate legal proceedings against a 
third state employer in situations where the employee habitually carries out 
his work in a Member State or is engaged through a business that is situated 
in a Member State.  
Surely, the place where the employee habitually carries out his work in 
performance of the (employment) contract is easily determined in situations 
where the employee performs his obligations towards the employer in one 
single country. Where the employee discharges his obligations towards the 
employer in more than one country it is more difficult to establish a single 
locus laboris. In those cases, one must rely on the definition provided in the 
case law of the European Court of Justice. According to the ECJ, in 
situations where the work is performed in more than one Member State, it is 
important to provide an independent meaning to the concept of ‘habitual 
place of performance’ in order to avoid a ‘multiplication of courts having 
jurisdiction’ and ‘preclude a risk of irreconcilable decisions’.577 As such, 
jurisdiction is not to be conferred on the courts of each Member State in 
which the employee performs or has performed his employment 
obligations.578 Instead, the courts of the ´place where or from which the 
employee principally discharges his obligations towards his employer´579 are 
to take cognizance of the dispute in its entirety. These are the courts of ‘the 
place where the employee has established the effective centre of his working 
activities and where, or from which, he performs the essential part of his 
duties vis-à-vis his employer’.580 In situations where the employee is set to 
perform the same or similar activities in multiple Member States it may be 
                                                          
577 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:306, para. 21; Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 13. These decisions  were held under the Brussels Convention, but 
equally applies under the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast. Cf. Case C-220/88 
Dumez France and Tracoba [1990] ECR I-49, ECLI:EU:C:1990:8, para. 18.  
578 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, ECLI:EU:C:1993:30, 
para. 23. 
579 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, ECLI:EU:C:1993:30, 
para. 24, 26. 
580 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical[1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23, 26. 
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impossible to identify a centre of working activities. In those cases, the time 
spent working in the various Member States shall be decisive in determining 
jurisdiction.581 Thus, the courts of the state in which the employee has 
worked for the longest time period shall have jurisdiction, except where 
there is a court that has a more significant connection to (the subject matter 
of) the dispute.582 The criterion of ‘the place in which, or from which, the 
employee habitually carries out his work’ is thus given a broad 
interpretation, leaving little to no room for the application of the fallback 
rule of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) which awards jurisdiction to the engaging place of 
business. In fact, since the engaging place of business acts as secondary 
place of jurisdiction, its application is automatically excluded once a habitual 
place of work is established.583 As such, the broad interpretation given to the 
concept of habitual employment leaves few situations in which the fallback 
rule of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) which awards jurisdiction to the engaging place of 
business would be applicable. The question may be raised as to whether the 
rule awarding jurisdiction to engaging place of business still serves a 
purpose or even serves to the benefit of the individual employee. 
Consequently, there have been calls to abolish the fallback rule of Article 
21(1)(b)(ii) in favour of the general rules on jurisdiction which may provide 
the employees with more and alternative bases of jurisdiction whenever their 
place of habitual employment cannot be determined.584   
                                                          
581 Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, para. 50. 
582 Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, para. 50-54.  
583 Cf. Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2001] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, paras. 32, 38, 40. In Voogsgeerd the ECJ held that the court seised 
must take account of all the factors which characterise the activity of the employee and must, 
in particular, determine in which State is situated the place from which the employee carries 
out his tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work and the place 
where his tools are situated  as well as ‘the place of actual employment’ and the place where 
the employee ‘must report before discharging his tasks’. As such, the ECJ in Voogsgeerd 
appears to equate the place of habitual employment, for employees working in the transport 
sector, to ‘a fixed base from which work is organised and where the personnel perform other 
obligations in relation to the employer’. See: COM(2005) 650 final, p. 7. 
584 See e.g. Grusic 2013, p. 173-192, who e.g. equates the position of employees, in the 
absence of a fallback rule in Article 21 Brussels I Recast to the position of claimant service 
providers, allowing for the claimant to initiate legal proceedings in the courts for each place 
where services are or have been provided. In my view, however, the application of the 
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5.5.1.1 Recent developments  
The recent Recast of the Brussels I Regulation only effectuated minor 
alterations to the rules on jurisdiction in employment matters by providing a 
partial extension of Article 21(1)(b) Brussels I Recast to employers 
domiciled outside the European Union.  Believing additional changes to the 
rules on jurisdiction existing in the area of employment law to be required, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs issued ‘an own-initiative report on the 
question of jurisdiction in the field of employment law, with a view to the 
next amendment of the Brussels I Regulation.’585 This includes a motion for 
a European Parliament resolution calling on the Commission to examine the 
rules of Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast in light of industrial action and to 
investigate whether the fallback clause of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) should be 
rephrased ‘so as to refer to the place of business from which the employee 
receives or received day-to-day instructions rather than to the engaging place 
of business.’586 Reasons provided for the a revision of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) 
Brussels I Recast are the scarcity of situations in which the criterion of the 
engaging place of business is relevant and the absence of a sufficient 
connection between the location of the engaging business and the 
employment dispute causing the forum not to benefit the employee.587 By 
contrast, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs makes a plea for 
a revision of Article 21 to include a forum actoris.588 Accordingly, an 
employee should be able to sue his employer in the courts of the Member 
State in which the employee is domiciled. The inclusion of the latter 
                                                                                                                                        
provisions relating to the provision of services in matters relating to an individual 
employment contract seems questionable at best. As is clear from Article 20(1) Brussels I 
Recast section 5 replaces the rules on general jurisdiction in matters relating to the individual 
employment contract. In the absence of a fallback provision providing for jurisdiction at the 
place of the engaging establishment, employees will thus only be able to resort to the forum 
rei (per Article 21(1)(a)) or, in cases where the disputes relates to the operations of a branch, 
agency or other establishment, to the courts of the place in which the latter is situated (per 
Article 20(1) and Article 7(5).   
585 Report on improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment 
(2013/2023(INI)), p. 6. 
586 Report on improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment 
(2013/2023(INI)), p. 5. 
587 Report on improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment 
(2013/2023(INI)), p. 8. 
588 Report on improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment 
(2013/2023(INI)), p. 11. 
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provision would coincide with the rules on jurisdiction already existing for 
the other two protected classes: consumers and insurees. In most cases 
however such a forum actoris will equate to the courts in the country of 
habitual employment, leaving few differences with the jurisdictional basis 
already existing in Article 21(1)(b)(i).   
 
5.5.1.2 Classification of transfer related claims 
As outlined above in paragraph 4, several claims may arise from a (cross-
border) transfer of undertaking. As the employee-employer paradigm is 
paramount to the transfer of the rights and obligations stemming from the 
employment contract or relationship it appears natural to apply, in the 
absence of specific rules on jurisdiction relating to a transfer of undertaking, 
the rules existing for individual contracts of employment when it comes to 
attributing jurisdiction in a transfer related dispute.589 Surely, in the absence 
of an employment contract or employment relationship existing between the 
transferor and the employee on the date of the transfer no transfer of 
undertaking (in the sense that is attributed to this legal concept in the area of 
employment protection) would transpire by reason of the acquisition of the 
transferor’s undertaking or part of the transferor’s undertaking by the 
transferee. Yet, the variety of claims possibly resulting from a transfer of 
undertaking, although they are almost uniformly founded in the individual 
contract of employment, range from being collective to individual in nature. 
In this sense, it is important to establish which claims rooted in or connected 
to the individual contract of employment or employment relationship are 
covered by the special rules on jurisdiction for individual employment 
contracts existing in section 5 of the Brussels I Recast.  
 
5.5.1.2.1 Concept ‘individual contract of employment’ 
The section on jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment does not 
provide a definition of the term ‘individual contract of employment’ or the 
notion of ‘employee’.590 It is in line with the general purpose and objectives 
of the Brussels I Recast that these concepts are interpreted in an autonomous 
fashion. An autonomous or independent definition will thus ensure an equal 
and uniform application of the regulation throughout the Member States. In 
                                                          
589 For the preferred jurisdictional path, see paragraph 6 of the current Chapter. 
590 See section 5 Brussels I Recast; Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 328. 
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the case law pertaining to the Brussels Convention the ECJ has provided 
certain indicators that serve to a better understanding of the notion of 
‘employment contract’:    
    
“…contracts of employment, like other contracts for work other than on 
a self-employed basis, differ from other contracts – even those for the 
provision of services – by virtue of certain particularities: they create a 
lasting bond which brings the worker to some extent within the 
organizational framework of the business of the undertaking or 
employer (…).”591  
As such, under an individual employment contract the employee is included 
in the organizational framework of the employer, suggesting a certain degree 
of subordination.592 The existence of an individual employment contract 
requires a contract to be concluded between an employee and an employer. 
Within this authoritative relationship it is the employer who exercises 
control over the employee by providing mandatory instructions. The 
employee, in turn, is entitled to remuneration and is exempt from the risks 
associated with doing business.593 Although the above provides a definition 
of the concept ‘individual employment contract’ the different language 
versions of the Brussels I Recast suggest that the concept is to include 
individual obligations arising out of an employment contract.594        
Whereas, the definition of employment contract appears autonomous to the 
Brussels I Recast, a different situation exists under the Acquired Rights 
Directive. A transfer of undertaking is predicated on the existence of an 
employment contract or employment relationship between the transferor and 
the employee(s). In the absence of such an employment relationship a 
transfer of undertaking would not take effect. Moreover, the personal scope 
of the directive is in part defined by the national laws of the Member States 
and their definition of the terms employment contract and employment 
                                                          
591 Case 266/85, Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer [1987] ECR 00239, 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:11, para 16; Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 328. 
592 Mankowski 2009, p. 23; Kuypers 2008, p. 715. 
593 Mankowski 2009, p. 23; Kuypers 2008, p. 715. 
594 Cf. The Dutch language version: ‘bevoegdheid voor individuele verbintenissen uit 
arbeidsovereenkomst’ or the German language version: ‘‘ein individueller Arbeitsvertrag oder 
Ansprüche aus einem individuellen Arbeitsvertrag’. 
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relationships595, allowing a considerable amount of divergence in the 
application of the directive and its national counterparts throughout the 
Member States.596 Still, it stems from the directive that only those employees 
integrated in the economic entity to be transferred may rely on the provisions 
of the Acquired Rights Directive. As such, the directive, similar to the 
Brussels regime, suggests that the definition of employment contract or 
employment relationship is predicated on the employees’ position in the 
organizational framework of the business of the employer.     
5.5.1.2.2 Concept of employee 
Under the Brussels regime, the definition of employee, similar to that of 
‘individual employment contract’, for reasons of legal certainty and a 
uniformity of decisions, is likely to require an autonomous interpretation. In 
providing this definition the meaning given to the concept in other parts of 
EU law could potentially be drawn upon.597 However, the majority of EU 
legislation in the employment area leaves the definition of employee to the 
national laws of the Member States. As such, an autonomous definition of 
the concept of employee, even one that draws upon the existing definitions 
of employee in European Union law, might be at odds with the definition of 
employee under the Acquired Rights Directive, which leaves it to the 
Member States to determine which parties can invoke the acquired rights 
provisions as an employee. As per Article 2(1)(d) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive ‘"employee" shall mean any person who, in the Member State 
concerned, is protected as an employee under national employment law.’ 
Moreover, as outlined above, the scope of the directive is in part defined the 
by the national laws of the Member States and their definition of 
employment contract and employment relationships.598 Once it has been 
established that an employee enjoys protection as an employee under 
national law he may rely on the acquired rights provisions if, at the time of 
the transfer, he is employed by the transferee in addition to being part of the 
                                                          
595 Article 2(2) Acquired Rights Directive, which provides: ‘This Directive shall be without 
prejudice to national law as regards the definition of contract of employment or employment 
relationship’. See Chapter 2, paragraph 4. 
596 Hepple 1998, p. 5; CMS report 2006, p. 20. 
597 For example, the meaning given to ‘employee’ under the Rome I Regulation. 
598 Article 2(2) Acquired Rights Directive, which provides: ‘This Directive shall be without 
prejudice to national law as regards the definition of contract of employment or employment 
relationship’. 
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organizational framework of the undertaking to be transferred. Given the 
similarities of this definition to the notion of employment contract under the 
Brussels regime (see paragraph 5.5.1.2.1), it seems unlikely that a uniform 
definition of the concept of employee under the Brussels I Recast would 
prevent those entitled to the safeguarding of their employment relationship 
under the Acquired Rights Directive from access to the jurisdictional bases 
available in matters relating to the individual contract of employment under 
Article 21 Brussels I Recast. However, it should be remembered that the 
personal scope of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts, being a test of substantive law, is to be applied second to the 
definitions in private international law, in the areas of jurisdiction and the 
conflict of laws. Therefore technically no conflict of definitions will arise.  
 
5.5.1.2.3 Person of the plaintiff 
Surely, whether a person is classified as an employee under section 5 of the 
Brussels I Recast is to be assessed on an individual basis. The facts of the 
case and the specific characteristics of the employment relationship will 
determine whether there exists an individual contract of employment within 
the meaning of section 5 of the Brussels I Recast. In this sense, it is 
noteworthy that a textual or grammatical interpretation of Article 21 
Brussels I Recast suggests that for claims relating to the individual contract 
of employment the person of the plaintiff, in cases where an action is 
brought against an employer, is irrelevant. This absence of a specific 
mention of the employee, as the person of the plaintiff, is in stark contrast to 
the other two sections providing special rules of jurisdiction for weaker 
economic and contractual parties, i.e. the sections on jurisdiction in matters 
relating to insurance and consumer contracts, which do make reference to the 
person of the plaintiff.599 A parallel interpretation of the sections on 
insurance and consumer contracts suggests that professional parties cannot 
rely on the special provisions providing jurisdiction for weaker parties, as by 
their very definition these parties do not possess the weaker contractual or 
socio-economic position which requires the rules on jurisdiction to be 
                                                          
599 E.g. Article 17(1) Brussels I Recast provides: ‘A consumer may bring proceedings against 
the other  party to a contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is 
domiciled or, regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts for the place where 
the consumer is domiciled.’  
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tailored in their favour. As such, it is unclear whether trade unions and other 
(professionalized) employee representatives will be able to make use of the 
special rules on jurisdiction provided in section 5. In addition, it will depend 
on the nature of the instituted claim whether a claim by a trade union acting 
on behalf of an employee will even be classified as an action relating to the 
individual employment contract.  
 
5.5.1.2.4 Claims relating to a cross-border transfer of undertaking 
For most claims relating to or arising from a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking their connection to the individual employment contract will be 
easily established. These claims, such as claims relating to unfair dismissal, 
claims for (re)employment and salary claims undoubtedly belong to the 
purview of the rules on jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment. 
Other possible claims arising from or connected to the transfer of 
undertaking also have a strong connection to the employment contract. 
Indeed, in the absence of an individual employment contract or employment 
relationship no transfer of undertaking would take place. However, since 
section 5 is limited to obligations arising from an individual contract of 
employment claims that are collective in nature are beyond the scope of this 
section. This surely holds true for claims relating to obligations arising from 
a collective agreement. In situations where an employee or employee 
representative seeks the observance of terms and conditions agreed in 
collective agreements section 5 of the Brussels I Recast cannot be relied 
upon. As such, claims relating to collective agreements befall the general 
rules on jurisdiction. Even though, in situations where an individual 
employee wants to hold the transferee to obligations stemming from a 
collective agreement, the basis of his claim is related to his position as an 
employee, the claim cannot be classified as arising from the individual 
contract of employment. Whereas it is instantly clear that claims relating to 
collective agreements do not equate to the individual contract of 
employment it is somewhat more difficult to classify claims regarding the 
preservation of status and function of employee representatives and claims 
relating to the observance of information and consultation requirements. 
Claims relating to the status and function of employee representatives, 
although where it concerns the individual representative related to the 
individual contract of employment, fall outwith the provisions on special 
jurisdiction over the individual contracts of employment. The reason for this 
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is that employee representatives who seek restoration of their status and 
function by the transferee or, as individual representatives, seek continuance 
of the protection provided to employee representatives by the laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions or practice of the Member States, do 
so on the basis of their position as employee representatives rather than on 
the basis of their position as an individual employee. As such, employee 
representatives and trade unions seeking a preservation of their status and 
function as employee representatives must rely on the general rules on 
jurisdiction providing jurisdiction to the forum rei and alternatively the 
courts of the place where the transferred undertaking is situated.600  
 
In respect of claims relating to the information and consultation of employee 
representatives Article 7 of the Acquired Rights Directive requires the 
transferor and transferee to inform and consult601 the representatives of their 
respective employees of several transfer related issues. As such, the 
information and consultation of employee representatives does not appear a 
cross-border issue per se.602 Yet, the Member States have not equally 
transposed the information and consultation provision into their national 
legislation. There are some Member States, such as Germany and Austria, 
which impose a common duty on the transferor and transferee to inform and 
consult the employees or employee representatives.603 In these countries the 
transferor or transferee is required to inform the employees/ employee 
representatives of the (effects of the) upcoming transfer, allowing a foreign 
transferee to inform and consult the employees/ employee representatives of 
the undertaking to be transferred. Consequently, the affected employees may 
initiate legal proceedings for a failure to comply with information and 
consultation requirements against a foreign transferee, resulting in a cross-
                                                          
600 As regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other 
establishment the courts of the Member State in which the branch, agency or other 
establishment is situated shall have alternative jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(5) 
Brussels I Recast.  
601 Article 7(1) for information requirements; Article 7(2) for consultation requirements.  
602 Cf. CMS report 2006, p. 59. 
603 §613a(5)BGB; §3a AVRAG; According to the German Explanatory Memorandum it is up 
to the transferor and transferee to decide how they will fulfill this common duty: ‘Zur 
Unterrichtung der Arbeitnehmer sind der bisherige Arbeitgeber oder der neue Inhaber 
verpflichtet. Beide sollen sich untereinander verständigen, in welcher Weise sie ihre 
Informationspflicht erfüllen.’ (BT-Drucks 14/7760, p. 19. 
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border dispute. As such, the idea that a failure to properly inform and consult 
employee representatives cannot not in itself amount to a transnational 
dispute proves false. For example, the acquisition of a business previously 
operated by a Dutch NV by a German AG will amount to a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking. If the Dutch employees of the transferred 
undertaking decide to initiate legal proceedings against the German 
transferee for a failure to inform and consult the employees and/or employee 
representatives before a Dutch court there exists a cross-border dispute. This 
dispute is transnational in nature irrespective of the applicable law, i.e. of 
whether the transferee is actually obliged to inform and consult the 
employees/ employee representatives of the undertaking to be transferred.604 
The difficulty in classifying information and consultation requirements lies 
in the fact that it is not always clear whether the individual employees or 
their representatives have a right to such information and consultation. The 
wording of the general rule of Article 7 of the Acquired Rights Directive 
clearly provides that this right befalls the representatives of the employees. 
Only in the absence of employee representatives must the affected 
employees be informed individually.605 In addition, some Member States, 
such as Germany, have transposed the provisions of regarding information 
and consultation requirements only to the benefit of the individual employee. 
For example, on the basis of § 613a(5) BGB transferor and transferee are 
required to inform the individual employees of several transfer related 
issues. Logically, actions relating to information and consultation 
requirements will only be covered by section 5 Brussels I Recast if the rights 
to such information and consultation are considered to stem from the 
individual contract of employment under the autonomous definition 
provided thereof in the Brussels I Recast. If the transferee and transferor are 
required to inform and consult the employee representatives, claims initiated 
by employee representatives for a failure to comply with these requirements 
are therefore likely to be beyond the scope of section 5. By contrast, where 
an individual employee initiates proceedings for a failure to comply with 
information requirements on the basis of his individual right to such 
                                                          
604 Such a duty does exist in German law § 613a(5)BGB, whereas it does not in Dutch law 
Art. 25(1)(a)(b) WOR and Art. 7:665a BW. 
605 Article 7(6) Acquired Rights Directive.  
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information his claim is likely to be covered by the rules on jurisdiction for 
individual contracts of employment.  
Surely, the attribution of jurisdiction in disputes relating to a failure to 
properly of inform and consult employees and their representatives upon a 
transfer of undertaking would benefit from an abstract classification, without 
recourse to national law. However, it is the nature of the instituted claim that 
is decisive for the determination of jurisdiction under the Brussels I Recast. 
As the above shows the nature of this claim, as an inevitable result of 
minimum harmonization, may vary from collective to individual depending 
on the applicable law.     
 
5.5.2 Claims initiated by the transferor or transferee 
There may be some, limited, situations in which the transferee or transferor 
will seek to initiate legal proceedings against an employee for reasons, 
partly, relating to of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. Since the 
Acquired Rights Directive effectuates an automatic transfer of the existing 
employment contracts and employment relationships from the transferor to 
the transferee, the transferee, as the new employer, may wish to sue an 
individual employee for a failure to comply with obligations arising from the 
employment contract. If the employee contests the position of the transferee 
as the employer, the transferee may invoke Article 3(1) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive or its national counterpart(s).  
 
On the basis of Article 22 Brussels I Recast the employer, either the 
transferee or the transferor, may only bring proceedings in the courts of the 
Member State in which the employee is domiciled. As such, Article 22 
essentially forms a reproduction of the general rule attributing jurisdiction to 
the forum rei under Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast. In most cases, the 
domicile of the employee will coincide with the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work. In addition to being able to sue the employee 
in the courts of the latter’s domicile, the employer, by reason of Article 22(2) 
has the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which the original claim 
is pending. Thus, in situations where the employee acts as a plaintiff the 
employer, being either the transferor or the transferee, is entitled to present a 
counter-claim at the same venue.  
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5.5.3 Jurisdiction clauses 
In general, as derived from the principle of party autonomy, the parties are 
free to choose the court(s) internationally competent to govern any disputes 
arising from their legal relationship.606 The transferor, as the initial 
employer, and the employee, may, for example, upon the conclusion of the 
employment contract agree to a choice of forum, subjecting any disputes 
which have arisen or which may arise in connection with their legal 
relationship to a designated court. In matters where the choice of forum or 
jurisdiction clause is considered part of the contract of employment or the 
employment relationship such a clause will bind the transferee by reason of 
the transfer of undertaking.607 Thus, the fact that the transferee did not 
consent to the jurisdiction clause as he did not partake in drafting the 
agreement cannot be invoked against the employee.  
 
As a general rule, a valid jurisdiction clause confers exclusive jurisdiction on 
the designated court.608 Yet, in matters relating to the individual contract of 
employment the parties possess limited autonomy to designate the court(s) 
having jurisdiction.609 Within the employee-employer paradigm the 
employee is most often considered a weaker party in need of protection.610 In 
order to compensate for the existing inequality in bargaining power between 
the employee and employer, Article 23 of the Brussels I Recast only allows 
for specific jurisdiction clauses to the benefit of the employee.611 According 
to Article 23, the provisions on jurisdiction over individual contracts of 
employment, as contained in section 5 of the Brussels I Recast, may only be 
departed from by agreements entered into after the dispute has arisen612 or 
agreements which allow the employee to bring proceedings in the courts 
other than those indicated by Articles 20 and 21 Brussels I Recast.613 As 
                                                          
606 Recital 19 Brussels I Recast. 
607 Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
608 Article 25(1) Brussels I Recast. 
609 Recital 19 Brussels I Recast. 
610 E.g. Recital 18 Brussels I Recast outlines that as the weaker party, the employee ‘should be 
protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules’; C-
462/06 Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard [2008] ECR 
I-3965, ECLI:EU:C:2008:299, para.17. 
611 Cf. Magnus, Mankowski et al. 2012, p. 343. 
612 Article 23(1) Brussels I Recast. 
613 Article 23(2) Brussels I Recast. 
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such, Article 23 Brussels I Recast subjects the parties’ freedom to choose the 
court that will preside over their dispute to two distinct conditions. The 
parties may, after a dispute has arisen, agree to have their dispute 
adjudicated by a specific court. By agreeing to do so after the dispute has 
arisen, the parties oust the jurisdiction of the courts what would otherwise be 
competent on the basis of Article 20 and 21 Brussels I Recast. In other 
words, jurisdiction agreements concluded after the manifestation of a dispute 
are exclusive in nature. Given the employee protective nature of section 5, 
exclusivity of the choice of forum is possible due to the fact that, at this 
stage in the employment relationship, the inequality between employee and 
employer has, to a large extend, been lifted.614 This is not the case in 
situations where the jurisdiction clause or choice of forum has been made 
prior to the existence of a dispute. In situations where e.g. a jurisdiction 
clause has been inserted ab initio in the employment contract such a choice 
of forum is invalid615 save for the situations in which the choice of forum 
allows the employee to bring proceedings in a court other than those 
indicated in Articles 20 and 21 Brussels I Recast. As such, a jurisdiction 
clause entered into before a dispute has arisen is only permissible under the 
regulation if it provides the employee with a forum additional to the courts 
ordinarily having jurisdiction on the basis of section 5.616 As such, employer 
and employee are free to conclude a jurisdiction clause granting additional 
jurisdiction to a court other than the court of the employer’s domicile, the 
court of the place of habitual employment or the court of the location of the 
business engaging the employee.617 In doing so, the parties may even grant 
jurisdiction to the courts of a non-Member State insofar as the clause or 
agreement conferring such jurisdiction does not exclude jurisdiction 
provided by the regulation.618   
                                                          
614 See Magnus, Mankowski et al. 2012,  p. 344. 
615 Provisions contrary to Article 23 are without legal force per Article 25(4). 
616 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic 
of Algeria Case C-154/11 [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:309, para. 54-60; C-154/11 Ahmed 
Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:491, para. 62, 
63; Jenard report 1979, p. 33. 
617 See Article 21 Brussels I Recast. 
618 C-154/11 Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:491, para. 65; Since Article 23 itself makes no mention of the courts 
allowed to be designated; it is generally assumed that the parties may also grant jurisdiction to 
the courts of a non-Member State. This not only applies to the additional forum of Article 
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5.5.4 Tacit prorogation of jurisdiction       
As per Article 26 of the Brussels I Recast tacit prorogation of jurisdiction 
occurs when the defendant enters an appearance before a Member State 
court that does not have jurisdiction on the basis of other provisions of the 
regulation. By appearing and lodging his defences on the merits without 
contesting jurisdiction the defendant tacitly submits to the jurisdiction of the 
court. However, in matters where the employee is the defendant, the newly 
inserted paragraph 2 of Article 26 guarantees that the employee is informed 
of his right to contest the jurisdiction of the court and the consequences of 
entering or not entering an appearance. The inclusion of this paragraph 
excludes situations in which, an employee without knowing so submits to 
the courts of a state that would not otherwise have jurisdiction on the basis 
of the regulation. 
 
5.5.5 Arbitration clauses 
Where an arbitration agreement is part of a contract of employment or where 
it has been concluded within the employee-employer paradigm,619 such 
arbitration agreement will, upon a transfer of undertaking, transfer to the 
transferee by operation of law. As such, the fact that the transferee was not 
party to drafting the agreement cannot be invoked against the employee. The 
transferor and employee may, for instance, as is not uncommon in 
employment matters, agree that any and all disputes arising from the contract 
of employment or employment relationship will be submitted to (binding) 
arbitration.620 Consequently, the transferor, transferee and employee will all 
                                                                                                                                        
23(2), but also to jurisdiction clauses concluded after a dispute has arisen per Article 23(1), 
see: Gottwald, Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO, 2013, Art. 21, para. 2. 
619 There is some discussion/ ambiguity as to whether an arbitration agreement in a collective 
agreement (where the collective agreement has not been incorporated in to the employment 
contract) will transfer to the transferee. Where the employee seeks to initiate proceedings 
against the transferor, an arbitration clause in a collective agreement will surely apply. 
Generally, the non-compliance with an arbitration clause in a collective agreement will lead to 
inadmissibility before the (national) courts: HR 17 January 2003, NJ 2004/280, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF0136; HR 14 December 1973, NJ 1974/92; HR 22 December 1985, NJ 
1986/275.  
620 Arbitration clauses in employment contracts or collective agreements are not uncommon. 
It is not always necessary that the parties have explicitly agreed on arbitration, a mere 
reference to a collective agreement containing an arbitration clause in an individual contract 
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be bound by the arbitration agreement. By agreeing to arbitration the parties 
oust the court(s) that would otherwise be competent, e.g. on the basis of the 
Brussels I Recast. 
 
The Brussels I Recast, in Article 1(2)(d), explicitly excludes arbitration from 
its substantive scope of application. In addition, Article 73(2) states that the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958, takes precedence over the 
Regulation. Yet, the parties may challenge the validity of the arbitration 
agreement as a preliminary issue by initiating legal proceedings before a 
(non-chosen) Member State court. Such a court must, in order to determine 
its jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute, also evaluate the validity 
and effect of the arbitration agreement.621 The fact that parties may 
consciously seek (Member State) court intervention in order to elude arbitral 
proceedings, with a risk of resulting parallel proceedings and irreconcilable 
judgments, was one of the main issues discussed during the Recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation.622 As such, in an effort to improve the interface 
between the Brussels I Regulation and arbitration the initial proposal for the 
Brussels I Recast623 included in Art. 29(4) a lis pendens provision on the 
jurisdiction of Member State courts whose jurisdiction is challenged on the 
basis of an arbitration agreement. According to the proposed provision 
‘where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, 
the courts of another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the 
basis of an arbitration agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of 
the Member State where the seat of the arbitration or the arbitral tribunal is 
                                                                                                                                        
of employment is sufficient to subject any disputes to arbitration. (HR 17 January 2003, NJ 
2004/280, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF0136); Van Slooten 2011, p. 79. 
621 Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact assessment accompanying to the document of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM [2010] 748 final, 
SEC [2010] 1548 final, p. 35-37. 
622 Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact assessment accompanying to the document of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM [2010] 748 final, 
SEC [2010] 1548 final, p. 35-37; Lazic 2011, p. 290-291. 
623 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and for the Council on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), 
SEC [2010] 1547 final; SEC [2010] 1548 final.; COM[2010]748 final. 
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have been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an 
incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that arbitration 
agreement.’624 Consequently, the courts of a Member State whose 
jurisdiction is challenged on the basis of an arbitration agreement shall stay 
proceedings or decline jurisdiction, if prescribed by national law,625  in 
favour of the courts or tribunal of the Member State of the seat of arbitration. 
Once the existence, validity or effect(s) of the arbitration agreement is 
established Article 29(4) requires the court seised to decline jurisdiction.626 
Although the provision of Article 29(4) may have indicated the relation 
between arbitration and the Brussels I Recast, it did not offer a solution 
when it comes to employment matters as those were expressly excluded 
from the provision.627  
 
The Recast has not, ultimately, resulted in explicit changes to the regulation, 
the proposed Article 29(4) has been scrapped and recital 12 now delineates 
the scope of the Regulation with respect to arbitration:628 
“This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this 
Regulation should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of 
an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an 
arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from 
staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, in accordance with their national law.”629 
Accordingly, the Member States are free to, among others, in proceedings 
where jurisdiction of the court is challenged on the basis of an existing 
arbitration agreement or where the validity of the arbitration agreement is 
otherwise raised as a preliminary issue, refer the matter to arbitration, to stay 
or dismiss proceedings or to assess the validity and effect of the arbitration 
agreement. Yet, when it comes to the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in which the validity or effect of the arbitration agreement has 
                                                          
624 Art. 29(4) paragraph 1 proposal Brussels I Recast. 
625 Article 29(4) paragraph 2.  
626 Article 29(4) paragraph 3. 
627 Article 29(4) paragraph 4 expressly excludes insurance, consumer and employment law 
matters.  
628 See Ippolito & Adler-Nissen 2013,  p. 165-166. 
629 Recital 12, paragraph 1.  
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successfully been challenged, either as a preliminary or a substantive issue, 
the rules on recognition and enforcement contained in the regulation should 
not be applied. Surely, in situations where the validity or effect of an 
arbitration agreement is a principal issue, the Brussels I Recast will not be 
applicable. Yet, in cases which are substantially covered by the Brussels I 
Recast where the validity of an arbitration agreement is raised as an 
incidental issue, the (jurisdictional) rules of the regulation, including those 
on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, require application. 
Moreover, in situations where a Member State court has determined that an 
arbitration agreement is ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed’, its judgment on the substance of the matter still requires 
recognition and enforcement on the basis of the regulation.630 Here, the fact 
that a Member State court has, incidentally, decided on a matter which is not 
covered ratione materiae by the Brussels I Recast, does not prevent the 
regulation from being applied.631 There may even be a partial recognition 
and enforcement of the judgment, excluding the decision on the matter, e.g. 
the decision on the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement, which 
falls outside the scope of the Brussels I Recast. Thus an employee, who has 
received a positive judgment of a Member State court, after a successful 
challenge of an arbitration clause, on a matter relating to a transfer of 
undertaking can apply for recognition and enforcement of the substantive 
part of the judgment in accordance with the Brussels I Recast. In situations 
where there exist conflicting judgments of a Member State court and an 
arbitral tribunal, recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award on the 
basis of the New York Convention takes precedence. Thus, the present 
delineation between the Brussels I Recast and arbitration, although improved 
compared to the Brussels I Regulation, still leaves room for abusive 
litigation tactics and parallel proceedings.      
     
5.6 Multiple defendants 
An employee or his representative may wish to sue both the transferor and 
transferee in composite proceedings. In disputes relating to a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking an employee is likely to have connected claims 
against multiple defendants, i.e. the transferor and transferee, domiciled in 
                                                          
630 Recital 12, paragraph 3. 
631 Cf. Magnus, Mankowski et al. 2012, p. 632. 
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different Member States. An employee may, for instance, wish to sue 
transferee and transferor for damages and/or employment for unfair 
dismissal upon a transfer of undertaking.632 Other claims could e.g. include a 
failure to comply with information and consultation requirements, failures to 
uphold rights and obligations stemming from (collective) employment 
contracts and disputes concerning the existence of a transfer of 
undertaking.633 The likelihood of joint or connected claims is furthered by 
the fact that the Acquired Rights Directive offers the Member States the 
possibility of imposing joint and several liability on transferor and transferee 
for a failure to comply with pre-transfer obligations stemming from the 
employment contract or employment relationship.634 As such, several 
Member States, such as Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands allow for the joint and separate liability of transferor and 
transferee upon the transfer of undertaking.  
 
In situations where the employee, employee representatives or trade unions 
wish to sue both the transferee and the transferor, Article 8(1) Brussels I 
Recast allows both claims to be brought before a single court.635 Article 8(1) 
Brussels I Recast, which provides the option of composite proceedings at the 
court of domicile of one (former) employer, states: 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued where he is 
one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one 
of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that 
                                                          
632 Cf. BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 37/10, NZA 2011,1143; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 
December 2009 - 22 Sa 45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 - 14 Ca 515/08. 
633 Cf. BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 37/10, NZA 2011,1143; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 
December 2009 - 22 Sa 45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 - 14 Ca 515/08 
634 Article 3(1) paragraph 2 ARD (2001/23/EC). 
635 This was not possible under the predecessor of the Brussels I Recast, the Brussels I 
Regulation, under which the provision on multiple defendants (Article 6) was not considered 
to apply to the section of individual employment contracts: See Case C-462/06 
Glaxosmithkline, Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard [2008] 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:299. 
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it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.”636 
Thus, application of the special jurisdictional provision on multiple 
defendants is dependent on a number of requirements. First, both the anchor 
defendant and the co-defendant(s) have to be domiciled in a Member State. 
The Article does not apply to third country co-defendants, i.e. those not 
domiciled in a Member State, even in situations where they are part of a 
number of defendants, some of whom are domiciled in a European Member 
State.637 Article 6 of the  Brussels I Recast exhaustively governs the issue of 
jurisdiction in relation to third state defendants. According to paragraph 1 of 
Article 6 jurisdiction over those not domiciled in a Member State is to be 
determined, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, by 
the law of the Member State of the court seised. As such, where it concerns 
(individual) employment (contract) matters, the newly inserted Article 21(2), 
which allows employees to bring suit against a third state employer in the 
courts of habitual employment or the courts of the engaging business, has no 
bearing on the application of Article 8. Thus, an employee wanting to sue 
both transferor and transferee in composite proceedings, can only do so 
under the Brussels I Recast where both transferor and transferee are EU 
domiciliaries.  
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
The aim of the present paragraph was to outline the existing rules on 
jurisdiction throughout the Member States of the European Union insofar as 
it concerns claims arising from or relating to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. In determining international jurisdiction in disputes arising 
from a cross-border transfer of undertaking, in the absence of any provisions 
on international jurisdiction existing in the Acquired Rights Directive, the 
Brussels I Recast is the main instrument of importance. After all, throughout 
the European Member States the Brussels I Recast is the primary and 
                                                          
636 The wording of Article 8(1) reflects the ruling in Case 198/87 Athanasios Kalfelis v 
Bankhaus Schröder Münchmeyer Hengst and co. and others [1988] ECR 5565, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:283, para.13 and ruling. 
637 Case C-645/11 Land Berlin v Sapir a.o. [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:228; Opinion Advocate 
General Trstenjak Land Berlin v Sapir a.o. Case C-645/11 [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:757, para. 
105-122 
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universally applied instrument for establishing international jurisdiction in 
civil and commercial matters. Although it must be recognized that a transfer 
of undertaking inhabits certain semi-public components complicating its 
classification as a civil and commercial matter, all claims arising from a 
transfer of undertaking are covered ratione materiae by the Brussels I 
Recast. After all, all actors involved in a transfer of undertaking, such as 
transferor, transferee, employee(s) and employee representative(s) are likely 
private individuals or private entities. In essence, it can be stated that all 
claims arising from or related to a (cross-border) transfer of undertaking 
befall the substantive scope of the regulation, as long as these claims do not 
pertain to the exercise of public authority. Several claims such as claims for 
unfair dismissal or for the preservation of status and function (insofar as this 
is possible in cross-border transfer scenarios) of employee representatives 
may therefore arise. As is apparent from the preceding (sub)paragraphs these 
claims do not befall a single jurisdictional category under the Brussels I 
Recast. Although a transfer of undertaking is inherently subject to the 
employee-employer paradigm the rights and obligations stemming from such 
a transfer are not limited to the individual employment relationship. In 
addition to individual interests the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts inhabit certain operational, economic and collective 
employment interests which cannot be subsumed under the special rules on 
jurisdiction for disputes relating to individual employment contracts. In fact, 
subsuming all claims arising from a transfer of undertaking under any one of 
the existing jurisdictional bases or categories appears incompatible with the 
Brussels regime, which attributes jurisdiction on the basis of the instituted 
claim. As a result of such incompatibility the various claims that might arise 
from a transfer of undertaking are subject to different rules on jurisdiction; 
whereas some are subject to the general rule of Article 4, awarding 
jurisdiction to the domicile of the defendant, other claims befall the variety 
of jurisdictional bases offered by the special jurisdictional category for 
individual contracts of employment. Whether distributing the several claims 
arising from a transfer of undertaking over several jurisdictional rules, 
resulting in different jurisdictional bases (and competent courts) for different 
transfer-related claims is desirable or whether a separate jurisdictional 
category within the Brussels I Recast or the Acquired Rights Directive is 
warranted are questions that will be answered in the following, final, 
paragraph of the present Chapter.  
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6. Preferred jurisdictional path 
As is apparent from the introduction, the present Chapter serves a dual 
purpose as it seeks to outline the rules on jurisdiction pertaining to cross-
border transfers of undertakings throughout the EU Member States as well as 
to assess whether these rules on jurisdiction are in need of revision. In 
answering these questions the previous paragraphs have shown that issues of 
international jurisdiction in situations involving a transfer of undertaking are 
universally considered to befall the Brussels I Recast. In addition, the 
different views and theories on the classification of transfers of undertakings 
that exist within the area the conflict of laws are not upheld when it comes to 
establishing the competent court. More so, the issue of jurisdictional 
classification is one that appears far afield from the discussion on 
international jurisdiction in situations involving a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. Whether the various views on the appropriate conflict of laws 
path for transfers of undertakings may have any bearing on the proper 
jurisdictional path is an issue that will be discussed in this final paragraph. 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive is absent of any provisions on 
international jurisdiction, the effectiveness of the Brussels I Recast in 
relation to cross-border transfers requires assessment. The Recast itself 
offers no specific jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings, 
resulting in the claims arising therefrom to be accommodated within the 
existing provisions of the regulation. The question therefore arises whether 
these existing provisions offer a satisfactory solution in establishing the 
competent court for claims arising from a transfer of undertaking. As such, 
the present paragraph seeks to outline the preferred jurisdictional path for 
claims resulting from a cross-border transfer of undertaking. In doing so, it 
addresses the effectiveness of the existing regime and questions whether this 
regime should be upheld or requires revision or replenishment.  
 
6.2 Effectiveness of existing legal instruments 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive itself is absent of any provisions on 
international jurisdiction, throughout the EU Member States, jurisdiction 
over claims arising from a cross-border transfer of undertaking is to be 
established on the basis of the Brussels I Recast. Although some difficulties 
may arise in classifying all claims stemming from a transfer of undertaking 
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as civil and commercial matters,638 these claims may generally be considered 
to befall the substantive scope of the regulation, as long as they do not 
concern the exercise of public powers. The Acquired Rights Directive 
bestows several rights and obligations of a different nature on those affected 
by a transfer of undertaking. As a result, a wide range of claims initiated by 
different actors, such as employees, employee representatives, trade unions, 
transferor and transferee, may arise in relation to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. Since the Brussels I Recast does not include a special 
jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings, all claims arising from 
or in relation to a cross-border transfer of undertaking are accommodated 
within the existing provisions of the regulation. In other words, the Brussels 
I Recast does not offer a single jurisdictional basis for all transfer-related 
claims, but instead, divides them among several Articles on jurisdiction on 
the basis of the initiated claim. The various claims that might arise from a 
transfer of undertaking are therefore subject to different rules on jurisdiction: 
whereas some plaintiffs will have to make due with the general rule of 
Article 4, awarding jurisdiction to the domicile of the defendant, others can 
seek refuge in the variety of jurisdictional bases offered by the special 
jurisdictional category for individual contracts of employment.  
 
6.2.1 Individual employment claims 
Most claims arising from a cross-border transfer of undertaking, such as 
claims for unfair dismissal,639 objections to a transfer,640 claims for 
redundancy payments due to the existence of a substantial change in working 
conditions641 or claims for (re)employment due to the existence of a 
transfer,642 will seek enforcement of individual employment rights. In these 
cases, section 5 of the Brussels I Recast, offers special rules on jurisdiction. 
Here, as outlined in the present Chapter, Article 21 determines that, in 
                                                          
638 The problem with this classification lies in the semi-public nature of some parts of a 
transfer of undertaking, especially where it concerns the preservation of status and function of 
employee representatives, since in some Member States, e.g. Belgium, the application of such 
provisions is enforced by administrative fines. 
639 Article 4(1) Acquired Rights Directive.  
640 Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive 
641 Article 4(2) Acquired Rights Directive.  
642 Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive.  
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addition to the courts of his domicile,643 an employer may commonly be sued 
in the courts of the place where, or from where, the employee habitually 
carries out his work. In the absence of a relocation of the undertaking to be 
transferred this place will generally be easily established and equate to the 
location of the pivot of the transfer, i.e. the undertaking to be transferred. As 
employees generally tend to carry out their work in a single country, the 
place of habitual employment is mostly easily established. In situations 
involving a transfer of undertaking without relocation the actual and legal 
position of the affected employees will, in principle, be subject to little 
change. They will continue to their employment within the same 
undertaking, at the same location, within the same country. Upon a transfer-
related dispute, rooted in or connected to the individual contract of 
employment, an employee will thus be able to sue the employer (either 
transferor or transferee) in the courts of the Member State of latter’s 
domicile or in the court of the place where he has thus far discharged his 
employment obligations.644 In other words, where the habitual place of work 
does not change as a result of the transfer, the affected employees will be 
able to sue both transferor and transferee before the courts of the place of 
habitual employment. Employees are even able to sue transferor and 
transferee in composite proceedings, as the ban on the application of Article 
8(former Article 6) in respect of the individual employment contract has 
lifted with the introduction of the Brussels I Recast.  
 
Where a transfer involves a cross-border relocation of the transferred 
undertaking, the establishment of the habitual place of employment may 
prove more difficult. If the employees are required to habitually continue 
their employment at the foreign place of relocation their habitual place of 
employment is deemed to have change as no animus revertendi or retrahendi 
will exist. Since in cross-border transfers of undertakings there exists an 
intention to permanently perform the work at the new location, the 
employees habitual place of employment is deemed to have changed from 
the date of the transfer-related relocation. The affected employees will 
therefore, on the basis of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) be able to initiate proceedings 
against the transferee in the courts of the new place of habitual employment. 
                                                          
643 Article 21(1)(a) Brussels I Recast.  
644 Art. 21(1)(b)(i) Brussels I Recast.  
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Based on the provisions of the Brussels I Recast, only the courts in the place 
of origin, i.e. the former habitual place of employment, will have jurisdiction 
over a transfer-related dispute between the employee(s) and the transferor. 
As a result, in cases involving a cross-border transfer of undertaking, the 
application of the existing provisions of the Brussels I Recast in relation 
claims seeking to enforce individual employment rights may, on occasion 
lead to the somewhat unsatisfactory result that the transferee cannot be sued 
in the place from where the transferred undertaking originates, i.e. the former 
place of habitual employment. In these cases, the affected employees, 
although having transferred to the transferee, may, for reasons of proximity, 
ease, language and trust, prefer the place of origin of the undertaking as a 
forum over the new place of habitual employment.645 Such a forum however 
is not available to the employees in their claim against the transferee, save 
for situations where the place of origin of the undertaking equates to the 
place of domicile of the transferor and the transferor and transferee are sued 
in composite proceedings.  
 
6.1.2 Non-individual employment claims 
In most cases, those seeking enforcement of the non-individual employment 
rights arising from the Acquired Rights Directive will have to make due with 
the jurisdictional basis provided by Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast. As 
such, those seeking enforcement of collective employment interests, the 
function and status of employee representatives or information and 
consultation requirements will have to resort to the domicile of the transferee 
or transferor. In rare cases however, Article 7(5) might offer a solution 
where the transferred undertaking equates to a secondary establishment of 
the transferor or the transferee. In these cases the employees will be able to 
sue in the courts of the place where the undertaking, which constitutes a 
‘branch, agency or other establishment’, is situated, insofar as the claim 
arises out of the operations of that ‘branch, agency or other establishment’, 
which is likely the case in cross-border transfer scenarios.646  
Generally, the employees, employee representatives and trade unions 
seeking to enforce non-individual employment rights have to rely on the 
                                                          
645 Bearing in mind that this place of origin will likely equate to the employee’s domicile.  
646 See above, paragraph 5.4. 
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jurisdictional basis of Article 4 providing jurisdiction to the courts of the 
Member State of domicile of the transferor or transferee. In this, situations 
may arise where the place of domicile of transferor or transferee does not 
equate to the location of the transferred undertaking before or after the 
transfer or to the place of habitual employment, e.g. in situations where the 
transferee or transferor is domiciled in a non-Member State. After all, it is 
imaginable that the statutory seat, central administration and principal place 
of business of the transferee are not located in the country of origin, 
relocation or of habitual employment. In most cases, this incongruence is 
overcome by the application of Article 7(5) Brussels I Recast. After all, in 
situations where the defendant is located elsewhere, the transferred 
undertaking could be considered a secondary establishment under Article 
7(5) Brussels I Recast, leaving the plaintiffs with the alternative forum of the 
location of the (transferred) undertaking. However, on rare occasions, where 
the rights for which enforcement is sought are not considered to constitute a 
claim out of the operations of the secondary establishment, Article 7(5) will 
not apply.647 In these cases, the plaintiffs will be left with a competent court 
which has no geographic proximity to the dispute, which may be considered 
inequitable, especially in cases of a transfer of undertaking where the 
employee has become attached, by operation of law, to an employer whom 
he has not freely chosen.  
6.1.3 Outbound transfer 
In outbound transfer scenarios an undertaking is transferred from a Member 
State to a non-Member State, meaning that the transfer is coupled with a 
cross-border relocation to a country outside the European Union. In these 
cases, all actors involved in a transfer of undertaking will have difficulty 
initiating proceedings, against a foreign transferee, in a Member State court 
(on the basis of the Brussels I Recast). If, in addition to the cross-border 
relocation, the transferee is domiciled in a non-Member State, e.g. the state 
of relocation, the Brussels I Recast will not apply.648 This is only different in 
a few specific situations. For example, where it concerns the individual 
contract of employment, an extended concept of domicile is utilized. As 
such, Article 20(2) enables employees to, in disputes relating to a transfer of 
                                                          
647 See above, paragraph 5.4. 
648 The same holds true where it concerns any other non-Member State domiciled defendant, 
such as e.g. the transferee.  
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undertaking, sue a non-EU domiciled transferee in the courts of the Member 
State where the transferred undertaking is located, if by reason of the transfer 
the transferred undertaking has become a dependent branch or 
establishment.649 In outbound transfer scenarios this provision however does 
not offer a solution to the inability to initiate proceedings against a non-
Member State transferee before the courts of a Member State as the 
secondary establishment mentioned in Article 20(2) will have transferred to 
a non-Member State as a result of the relocation. A solution is neither 
offered by Article 21(2) which attributes jurisdiction to the court of habitual 
employment in case of a claim against a non-Member State employer. In 
outbound transfer scenarios, depending on whether the employee decides to 
continue his employment with the transferee, the relocation of the 
undertaking will likely result in the emergence of a new habitual place of 
employment. In these cases, employees are therefore unable to sue a non-
Member State transferee on the basis of the Brussels I Recast: the transferee 
as defendant falls outside the formal scope of the regulation and under the 
exceptions to the formal scope the rules on jurisdiction do not point towards 
the courts of a Member State, leaving the Brussels I Recast unable to provide 
a competent court, which is a wholly unsatisfactory result. After all, in 
outbound transfer scenarios the undertaking to be transferred is located 
within a Member State, as are the affected employees. More so, prior to the 
transfer these employees are likely to habitually carry out their employment 
within the Member State of origin. It are the transferor and transferee that 
have, by reason of the transfer willingly subjected not just themselves but 
also the affected employees to the jurisdiction of another Member State. The 
transferor will generally have agreed to the (foreign) person of the transferee 
or the cross-border relocation that accompanies the transfer. The transferee, 
on the other hand, has voluntarily acquired a foreign undertaking. The 
employees however cannot exert any influence over the effectuation of the 
transfer, the person of the transferee or the location of the transferred 
undertaking upon or immediately after the transfer. On the date of the 
transfer all rights and obligations transfer to the transferee by operation of 
                                                          
649 For Article 20(2) to have effect the dispute must arise out of the operation of the branch or 
establishment, which is undoubtedly the case where it concerns a dispute arising from a 
transfer of undertaking, i.e. the transfer of the brand or establishment within the meaning of 
Article 20(2).  
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law. Such a transfer is initiated within the Member State where the 
undertaking to be transferred is located. In the absence of a Member State 
court having jurisdiction there exists no geographic proximity to the pivot of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, i.e. the undertaking being transferred, which 
is at odds with the protective nature of the directive.  
 
6.1.4 Conclusion 
The Brussels I Recast offers no special jurisdictional category for transfers 
of undertakings, leaving any claim stemming therefrom to be accommodated 
by the various provisions on jurisdiction that exist within the regulation. It 
may be argued that the concurrence of the claims arising from a transfer of 
undertaking under a single rule or category of jurisdiction is to be preferred, 
however, the Brussels I Recast leaves no room for such concurrence of 
claims other than under the general rule which affords jurisdiction to the 
forum rei. The subsumption of all claims arising from a transfer of 
undertaking under this general category would conflict with the protective 
nature of the Acquired Rights Directive and would defy procedural 
efficiency and fairness by quite possibly resulting in a loss of proximity 
between the adjudicating court and the dispute. Subsuming all transfer-
related claims under the category for individual employment contracts does 
not offer a solution either. After all, in addition to individual interests the 
Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts inhabit certain 
operational, economic and collective employment interests which are 
difficult to reconcile with the special rules on jurisdiction for disputes 
relating to individual employment contracts. More so, although opaque at 
times, the Brussels I Recast in most transfer-related cases provides sufficient 
access to justice. However, in certain specific cases, most notably in relation 
to non-Member State defendants (in all likelihood the transferee), the 
provisions of the Brussels I Recast provide a highly unsatisfactory result. 
These cases do not appear to fit in well with the existing jurisdictional 
regime. As such, the following paragraph will suggest a solution to this 
problem.  
6.2 Proposed changes to the Acquired Rights Directive 
In light of the findings in the previous (sub)paragraphs, the present 
paragraph seeks to provide a solution to the absence of jurisdiction for 
Member State courts in outbound transfer scenarios and other problems 
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relating to of a lack of proximity existing between the competent court and 
the transfer-related dispute. Although it may be difficult to establish which 
jurisdictional rule is to apply to specific claims arising from a transfer of 
undertaking, the Brussels I Recast in most cases provides sufficient access to 
justice. Instead of providing a new, separate jurisdictional category for 
transfers of undertakings, it is therefore preferred to provide an additional 
ground for jurisdiction within the Acquired Rights Directive. This rule 
should serve as a single (additional) jurisdictional base for all claims seeking 
to enforce rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking. In 
this, claims arising from a transfer of undertaking would benefit from a 
jurisdictional rule that is not plagued by complexity and ambiguity and that 
has the advantage of being easily applicable and of providing legal certainty 
and predictability. Since the undertaking to be transferred is pivotal to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member State of the location of such undertaking is desirable. As such, the 
Acquired Rights Directive should, akin to the Posting of Workers 
Directive,650 include a rule on jurisdiction additional to those existing within 
the Brussels regime. A provision encompassing such a rule could be 
structured as follows: 
‘In order to enforce the rights and obligations stemming from this 
directive, proceedings may be instituted in the Member State in which 
the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or immediately prior 
to the transfer without prejudice, where applicable, to the right, under 
existing international conventions and regulations on jurisdiction, to 
institute proceedings in another State.’ 
                                                          
650 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services OJ [1997] 
L18/1, which in Article 6 provides a specific provision on jurisdiction; Cf. the upcoming 
revision of the Posting of Workers Directive: Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services COM(2016) 128 final.  
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In response to economic globalization, as the previous Chapters have 
signalized, there has been a considerable influx in cross-border mergers, 
acquisitions and corporate restructuring activities over the last decades. The 
removal of trade barriers, the internationalisation and integration of capital 
markets,651 the establishment of the European Monetary Union and new 
technological developments are driving forces to enhancing corporate 
mobility throughout Europe. In this, economic globalization denotes an 
increased integration of economic markets attributed to a rise in cross-border 
trade and a rapid spread an development of new technologies,652 a process 
which has evoked a pattern of increased cross-border business activities. 
More so, the European Commission believes that the growing integration of 
Member State economies will only increase the number of cross-border 
transfers of undertakings.653 The prospect of increasing cross-border 
transfers of undertakings has been a consistent factor in the establishment 
and development of the Acquired Rights Directive which was originally 
enacted to deal with the rise in international takeovers and amalgamations 
that would inevitably arise from the creation of a Common Market.654 Since 
the differences existing in the national laws of the Member States as regards 
the protection of employees in the event of a transfer of undertaking could 
have a direct effect on the functioning of the Common Market, the directive 
seeks to reduce these differences by promoting the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States with regard to safeguarding the rights of 
employees in the event of transfer of undertaking. Considering the absence 
of EU competence in effectuating a unification of the labour laws of the 
                                                          
651 Cf. Green paper ‘Building a Capital Markets Union’, COM [2015] 63 final, according to 
which investment in European companies and infrastructure  
652 Shangquan, p. 1-2. A rapid development of new technologies is also considered a main 
driver of the integration of capital markets. See COM [2015] 63 final, p. 25.  
653 Commission services’ working document. Memorandum on rights of workers in cases of 
transfers of undertakings [2004], p. 11-12, available online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2444&langId=en>. 
654 Nowadays frequently referred to as internal market. 
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Member States655 the approximation of laws is attempted by means of partial 
harmonization.656 Consequently, the national systems (were to) provide 
minimum standards of employment protection that may only be departed 
from in melius.657 Not only does the directive allow the Member States to 
impose measures more favourable to the affected employees, it also leaves 
several key aspects, such as the concepts of ‘employee’, ‘employment 
relationship’ and ‘employee representative’ to be defined by national law.658 
Although hypothetically a harmonization of laws would effectuate a certain 
conformity and unification of the substantive laws of the Member States 
rendering the conflict of laws ineffective, in actuality the conflict of laws is 
only rendered superfluous when a directive is equally transposed throughout 
the Member States and the Member States are not provided with any leeway 
in transposing the directive.659 Where it concerns the Acquired Rights 
Directive wide variations in national employment law combined with the 
effects of partial harmonization indicate that conflict of laws rules continue 
to play a crucial role in establishing the appropriate legal regime in cross-
border transfer situations. The issue of cross-border transfers of undertakings 
is therefore inextricably linked to the conflict of laws. Whereas increased 
interconnectedness and international migration may give rise to an influx in 
cross-border commercial dealings and thus to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, the existing legal diversity highlights the need for the conflict 
of laws, i.e. the determination of the law applicable to a cross-border transfer 
of undertaking. With legal diversity and cross-border legal relationships 
                                                          
655 The founding treaties did not confer any competence on the EU to enact legislation in the 
field of labour law save for the free movement of workers. Labour law legislation was 
therefore enacted on the basis of the competence existing for the internal market. The Single 
European Act provided the EU with the power to establish legislation with regard to 
employment health and safety in Article 118a EC whereas Article 153(1) TFEU, introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides the EU with a supportive and complementary 
competence allowing the enactment of directives effectuating partial harmonization. See: 
Mańko 2015, p. 9-10; Riesenhuber 2012, p. 141.  
656 Cf.  Hepple 2005, p. 190. 
657 Article 8 Directive 2001/23/EC; Article 7 Directive 77/187/EEC; Guibboni 2006, p. 235 et 
seq. 
658 Cf. Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, COM[2007] 334 def. , p. 5; Davies 2012, p. 228 et seq. 
659 Cf. Krebber 1998, p. 124 et seq. 
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forming preconditions for the existence of private international law, the issue 
of cross-border transfers of undertakings undoubtedly holds some questions 
of private international law.660 More so, the previous Chapters have shown 
that the problems arising from or in relation to cross-border transfer of 
undertakings are largely rooted in the differences existing between the laws 
of the Member States and the absence of a clear and universally accepted 
conflict of laws path. Whereas these Chapters have served to highlight the 
need for clear and uniform conflict of laws provisions regarding transfers of 
undertakings at a European plane, the present Chapter seeks to assess and 
define the rules that determine the applicable law in the event of a cross-
border transfer of undertaking. As the following will show, there exists a 
large variety of views and ideas on the method through which the law 
applicable to a transfer of undertakings is and should be obtained. This 
Chapter first seeks to establish and identify the existing method through 
which the law applicable to a cross-border transfer of undertaking is to be 
determined. Second, several views and ideas on the appropriate conflict of 
laws method are evaluated and discussed. The ultimate aim of this Chapter is 
to assess and identify the present conflict of laws regime in relation to cross-
border transfers of undertakings and to determine whether this regime should 
be upheld or is in need of revision. In achieving this aim several questions 
arise ranging from the classification under the conflict of laws to the 
influence of primary and secondary European Union law on the conflict of 
laws and the conflict of laws connection. Prior to addressing these issues, 
this Chapter provides a historic overview of the conflict of laws in relation to 
the Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
2.History 
The area of employment law constitutes a relatively new legal field, 
especially compared to that of commercial law, company law and the 
conflict of laws. In a 1962 memorandum the European Commission first 
signaled the importance of a social policy complementing the European 
Community’s core activities:  
 
                                                          
660 Although legal diversity is an inevitable result of partial harmonization it is difficult to 
reconcile with the internal market considerations upon which the directive is built.  
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‘If we consider the ultimate aim of the Treaty, i.e. an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, there can be no doubt in our minds that 
pursuit of an advanced social policy must form an indispensable part of 
the Community s activities, especial1y if the European edifice is to have 
a solid foundation in the real support of the workers who make up the 
vast majority of the population of our countries. The aims of the 
Community are as much social as economic, and the former cannot be 
regarded solely as a consequence of the latter but should also be 
achieved as the result of action taken for social reasons. Even if some of 
the rules, principles and instruments that the Treaty lays down in the 
social field relate in the first place to economic needs and serve 
economic ends, they are unquestionably to be looked at now, within the 
general framework of the Treaty, as principles and rules of social 
policy, and they must be implemented as such. The fact that social 
questions, though very much to the fore at the national level, might 
seem to be still ill-defined at Community level cannot justify a 
"passive" social attitude on the part of the Community s institutions.’661 
 
The Commission considered it vital for the European Community to have a 
social policy complementing, but not subordinate to, other types of 
Community policy.662 Next, the European social dimension, which was 
discovered during the Paris Summit of 1972,663 came to a rise during the 
nineteen seventies with the establishment of the first European directives on 
social policy. These European directives relate to gender equality,664 
collective redundancies665 and transfers of undertakings.666    
                                                          
661 Memorandum of the Commission on the action programme of the Community for the 
second stage, COM (62) 300, p. 44. 
662 COM (62) 300, p. 45-46. 
663 During the summit, vigorous action in the social sphere was considered important. it was 
decided that a social action programme was to be completed before 1 January 1974, Meetings 
of the Heads of State or Government Paris 19-21 October 1972, The First Summit Conference 
of the Enlarged Community, Bull. EC 10-1972, p. 19. 
664 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions. 
665 Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to collective redundancies. 
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2.1 Proposals of 1974 and 1975 
Although originally aimed to complement a surge in international takeovers 
and amalgamations, the present Acquired Rights Directive, i.e. Directive 
2001/23/EC, is not equipped with any accompanying (express) choice of law 
provisions. Surely, Article 1(2), as briefly pointed out in the previous 
Chapter, may be construed as a scope rule with certain choice of law 
implications, it does not however, expressly state which national acquired 
rights provisions are to apply in cross-border transfer situations. Earlier 
drafts of the directive did, to some extent, take account of the possible 
conflict of laws implications of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. The 
original proposal for a directive of 1974 did not contain an express conflicts 
of laws provision with regard to which law was to apply to a transfer of 
undertaking per se. In other words, it did not expressly provide which 
national acquired rights provisions were to apply to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking.667 It did however, in Article 10, provide a conflict-of-laws 
provision, encompassing specific conflict of laws rules with respect to the 
individual employment relationships affected by the transfer of undertaking: 
 
‘1. The labour laws of a Member State which are applicable to 
employment relationships prior to the merger or takeover shall also 
apply after the merger or takeover has taken place. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply where the place of work of 
the employee is transferred in a valid manner to another Member State 
or where the application of another body of labour law is concluded 
with the employee in a valid manner. Rights which were explicitly or 
implicitly included in the employment contract or which result from 
customary industrial practice shall, however, remain unaffected.’668  
 
                                                                                                                                        
666 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.  
667 Article 10 of the proposal therefore did not encompass a conflict of laws provision 
regarding the transfer of undertaking itself or the territorial application of the directive. Cf.  
Wimmer 1995, p. 207; Hepple 1998, p. 5, 7; Kania 2012, p. 77. 
668 Proposal for a Directive of the Council on harmonization of the legislation of Member 
States on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalgamations, COM (74) 351 final/2; V/631/74-E. 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
208 
 
In the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission 
recognizes that an employee’s place of work generally does not change as a 
result of a merger or takeover.669 Even in the event of an international 
takeover or merger, the changes in the structure of the company will 
generally not warrant a change in the habitual place of work. As a result, the 
law that applies to the employment relationships remains unchanged upon a 
transfer of undertaking. Nonetheless, it is perceivable that the law that 
applies to the employment relationship does change in connection with a 
transfer of undertaking. To this end, the Commission distinguishes three 
cases: (1) the employee is posted to another country, (2) the entire 
undertaking is relocated to another Member State and (3) an agreement is 
concluded with the senior staff on arrangements concerning labour 
legislation which will apply to the undertaking’s head office abroad.670 In 
these cases, a change in the law that applies to the employment contracts or 
relationships is considered permissible. The general conflict of laws rules 
that exist for determining the law that applies to such contracts or 
relationships continue to apply.671 Hence, as stated above, the 1974 proposal 
and the conflict of laws provision contained therein did not specifically 
address the issue of which national acquired rights provisions are to apply in 
the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. What is clear however, is 
that a cross-border transfer of undertaking that is e.g. coupled with a 
simultaneous or subsequent relocation may effectuate a change in the law 
applicable to the individual employment contract.  In this sense, a change in 
place of work that is the result of a cross-border transfer of undertaking is, 
not surprisingly, equated to any other change in the habitual place of 
employment of an employee. Indeed, in the absence of any choice of law 
provision contained in the employment contract a change in the habitual 
place of employment generally effectuates a change in the law governing the 
individual employment contract.  
 
The revised proposal of 1975, although clearly applying to cross-border 
transfers of undertakings,672 did not comprise any conflict of laws 
                                                          
669 COM (74) 351 final/2, p. 12. 
670 COM (74) 351 final/2, p. 13 
671 COM (74) 351 final/2, p. 13. 
672 See COM (75) 429 final, Explanatory Memorandum p. 5-6; Chapter 2, para. 3.  
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provisions. The Commission eventually refrained from equipping the 
Acquired Rights Directive with provisions on the conflict of laws, as it was 
believed that this issue would be dealt with by the Regulation on the 
provisions of conflict of laws on employment relationships within the 
Community.673 The draft Regulation of 1972 envisioned, in Article 3, that 
employment relationships would be governed by the employment and labour 
laws of the State in which the undertaking of employment, i.e. the 
undertaking through or by which the employee was employed, was located. 
The draft Regulation allowed a few exceptions to this general rule. First, 
where an employee was engaged by an undertaking in a Member State and 
transferred to an undertaking belonging to the undertaking of employment in 
another Member State, the law of the former state (i.e. the location of the 
engaging undertaking) was to continue to apply to the employment 
relationship.674 Second, the employment relationship of employees that were 
temporarily posted abroad would continue to be governed by the labour laws 
in force at the location of the posting undertaking, i.e. the location of the 
establishment sending the workers.675 Finally, where employment entailed a 
frequent change in the place of work, the parties could conclude a written 
agreement subjecting the employment relationship to the labour laws in 
force at the location of the engaging company or at the place where the 
employees conducted most of their work activities.676 In Article 4(2) the 
                                                          
673 Draft Regulation on Conflict of Laws in Employment Matters, OJ [1972] C49/26; Opinion 
of the Economic and Social Committee, OJ [1972] C142/5; Amended proposal for a 
Regulation of the Council on the provisions of conflict of laws on employment relationships 
within the Community COM(75) 653 final; Hepple 1998, p. 7; Kronke 1989, p. 3. 
674 OJ [1972] C49/27, Article 4: ‘indien tot een onderneming, die haar zetel in een Lid-Staat 
heeft, bedrijven in een andere Lid-Staat behoren, mag worden overeengekomen dat op 
werknemers, die uit het land van de zetel van de onderneming overgeplaatst worden naar 
deze bedrijven, in plaats van het arbeidsrecht dat geldig is op de plaats van het bedrijf van 
tewerkstelling, het arbeidsrecht wordt toegepast dat geldt op de plaats van de zetel van de 
onderneming(…)‘.  
675 OJ [1972] C49/27, Article 5(1): ‘Op werknemers die, zonder de voor toepassing van 
artikel 6 voorgeschreven voorwaarden te vervullen, door hun bedrijf naar andere Lid-Staten 
worden uitgezonden voor een tijdelijke werkzaamheid in de zin van de op grond van artikel 51 
van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap uitgevaardigde 
voorschriften inzake de socialezekerheid van migrerende werknemers, blijft het arbeidsrecht 
van toepassing dat geldt ter plaatse van de uitzendende onderneming.’ 
676 OJ [1972] C49/28, Article 6: ‘Met werknemers, wier werkzaamheid een veelvuldige 
wisseling meebrengt van de plaats waar zij de arbeid verrichten zonder dat zij bij een ander 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
210 
 
proposed regulation mentioned several provisions that cannot be precluded 
by the aforementioned exceptions to the general rule. This Article did not 
make specific mention of any acquired rights provisions; no reference was 
made to the Acquired Rights Directive and the issue of transfer of 
undertakings was not specifically dealt with in the proposed regulation. The 
revised proposal for the regulation provided several changes, the most 
notable being a change in conflict of laws reference of the general rule.677 
According to Article 3(1) of the amended proposal workers would, in 
principle, ‘be subject to the laws relating to employment of the Member 
State in which they normally carry out their employment.’ Still, the proposal 
contained no specific mention of the issue of (cross-border) transfers of 
undertakings. More so, the Commission seized its work on the regulation by 
withdrawing the proposals in 1981, leaving the Acquired Rights Directive 
without the envisaged complementary conflict of laws provisions on 
employment matters.678            
 
2.2 Directives 77/187/EEC, 98/50/EEC and 2001/23/EC 
Express conflict of laws provisions, directly affirming which national 
acquired rights provisions apply in cross-border transfer situations, remain 
absent from the present Acquired Rights Directive, as well as from its 
predecessors, i.e. Directive 77/187/EEC and Directive 98/50/EC. 
Complementary conflict of laws provisions, indisputably applying to 
transfers of undertakings, also remain inexistent.679 The Commission 
commissioned a study, completed in 1998,680 on the legal consequences of 
cross-border transfers of undertakings within the European Union. This 
study, conducted by Hepple, recognizes the difficulties that may arise from 
the absence of any express conflict of laws provisions regarding transfers of 
                                                                                                                                        
dan hun oorspronkelijk bedrijf worden ingedeeld, kan bij arbeidsovereenkomsttoepassing 
worden overeengekomen van het arbeidsrecht dat geldt op de plaats van het oorspronkelijke 
bedrijf, dan wel van het arbeidsrecht dat geldt ter plaatse waar zij het grootste deel van hun 
werkzaamheden verrichten. De overeenkomst moet schriftelijk worden aangegaan.’ 
677 COM(75) 653 final.  
678 Cf. Hepple 1998, p. 8. 
679 Surely, it may be argued that the Acquired Rights Directive itself contains a scope rule 
with direct conflict of laws implications or that transfers of undertakings are to be governed 
by the law that governs the individual contract of employment by reason of the Rome I 
Regulation. These are all issues that are dealt with below.  
680 Hepple 1998. 
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undertakings and recommends that the Acquired Rights Directive should 
provide: 
 
‘that, where the Posted Workers Directive does not apply (below), the 
applicable law should be that of the Member State in whose territory the 
undertaking or part of the undertaking being transferred is situated on 
the date of a transfer, notwithstanding (a) that the transfer is governed or 
effected by the law of a country outside that Member State, or (b) that 
persons employed in the undertaking or part transferred habitually work 
outside that State, or (c) that the employment of any of those person is 
governed by any such law.’681 
 
As such, the laws in force at the location of the transferred undertaking prior 
to the completion of the transfer (i.e. on the date of the transfer), according 
to Hepple, shall constitute the applicable law. Additional recommendations 
in situations concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings had regard to 
the definition of employee and employee representation. In the absence of 
application of the Posted Workers Directive, Hepple recommends that ‘the 
definition of contract of employment or employment relationship is that of 
the Member State in whose territory the undertaking or part of an 
undertaking being transferred is situated on the date of the transfer.’682 Since 
the directive leaves it to the Member States to determine the personal scope 
of the directive by applying to those protected as employees under national 
law,683 the personal scope of the directive may vary depending on the 
national law that is applied. As per Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187/EEC the 
rights and obligations stemming from an employment contract or 
employment relationship shall transfer to the transferee by reason of the 
transfer. As such, it is important to establish who qualifies as having an 
employment contract or employment relationship with transferor on the date 
of the transfer, in other words: who is protected as an employee by the 
Acquired Rights Directive. By subjecting the definition of contract of 
                                                          
681 Hepple 1998, p. 20-21. 
682 Hepple 1998, p. 40, para. 14.3. 
683 See Chapter 2; Article 2(1)(d) Directive 2001/23/EC: "employee" shall mean any person 
who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an employee under national employment 
law; this subsection was not included in Directive 77/187/EEC and as such not part of the 
Directive described by Hepple.   
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employment or employment relationship to the laws of the Member State in 
whose territory the undertaking or part of an undertaking being transferred is 
situated on the date of the transfer, possibly conflicting applications of the 
directive are eliminated. In a third recommendation Hepple proposes to 
amend the wording of Article 5 of the directive, by stating that the ‘law 
applicable to determine whether there is proper representation for the 
purposes of the third paragraph shall be the law of the Member State in 
whose territory the transferred undertaking is situated on the date of a 
transfer.’ To my mind, the wording of this last recommendation is somewhat 
ambiguous. A literal reading suggests that the law of the Member State in 
whose territory the transferred undertaking, i.e. the undertaking that has 
been transferred to the transferee, is situated on the date of the transfer shall 
be applied in determining whether there is proper representation. In this 
sense, if the transfer is coupled with a simultaneous relocation to e.g. the 
country of the transferee on the date of the transfer the laws in force in the 
Member State of the transferee shall determine whether there is proper 
representation. Judging from the wording of the report however, this is 
clearly not what is intended by the recommendation. Referencing the 
proposal for the 10th company directive on cross-border mergers Hepple 
introduces the problem of the so-called ‘Flucht aus der Mitbestimmung’ 
which arises when undertakings are transferred from Member States with 
strong participation rights to States with lesser participation rights.684 His 
recommendation is intended to ensure the protection of national systems of 
employee representation.685 In fact, he states that the ‘general rule as to 
conflict of laws proposed above is that the applicable law should be that of 
the Member State in whose territory the transferred undertaking is situated. 
This will enable that Member State to protect its system of employee 
representation. In order to prevent avoidance of this by local management 
where there is a shift in the central administration to another country as a 
result of a cross-border transfer, it is recommended that the wording of the 
proposed revision of Art. 5(1) be amended.’ Thus, it seems to me that the 
law that should be decisive in order to prevent a Flucht aus der 
Mitbestimmung is the law of the Member State is which the undertaking to 
be transferred is situated, i.e. the law of the Member State in which the 
                                                          
684 Hepple 1998, p. 42, para. 16.1. 
685 Hepple 1998, p. 42, para. 16.1. 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
213 
 
undertaking is situated immediately prior to the transfer. The use of the 
phrasing transferred instead of the more precise to be transferred or being 
transferred, which Hepple does utilise in his recommendation for the general 
rule, gives rise to unnecessary confusion. In fact, it leaves me to wonder 
whether in his recommendation, Hepple, did not intentionally opt for the 
laws in force in the state of relocation. This however, is not in line with 
arguments put forward in the report nor does it meet the aim and purpose of 
the directive. Regardless, the recommendations made in the report did not 
make it into the 1998 directive, which merely involved a codification of the 
existing case law of the European Court of Justice. The present Acquired 
Rights Directive, i.e. Directive 2001/23/EC, consolidated the Directives 
77/187/EEC and 98/50/EC without any amendments. Thus, the present 
directive largely corresponds to the original, concluded in 1977. Express 
provisions on cross-border transfers of undertakings and the conflict of laws 
still remain inexistent as do any complementary conflict of laws provisions, 
indisputably applying to transfers of undertakings. 
 
2.3 Recent developments 
In recent years, the issue of cross-border transfers of undertakings has 
regained the interests of the European Commission, leading to the 
consultation of social partners with a view to amending the directive. This 
paragraph aims to discuss the efforts of the European Commission in 
revising the Acquired Rights Directive in light of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings and the reports issued to aid the decision on the necessity of 
such a revision.  
 
2.3.1 CMS report 
A 2006 report completed by the CMS group, in particular by Gaul, Jeffreys, 
Tinhofer and van Wassenhove, aimed to identify the main legal and technical 
problems arising from the applicability of the Acquired Rights Directive to 
cross-border transfers of undertakings. In identifying these problems the 
authors specifically address the issue of the conflict of laws. The report was 
concluded during the time that, with regard to the EU Member States, the 
Rome Convention was still the primary international instrument regulating 
the applicable law to contractual obligations in situations involving a choice 
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between the laws of different countries.686 Even though the Rome 
Convention, at a European level, has since been surpassed by the Rome I 
Regulation the reasoning of the report can be equally applied to the latter.  
Without specifically addressing the issue it is clear from the report that the 
authors believe the transfer of undertaking and the bulk of obligations 
stemming therefrom to be contractual in nature. As such there is no 
discussion as to whether and on what grounds the issue of cross-border 
transfers of undertakings falls within the ambit of the Rome Convention. 
Seeing as the material scope of the Rome Convention confines the 
application of the instrument to contractual obligations the classification of 
the issue of transfer of undertakings as contractual undeniably preempts the 
reasoning that certain provisions of the Convention regulate the law that 
applies to (certain parts of) a transfer of undertaking. According to the report 
a distinction has to be drawn between contractual issues, regulated by the 
Rome Convention, and other legal issues involving the transfer of a 
business.687 As such the report states that certain parts of a transfer of 
undertaking such as the provisions relating to the status and function of 
employee representatives fall outwith the material scope of the Rome 
Convention, and are therefore governed by the national laws of the Member 
States. Since employee participation rights are generally based in the 
principle of territoriality the report believes these rights to be subject to the 
laws of the place where the business is located.688 Generally, the laws in 
force at the place where a business is situated govern the employment 
representation and employment participation rights. As such, without 
specifically addressing the issue of a conflict of laws classification, the 
report, akin to the Rome Convention, appears to attribute significant 
meaning to the nature of the instituted claim and the rights and obligations 
for which enforcement is sought. In doing so, the transfer of undertaking is 
not considered an independent conflict of laws category nor is it classified as 
a whole as one legal concept to be governed by a single law. The legal 
concept of a ‘transfer of undertaking’ and all rights and obligations 
stemming therefrom are therefore not entirely governed by a single law, e.g. 
by assimilation to the employment contract by the laws applicable to the 
                                                          
686 Cf. Article 1(1) Rome Convention.  
687 CMS 2006, p. 64. 
688 CMS report 2006, p. 64. 
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individual contract of employment. Instead, as may be inferred from the 
report, a transfer of undertaking is comprised of and divided into several 
contractual and non-contractual obligations that are to be treated separately 
under the conflict of laws. Consequently, the report merely details the 
(conflict of) law(s) as it is, in the perception of the authors, presently applied 
and leaves the reader unaware of the many different views and ideas that 
exist in this regard.  
 
Apart from a few issues falling outside the scope of the Rome Convention 
the report generally assumes that the rights and obligations stemming from 
the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts are governed by 
the law that applies to individual contracts of employment on the basis of 
Article 6 of the Rome Convention. As stated above, the report does not 
provide any reasoning underlying this classification or any insights into the 
various views and opinions existing in this regard; it merely states that 
certain specific transfer related issues should be subject to the law designated 
by Article 6 of the Rome Convention (similar to Article 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation: 
 
‘In our view, this basic rule must apply for deciding which law governs 
the question of whether the transferee automatically takes over the 
employment relationships of the employees concerned. The same goes 
for dismissal and the modification of (contractual terms and 
conditions.’689 
 
In discussing the applicable law to these transfer related issues, i.e. the 
question of whether the transferee takes over the employment relationships 
of the affected employees, whether there has been a valid dismissal and 
whether there has been a (substantial) modification of contractual terms and 
conditions, the report makes a distinction between cross-border transfers of 
undertakings that are accompanied by a cross-border relocation and cross-
border transfers of undertakings that do not involve a relocation of the 
transferred undertaking. The latter type of transfer situations generally 
involves no change in the location of the undertaking and the place of work 
of the affected employees. Since the primary connecting factor for individual 
                                                          
689 CMS report 2006, p. 64. 
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contracts of employment is to be found in the habitual place of employment 
such transfer situations typically do not result in a change in the applicable 
law, either to the employment contract itself or to the rights and obligations 
stemming from a transfer of undertaking. However, in situations involving a 
simultaneous or subsequent relocation of the transferred undertaking the 
habitual place of work of the employees employed in the undertaking is 
likely to change. In this sense a question arises as to when such change in 
applicable law takes effect. The report argues that the date of the transfer 
agreement or the date upon which employee actually continues his work at 
the new location may be decisive.690 As such it may be that the law that 
applies to several of the obligations arising from a transfer of undertaking 
changes when the transfer takes effect or when the employee starts work at 
the new location. Since there still remain differences in the national acquired 
rights provisions of the Member States such a change in applicable law may 
give rise to several difficulties. The report therefore proposes amending the 
Acquired Rights Directive in this regard: 
 
‘First, given that the main problems arising from the application of the 
Directive on cross border transfers stem from determining which 
national law applies to the transfer the Directive should introduce rules 
aimed at determining the law applicable to employment contracts in 
situations where there may be a conflict between the laws of different 
Member States.’691 
 
Here, the report recognizes that the main problems in situations involving a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking find their basis in conflicting Member 
State laws and the absence of a clear conflict of laws solution. In addition, 
the preceding citation shows that the authors believe that the solution in 
determining the applicable national law to a transfer of undertaking stems 
from the law that applies to the individual employment contract. After all, 
the report proposes the introduction of specific conflict of law rules for 
individual employment contracts in order to counter the problems that arise 
from determining which national law applies to the transfer. The rule or 
                                                          
690 CMS report 2006, p. 65. 
691 CMS report 2006, p. 83.  
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connecting factor that is subsequently presented is incomprehensible and 
may be difficult to reconcile with the existing conflict of laws regime: 
 
‘As a general rule, except when the applicable law of both Member 
States can be observed (for example concerning the information and 
consultation obligation of the workers where each employer has to 
respect the applicable law of the Member State in which it is located) 
we consider that the governing law (for contractual issues) should, in 
most cases, be the applicable law of the Member State in which the 
transferor is located (unless the undertaking is not located in the same 
Member State, in which case the law of the undertaking’s member State 
should apply), since the Directive is intended to protect the rights of the 
transferred workers. Their rights should then be preserved in line with 
the protection offered by their Member State (the initial conditions.) 
However, a transitional period could be provided for, to give the 
transferee the opportunity to harmonise the employment conditions.’692    
 
First, as a general rule the conflict of laws seeks to resolve issues involving 
conflicting laws by designating a single law to govern the legal relationship 
rather than opting for a cumulative application of both laws. Such a 
cumulative approach will, in most cases, only prove feasible if there is no 
conflict between the laws seeking application.693 Second, the report proposes 
the location of the transferor as a possible connecting factor for the 
contractual issues arising from a transfer of undertaking. This proposed 
conflict of laws rule, although highly practicable, is vaguely formulated. 
Given its pivotal role in the Acquired Rights Directive the seat of the 
undertaking to be transferred may well embody the most natural connecting 
                                                          
692 CMS report 2006, p. 83. 
693 The report states that the absence of a conflict of laws exists in situations involving the 
information and consultation requirements arising from the Directive. According to Article 7 
of Directive 2001/23/EC transferee and transferor are required to inform the representatives of 
their respective employees of certain transfer related issues. This provision however, has not 
been equally transposed throughout the Member States. As such, there are certain Member 
States, such as Germany and Austria that impose a common duty on the transferee and 
transferor to inform individual employees. ‘Zur Unterrichtung der Arbeitnehmer sind der 
bisherige Arbeitgeber oder der neue Inhaber verpflichtet. Beide sollen sich untereinander 
verständigen, in welcher Weise sie ihre Informationspflicht erfüllen.‘ BT-Drucks [2001] 
14/7760. Therefore the absence of any conflicting laws in this regard seems far-fetched.   
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factor in determining the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking and the 
rights and obligations stemming directly therefrom. The proposed conflict of 
laws rule, however, primarily seeks connection to the location of the 
transferor, with the exception that in situations where the undertaking is not 
located in the Member State of the transferor the laws in force in the 
Member State of location of the undertaking are to apply. As such it is not 
the location of the transferor but rather the location of the undertaking (to be 
transferred) that is considered decisive. Thus the report could have discarded 
its equivocal phrasing by simply stating that the location of the undertaking 
(to be transferred) is decisive in determining the applicable law. More so, the 
proposed conflict of laws rule is only intended to apply to contractual issues. 
Assuming this refers to the contractual issues arising from a transfer of 
undertaking, the report does not intend to subject the entirety of the rights 
and obligations arising from a transfer of undertaking to a single law, 
designated by a single connecting factor. As such it does not propose the 
introduction of the transfer of undertaking as a separate reference category 
under the conflict of laws. Rather, the report aims to introduce a rule ‘aimed 
at determining the law applicable to employment contracts in situations 
where there may be a conflict between the laws of different Member States’. 
The proposed rule appears to require incorporation into the Acquired Rights 
Directive and seeks application in derogation of the general rules that aim to 
determine the law that applies to individual contracts of employment. 
Apparently, even though this is not specified in the report, such a rule is 
intended to take priority over the Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation 
as a lex specialis. Surely as per Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation special 
supremacy is awarded to Community legislation which lays down specific 
conflict of laws rules relating to contractual matters in specific matters, such 
as European directives.694 As such, this provision, which lays down the latin 
maxim of lex specialis derogat legi generali, would ensure the prevalence of 
a conflict of laws provision incorporated in the Acquired Rights Directive 
over any conflicting provisions contained in the Rome I Regulation. Yet in 
incorporating a special conflict of laws provision into the Acquired Rights 
Directive one has to pay mind to the likelihood with which the proliferation 
of isolated conflict of laws provisions throughout secondary Community law 
will thwart legal certainty. This issue was already raised in legislative history 
                                                          
694 A similar provision may be found in Article 20 of the Rome Convention.  
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during the preparation of the Rome I Regulation.695 In an effort to provide 
more clarity to the relationship between the Rome I Regulation and conflict 
of laws provisions contained in secondary Community law, such as 
employee protective directives, Article 22(a) of the proposed Rome I 
Regulation provided for the prevailing application of special conflict of laws 
provisions laid down in a listed number of directives.696 Seeking to better 
align the Rome I Regulation with the Rome II Regulation the European 
Parliament ensured that this provision did not make it into the final wording 
of the regulation.697 Still, the difficulties in determining the relationship 
between the conflict of laws provisions of the regulation and those included 
in secondary Community law remain. Including a special provision in the 
Acquired Rights Directive aimed at ‘determining the law applicable to 
employment contracts’ in the event of a transfer of undertaking698 may 
therefore impair the reliability of the body of conflict rules existing within 
the European Union rather than serve to its benefit. The proposed addition to 
the Acquired Rights Directive would consequently be more practicable if it 
were included in the Rome I Regulation or if it were accompanied by a 
provision excluding the issue of transfers of undertakings from the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation. The latter, although to be preferred, may prove more 
difficult, since the proposed conflict of laws provision, as mentioned above, 
does not appear to foster the inception of a transfer of undertaking as a 
separate conflict of laws category. In fact, the proposed provision only seeks 
to determine the applicable law to an individual employment contract in the 
event of a transfer of undertaking and remains silent on the law that is to 
                                                          
695 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization, COM(2002) 654 
final, p. 17-18. 
696 Annex I listed only four directives: Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State (Directive 7/1993/EC); Directive concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (Directive 71/1996/EC); 
Second non-life insurance Directive (Directive 357/1988/EEC, as amplified and amended by 
Directives 49/1992/EC and 13/2002/EC); Second life assurance Directive (Directive 
619/1990/EEC as amplified and amended by Directives 96/1992/EC and 12/2002/EC) and 
most notably excluded several key directives in the area of consumer law.  
697 Draft European legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 
COM(2005)0650 – C6-0441/2005 – 2005/0261(COD), Amendment 58.  
698 CMS report 2006, p. 83.  
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govern the remaining employment effects of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, some of which may be beyond the scope of the Rome I 
Regulation and do not appear to be captured by any conflict of laws 
provision that is universal among the Member States whereas others, such as 
the effects on the collective employment contracts do fall within the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation but fall outside the scope of the specific provision on 
individual contracts of employment. The proposed conflict of laws 
provisions for employment contracts is therefore best described as 
inadequate; it merely deals with some of the conflict of laws issues that arise 
in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. Yet regardless of the 
report issued by Gaul, Jeffreys, Tinhofer and van Wassenhove and its merits, 
the present Acquired Rights Directive still operates without any 
accompanying conflict of laws provisions explicitly determining which 
national acquired rights provisions are to prevail in the event of a cross-
border transfer of undertaking.  
      
2.3.2 Legislative efforts 
In a 2007 report699 the European Commission revealed its intentions to 
initiate a consultation of social partners with a view to amending the 
Acquired Rights Directive in order to better accommodate cross-border 
transfers of undertakings: 
 
‘The Commission believes, however, that the absence of explicit 
treatment of cross-border transfers in the Directive, which nevertheless 
applies to transfers in which the undertaking being transferred falls 
within the territorial scope of the Treaty, can cause uncertainty on the 
part of employers and employees. Furthermore, the Commission 
believes that the enlargement of the EU and the consolidation of the 
internal market, globalisation and the facilitation of cross-border 
activities by the Regulations on the European Company and on the 
European Cooperative Society, or by the Directive on cross-border 
mergers, are factors liable to increase the phenomenon of cross-border 
transfers. Consequently, the Commission believes that the Directive 
                                                          
699 Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses [SEC(2007) 812].  
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could be amended with a view to clarifying this point, thereby 
contributing to the improvement of the acquis communautaire. To this 
end, it intends to consult the social partners pursuant to Article 138(2) 
of the Treaty.’700   
 
On 20th June 2007, the Commission launched such a first phase consultation 
of social partners.701 Pursuant to Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty the 
consultation of social partners is required before proposals in the social 
policy field are submitted.702 In this first phase consultation the Commission 
recognized that ‘the applicability of Directive 2001/23/EC to cross-border 
transfers with a change in the place of work raises a few important questions 
that cannot be answered by either the Directive or the existing instruments of 
private international law.’  It therefore enquired whether social partners 
believed it necessary to amend the Acquired Rights Directive or take any 
other type of Community action in order to deal with the issue of cross-
border transfers that are coupled with a (cross-border) relocation of the 
transferred undertaking. Since the social partners believed that the existing 
instruments of Community private international law adequately dealt with 
any problems of private international law, the Commission decided not to 
continue its legislative efforts.703  
 
3. Classification 
In establishing the law that applies to (the effects of) a transfer of 
undertaking, or any other legal relationship, by reason of our Savignian 
heritage, connection is sought to the legal system to which the legal 
relationship is most closely connected, i.e. the location of the legal 
relationship’s natural seat. This legal system is determined by the reference 
                                                          
700 SEC(2007) 812, p. 10.  
701 First phase consultation of social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning cross-border transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses,  
702 Letter to the social partners by N.G. van der Plas, Director General, European 





703 European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe [2008], p. 135. 
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rule accompanying a specific category of legal relationships. The 
compartmentalisation of the conflict of laws has given rise to of a large 
variety of conflict of laws classes or categories. Each of these classes or 
categories contains a different conflict of laws reference producing a 
different substantive result, i.e. designating a different national law as being 
applicable to a particular legal relationship. The doctrine of classification,704 
also known as qualification or characterization705 entails a primary 
consideration in the conflict of laws process706 and in effect involves the 
allocation of the legal relationship in dispute as belonging to its naturally 
complementary conflict of laws category. In other words, the doctrine or 
problem of classification, as first addressed by Kahn707 and Bartin,708 entails 
a search for the applicable conflict of laws rules. Determining which law 
applies to a cross-border transfer of undertaking thus naturally requires the 
classification of the concept ‘transfer of undertaking’ under the conflict of 
laws.709 To this end, it needs to be established if, under the conflict of laws, a 
transfer of undertaking amounts to a separate conflict of laws category or 
whether the transfer is assimilated under a particular category. In addition, it 
needs to be established whether a transfer of undertaking as a whole befalls 
one conflict of laws category or whether the various rights and obligations 
stemming from a transfer of undertaking per se require a separate conflict of 
laws connection. There exists various views and ideas on the classification 
of a transfer of undertaking and the reference rule to be utilized in order to 
obtain the applicable law. Whereas some believe a transfer of undertaking 
and the accompanying social effects to be subject to the law that governs the 
individual contract of employment others feel that a transfer of undertaking 
constitutes a separate conflict of laws category best equipped with a 
reference rule that seeks connection to the undertaking to be transferred.710 
Since the process of classification generally takes place on the basis of the 
lex fori it is for the courts adjudicating a particular matter to decide, on the 
                                                          
704 Cf. Lorenzen 1941 p. 743 et seq. 
705 A term first introduced by Falconbridge: Falconbridge 1937, p. 235, 236, 239; Cormack 
1941, p. 222 et seq.  
706 Described by Siehr as the ‘cover-question of private international law’: Siehr 2005, p. 40. 
707 Kahn 1891, p. 1-143. 
708 Bartin 1899, p. 1-82. 
709 Rauscher 2013, p. 222. 
710 See e.g. Bittner 2000; Henckel 2012; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015; Haanappel-van der 
Burg 2016 I. 
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basis of their national law,  how a transfer of undertaking is to be classified. 
In this, the doctrine of classification attempts to fill a void in the Savignian 
conflict of laws approach by proceeding from the premise that, by reason of 
legal diversity, there does not exist a universally accepted natural seat to all 
legal relationships.711 A classification lege fori would, in principle, enable 
the European Member States to utilise different classifications for a transfer 
of undertaking. Such an outcome however appears curious since the concept 
of a transfer of undertaking is based in European law. Should it be possible 
for the Member States to attribute different classifications to a legal concept 
or relationship of European descend?  
 
It is generally accepted that where it concerns international treaties or 
European Regulations on private international law a classification lege fori 
would diminish the universal or supranational character of the provisions 
enshrined in such a treaty or regulation.712 European Regulations on private 
international law, such as the Rome I Regulation, already provide for an 
independent or autonomous interpretation of the concepts enshrined in these 
regulations. As for the Acquired Rights Directive, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is tasked with the interpretation of the majority of the 
concepts contained therein.713 Since the provisions in the directive and its 
national counterparts find their basis in European law differences in the 
classification of a transfer of undertaking throughout the Member States are 
difficult to imagine. Yet, these differences do appear to exist: within the 
legislation of the United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg a transfer of 
undertaking appears to be classified as a separate category under the conflict 
of laws, accompanied by a unilateral conflict or reference rule: whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within one of these Member States 
its national acquired rights provisions require unilateral application.714 In 
                                                          
711 Weber 1986, p. 47. 
712 Traest 2003, p. 401. 
713 It is up to the Court of Justice of the European Union to interpret the provisions of a 
directive as well as to assess whether a specific provision is properly transposed into national 
law. Cases are referred to the court in a variety of manners on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU; 
Art. 263 TFEU and Art. 267 TFEU. 
714 Art. L. 127-1 (2) Code du Travail Luxembourg : ‘Le présent chapitre s’applique chaque 
fois que l’entreprise, l’établissement ou la partie d’entreprise ou d’établissement à transférer 
se situe sur le territoire national du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.’; Art. 3(1)(d) Transfer of 
Business (Protection of Employment) Regulations, S.L. 452.85: ‘Article 38 of the Act and 
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Germany on the other hand, the Bundesarbeitsgericht ruled against the 
application of the primary German acquired rights provision as an overriding 
mandatory rule. Instead, according to the Bundesarbeitsgericht the rights and 
obligations stemming from §613a BGB befall the law that applies to the 
individual contract of employment. The present paragraph deals with the 
various views and ideas on the classification of a transfer of undertaking, 
whether based in legal doctrine or in the laws of the Member States.          
 
3.1 Separate conflict of laws category 
What is clear from preceding paragraph is that there exists no express 
conflict of laws provisions dealing with the concept of a transfer of 
undertaking as a separate conflict of laws category. The rights and 
obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking could therefore be dealt 
with separately under the conflict of laws or could be assimilated as a whole 
under an existing conflict of laws category, such as e.g. the category existing 
for individual contracts of employment. Surely if no express provision 
regarding the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking exists the issue may 
still be encompassed by the Rome I Regulation on the conflict of laws for 
                                                                                                                                        
these regulations shall apply: where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business to be transferred is situated in Malta.’; Art. 3(4)(c) the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006 no. 246 (as amended 
by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014, S.I. 2014 No. 16): ‘Art. L. 127-1 (2) Code du Travail 
Luxembourg : ‘Le présent chapitre s’applique chaque fois que l’entreprise, l’établissement ou 
la partie d’entreprise ou d’établissement à transférer se situe sur le territoire national du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.’; Art. 3(1)(d) Transfer of Business (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations, S.L. 452.85: ‘Article 38 of the Act and these regulations shall 
apply: where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business 
to be transferred is situated in Malta.’; Art. 3(1)(a) the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006 no. 246 (as amended by The Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2014, S.I. 2014 No. 16): ‘Subject to paragraph (1), these Regulations apply to: a 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business (which may also be 
a service provision change) where persons employed in the undertaking, business or part 
transferred ordinarily work outside the United Kingdom.’: Haanappel-van der Burg 
(Haanappel-van der Burg 2015) does not classify the provisions existing in the United 
Kingdom as a separate conflict of laws category accompanied by a unilateral conflict of laws 
provision. She finds that the United Kingdom classifies its provisions on transfers of 
undertakings as overriding mandatory provisions that override the law governing the 
individual contract of employment, p. 287. 
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contractual obligations. There are several views and ideas on how a transfer 
of undertaking should be dealt with under the conflict of laws. Whereas one 
view establishes that a transfer of undertaking encompasses a separate 
conflict of laws category that should be accompanied by a separate conflict 
of laws reference another finds that the transfer of undertaking may as a 
whole should be assimilated under the conflict of laws category existing for 
the individual contract of employment. A third view suggests that a transfer 
of undertaking does not amount to a separate conflict of laws category, 
leaving the various effects of a transfer to be dealt with differently under the 
conflict of laws. The following subparagraphs will show the differences 
existing in the conflict of laws theories dealing with the issue of cross-border 
transfers of undertakings. There exist three main views on the most 
appropriate connecting factor for determining the law that applies to the 
effects of a transfer of undertaking: connection to the transfer agreement, 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred and 
connection to the individual contract of employment. Within each of these 
views a transfer of undertaking is considered a separate conflict of laws 
category.715     
  
3.1.1 Connection to the transfer agreement 
A transfer of undertaking is generally the result of an agreement by the 
transferor and the transferee. According to Article 1(1)(a) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive the directive applies to ‘to any transfer of an undertaking, 
business, or part of an undertaking or business to another employer as a 
result of a legal transfer or merger.’ Whereas most language versions of the 
directive utilize the term ‘legal transfer’, some language versions of this 
particular paragraph, such as the Dutch and German versions, expressly 
mention that a transfer of undertaking may result from an agreement.716 A 
transfer of undertaking may therefore find its basis in the agreement existing 
between the transferor and transferee. Since the agreement between the 
transferor and transferee effectuates an ex lege transfer of rights and 
                                                          
715 There may be some disagreement with this statement amongst those favouring connection 
to the law governing the individual contract of employment as some of the arguments in 
favour of connection to the employment contract are also used in favour of subjecting the 
effects of a transfer of undertaking to different laws and different conflict of laws categories.   
716 NL: ‘overdracht krachtens overeenkomst of een fusie’; DE: ‘vertragliche Übertragung oder 
durch Verschmelzung anwendbar’;  
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obligations stemming from the existing employment contracts or 
relationships it may seem plausible to subject the transfer of these rights and 
obligations to the law governing the transfer agreement.717 One of the main 
advantages of conflictually subjecting the transfer of undertaking and its 
employment effects to the transfer agreement existing between the transferor 
and the transferee is that, by doing so, the entire acquisition or transfer of the 
undertaking by the transferee may be governed by a single law or legal 
system. In other words, by subjecting the acquisition or transfer and its 
effects to a single law or legal system, a fragmentation of the effects of the 
transfer (under several legal systems) will be avoided.718 As a general rule, 
the transfer agreement, by reason of party autonomy, will be governed by the 
law chosen by the parties. By subjecting the employment effects of a transfer 
of undertaking to the transfer agreement itself, the transferor and transferee 
will, by reason of a mere choice of law, be able to circumvent mandatory 
provisions of employment law, such as those transposing the Acquired 
Rights Directive, and prevent the affected employees from transferring to the 
transferee. By reason of a choice of law the parties will have the ability to 
subject the entire to transfer or business acquisition to a law that is absent of 
any acquired rights provisions. Thus, the application of the law that applies 
to the transfer agreement existing between the transferor and transferee bears 
the risk that the employees will be deprived of the protection afforded to 
them by the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts. For this 
very reason, the conflict of laws connection to the transfer agreement is 
consistently rejected throughout legal literature.719 The transferor and 
transferee should not be able to choose the law that will govern the effects of 
the transfer in relation to the existing employment contracts or relationships 
without the knowledge or consent of the affected employees.720 The 
                                                          
717 Cf. Zweigert 1958, p. 657 who rejects this approach in favour of the law governing the 
agreement that is being transferred, such as the employment contract, in light of the employee 
protective nature of the transfer of rights and obligations stemming from an employment 
contract. 
718 Pietzko 1988, p. 215; Kronke 1981, p. 159; Kania 2012, p. 82; Franzen 1994, p. 70; BAG 
29 October 1992 - 2 AZR 267/92, para. II.2. 
719 Gamillscheg 1959, p. 237; Gamillscheg 1983, p. 359; Junker 1992, p. 233; Pietzko 1988, 
p. 216; Kronke 1981, p. 159; Kronke 1989, p. 9; Mankowski 1994, p. 96; Kania 2012, p. 82-
83, Franzen 1994, p. 70; Däubler 1994, p. 124; Niksova 2014, p. 70-71; Bittner 2000, p. 460, 
footnote 20; Richter 1992, p. 70; Drobnig, Becker & Remien 1991, p. 68. 
720 Kania 2012, p. 83; Richter 1992, p. 68. 
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application of mandatory provisions of employment law, such as national 
acquired rights provisions, should not be dependent upon a unilateral 
decision of the transferee and transferor. In essence, the mere fact that the 
employees cannot in any way influence the law that will govern the transfer 
agreement makes that they as weaker parties are deserving of protection. To 
this end the interests of the affected employees outweigh those of the 
transferee.721 The transferee undoubtedly has the opportunity to avail himself 
of legal advice prior to the transfer, enabling him to discount the transfer of 
the affected employees into the calculation of the purchase price.722 The 
transferee requires no protection under the conflict of laws as any 
unexpected transfer of employees may be entirely attributable to him. The 
conflict of laws connection to the transfer agreement is therefore correctly 
rejected.     
 
3.1.2 Connection to the location of the undertaking 
While the conflict of laws connection to the transfer agreement is generally 
rejected throughout legal literature, it is frequently argued that the transfer of 
undertaking and its effects should be subject to the laws in force in country 
of the seat of the undertaking (to be) transferred.723 In effect there exist two 
main views on the most appropriate conflict of laws connection of a transfer 
of undertaking and its employment effects.724 Connection is either sought to 
the employment contract or the location of the undertaking to be transferred, 
also known as the lex loci approach. Since the undertaking to be transferred 
is pivotal to the Acquired Rights Directive, the seat of this undertaking may 
well embody the most natural connecting factor.725 After all, Article 1(2) of 
the directive attributes special meaning to the seat of the undertaking by 
causing the directive to apply ‘where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated 
                                                          
721 Niksova 2014, p. 71; Kania 2012, p. 83; Däubler 1994, p. 124.  
722 Kania 2012, p.83; Däubler 1994, p. 124. 
723 Bittner 2000, p. 464 et seq.; Junker 1992, p. 234 et seq.; Junker 1994, p. 40;  Birk 1982, p. 
396; Reichold 2008, p. 697 et seq; Birk 1978, p. 291; Henckel 2012, p, 389; Haanappel-van 
der Burg 2015, p. 293; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8; Cf. Laagland 2011, p. 17; Junker 
2012, p. 13. 
724 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 460. 
725 Cf. Henckel 2012, p. 385. 
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within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.726 The primary argument in favour 
of the application of the laws in force at the seat of the undertaking to be 
transferred therefore lies in the Acquired Rights Directive itself. Given that 
in Article 1(2) of the directive special meaning is attributed to the seat of the 
undertaking by applying the directive whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty, some 
Member States appear to have translated this provision into their national 
law to the extent that their national legislation applies where and so far as the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within their distinct territory. The 
United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg all appear to have classified a 
transfer of undertaking as separate conflict of laws category, accompanied 
by a unilateral conflict or reference rule: whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within one of these Member State its national acquired 
rights provisions require unilateral application.727 Although the directive 
itself does not hold an explicit predisposition for any particular conflict of 
laws connection, it does require application whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated in a Member State, aiding the idea that the situation or 
location of the undertaking to be transferred holds considerable meaning for 
the conflict of laws.   
 
Indeed, the Acquired Rights Directive revolves around the undertaking to be 
transferred and the effects of this transfer upon the affected employees. More 
so, the effects of a transfer of undertaking are not confined to the individual 
employment relationship, but also concern operational, economic and 
                                                          
726 Emphasis added KCH.  
727 Art. L. 127-1 (2) Code du Travail Luxembourg : ‘Le présent chapitre s’applique chaque 
fois que l’entreprise, l’établissement ou la partie d’entreprise ou d’établissement à transférer 
se situe sur le territoire national du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.’; Art. 3(1)(d) Transfer of 
Business (Protection of Employment) Regulations, S.L. 452.85: ‘Article 38 of the Act and 
these regulations shall apply: where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business to be transferred is situated in Malta.’; Art. 3(4)(c) the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006 no. 246 (as amended 
by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014, S.I. 2014 No. 16): ‘Subject to paragraph (1), these 
Regulations apply to: a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business (which may also be a service provision change) where persons employed in the 
undertaking, business or part transferred ordinarily work outside the United Kingdom.’ 
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collective employment interests.728 Keeping these additional effects in mind, 
it may be false to subject all of these rights and interests, such as employee 
participation rights and the right to observance of terms and conditions 
agreed in collective agreements, to the law governing the individual 
employment contract. In this sense, the proponents of seeking connection to 
the location of the undertaking to be transferred consider the continuity of 
the employee representative body or the continuance of terms and conditions 
agreed in collective agreements of similar importance as the transfer of the 
existing employment contract to the transferee.729 This argument is often 
countered by the statement that the primary purpose of the continuation of 
the employment relationships upon a transfer of undertaking is rooted in the 
protection of the individual employee, causing the continuation of the 
employment representative body and the observance of collective 
agreements to be merely of secondary importance.  In this context, it should 
be noted that oftentimes there is no strict dichotomy in result between the 
law that applies to the individual employment contract and the law in force 
at the seat of the undertaking to be transferred as the place of habitual 
employment, the primary factor in determining the law that applies to the 
employment contract, will frequently coincide with the place in which the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated. Still, compared to the law 
applicable to the employment contract, which may require a lengthy 
assessment seeking the habitual place of employment or failing that the 
location of the business through which the employee was engaged,730 the 
geographic centre of the undertaking is easily determined. In addition, a 
main advantage of the conflict of laws connection to the seat of the 
undertaking to be transferred, especially when compared to the connection to 
the individual employment contract, is that all those employed in the 
                                                          
728 Bittner 2000, p. 464; Birk 1982, p. 396; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 290. 
729 Junker 1992, p. 235; Niksova 2014, p. 72. 
730 Cf. Article 8 Rome I Regulation. Such a lengthy assessment will mostly take place where it 
concerns undertaking with a high level of mobility or an undertaking that is already geared 
towards several countries including the one in which it is situated. These type of undertakings 
may embody a larger number of cross-border transfers when compared to undertakings that 
that are solely conducting their business within one single country. Still, in most cases the 
employees of the undertaking to be transferred will habitually carry out their employment at 
the location of the undertaking to be transferred, allowing no difference between the 
application of the law that applies to the individual contract of employment and the laws in 
force at the seat of the undertaking to be transferred.   
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undertaking to be transferred, i.e. the entire workforce, will be subject to the 
same transfer provisions upon the transfer of undertaking. By contrast, in 
deploying the law that applies to the individual employment contract a 
fragmentation may occur due to the possible existence of e.g. varying 
employment contracts and choice of law clauses contained therein. 
Consequently, the connection to the individual employment contract and the 
fragmentation of the law applicable among the workforce may result in only 
part of the workforce transferring to the transferee. Such disparity does not 
occur when seeking connection to the seat of the undertaking to be 
transferred.731 In essence the connection to the seat of the undertaking does 
away with the practical objections to applying different laws to the 
employment effects of a transfer of undertaking upon the employees affected 
by the transfer by reason of the variances existing in individual employment 
contracts. However, the notion that the law of the seat of the undertaking to 
be transferred, as opposed to the law applicable to the individual 
employment contract, ensures that the transfer of all workers employed in 
the undertaking is subject to the same law is somewhat undercut by the 
preferential law approach enshrined in Article 6(1) Rome Convention and 
Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation.  Where a choice of law in the employment 
contract derogates from the mandatory provisions of the law that would 
otherwise be applicable, these mandatory rules will apply in order to ensure 
a minimum level of employee protection. In essence, the preferential law 
approach ensures that the rule that is most favourable to the employee 
prevails. When seeking connection to the law that applies to the individual 
employment contract upon a transfer of undertaking the transfer of the entire 
workforce is therefore subject to the same law, except when e.g. a choice of 
law in an individual employment contract offers the individual employee 
more protection than the law that would otherwise be applicable to his 
employment contract or when the objectively applicable law does not equate 
the habitual place of employment of the main body of workers.  
Consequently, determining the law that applies to the individual employment 
contract may prove a particularly burdensome task, both due to the 
determination of the habitual place of employment and to the preferential 
                                                          
731 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Bittner 2000, p. 464. 
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law approach enshrined in Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation, which may732 
require an extensive subjective comparison between the law chosen and the 
law objectively applicable.733 By contrast, as mentioned above, the location 
of the undertaking to be transferred is easily determined. In addition, 
applying the location of the undertaking to be transferred as a connecting 
factor results in a more neutral and closer connection to the transfer of 
undertaking itself. It is the transfer of the undertaking itself that forms the 
nexus of a transfer of undertaking, thus justifying the conflict of laws 
connection to the geographic location of the undertaking to be transferred.734 
More so, from a Savignian perspective, a conflict of laws category requires a 
connecting factor epitomized by abstraction and neutrality that is absent of 
any considerations based in substantive law. The notion that the primary 
purpose of a transfer of undertaking is the protection of the individual 
employee requiring a conflict of laws connection to the law that governs the 
individual contract of employment determined by a choice of law, the 
habitual place of employment, the location of the engaging place of business 
or a closer connection, falsely inserts the purpose of substantive law into the 
conflict of laws reasoning.735 More so, as stated above, there are some 
reservations to this purported purpose of a transfer of undertaking: a transfer 
of undertaking does not solely serve to the benefit of the individual 
employee as it effectuates the transfer of both individual and collective 
rights. The continuation of collective and company agreements and the 
preservation of status and function of employee representatives may be of 
equal value. In addition, the legitimate expectations of the employees in the 
continuation of their employment also extends to an interest in the 





                                                          
732 Whether this is in fact the case depends on the interpretation of Article 8(1) Rome I 
Regulation. There exist various views and ideas in this regard, Cf. Zilinsky 2009.  
733 See e.g. Wurmnest 2012, p. 119; Zilinsky 2009, p. 1033; Even & van Kampen 2004, p. 31; 
Grušic 2015, p. 144, p. 150 et seq.; Franzen 2010, p. 234; Strikwerda 1993, p. 257. 
734 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Junker 1992, p. 235.  
735 Bittner 2000, p. 465; For some objections to this notion see paragraph 4.1.3. 
736 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Junker 1992, p. 235. 
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3.1.3 Connection to the individual employment contract 
In addition to the connection to the transfer agreement and the connection to 
the seat of the undertaking to be transferred the applicable law to (the effects 
of) a cross-border transfer of undertaking be sought through connection to 
the individual employment contract.737 According to this view, which 
constitutes the prevailing opinion, 738 for reasons of employee protection, in 
line with the employee-protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive, 
the transfer of undertaking should be subject to the law that governs the 
individual contract of employment.739 The justification of this approach lies 
first in the conflict of laws assessment of contract acquisition or the 
assignment of debts, according to which the transfer of a contract is 
governed by the law that governs the contract itself. This law is also believed 
to apply to contract transfers that occur by operation of law, such as the ex 
lege transfer of insurance, rental, consumer and employment agreements.740  
As such, the conflict of laws assessment that applies to contract acquisitions 
could also be extended to transfers of undertakings: since the transfer of 
undertaking effectuates the ex lege transfer of the rights and obligations 
stemming from the existing employment contract or relationship, the transfer 
of the employment contract or relationship to the transferee should be 
governed by the law that governs the employment contract or employment 
relationship.741 A second justification for the conflict of laws connection to 
the individual employment contract is to be found in the aims and purpose of 
the Acquired Rights Directive. Since the primary aim of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts is to protect employees by securing 
the preservation of their employment upon a transfer of undertaking, the 
                                                          
737 Cf. BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 18/10; BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92; LAG 
Baden-Württemberg 17 September 2009 – 11 Sa 40/09; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 
December 2009 – 22 Sa 45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 – 14 Ca 516/08; LAG 
Hamburg 22  May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03; Ktr. Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, JAR 
2008/271.  
738 BAG 26 May 2011 – 8 AZR 18/10; BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92; LAG Baden-
Württemberg 17 September 2009 – 11 Sa 40/09; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 December 
2009 – 22 Sa 45/09; ArbG Freiburg 13 March 2009 – 14 Ca 516/08; LAG Hamburg 22 May 
2003 – 8 Sa 29/03; Ktr. Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, JAR 2008/271; CMS report 
2006; Leuchten 2012, p. 413; Cf. Ebert 2008, p. 146. 
739 Junker 2012, p. 13. 
740 Zweigert 1958, p. 657. 
741 Franzen 1994, p. 75; Zweigert 1958, p. 657. 
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transfer itself is intrinsically connected to the employment contract or 
relationship that exists with the transferor. It is this close connection to the 
employment relationship that may justify the conflict of laws connection to 
the law applicable to the employment contract. The principal purpose of the 
Acquired Rights Directive is to secure a continuance of the rights and 
obligations stemming from an employment contract or relationship.  It is this 
reasoning that is invoked against the argument that the Acquired Rights 
Directive does not merely provide for individual rights and obligations but 
also contains labour market and social implications by having an effect on 
employee participation and the terms and conditions agreed in collective 
agreements. For reasons of employee protection it is thus considered that the 
law governing the individual employment contract is best suited to 
determine whether a transfer of undertaking has taken place.742 Once a 
transfer has been established this law should also govern and determine the 
effects of the transfer. Yet, as mentioned above, one may ask whether, under 
the Savignian conflicts approach, any value should be attributed to the 
substantive purpose of the acquired rights provisions.743 After all, the 
traditional conflict of laws approach is characterized by abstraction and 
neutrality and is absent of any considerations of substantive law including 
the aim and purpose of such law. In this sense, raising the primary aim of a 
transfer of undertaking, which is the protection of employees, as an 
argument for the conflict of laws connection to the individual contract of 
employment conflicts with the abstract and neutral nature of the traditional 
conflict of laws method. However, this method has been subject to change 
and adaptation over time. In fact, from a methodological point of view 
modern private international law is characterized by eclecticism. In certain 
areas of law, such as that of international employment, the conflict of laws 
reference is to some extent motivated by a quest for substantive justice. The 
argument that substantive law considerations cannot play a part in the 
determination of the proper conflict of laws path for transfers of 
undertakings therefore loses some, if not all, of its validity.  
 
In addition to the underlying purpose of employment protection, the conflict 
of laws connection of the issue of transfers of undertakings to the 
                                                          
742 Junker 2012, p. 13;  Mankowski 1994, p. 97; Däubler 1994, p. 124.  
743 Bittner 2000, p. 465. 
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employment contract is based on the interests in and trust of the affected 
employees in the continuance of their employment. The employment 
contract provides the employees with a certain legal position, which includes 
the right to transfer to the transferee.744 Their interests in maintaining this 
status is considered to take precedence over the need to protect the transferee 
against unforeseen obligations, especially since the transfer of the business is 
entirely beyond the employee’s control.745 The connectedness with the 
employment contract or relationship is further illustrated by the fact that 
issues concerning transfers of undertakings often arise in procedures for 
dismissal which under the conflict of laws undoubtedly belong to the 
purview of the conflict rule for employment contracts.746 In those cases, the 
question whether or not a transfer has taken place, causing the employee to 
become employed by the transferee as the new employer, forms the very 
essence of proceedings.  
 
3.2 Division according to the rights in dispute 
In addition to the existence of a separate conflict of laws category for the 
transfer of undertaking or the transfer of undertaking being assimilated as a 
whole under an existing conflict of laws category, i.e. that of the individual 
contract of employment, there exists the view that the conflict of laws 
connection of a transfer of undertaking may be divided depending on the 
rights in dispute. In this sense, the rights and obligations stemming from a 
transfer of undertaking are not considered to, as a whole, befall one single 
reference category or reference rule. Instead, these rights and obligations are 
divided under the conflict of laws, leaving the possibility that different rights 
and obligations arising from or in connection to a transfer of undertaking are 
subject to the laws of different countries. Under this view, some rights and 
obligations, such as those concerning the transfer of the employment 
relationship and protection against dismissal, befall the conflict of laws 
reference for individual contracts of employment, whereas other rights and 
obligations, such as those stemming from collective bargaining agreements, 
are subject to a different conflict of laws provision. Under this view, most 
                                                          
744 Zweigert 1958, p. 656-657; Cf. Junker 1992, p. 234; Gaul & Mückl 2011, p. 2319-2320.  
745 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92; Henckel 2012 ; Kania 2014, p. 83-84. 
746 It is undisputed that issues regarding dismissals are (generally) governed by the law 
applicable to the employment contract.  
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rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking will be 
captured by European private international law instruments.747 Some rights 
and obligations however, such as those relating to employee representation, 
will be left to domestic (mostly uncodified) sources of private international 
law.748 Determining the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking by 
dividing the rights and obligations to which a transfer gives rise will likely 
result different laws governing different parts of the transfer, making it 
difficult for the parties involved, i.e. transferee, transferor and the affected 
employees, to determine their legal position. A transfer of undertaking is no 
longer treated as a single concept of law, but divided into several 
components, possibly resulting in an impenetrable forest or labyrinth of 
different legal rules and laws. I therefore feel that this view should be 
rejected. Not only does a division, under the conflict of laws, of rights and 
obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking significantly thwart 
legal certainty. it also results in the loss of the interaction and 
interdependency that exists between the acquired rights provisions of single 
legal system. 
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
The above shows that there are several views and ideas on the proper 
conflict of laws path for transfers of undertakings, none of which are 
universally accepted. Whereas some of these views hold obvious merits, 
others are easily rejected. As is clear from the preceding paragraphs one of 
these views, i.e. the connection  to the transfer agreement, clearly conflicts 
with the aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive, whereas another, 
i.e. the division according to the rights in dispute, appears to frustrate legal 
certainty. Both these views should be discounted in the search for the most 
befitting conflict of laws solution in cases of transfers of undertakings. In 
essence there exist two main views on the preferred conflict of laws 
connection for transfers of undertakings.749 These main views concern the 
connection to the individual employment contract and the connection to the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred. In deciding between these to 
views, it should be borne in mind that in the prevailing opinion a transfer of 
                                                          
747 The Rome I Regulation and Rome Convention.  
748 Cf. Laagland 2011, p. 26-27. 
749 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 460. 
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undertaking and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom are to be 
governed by the law that governs the individual contract of employment. 
The justification for this connection is primarily found in the employee-
protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts.750 Since the principal purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive 
is to secure a continuance of the rights and obligations stemming from an 
employment contract or relationship, this purpose is considered to justify the 
conflict of laws connection to the individual employment contract. 
Forestalling the findings of paragraph 8 of this Chapter, which holds a 
detailed portrayal of what I believe to be the proper conflict of laws path for 
transfers of undertakings, I can reveal that to my mind a connection to the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred is better suited to deal with 
issues of conflicting laws in situations involving a transfer of undertaking. 
Even though primarily intended to protect the individual employee, the 
effects of a transfer of undertaking are not confined to the individual 
employment relationship, but also concern operational, economic and 
collective employment interests, for which the individual employment 
contract holds an ill-suited connection. Since the undertaking forms the pivot 
of the Acquired Rights Directive a more suitable connecting factor is to be 
found in the seat of the undertaking to be transferred. It is the directive that 
revolves around this undertaking with its provisions only becoming 
operative if the transfer of an undertaking is to take effect. More so, a 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred is supported 
by Article 1(2) of the directive, which attributes special meaning to the seat 
of the undertaking by causing the directive to apply ‘where and in so far as 
the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.751 Contrary 
to a connection to the individual employment contract, the seat of the 
undertaking is easily determined and entails a neutral connection that is 
closely connected to the transfer of undertaking itself. However, since my 
view conflicts with the prevailing opinion it will not be discussed in detail 
until paragraph 8 of the present Chapter. Building on the notion that the 
connection to the individual employment contract holds the predominant 
                                                          
750 Junker 2012, p. 13. 
751 Emphasis added KCH.  
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opinion,752 the following paragraphs will discuss this conflict of laws 
connection, its accompanying conflict of laws rules and their merits and 
demerits.  
 
4. Rome I Regulation 
This paragraph seeks to discuss the application of the Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations. It is due to the prevailing 
opinion, that seeks connection to the individual contract of employment in 
determining the law that governs a transfer of undertaking that this 
paragraph seeks to discuss the Rome I Regulation. In doing so, this 
paragraph considers the scope of the regulation and the consequences of 
seeking connection to the individual contract of employment.  
 
Even though a transfer of undertaking in itself does not constitute a 
contractual obligation as it occurs ope legis, the rights and obligations that 
are secured by the transfer are mostly based in agreement.753 In addition, 
were it not for the agreement between the transferor and the transferee a 
transfer of undertaking would not occur. It is therefore assumed that a 
transfer of undertaking, either as a whole or in part befalls the Rome I 
Regulation. Although I strongly feel that a transfer of undertaking constitutes 
or should constitute a separate category under the conflict of laws for which 
the locus laboris holds an ill-suited connecting factor, it is generally believed 
that the law that governs a transfer of undertaking equates the law that 
applies to the individual contract of employment. As such, according to the 
prevailing opinion the transfer of undertaking, from a conflict of laws 
perspective, is assimilated under the conflict of laws category that exists for 
the individual contract of employment. This assimilation finds its basis in the 
accessory relationship that exists with the employment contract. After all, 
the employment contract generally constitutes a relationship that exists 
between similar parties as the transfer of undertaking: being the 
transferor/transferee (employer) and the employee. In applying the Rome I 
                                                          
752 Save for the laws of the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Malta, which do seek 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred, provided that the undertaking 
is located within their distinct territory.  
753 Most rights and obligations that are secured by the Acquired Rights Directive find their 
basis in the individual contract of employment.  
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Regulation, a transfer of undertaking may either be assimilated as a whole 
under the employment contract or the rights and obligations arising from a 
transfer of undertaking may be divided depending on the issues in dispute. In 
the latter situation the rights and obligations are divided under the existing 
Articles of the Rome I Regulation. For example, a dispute concerning an 
unfair dismissal (for reasons of the transfer) will be governed by Article 8 on 
individual contracts of employment, whereas a dispute concerning the 
continuance of rights and obligations stemming from collective agreements 
may be governed by Article 3 or 4 Rome I Regulation. Other issues, such as 
those involving employee participation may be entirely beyond the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation.  
 
4.1. Scope 
By reason of Article 1 the Rome I Regulation754 applies ‘in situations 
involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters’. The regulation applies to contracts concluded as from 
17 December 2009; contracts concluded prior to that date are generally 
governed either by the Rome Convention or the domestic law of the Member 
States.755 Since the Rome I Regulation does not apply to obligations that are 
not based in contract, it is important to assess whether a transfer of 
undertaking amounts to a contractual obligation. This question of whether a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking falls within the ambit of the Rome I 
Regulation is one that is commonly surpassed in discussing the issue of 
cross-border transfers of undertakings. It needs to be examined whether the 
intrinsic connection between a transfer of undertaking and the transfer 
agreement or the employment contract could secure a contractual nature for 
the employment law concept. In deciding whether a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking is caught by the Rome I Regulation the scope of the regulation 
should not be confused with the preferred connection under the conflict of 
laws. Surely, before even touching upon the conflict of laws connection it 
must be established whether a particular case falls within the ambit of the 
regulation.  
                                                          
754 The Rome I Regulation applies in all European Member States with the exception of 
Denmark.  
755 Since the formal scope of the Regulation is universal in the sense that by reason of Article 
2 any law specified by the Regulation shall be applied regardless of whether or not it is the 
law of a Member State there is no situation in which this scope is not fulfilled.   
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
239 
 
As is clear from Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive, ‘the 
transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or 
from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by 
reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.’ This transfer of the 
rights and obligations stemming from the existing employment contracts or 
relationships to the transferee occurs automatically, i.e. by operation of law, 
due to the transfer of the undertaking or business to another employer. This 
automatic nature equally applies to other effects of the transfer such as the 
protection against dismissal, the transfer of rights and obligations agreed in 
collective agreements and the preservation of status and function of 
employee representatives.756 The directive elucidates that a transfer of 
undertaking is the result of an agreement by the transferor and the transferee. 
According to Article 1(1)(a) of the Acquired Rights Directive the directive 
applies to ‘to any transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an 
undertaking or business to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or 
merger.’ In some language versions of this particular paragraph even clarify 
that the transfer of undertaking, although effectuated by law, finds its basis 
in contract.757 For example, according to the Dutch language version, the 
directive applies to any transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an 
undertaking or business to another employer as a result of an ‘overdracht 
krachtens overeenkomst of een fusie’. As a result, a transfer of undertaking is 
based in the agreement by the transferor and transferee. However, the very 
fact that a transfer of undertaking occurs ope legis makes that a (cross-
border) transfer of undertaking and the obligations stemming therefrom are 
outwith the scope of the Rome I Regulation. Indeed, it is the legal transfer or 
merger that effectuates the ex lege transfer of the (rights and obligations 
stemming from the) existing employment contracts to the transferee. The 
obligations of the transferor and transferee that arise upon a transfer of 
undertaking are not primarily contractual in nature and are not subject to 
                                                          
756 In addition, the transfer occurs irrespective of the will and consent of the transferee, 
transferor or the affected employees The employees however, do have a right to object to the 
transfer of rights and obligations stemming from their employment relationship. The effects of 
this objection is left to the national laws of the Member States.  
757 NL: ‘overdracht krachtens overeenkomst of een fusie’; DE: ‘vertragliche Übertragung oder 
durch Verschmelzung’; ES: ‚ una cesión contractual o de una fusión’; HR: ‘posljedica 
ugovornog prijenosa, pripajanja ili spajanja poduzeća’; IT: ‘a cessione contrattuale o a 
fusion’.  
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party autonomy. In fact, these obligations arise by operation of law 
regardless of the will of the affected parties. Thus, it is my firm belief that, 
although closely related to the transfer agreement and the employment 
contract (both of which are subject to the Rome  Regulation) the rights and 
obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking fall outside the 
substantive scope of the Rome I Regulation as they themselves are not 
contractual in nature.758 For example, the transferee enters into the existing 
employment relationships automatically by reason of the transfer. This 
transfer does not depend upon the transfer agreement or upon the 
employment contract existing between the transferor and the affected 
employees. The obligation of the transferor to take over the existing 
workforce is not based in contract, but exists ope legis. Another example 
may include a transferee’s failure to preserve the status and function of 
employee representatives. The transferee’s obligation to, subject to some 
conditions, preserve the status and function of employee representatives 
stems from law by reason of the transfer and does not constitute a 
contractual obligation; neither the employment contract nor the transfer 
agreement requires such a continuance of status and function. To summarize, 
(the rights and obligations stemming from) transfers of undertakings are 
outside the substantive scope of the Rome I Regulation. The fact that, as a 
result of the transfer, the transferee has entered into a contractual relationship 
with the affected employees does not alter the characterization of a transfer 
of undertaking (and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom) as non-
contractual. The substantive scope of the regulation is not dependent on the 
relationship existing between the parties in dispute, but upon ‘situations 
involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters’.     
 
As stated above, the notion that a transfer of undertaking and the rights and 
obligations stemming therefrom are outwith the substantive scope of the 
Rome I Regulation, is not one that is universally shared. Most authors falsely 
assume that due to the connectedness with the individual employment 
                                                          
758 This also applies to the Rome Convention; Surely, as a result of the transfer the transferee 
enters into the existing employment relationship, any disputes arising directly from that 
relationship (and not from the transfer) will generally fall within the scope of the Rome I 
Regulation.  
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contract a transfer of undertaking is covered by the Rome I Regulation. The 
provisions of the regulation therefore still holds some value in relation to a 
transfer of undertaking. In addition, in seeking connection to either the 
transfer agreement or the individual contract of employment under the 
conflict of laws the provisions of the regulation may, by analogy, be applied 
to the issue of transfers of undertakings. In the latter case the analogical 
application of the provisions of the regulation results in the substantive scope 
being surpassed. Here, the regulation does not apply on its own merit, but its 
provisions are applied by reason of comparison.759  
 
In relation to the conflict of laws views and theories discussed above, the 
Rome I Regulation may apply in determining the law applicable to the 
transfer agreement (on the basis of Articles 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation) and 
to the individual contract of employment (per Article 8 Rome I Regulation). 
As such, in seeking connection to the transfer agreement or the individual 
contract of employment, both views which I believe to be incorrect, the 
applicable law to a transfer of undertaking is determined via the Rome I 
Regulation.  My preferred option of deploying a connection to the seat of the 
undertaking, however, is not open under the Rome I Regulation. This option 
either requires the transfer of undertaking to be counted as a separate conflict 
of laws category for which a special provision is yet to be devised or it 
requires an extensive interpretation of the scope rule contained in Article 
1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, classifying this rule as either a 
unilateral or a multilateral conflict of laws rule.  
 
4.2 Art. 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation – general rules 
Party autonomy lies at the heart of European private international law in 
matters relating to contract. This is clear from Article 3 of the Rome I 
Regulation, which, echoing the wording of the Rome Convention, codifies 
the principle of party autonomy by expressly allowing the parties to choose 
the law governing their contract. In doing so, the law designated by the 
Rome I Regulation primarily finds its basis in a subjective choice of law 
rather than an objective approach seeking the closest connection to a 
                                                          
759 Generally on the basis of (uncodified) national sources of private international law. 
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particular country.760 As such, the contractual parties may freely agree, either 
expressly or tacitly, on the law that governs their contract as a whole or in 
part.761 This freedom of choice continues to exist for the duration of the 
contract, allowing the parties to agree on a change in applicable law at any 
time.762 By reason of Article 3(3) and 3(4)763 the choice of law may however 
be limited if utilized in order to circumvent mandatory provisions of 
Member States  or Community law.764 In the absence of a choice of law, the 
applicable law is generally determined on the basis of Article 4 Rome I 
Regulation, which in paragraph 1 holds specific connecting factors for 
specific types of contracts. In the absence of the contract in dispute being 
classified as any of these specific types of contracts or where the contract 
befalls several of the categories listed in paragraph 1, the applicable law to 
the contract is determined by connection to the habitual residence of the 
person effectuating the characteristic performance by reason of Article 4(2). 
In determining the applicable law to e.g. the transfer agreement, the transfer 
of the undertaking forms the characteristic performance, resulting in the 
applicable law being dependent on the habitual residence765 of the transferor. 
Paragraph 3 holds an escape clause which is to apply whenever the contract 
                                                          
760 This notion however, is somewhat tempered by the existence of preferential law approach 
that allows for the protection of several weaker parties such as consumers, insurees (i.e. 
insurance policy holders) and employees.  With respect to these weaker parties the Rome I 
Regulation limits the choice of law to be made by the parties to a contract.  
761 As per Article 3(1) second sentence ‘the choice shall be made expressly or clearly 
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case.’; For a contract of 
employment this means that the applicable law may be derived from e.g. references to 
national law in the employment contract or from the application of national collective 
bargaining agreements; Cf. D. Martiny, Munchener Kommentar zum BGB 6. Auflage 2015, 
Art. 8 Rom I-Vo, para. 20. Article 3(1) third sentence expressly allows for depecage: by their 
choice the parties can select the law applicable tot he whole or to only part of the contract.  
762 Article 3(2) Rome I Regulation.  
763 Article 3(4) Rome I Regulation holds a new provision in comparison to the Rome 
Convention. The paragraph reads: ‘where all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable 
law other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement.’ 
764 Cf. Schönbohm,  Beck'scher Online-Kommentar Arbeitsrecht, VO (EG) 593/2008, Art. 3, 
Rn. 36.  
765 Article 19 Rome I Regulation determines the habitual residence of companies and natural 
persons acting in the course of business.  
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is manifestly more closely connected with another country than that 
indicated by paragraphs 1 and 2. In addition, Article 4(4) holds a fallback 
rule that applies when the applicable law cannot be determined on the basis 
of paragraphs 1 and 2. On the basis of this rule the applicable law will then 
be determined by the principle of the closest connection. Pursuant to 
paragraph 4 the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which it is most closely connected whenever paragraph 1 and 2 cannot be 
applied, for instance in establishing the applicable law to a joint venture 
agreement.766    
 
4.3 Art. 8 Rome I Regulation – individual employment contract 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation holds a special conflict of laws category 
for individual employment contracts, which holds: 
 
‘1.   An individual employment contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice of law 
may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from 
by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have 
been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. 
2.   To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment 
contract has not been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which 
the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the 
contract. The country where the work is habitually carried out shall not 
be deemed to have changed if he is temporarily employed in another 
country. 
3.   Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to 
paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is 
situated. 
4.   Where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract 
is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply.’ 
 
                                                          
766 F. Ferrari, VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 4 Mangels Rechtswahl anzuwendendes Recht, para. 80 
in: Ferrari, Kieninger & Mankowski et al. 2012;  Magnus 2010, p. 38. 
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The provision of Article 8 operates as a lex specialis in relation to the 
general rules set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the regulation.767 The provision 
applies to all individual contracts of employment and does not set forth any 
definition of the notion of employment contract or any additional 
requirements akin to the provisions existing for consumers in Art. 6 Rome I 
Regulation. Nonetheless, the application of the provision is limited to 
individual contracts of employment and does not extend to collective 
employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements, which are 
generally bound by the principles of territoriality. The provision itself 
prescribes the procedure for establishing the applicable law to an 
employment contract. This procedure may prove rather intricate and has, in 
part, been described as ‘labyrinthine’ as it,768 in situations where the parties 
themselves have decided upon an applicable law, requires a court to first 
establish the law that would govern the contract in the absence of a choice of 
law, second, to establish whether and which mandatory rules for 
employment protection exist and to end, apply the rules that favour the 
employee over the rules chosen by the parties.769 In establishing the 
applicable law in the absence of choice the court must determine the 
applicable law by seeking connection to the place of habitual place of 
employment.770 If this place cannot be determined the location of the place 
of business through which the employee was engaged forms the objective 
connecting factor in establishing the applicable law.771 However the escape 
clause of Article 8(4) provides that if there exists a closer connection to a 
                                                          
767 Cf. Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Heiko Koelzsch v Luxembourg Case C-29/10 
[2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2010:789, para. 48, held under the Rome Convention. 
768 Wojewoda 2000, p. 201. The labyrinth being the procedure for establishing the applicable 
law in the absence of choice: the law that applies to the individual contract of employment is 
the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries 
out his work in performance of the contract, even if temporarily employed in another country; 
if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in one country, the contract is to be 
governed by the law of the country where the engaging place of business is situated provided 
that it does not appear from the circumstances that the contract is more closely connected with 
a country other than that of the habitual place of work or the engaging place of business, in 
which case the law of that other country shall apply.   
769 Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation.  
770 Article 8(2) Rome I Regulation; the Regulation describes this place as the place where, or 
failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the 
contract.  
771 Article 8(3) Rome I Regulation. 
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country other than that of the habitual place of employment or the engaging 
place of business, the laws of that other country shall prevail.772 
  
4.3.1 Preferential law approach 
In the interest of weaker party protection, i.e. the protection of the interests 
of the individual employee, Article 8 restricts the effects of a choice of law 
made by the parties. Since employees are considered weaker parties, they are 
‘protected by choice-of-law rules that are more favourable to the interests 
than the general rules’, an objective that is emphasized in Recital 23 of the 
regulation. Hence, the provision of Article 8 is generally to be interpreted 
favor laboratoris. This idea of weaker party protection is relatively new to 
private international law, which in its traditional sense is defined by its 
neutrality. In classic private international law the objective is to find the 
appropriate legal system rather than to achieve substantive justice, no special 
treatment was therefore originally afforded to employees. Yet as it stands, 
the Rome I Regulation is equipped with a specific choice of law rule for 
individual contracts of employment. As a general rule, the law that governs 
the individual employment contract may be chosen by the parties in 
accordance with Article 3 Rome I Regulation. Yet, this choice of law is 
restricted to the benefit of the employee. The choice of law may not have the 
result of depriving the employee of the mandatory employment laws and 
provisions of the objectively applicable law. In this sense, the preferential 
law approach enshrined in Article 8(1) only comes into play in situations 
where the parties have chosen a law that differs from the law that is 
considered objectively applicable. In these situations, a comparison must be 
made between the law chosen by the parties and the law objectively 
applicable. A primary question in performing this comparison entails the 
extent to which both laws require appraisal.773 A general all-encompassing 
comparison of both legal systems, dissociated from the case at hand,  is 
considered unsuitable as it imposes a difficult and insurmountable task for 
the courts. It would be arbitrary and nonsensical to suggest that the law of a 
single state, e.g. the Netherlands, is on the whole better than the laws in 
                                                          
772 Article 8(4) Rome I Regulation. This was the case in BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 
267/92. 
773 Grušic 2015, p. 144, p. 150 et seq. 
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force in another, e.g. Belgium.774 After all, single provisions within a 
specific legal system may prove more favourable than others and may be 
incompatible with another legal regime.775 In addition, the chosen law may, 
on the whole prove more favourable to the employee, whereas the specific 
issue under consideration yields a better result under the objectively 
applicable law.776 Yet, the reverse approach, allowing for an unwantedly 
narrow comparision of the chosen law and the objectively applicable law 
would open the door to ‘cherry picking’. In such a situation the employee 
would be able to pick and choose the laws most favourable to his situation, 
possibly resulting in the receipt of better protection than envisioned by either 
law.777 The provisions from which the employee may pick and choose are 
generally part of a well-balanced system of law, allowing the application of 
these provisions without their legal counterparts may result in the law losing 
its overall cohesion.778 After all, the effect of employment provisions may 
differ depending on whether they are applied singular or conjunction with 
other provisions.779 Thus, neither a broad nor a narrow comparison provides 
a satisfactory approach under Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation. The solution 
lies in a middle ground between the two approaches. It is generally 
considered that the comparison to be made under the preferential law 
approach should find its basis in the specific subject matter in dispute.780 To 
this end, there should be a comparison of the parts of the law regulating the 
issue in question, e.g. a comparison of the rules on unfair dismissal. Here 
too, however, there may be varying views on the set of rules that require 
comparison. Should the comparison comprise of the area of employment law 
                                                          
774 Franzen 2010, p. 234; Grušic 2015, p. 150; Strikwerda 1993, p. 257. 
775 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA Case C-384/10 [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:564, para. 49. 
776 Cf. D. Martiny, Munchener Kommentar zum BGB, 6. Auflage 2015, Art. 8 Rom I-VO, 
No. 42. 
777 Krebber 2000, p. 528; Grušic 2015, p. 150.  
778 Cf. Grušic 2015, p. 150. 
779 Van Eeckhoutte 2006, p. 173; Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Jan Voogsgeerd v 
Navimer SA Case C-384/10 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:564, para. 49 
780 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA Case C-384/10 [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:564, para. 49; Opinion Advocate General Wahl Schlecker v Boedeker  Case 
C‑64/12 [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, para 34; D. Martiny, Munchener Kommentar zum 
BGB, 6. Auflage 2015, Art. 8 Rom I-VO, no. 42; Honsch 1988, p. 116; Zilinsky 2009, p. 
1033.  
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in its entirety, should it be limited to certain areas within the realm of 
employment law such as protection against dismissal or could the group of 
rules be even more limited e.g. to the notice period in relation to a 
dismissal?781 Again, the narrower the comparison, the greater the risk of 
cherry picking and of a loss of the consistency of law. Yet, the broader the 
comparison, the more abstract and difficult the assessment of which law is 
considered more favourable. Once more, a middle ground, bearing in mind 
the specific issues raised in the case at hand, should be sought. The 
comparison should therefore relate to a cohesive set of rules rather than a 
single provision or an entire area of law.782 In a recent judgment the highest 
German employment tribunal, the Bundesarbeitsgericht ruled on this issue. 
The case involved a comparison between the chosen law, i.e. the law of 
Algeria, and the objectively applicable German law and involved a claim for 
unfair dismissal. The Bundesarbeitsgericht ruled that: 
 
‘Die Frage, welche der in Betracht kommenden Rechtsordnungen für 
den Arbeitnehmer günstigere Regelungen enthält, ist eine Rechtsfrage, 
die objektiv und nach dem Maßstab des Gesetzes zu beantworten ist. 
Dazu ist ein Sachgruppenvergleich vorzunehmen. Zu vergleichen sind 
die in einem inneren, sachlichen Zusammenhang stehenden 
Teilkomplexe der fraglichen Rechtsordnungen. Die Günstigkeit anhand 
eines Vergleichs je einzelner Normen zu bestimmen, ist nicht 
sachgerecht. Dies könnte dazu führen, dass der Arbeitnehmer durch 
eine Kombination einzelner Vorschriften der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung 
einen Schutzstandard erlangt, der über demjenigen liegt, den die 
betroffenen Rechtsordnungen tatsächlich gewähren. Eine solche 
Besserstellung entspricht nicht dem Schutzzweck der Norm. Auch ein 
abstrakter „Gesamtvergleich" der Rechtsordnungen ohne Rücksicht auf 
die zu beurteilende Sachfrage würde dem Sinn und Zweck von Art. 
30 Abs. 1 EGBGB (aF) nicht gerecht. Dieser besteht darin, dem 
Arbeitnehmer im Einzelfall den ihm nach dem Regelstatut zustehenden 
Schutz zu erhalten. Dem Arbeitnehmer wäre nicht gedient, wenn das 
                                                          
781 Krebber 1997, p. 330;  Krebber 2000, p. 529; D. Martiny, Munchener Kommentar zum 
BGB, 6. Auflage 2015, Art. 8 Rom I-VO, no. 42.  
782 Even & van Kampen 2004, p. 33-34.  
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gewählte Recht zwar „alles in allem" das günstigere wäre, sich für den 
konkreten Streitgegenstand aber als unvorteilhafter erwiese.’783   
 
Consequently, the Bundesarbeitsgericht dismisses both the broad and the 
narrow approach and opts for a comparison of groups of rules arranged by 
subject matter. A comparison should be made between a coherent set of rules 
existing in the legal systems in question, in this case the totality of relevant 
provisions on the protection against dismissal.784 Given the disadvantages of 
an approach that is either too narrow or too broad this option for the 
comparison of a specific coherent set of rules seems to best accommodate 
the preferential law approach under Article 8(1). It has the advantage of 
being consistent with the wording of Article 8(1), which results in the 
application of the mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law 
whenever these provide more protection than the law chosen by the parties. 
The preferential law approach therefore does not result in a choice for the 
law that is on the whole most favourable, instead it allows for dépeçage: 
certain distinguishable parts of the employment contract may be governed by 
a different law. It are these distinguishable parts or specific coherent sets of 
rules that can be part of the preferential law comparison. It is fair to assume 
that, if considered mandatory,785 (the employment effects of) a transfer of 
undertaking could form such a distinguishable set of rules.  
                                                          
783 BAG, 10 April 2014 - 2 AZR 741/13, BeckRS 2014, 71952. 
784 BAG, 10 April 2014 - 2 AZR 741/13, BeckRS 2014, 71952. 
785 There exist little doubt as to whether the provisions of the directive and their national 
counterparts may be considered mandatory. In fact, the EFTA court has even gone so far as to 
describe the provisions stemming from the directive as being of public policy. In the case of  
Langeland v Norske Fabricom the Court, in its advisory opinion, held that: ‘the purpose of the 
Directive is to ensure that the rights arising from a contract of employment or employment 
relationship of employees affected by the transfer of an undertaking are safeguarded. Since 
this protection is a matter of public policy, and therefore independent of the will of the parties 
to the contract of employment, the rules of the Directive must be considered to be mandatory, 
so that it is not possible to derogate from them in a manner unfavourable to employees. It 
follows that employees are not entitled to waive the rights conferred on them by the Directive 
and that those rights cannot be restricted even with their consent.’ (Case E3/95 Torgeir 
Langeland v Norske Fabricom A/S [1995-1996] EFTA Ct. Rep. 36, para. 42-43) In its ruling 
the EFTA court even went so far as to say that an employee cannot waive the rights conferred 
by the mandatory provisions of the Directive, such as Article 3(1), even if as whole he is not 
placed in a worse position.  
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In opposition to the generally accepted preferential law approach, there 
exists the idea that the mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable 
law apply regardless of the choice of law made by the parties.786 In other 
words, according to this view,  the parties may not set aside the mandatory 
provisions of the objectively applicable law by a mere choice of law, 
rendering these provisions choice-resistant. In this sense the parties are left 
with a merely substantive choice: they may only choose the law in those 
areas where the objectively applicable law is merely regulatory in nature.787 
Under application of the preferential law approach Article 8(1) is plagued by 
ambiguity. Not only is there no direct indication of which approach is to be 
used in determining the extent of comparison between the law chosen and 
the law objectively applicable, the application of the approach may be 
subjective and gives rise to uncertainty regarding the applicable law. In 
addition, the question arises whether Article 8(1) intends to favour or to 
protect the employee. The wording of Article 8(1) suggests that a choice of 
law to the benefit of the employee may be possible: indeed the notion that no 
choice of law may deprive the employee of the protection he enjoys under 
the objectively applicable law, implies that, by reason of a choice of law, 
more protection may be bestowed upon the employee. However, by limiting 
the choice of law to the areas where the objectively applicable law is merely 
regulatory in nature, the objective of protecting the employee may still be 
fulfilled. After all, in the latter situation the employees are always subject to 
the mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law with the benefit 
that there is no confusion as to the applicable law. This view is therefore 
preferable to the preferential law approach under Article 8(1) as it provides 
for legal certainty and an ease of application.788   
 
4.3.2. Habitual place of employment 
In order to properly assess the law that governs the employment contract, 
both in the absence and in the presence of a choice of law, it must first be 
established which law governs the employment contract (or would have 
governed the employment contract) in the absence of a choice made by the 
parties. The objectively applicable law to the employment contract is first 
                                                          
786 Strikwerda 2015, p. 182; Cf. Even & van Kampen 2004, p. 31-32; Zilinsky 2009, p. 1033.  
787 Strikwerda 1993, p. 252. 
788 Strikwerda 2015, p. 182. 
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determined by Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation, which calls for the 
application of the laws in force in the country of the habitual place of 
employment. In effect, the employment contract is to be governed ‘by the 
law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee 
habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract’.789 This law is 
deemed not to have changed if the employee is temporarily employed in 
another country. The wording of Article 8(2) is similar to that of Article 6 of 
the Rome Convention. However, in light of the case law of the European 
Court of Justice in relation to Article 19(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, which utilises the same objective 
connecting factors as the Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention, the 
Rome I Regulation in its reference includes the wording ‘in which, or failing 
that, from which’.790 As such, Article 8(2) incorporates the reasoning 
stemming from the judgments in Mulox v. Geels,791 Rutten v. Cross 
Medical792 and Weber v. Ogden793  that the habitual place of work constitutes 
the place where, or from which, the employee performs the essential part of 
his duties towards his employer, thus creating a certain synergy between the 
Brussels regime and the Rome I Regulation.794 In Koelzsch the ECJ 
confirmed that the interpretation of the habitual place of employment under 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention must be taken into account in 
determining the applicable law under Article 6 of the Rome Convention, the 
predecessor of Article 8 Rome I Regulation.795 This reasoning is shared by 
AG Trstenjak, who in her opinion in Koelzsch, trusts that a literal, historical, 
systematic and purposive interpretation allows or promotes a parallel 
                                                          
789 Article 8(2) Rome I Regulation.  
790 COM (2005) 650 final, p. 7; Niksova 2014, p. 78-79; The wording ‘from which’ 
incorporates the so-called ‘base theory’ in Article 8. 
791 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:306. 
792 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7.  
793 Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122. 
794 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:306; Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:7; Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] 
ECR I-2013, ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, para. 49 and 58.  
795 Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 33; Cf. Article 24 Rome I Regulation. 
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interpretation of the concepts contained in the Brussels and Rome 
Convention.796 This parallel interpretation should however be approached 
with some caution as the objectives rules on international jurisdiction and the 
conflict of laws differ.797       
 
In most cases determining the habitual place of work will not prove difficult 
as employees generally tend to carry out their employment within a single 
country. This is equally true for migrant workers and those employed by 
foreign employers. Problems in determining the habitual place of work 
therefore only occur in situations of transnational employment, i.e. in 
situations where the employee carries out his work in more than one 
country.798 These situations do not include temporary employment abroad, as 
the regulation, in Article 8(2), clearly stipulates that the habitual place of 
employment does not change due to a temporary posting abroad. The 
provision does not however impose a time limit on such a posting. Article 
8(2) does not clarify when a temporary posting abroad results in a change in 
the habitual place of employment. Recital 36 of the regulation sheds light on 
this issue by declaring that ‘work carried out in another country should be 
regarded as temporary if the employee is expected to resume working in the 
country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad.’ The habitual place of 
employment in cases involving a posting abroad therefore depends on the 
animus revertendi of the employee and the animus retrahendi of the 
employer.799 Without an intention and an expectancy to return to the place of 
original or habitual employment a posting abroad will be classified as a 
change in the habitual place of work and will thus involve a change in the 
applicable law. For those employees involved in a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking that is coupled with a cross-border relocation of the undertaking 
                                                          
796 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Heiko Koelzsch v Luxembourg Case C-29/10 [2011] 
ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2010:789, para. 58-81.  
797 Van Eeckhoutte 2006, p. 170; Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Heiko Koelzsch v 
Luxembourg Case C-29/10 [2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2010:789, para. 82-83; Grušic 
2015, p. 144, p. 150 et seq. 
798 An employee may perform is obligations towards his employer throughout several 
locations in one particular country. The existence of several locations of employment within a 
single country are however irrelevant to the determination of the applicable law under Article 
8(2): what is decisive is the country in which the employment is habitually performed. Cf. 
Haanappel-van der Burg, Arbeidsovereenkomst, art. 8 Rome I, note 4 (2014). 
799 Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 79; Deinert 2013, p. 143; Mankowski  2006, p. 107; Peters 2009. 
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this means that the intention to permanently perform the work at the new 
location results in a change of the habitual place of employment. If the 
employee and transferee agree on establishing a general place of work at the 
new location the law that applies to the employee’s employment contract is 
therefore likely to change. To my mind, for determining the law that applies 
to a transfer of undertaking however, the applicable law at the time of the 
transfer is decisive. No change in (applicable transfer) law can therefore 
occur due to a change in the habitual place of employment that occurs after 
the transfer has taken place. As is clear from the case law regarding Article 
5(1) Brussels Convention the place where an employee ‘habitually carries 
out his work is the place where, or from which, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties 
vis-à-vis his employer.’ The determination of the applicable law thus 
requires an examination of whether the employee principally carries out his 
work in or from one or several countries.800 An employee works in one 
single country if the effective centre of the employee’s working activities is 
located within that country.801 This means that the habitual place of 
employment equals the place where the employee performs the essential part 
of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.802 In the absence of a centre of 
activities,803 the place where the employee carries out the majority of his 
activities constitutes the habitual place of employment.804 If it cannot be 
established in which country the employee performs the majority of his 
activities the fall back rule of the engaging place of business still does not 
come into play. Situations where the location of a majority of activities 
cannot be established are most likely to occur in employment relationships 
that are epitomized by very high degree of employee mobility, such as those 
existing in the transport sector or commercial representatives operating 
                                                          
800 Cf. Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-
1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151. 
801 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23. 
802 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23; 
Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, ECLI:EU:C:1993:306. 
803 Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical[1997] ECR I-57, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, para. 23. 
804 Case C- 37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, para. 42; Cf. Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch tv État du Groot-
Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 45. 
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throughout several countries.805 In Koelzsch the ECJ reaffirmed that even in 
cases involving the transport sector, Koelzsch worked as a lorry driver based 
out of Germany under a contract governed by Luxembourg law and was 
involved in the transport of flowers and other plants from Denmark to 
mostly German destinations,806 ‘the criterion of the country in which the 
work is habitually carried out must be given a broad interpretation and be 
understood as referring to the place in which or from which the employee 
actually carries out his working activities and, in the absence of a centre of 
activities, to the place where he carries out the majority of his activities.’807 
In a later case, the ECJ appears to make every effort to ensure that the 
engaging place of business, even as a court of last resort, is not awarded 
application as a connecting factor.808 In Voogsgeerd v Navimer the plaintiff 
served as a chief engineer aboard two ships whose navigation area extended 
to the North Sea.809 In earlier proceedings, Voogsgeerd had failed to 
establish that he carried out the majority of his activities in Belgian waters. 
The ECJ held that the court seised must take account of all the factors which 
characterise the activity of the employee and must, in particular, determine 
in which State is situated the place from which the employee carries out his 
tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work and 
the place where his tools are situated810 as well as ‘the place of actual 
employment’ and the place where the employee ‘must report before 
                                                          
805 The cases in Mulox (Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd tv Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:306) and Rutten  (Case C-383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] ECR I-57, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:7) concerned commercial representatives. In both cases the employees 
worked from an office to which they frequently returned after performing their work abroad. 
806 Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 13, 14. 
807 Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 45.  
808 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer Sa SA [2011] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, para. 35; Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom 
Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, para. 43. 
809 An area of the seas which is exclusively comprised of the EEZs of the UK, Norway, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. 
810 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, 
para. 38; Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg [2011] ECR 
I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151, paras. 48 and 49. 
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discharging his tasks’.811 If all the factors that characterise the employment 
relationship are located in one country, i.e., if the majority of the obligations 
towards the employer are performed in the same country, the employee is 
considered to habitually carry out his work in or from that country.812 As 
such, the ECJ in Voogsgeerd appears to equate the place of habitual 
employment, for employees working in the transport sector, to ‘a fixed base 
from which work is organised and where the personnel perform other 
obligations in relation to the employer’.813 Application of the habitual place 
of work as a decisive factor in determining the applicable law therefore 
appears to almost exclude the fall back provision of Article 8(3), which takes 
into consideration the secondary factor of the engaging place of business.814 
Determining the place of habitual employment in the manner suggested in 
Voogsgeerd, i.e. by taking into account all the factors that characterize the 
employment relationship, will, in situations involving transnational 
employment, likely prove a lengthy and burdensome task, requiring a 
pervasive factual appraisal.815 Moreover, this approach subjects employees 
to considerable uncertainty with respect to the law that will govern their 
contract (in the absence of a choice of law). In this sense, it would have been 
preferable if the ECJ were to have cut the Gordian knot in favour of a more 
easily determined deciding connecting factor such as the place of business 
through which the employee was engaged, i.e. the place of business that 
provides work instructions to the employee. Indeed, where the habitual place 
of performance cannot be determined the place of the undertaking through 
which the employee was engaged should determine the law that governs the 
employment contract. Surely, it serves to the benefit of the employee if the 
law that has the closest legal, factual and geographic connection to the 
existing legal relationship governs the employment contract. In addition, the 
use of a single connecting factor for all employees whose habitual place of 
                                                          
811 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, 
para. 40. See: Rammeloo 2011, p. 407-408, who places a critical note on the cataloguing of 
the conflict of laws reference within (special) conflict rules. 
812 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, 
para. 39, 40, 41.  
813 COM(2005) 650 final, p. 7. 
814 Cf. Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, para. 32. 
815 The ruling in Voogsgeerd is likely limited to cases involving transnational employment 
such as international transport. 
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employment, in the absence of a centre of working activities or a place 
where the majority of the employment tasks are carried out, cannot be 
readily determined would contribute to enhancing legal certainty and 
attaining the overall objective of employee protection.816 Yet, the present 
interpretation of the concept of habitual employment leaves few situations in 
which the fallback rule of Article 8(3), which leads to the application of the 
laws in force at the location of the engaging place of business, would be 
applicable. Instead, in situations involving transnational employment or 
international transport connection is sought to the employee’s lasting base. 
In the absence of such a base the fall back rule of Article 8(3) is to apply.  
 
4.3.3. Engaging place of business 
In situations where the habitual place of employment cannot be determined, 
Article 8(3) Rome I Regulation provides that the law governing the 
employment contract is the law of the ‘country where the place of business 
through which the employee was engaged is situated.’ This connecting factor 
only comes into play when the applicable law cannot be determined on the 
basis of Article 8(2).817 As such, the engaging place of business serves as a 
secondary objective connecting factor that rarely requires application. Due to 
the broad interpretation attributed to the habitual place of work it is difficult 
to imagine scenarios under which the engaging place of business requires 
application. Such cases may be limited to situations where the employee 
does not carry out his employment within the territory of a single state, but 
performs his work on e.g. a drilling platform or on the high seas. Other 
situations could involve an employee that retains multiple permanent bases 
                                                          
816 This view is supported by AG Trstenjak in Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Jan 
Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA Case C-384/10 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:564 , para. 68: ‘ After all, 
using the place of engagement as the connecting factor has the advantage of making the 
applicable law foreseeable, unlike using a purely factual criterion such as the place where the 
work is habitually carried out. While the latter place is liable to change frequently over the 
course of a person’s employment, the place of engagement usually remains unchanged, 
notwithstanding any relocations by the undertaking itself or any long-term overseas postings 
of the employee.  In the final analysis, the place of engagement provides the clearest 
indication of where the employee was first incorporated into the structure of the undertaking. 
In the case, as here, of employment relationships which require the employee to be highly 
mobile, this appears to be the criterion which best serves the continuity of the legal 
relationships between the contracting parties.’  
817 Deinert 2013, p. 150; Grusic 2015, p. 167. 
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of equal importance throughout several countries.818 The original 
Commission proposal for the Rome I Regulation shows that these are the 
scenarios for which Article 8(3) was originally intended. The proposed 
Article 6(2)(b) indicated that an individual contract of employment would be 
governed ´if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in or from 
any one country, or he or she habitually carries out his work in or from a 
territory subject to no national sovereignty, by the law of the country in 
which the place of business through which he was engaged is situated.´819 
The inclusion of a specific provision for those carrying out their work 
outside a specific territory was met with resistance:820 after all, even if 
carrying out his work outside the territory of any state an employee may still 
perform his duties from a fixed base that is located within a specific country, 
making it possible to designate a habitual place of employment. In its 
opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee stated: 
 
´ (…)  the Committee finds it difficult to understand why a provision is 
needed for "territory subject to no national sovereignty" (Article 
6(2)(b)). Perhaps this refers to drilling platforms in international waters. 
This should at least be clarified in the explanatory memorandum.´821 
 
In its final wording, Article 8(3) did not include any reference to those 
performing their employment outside the territory of any specific state. 
Employment contracts under which work is performed in a locus sine lege, 
in the absence of a fixed base, naturally fall within the ambit of Article 8(3). 
Specific mention of this particular group of employees or employment 
contracts within Article 8(3) therefore appears superfluous. 
 
                                                          
818 Grusic 2015, p. 167. 
819 COM(2005) 650 final, p. 17. 
820 Basedow & Wurmnest et al. 2007, p. 291, 292; Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee  on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 2006, INT/307 Contractual 
obligations (Rome I). 
821 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee  on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I), 2006, INT/307 Contractual obligations (Rome I). 
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An important consideration in determining the engaging place of business as 
a second-tier connecting factor is understanding what constitutes an 
´engaging place of business´.822 It is debatable whether the location of the 
business concluding the employment contract, which may at times be 
arbitrary, should be decisive. After all, if this were to be the deciding factor, 
the employer, in particular in cases involving special types of contract that 
are subject to the purview of Article 8(3) only, may manipulate the 
applicable law by choosing to conclude the contract through a subsidiary or 
a recruiting agency located in another country. The location of the place of 
business that is involved in concluding the employment contract may thus 
hold an inherent choice of law, circumventing the employee protection 
encompassed by Article 8(1). In legal literature it is therefore on occasion 
assumed that the engaging place of business should correspond to the centre 
of the employment relationship, i.e. the place whether the employee is 
integrated into the organization.823 This integration may be characterized by 
the payment of wages, the accountancy of work, the receipt of instructions 
and taxation. Yet, as is clear from the judgments in Voogsgeerd  and 
Koelzsch, if such a place of organizational integration exists, it may 
constitute a fixed base under Article 8(2). The factors characterizing 
organizational integration could potentially be divided among several 
locations, making it difficult to establish a single place of business in which 
the employee is organizationally integrated. In the interests of legal certainty 
the ECJ in Voogsgeerd, opted for the application of the place of business 
where the contract is concluded as a more easily determined localization of 
the engaging place of business. The court ruled that in the interests of 
foreseeability only a strict interpretation of the engaging place of business as 
a subsidiary connecting factor will suffice.824 According to the court ´the use 
of the term ‘engaged’ in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, clearly 
refers purely to the conclusion of the contract or, in the case of a de facto 
employment relationship, to the creation of the employment relationship and 
                                                          
822 Grusic 2015, p. 167, Deinert 2013 p. 151, Mankowski  2009, p. 197.  
823 This view, which primarily exists in German legal literature is known as the 
Eingliederungstheorie: Deinert 2013, p. 151; Mankowski 2009, p. 197; Wurmnest 2009, p. 
491; Cf. Riesenhuber 2009, p. 132; Von Hein 2011, p. 415-416. 
824 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, 
para 47. 
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not to the way in which the employee’s actual employment is carried out.´825 
In this regard, the relevant place of business is the business ´in whose name 
and on whose behalf the contract is concluded.´826 The discussion as to 
whether the connecting factor in Article 8(3) intended to refer to the place 
where the employee is incorporated into the organization or to the place of 
business that concluded and negotiated the employment contract was thus 
put to an end by the ECJ’s decision in Voogsgeerd. The court stated that all 
factors that characterize the employment contract and refer to the way that 
the employment is actually carried out can only be taken into consideration 
in determining the ‘habitual place of work’.827 By referring to the engaging 
place of business as the establishment that negotiated the employment 
contract no real connection to the employment relationship may exist. From 
an employee protective perspective, the engaging place of business may 
therefore not prove a suitable connecting factor.828 Yet, the situation in 
which the engaging place of business as a connecting factor may be abused 
by the use of  e.g. recruitment offices located in countries known for their 
low employment standards already appears remedied by the interpretation of 
Article 8(3) itself as it may refer to the place of business in whose name and 
on whose behalf the employment contract is concluded. In addition, the 
escape clause of Article 8(4) may override the applicable law under Article 
8(3) (and 2) if a closer connection to another country exists. The relevance 
of the engaging place of business as a secondary connecting factor is 
therefore limited: on the one hand its application is limited due to the 
extensive application and interpretation of the habitual place of employment, 
on the other hand the law of the engaging place of business may be set aside 
if a closer connection with another country exists. 
 
4.3.4 Escape clause of Article 8(4) 
On the basis of Article 8(4) Rome I Regulation ‘where it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a 
                                                          
825 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842,para. 46. 
826 Grušic 2015, p. 169; Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, para. 49.  
827 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, 
para. 46; Cf. Van Hoek 2014, p. 161; Grušic 2015, p. 169. 
828 Cf. Van Hoek 2015, p. 442. 
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country other than that indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other 
country shall apply.’ In other words: if another country is more closely 
connected with the employment contract than the country of habitual 
employment and/or the country in which the engaging place of business is 
located, the laws of this country shall apply. Hence, the provision of Article 
8(4) does not constitute a fall-back clause or a tertiary connecting factor, but 
acts as an escape clause that may override the law designated by the primary 
and secondary connecting factors of the habitual place of employment and 
the engaging place of business.829 The escape clause reflects the Savignian 
notion that the legal relationship finds its home with (the law of) the country 
with which it is most closely connected. The aim of the provision is to 
achieve a conflict of laws justice, in situations where this justice is not 
attained by application of Articles 8(2) and 8(3). Deinert accurately 
describes the aim of the provision as the realization of private international 
law justice for the purposes of a fair determination of the applicable law and 
not the creation of substantive justice: 
 
“Es geht damit um die Verwirklichung international-privatrechtlicher 
Gerechtigkeit im Sinne einer gerechten Bestimmung des anwendbaren 
Rechts, nicht aber um materiell-rechtliche Gerechtigkeit, indem etwa 
die Suche nach dem für den Arbeitnehmer günstigsten Recht eröffnet 
wird.“830  
 
The purpose of Article 8(4) is therefore not to apply the law that is most 
beneficial to the individual employee, but to apply the law that is most 
closely connected to the legal relationship in dispute. 
 
The wording of paragraph 8(4) corresponds to that of Article 6(2) of the 
Rome Convention, but differs from the wording of the general escape clause 
contained in Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation. Under Article 4(3) the 
escape clause is only applied where a manifestly more closely connection 
exists, whereas in Article 8(4) a mere closer connection will suffice. Does 
this difference in the phrasing of the provisions mean that the escape clause 
of Article 8(4) is to be applied with more leniency than that of Article 4(3), 
                                                          
829 Deinert 2013, p. 154; Hönsch 1988, p. 114. 
830 Deinert 2013, p. 154-155. 
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which appears to only allow for application in truly exceptional 
circumstances?831 Does the employee protective nature of Article 8 justify 
such a lenient approach? An answer to these questions may be found in the 
case of Schlecker, held under Art. 6 Rome Convention. The primary 
question in this case did not refer to the differences between the escape 
clause in Article 4(3) and that in Article 8(3).832 Instead, the case concerned 
the relationship between the escape clause and the habitual place of work as 
a primary objective connecting factor. In Schlecker the Dutch Hoge Raad 
faced the question whether the escape clause can set aside the law designated 
by the habitual place of work even if a genuine connection, demonstrated by 
a lengthy period of habitual employment without interruption, to this place 
exists? In other words: is the application of the escape clause reserved for 
exceptional cases only or is the connecting factor of the habitual place of 
work easily displaced if a closer connection to another country exists? The 
case in Schlecker involved a German frontier worker, mrs. Boedeker, 
resident in Germany, employed by a German undertaking (with branches 
throughout several European Member States), but with a habitual place of 
employment in the Netherlands. Mrs. Boedeker had performed her work in 
the Netherlands for a period of more than ten years without interruption. The 
employer, Schlecker, had terminated the employment contract while offering 
mrs. Boedeker another job in Germany. In the dispute that followed mrs. 
Boedeker argued for the application of Dutch law on the basis of Article 
6(2)(a) Rome Convention whereas Schlecker argued for the application of 
German law on the basis of the escape clause. Even though mrs. Boedeker 
had performed her employment in the Netherlands for a lengthy period 
without interruption, all other relevant factors were located in Germany. In 
his conclusion Advocate General Strikwerda, after stating that the 
connecting factor of the habitual place of employment forms the 
embodiment of employment protection under the conflict of laws, argues 
that the escape clause deserves application if all relevant factors, other than 
that of the habitual place of employment, point towards a single country, 
unless the employee permanently (or for a lengthy period of time) performs 
his employment in another country: 
                                                          
831 Von Hein 2011,  p. 418; Grušic 2015, p. 174. 
832 Under the Rome Convention, Article 4(5) did not contain the word ‘manifestly’, it simply 
reffered to a country that is ‘more closely connected’.  




‘…in beginsel dient in gevallen waarin alle aanknopingspunten, behalve 
de plaats waar de werknemer zijn arbeid verricht, naar slechts één 
enkel land verwijzen, toepassing te worden gegeven aan de 
exceptieclausule van art. 6 lid 2, slot, EVO, tenzij de werknemer zijn 
arbeid langdurig of permanent in een ander land verricht. In dit laatste 
geval verzet het beschermingsbeginsel zich tegen toepassing van de 
exceptieclausule: het zou ertoe leiden dat de werknemer wordt 
onderworpen aan een ander beschermingsregime dan geldt in de 
omgeving waar hij langdurig dan wel op permanente basis ter 
uitvoering van zijn arbeidsovereenkomst werkzaam is.’833  
 
A lasting or permanent connection to the habitual place of employment may 
thus preclude the application of the escape clause. This notion finds its basis 
in the employee protective nature of the habitual place of employment as a 
primary objective connecting factor. In establishing the law that applies to 
the individual employment contract it is not decisive that a country other 
than that where the employee habitually performs his employment has a 
closer geographic connection to the legal relationship; what is important is 
whether the application of the law of this other country is detrimental to the 
purpose of the protection principle embodied by the habitual place of 
employment.834 The Hoge Raad did not immediately rule on the matter, but 
decided to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. In doing so it 
asked whether Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention should ‘be interpreted in 
such a way that, if an employee carries out the work in performance of the 
contract not only habitually but also for a lengthy period and without 
interruption in the same country, the law of that country should be applied in 
all cases, even if all other circumstances point to a close connection between 
the employment contract and another country?’835 Advocate General Wahl 
concluded that in deciding upon the relationship between the two parts of 
                                                          
833 Opinion Advocate-General Strikwerda: HR 3 February 2012 JAR 2012/69, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BS8791, para. 26(1). 
834 Opinion Advocate-General Strikwerda: HR3 February 2012 JAR 2012/69, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BS8791, para. 26(3). 
835 Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta 
Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551. 
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Article 6(2), i.e. the habitual place of employment as a primary connecting 
factor and  the escape clause, there are two conflicting views: 
 
‘According to the first, the fundamental relationship between those two 
parts is that of the rule and the exception, which means that the search 
for possible closer connections with another country can occur only in 
exceptional circumstances, that is to say, in the event that the 
presumptions result in the selection of a law which is manifestly 
inappropriate to the contract. According to the second view, there is no 
hierarchical relationship between the two parts and the court has a 
measure of discretion in determining the law most closely connected 
with the relevant contract.’836    
 
Opposing the view of Advocate General Strikwerda, who does not consider 
the application of the escape clause justified in situations where a genuine 
long-lasting connection to the habitual place of employment exists, 
Advocate General Wahl adopted the latter view by arguing that the escape 
clause ‘does not lose its raison d’ être’ in situations where ‘the employment 
contract has been performed in a lasting, continuous and uninterrupted 
manner in a single country’; ‘if a contract is obviously located in a State 
which is not that of the habitual performance of the work, it is still possible 
to bring that provision into operation.’837 Thus, in situations where the 
habitual place of employment does not constitute the centre of gravity of the 
employment relationship, its application may be omitted in favour of another 
country to which such a connection does exist.838 In this sense it is irrelevant 
that the law of one country, the habitual place of employment, as was the 
case in Schlecker, is more beneficial to the employee than the law of another; 
the objective of the employee protective provision is not to favour the  
individual employee, but to protect the employee by application of the 
(mandatory rules of the) law with which the most significant connection 
                                                          
836 Opinion Advocate General Wahl Schlecker v Boedeker  Case C‑64/12 [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, para. 42; Cf. Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the name 
‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551, para. 54. 
837 Opinion Advocate General Wahl Schlecker v Boedeker  Case C‑64/12 [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, para. 60. 
838 Opinion Advocate General Wahl Schlecker v Boedeker  Case C‑64/12 [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, para. 61. 
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exists.839 The ECJ concurred with the Advocate General and ruled that the 
provision of Article 6 Rome Convention should ensure application of the law 
with which the contract is most closely connected, even if that law is less 
favourable to the individual employee.840 In situations where the application 
of the habitual place of employment or the engaging place of business does 
not result in the application of the law that is most closely connected to the 
legal relationship at hand, the task of securing such a significant connection 
falls to the escape clause. In previous cases the court had decided, that due to 
the employee protective nature of the habitual place of employment, this 
connecting factor takes precedence over that of the engaging place of 
business.841 Such a hierarchy however is inexistent with respect to the escape 
clause, whether that of Article 6(2) Rome Convention or of Article 8(4) 
Rome I Regulation.842 Thus, in essence, the application of the escape clause 
of Article 8(4) is not merely reserved for exceptional cases, but comes into 
play whenever a more significant connection to a country other than that of 
the habitual place of employment or the engaging place of business exists.  
 
4.3.5 Application to a transfer of undertaking 
If, in determining the law that applies to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, connection is sought to the individual contract of employment, 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation will apply. In one view the entire transfer 
of undertaking is assimilated under the conflict of laws category for 
individual contracts of employment, meaning that all rights and obligations 
                                                          
839 Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta 
Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551, para. 60. 
839 Opinion Advocate General Wahl Schlecker v Boedeker Case C‑64/12 [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:241, para. 26; Opinion Advocate-General  Strikwerda: 3 February 2012 
JAR 2012/69, para. 21; Grušic 2015, p. 176; Deinert  2013, p. 154-155; Case C‑64/12 Anton 
Schlecker, trading under the name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta Josefa Boedeker [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:551, para. 34. 
840 Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta 
Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551, 34. 
841 Cf. Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842; Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg 
[2011] ECR I-1595, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151;  Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the 
name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551,  para. 
35-36. 
842 Case C‑64/12 Anton Schlecker, trading under the name ‘Firma Anton Schlecker’ v Melitta 
Josefa Boedeker [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:551, para. 38. 
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stemming from a transfer of undertaking will be subject to this conflict of 
laws category regardless whether these rights and obligations are individual 
or collective in nature. While on the basis of another view the applicable law 
is determined on the basis of the rights and obligations in dispute, which 
may befall Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the Rome I Regulation or may be entirely 
beyond its scope, to be determined by national sources of private 
international law. In previous paragraphs I have stated my objections to 
these conflict of laws connections as they do not do justice to the nature and 
objectives of the Acquired Rights Directive, which has both individual and 
collective underpinnings. The conflict of laws connection to the individual 
contract of employment is therefore wholly unsuited for the application to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, which although connected to the 
individual contract of employment is an entirely separate legal concept to be 
conflictually dealt with as such. More so, conflictually dividing the rights 
and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking will not only result 
in those rights and obligations possibly being governed by different legal 
systems, it will also make it more difficult to establish the applicable law and 
thwart the foreseeability of the applicable law.  Regardless, the connection to 
the individual contract of employment forms the prevailing opinion, and 
therefore deserves discussion. In seeking connection to the individual 
contract of employment the applicable law is determined by a restricted 
choice of law, the habitual place of employment, the engaging place of 
business or the country to which the contract is more closely connected. As 
stated above, the preferential law approach enshrined in Article 8(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation restricts the law chosen by the parties to the extent that 
such a choice may not deprive the employee of the protection granted by the 
mandatory provisions of the place of habitual employment, the engaging 
place of business or the country with which the contract is more closely 
connected. A transfer of undertaking and the rights and obligations 
stemming therefrom may constitute such provisions, which means that 
according to the prevailing view a comparison between the mandatory 
transfer provisions of the objectively applicable law and that of the choice of 
law must be carried out in order to assess which provisions are (as a whole) 
more beneficial to the employee. In this sense it may be that the German 
provision of § 613a BGB is considered more favourable than the Dutch 
provisions of Art. 7:662 et seq. BW, since under German law the employee 
has the right to contradict the transfer of his employment relationship to the 
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transferee and remain in employment with the transferor,843 known as a 
Widerspruchsrecht.844 Dutch law is not equipped with a provision allowing 
the employee to object to the transfer of his employment relationship, 
whereas German law provides the employees with an option additional to the 
transfer of the employment relationship.845 A similar Widerspruchsrecht 
exists in Austrian law, where, on the basis of  § 3(4) AVRAG, the employee 
has the option to object to the transfer of his employment relationship 
causing him to remain in employment with the transferor. However, in 
comparison to the German law this right of objection is more restricted and 
appears less beneficial to the employee since it only allows the employee to 
object to the transfer in situations where the transferee does not continue the 
protection granted by the existing collective agreements or does not assume 
the existing pension entitlements.846 A schematic representation of the above 
would show the German acquired rights provisions at the top as the most 
beneficial, followed by Austrian and subsequently Dutch law. With regard to 
cross-border transfers of undertakings differences in national law exist where 
the national laws have decided to extend the application of their acquired 
rights provisions beyond the minimum level of employment protection 
afforded by the Acquired Rights Directive: a classic example would be the 
application of the directive to seagoing vessels.847 Whereas some Member 
                                                          
843 It is likely that after the transfer of the undertaking the transferor will not be able to 
continue the employment of the employee. In those cases, under German law,  the transferor 
can dismiss the employee (with compensation) for economic reasons.  
844 There are some conditions to the application of this right. On the basis of 613a (6) BGB 
the employee has the right to object to the transfer of his employment relationship within a 
period of one month after being informed of the transfer. In practice however, it appears that 
this period in which the employee is allowed to object to the transfer is often extended for as 
much as one year due to the transferor’s or transferee’s failure to properly comply with the 
information and consultation requirements of 613a (5) BGB. 
845 Cf. Franzen 1994, p. 119 et seq.  
846 §3(4) AVRAG reads: ‚Der Arbeitnehmer kann dem Übergang seines Arbeitsverhältnisses 
widersprechen, wenn der Erwerber den kollektivvertraglichen Bestandschutz (§ 4) oder die 
betrieblichen Pensionszusagen (§ 5) nicht übernimmt. Der Widerspruch hat innerhalb eines 
Monats ab Ablehnung der Übernahme oder bei Nichtäußerung des Erwerbers zum Zeitpunkt 
des Betriebsüberganges innerhalb eines Monats nach Ablauf einer vom Arbeitnehmer 
gesetzten angemessenen Frist zur Äußerung zu erfolgen. Widerspricht der Arbeitnehmer, so 
bleibt sein Arbeitsverhältnis zum Veräußerer unverändert aufrecht.‘ 
847 For an extensive discussion of the application of the directive to seagoing vessels see 
Chapter 5 and  
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States, such as the Netherlands848, have upheld the exclusion of seagoing 
vessels others, such as Portugal and Spain, have decided to extend the 
application of their acquired rights provisions to the transfer of (single) 
seagoing vessels,849 which may be cause for them being considered more 
beneficial in an overall preferential law assessment under Article 8(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation.850 The fact that the acquired rights provisions are 
considered mandatory provisions under Article 8(1) makes them subject to 
the preferential law approach, causing an assessment of which transfer of 
undertakings provisions are more favourable to the employee. Beyond this, 
the provision of Article 8 does not require any special application in relation 
to cross-border transfers of undertakings. Surely, internationally operating 
undertakings, such as those in the transport sector, may be a likely subject of 
a cross-border transfer of undertaking, causing the problems in determining 
the habitual place of employment to be of relatively more frequent 
occurrence in cross-border transfer scenarios. The difficulties in establishing 
a habitual place of employment, which in most cases is easily determined, 
still, are not subject to change due to the dispute involving a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking. As such, the application of Article 8 Rome I 
Regulation does not require any application or yield any difficulties specific 
to cross-border transfers of undertakings. The application of the provision is 
not conditional on the employment issue in dispute.  
 
However, a problem that is frequently and falsely signalized in relation to 
cross-border transfers of undertakings is that of a change in the applicable 
law, also known as a conflit mobile or Statutenwechsel. Since, in seeking 
connection to the law governing the employment contract, the applicable law 
is primarily determined by the habitual place of employment, this law is 
                                                          
848 The Netherlands upholds the exclusion with regard to single vessels but does not prevent 
the transfer of seagoing vessels as part of a larger undertaking:  
849 Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, cf. COM(94) 300 final, para. 31; Commission 
Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, SEC(2007) 812; COM(2007) 
334 final. 
850 To this end, it is import to note that a Commission proposal for altering the exclusion of 
seagoing vessels in the Acquired Rights Directive is currently under consideration; See 
Chapter 5. 
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subject to change once a change in the habitual place of employment occurs. 
This situation is not specific to cross-border transfers of undertakings, but 
occurs with regard to employment contracts in general whenever the 
employee habitually continues his work at a new location in another country. 
More so, in deciding on the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking this 
law, to my mind, is cemented at the time of the transfer and as such not 
subject to change even in the event of a relocation of the undertaking. Those 
seeing the change in applicable law as a problem that is specific to cross-
border transfers of undertakings appear to depart from the misguided belief 
that in determining the law that applies to the transfer the law governing the 
employment contract as the last habitual place of employment should be 
decisive, as is the common understanding of the application of the provisions 
designating the applicable individual employment law under Article 8 Rome 
I Regulation and Article 6 Rome Convention.851 This change in applicable 
law, which works well for determining the law that applies to the individual 
contract of employment with respect to a single employer is wholly unsuited 
for application in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings.852 It is 
precisely a change in the legal position of the affected employees that the 
provisions involving a transfer of undertaking seek to prevent. Hence, a 
change in applicable law is entirely contrary to the aim and objectives of the 
Acquired Rights Directive which intends to safeguard the rights and 
obligations of the employees in the event of a transfer of undertaking. This 
changeability of the applicable law by reason of a change in habitual place of 
employment shows the incapability of (a stringent application of) the 
conflict of laws provision for individual contract of employments to 
adequately deal with issues involving a transfer of undertaking. To my mind, 
even if seeking connection to the individual employment contract, the 
applicable law should be decided at the time of the transfer, since this is the 
                                                          
851 Cf. Mankowski, 2003, p. 23 et seq; C-37/00 Weber v Ogden Services, para. 52; Niksova 
2014, p. 91. 
852 One could potentially argue that in determining the applicable law to a transfer of 
undertaking one should fixate the time of determination of the applicable law to the time of 
the transfer, however, Article 8 Rome I Regulation does not allow for such fixation. On the 
basis of Article 8 Rome I Regulation, the applicable law to the individual employment 
contract is subject to change since it is not fixated in time. (Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 89; Junker 
2005, p. 735). Allowing a temporal fixation for transfers of undertakings would mean the 
inclusion of a separate conflict of laws rule for transfers of undertakings. 
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time at which the employee relationships existing with the transferor will 
transfer to the transferee.853 The employment contract by its very nature is 
characterized by continuity; it constitutes a continuing or lasting agreement 
whereas a transfer of undertaking occurs at a set moment in time. Whereas a 
change in the applicable law does not suit a transfer of undertaking, the 
changeability of the applicable law works well for continuing performance 
agreements, such as an employment contract since it gives legal footing to a 
factual and lasting change in working environment.  The problems with 
subjecting the applicable transfer law to change by not designating the 
applicable law at the time of the transfer, can be shown by the following 
example: An undertaking situated in the Netherlands is transferred to a 
Dutch transferee. In connection with the transfer the undertaking is 
transferred to Curaçao.854 At the time of the transfer Dutch law governs any 
claims arising out of unfair dismissal as the habitual place of employment is 
located in the Netherlands. After the transfer, the undertaking is continued in 
Curaçao, a non-Member State who’s law is absent of any acquired rights 
provisions such as those affording protection against dismissal in the event 
of a transfer. The Acquired Rights Directive aims to protect all those 
employees employed in an undertaking that is situated within the territory of 
a European Member State upon or immediately prior to the transfer. As 
such, the application of the directive and its national counterparts extends to 
outbound-transfer scenarios where the undertaking is transferred from an EU 
Member State to a third country. Seeking connection to the last place of 
habitual employment, i.e. Curaçao, would result in a loss of acquired rights. 
In this scenario, contrary to the aims and purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, the employee would lose all acquired rights at the moment he 
decides to continue his employment with the transferee at the new location. 
In fact, the transferee is free to dismiss the employee once he starts to work 
in Curaçao. In these types of outbound-transfer scenarios the change in 
                                                          
853 Another argument against the change in applicable law may be found in the similarity to 
the conflict of laws assessment of contract acquisition or the assignment of debts, which is 
utilized as a justification for the assimilation of transfers of undertakings under the conflict of 
laws category of employment contracts.  Under the conflict of laws assessment of contract 
acquisition the transfer of a contract is governed by the law that governs the contract itself. 
This law continues to be decisive after the transfer. 
854 The law of Curaçao does not possess any provisions akin to the Acquired Rights Directive 
or the transfer of undertaking provisions contained in Dutch law.  
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applicable law resulting from the application of the habitual place of 
employment, which contrary to the provisions of Acquired Rights Directive, 
does not result in the application of the laws of a Member State, would have 
to be remedied by other means than connection to the individual 
employment contract.855 
 
In defining the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking it is important to 
draw a clear distinction between the law that governs the employment 
contract itself and the law that governs the rights and obligations stemming 
from a transfer of undertaking. One difference with the individual 
employment contract lies therein that at the time of a transfer of undertaking 
rights and obligations arise that affect the transferor, transferee, the 
employee and possible third parties. It is for these issues involving a transfer 
of undertaking only, that the applicable law should be decided at the time of 
the transfer. All other individual employment related issues are decided on 
the basis of a different timeframe, usually by connection to the last habitual 
place of employment. It are these combined rights and obligations, those 
stemming from the transfer of undertaking itself and those individual 
employment rights and obligations that exist beyond the transfer of 
undertaking, that determine the legal position of the employees involved in a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking. Thus, in determining the law that 
applies to the individual employment contract a different timeframe is 
decisive than in determining the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking. 
In the latter situation, by seeking connection to the individual employment 
contract, the location of the place of habitual employment at the time of the 
transfer should be decisive. In assessing when a transfer has occurred it is 
important to remember that a transfer of undertaking may be a gradual 
process making it hard to pinpoint the exact time at which the undertaking is 
transferred to the transferee. The time or the date at which the transfer takes 
place is not dependent upon an agreement between the transferee and 
transferor, rather the date of the transfer, as formulated by the ECJ in 
Celtec:856 
                                                          
855 Such a remedy may be found in applying the Dutch acquired rights provisions as having an 
overriding effect on the lex causae; Cf. Kania 2012, p. 138, 180 et seq.; Niksova 2014, p. 101-
103. 
856 Case C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v John Astley and Others [2005] ECR I-4389, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:321. 




‘is the date on which responsibility as employer for carrying on the 
business of the unit transferred moves from the transferor to the 
transferee. That date is a particular point in time which cannot be 
postponed to another date at the will of the transferor or transferee.’857  
 
Thus, even though the issue of transfers of undertakings should, in my 
opinion, constitute a separate conflict of laws category, if connection is 
sought to the individual contract of employment, as is the prevailing opinion, 
the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking should be determined at the 
date of the transfer. In doing so, one should establish the habitual place of 
employment on the date of the transfer. In determining the date of the 
transfer the case law of the European Court of Justice held under the 
Acquired Rights Directive, such as the decision in Celtec, should hold some 
relevance. My beliefs on this matter however, do not appear to be shared by 
the existing legal community. It is generally considered that if seeking 
connection to the individual employment contract, a conflit mobile will arise 
whenever a transfer of undertaking is coupled with a cross-border relocation 
of the habitual place of employment. In essence, in situations involving a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking that is accompanied by a cross-border 
relocation the question arises whether, in seeking connection to the 
individual employment contract, the applicable law changes due to a change 
in the habitual place of employment of the affected employees. Under a strict 
application of the employment provisions of Article 8 Rome I Regulation 
and Article 6 Rome Convention such a change is likely to occur. The 
following paragraphs will examine the effects of such a change and the 
views portrayed to remedy the conflit mobile.   
 
5. Conflit mobile 
As outlined in the previous paragraph,  in determining the law that applies to 
(the effects of) a cross-border transfer of undertaking the conflict of laws 
connection to the individual employment contract is likely to result in a 
change in applicable law upon relocation of the undertaking abroad. The law 
that applies to the individual contract of employment is by its very nature 
                                                          
857 Case C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v John Astley and Others [2005] ECR I-4389, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:321, para. 36, 44.  
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subject to change due to the fact that, under the conflict of laws, failing a 
choice of law, connection is commonly sought to the habitual place of 
employment.858 Thus, a change in the habitual place of employment may 
result in a change in applicable law due to the importance of the place of 
habitual employment as the primary objective connecting factor and the 
insignificance of the moment of conclusion of the employment contract.859 
The change in the applicable law is due to a change in the objective 
connecting factors and does not depend on the consent of the affected 
parties.860 The restriction that the moment of conclusion of a contract is 
decisive in determining the applicable law to a contract does not extend to 
international employment contracts. As such, the law objectively determined 
by the primary objective connecting factor of the place of habitual 
employment is in principle subject to change.861 Such a change in the 
habitual place of employment does not constitute a retroactive change in the 
applicable law.862 Instead, the applicable law conforms to the habitual place 
of employment in the respective periods of time.863 Rights and obligations 
concluded before and facts occurring before the change in the applicable law 
will be governed by the laws of the former place of work whereas facts, 
rights and obligations stemming from after the change in applicable law will 
be governed by the laws of the existing habitual place of employment.864 
However, claims arising from the continued employment contract, such as 
leave and pension entitlements, are subject to the new law governing the 
individual employment contract.865 Accordingly, in determining the lex loci 
                                                          
858 Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 89; Mankowski 2003, p. 23; Thüsing 2003, p. 1307; Deinert 2009, p. 
145; Kania 2012, p. 101; Spickhoff, BeckOK 2013 VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 8, Beck'scher 
Onlinekommentar BGB, para. 23; Däubler 1994, p. 130.   
859 Niksova 2014, p. 90; Thüsing 2003, p. 1307. 
860 Thüsing 2003, p. 1307; Surely the parties may (implicitly) agree tot the change in 
applicable law accompanying the change in employment location.  
861 Thüsing  2003, p. 1307, 1308; Niksova 2014, p. 89-91; Leuchten 2012, p. 414, 416; Rolfs, 
BeckOK KSchG § 1, Beck'scher Online-Kommentar Arbeitsrecht 2015, para. 418.1; Franzen 
1994, p. 102. 
862 Mankowski 2003, p. 21, 25 et seq.; Spickhoff, BeckOK 2013 VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 8, 
Beck'scher Onlinekommentar BGB, para. 23; Franzen 1994, p. 105. 
863 Spickhoff, BeckOK 2013 VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 8, Beck'scher Onlinekommentar BGB, 
Rn. 23. 
864 Niksova 2014, p. 90; Franzen 1994, p. 105; Kania 2012, p. 104.  
865 Franzen 1994, p. 105 et seq. ; Niksova 2014, p. 90.  
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laboris, the existing timeframe is decisive, i.e. after the relocation the 
employment contract will be governed by the laws in force at the new place 
of establishment.866 The conflict of laws connection to the individual 
contract of employment generally results in the application of the lex loci 
laboris, causing the relocation of an undertaking to effectuate a change in 
applicable law, due to a change in the objective connecting factor, i.e. the 
locus laboris.867 In other words, upon a transfer of undertaking, following 
the relocation to a foreign country the habitual place of performance of 
employment and thus the law that applies to the individual contract of 
employment (in the absence of a choice of law contained therein) will 
prospectively change. In situations where the affected employees are 
unwilling to or are yet to perform their employment at the new location the 
question arises whether the change in habitual place of employment 
transpires simultaneous to the relocation of the undertaking.868 On the basis 
of Article 8(2) Rome I Regulation the place of habitual performance as the 
place where the employee generally performs his work in the fulfillment of 
his employment contract is decisive. As such, it seems logical to subject the 
affected employees to an altered employment law only if they are 
contractually obliged to perform their employment at the new location.869 
Indeed, a mere change in the place of employment without the employees 
being required to perform their employment at the new location does not 
constitute a change in the law applicable to the employment contract.870 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation does not merely require the affected 
employees to be obliged to perform their employment at the new location. 
What is decisive is whether the employees actually continue their 
employment at the new place of establishment. Only when the affected 
employees have continued their employment abroad will the law that applies 
to their employment contract be subject to change due to the altered 
objective connecting factor of the habitual place of employment.871 Still, a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking entailing a relocation from one country 
                                                          
866 Provided that the affected employees continue their employment at the new place 
establishment. Cf. Franzen 1994, p. 102. 
867 Cf. Franzen 1994, p. 101.  
868 Franzen 1994, p. 104.  
869 Franzen 1994, p. 104. 
870 Niksova 2014, p. 96; Franzen 1994, p. 104. 
871 Kania 2012, p. 103 et seq.; Niksova 2014, p. 96.  
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
273 
 
to another and the accompanying change in habitual place of employment 
will regularly result in a change in applicable law.872 The employees that are 
willing to continue their employment abroad upon a transfer of undertaking 
will therefore likely be subject to a change in the applicable employment 
law. A resulting question is whether this altered applicable employment law 
also effectuates a change in the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking 
and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom. Is the law that applies to 
a transfer of undertaking cemented at the time of the transfer or is it subject 




A strict application of the law that applies to the employment contract, 
throughout Europe undeniably effectuated by the application of Article 8(2) 
Rome I Regulation, will result in a change in the law that governs the 
transfer of undertaking upon relocation of the undertaking abroad.  In this 
sense, it is perceivable that the change in the applicable law would render the 
transfer of undertaking ineffective or that it would result in e.g. a loss of 
acquired rights or a loss of protection against dismissal.873 A relocation that 
takes place immediately after a transfer of undertaking is likely to result in 
the instantaneous loss of the continued application of the employment rights 
and obligations existing at the time of the transfer.874 However, since the 
Acquired Rights Directive requires the Member States to provide the 
minimum standards contained in the directive, throughout the European 
Union, in intra-European transfer scenarios, the laws existing in the country 
of destination should guarantee the continuation of acquired rights upon a 
transfer of undertaking. In these cases, a loss of acquired rights upon a 
transfer of undertaking would conflict with the very nature and aim of 
                                                          
872 Such a change in applicable law will only be absent where the parties have included a 
choice of law in the employment contract or where the applicable law to the employment 
contract is established on another basis then by connection to the habitual place of 
employment, e.g. by connection to the engaging place of business (cf. Art. 8(3) Rome I 
Regulation) or by connection to a country to which the contract is more closely connected due 
to the circumstances of the case (cf. Art. 8(4) Rome I Regulation).  
873 Ebert 2008, p. 150. 
874 This loss is due to a change in the habitual place of employment at the moment of 
relocation of the business.  
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Acquired Rights Directive which is to protect employees affected by the 
transfer of an undertaking that is located within EU territory. The directive 
itself makes no distinction between domestic and cross-border transfers of 
undertakings and guarantees the continuation of acquired rights irrespective 
of the destination or location of the undertaking after the transfer.875 
However, where in intra-European transfer scenarios the rights and 
obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking may continue to exist 
due to the substitution of national acquired rights provisions of the Member 
State of origin by those of the Member State of destination, such substitution 
may not be possible in outbound transfer scenarios where the country of 
destination is located outside the European Union. In order to ensure the full 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive, via directive-compliant 
interpretation, the transfer of undertakings provisions existing in one 
Member State will have to be substituted, where such substitution does not 
exist automatically, by those existing in another, upon relocation of the 
undertaking to the latter Member State.876 Substitution is only possible 
insofar as the foreign institution equates to the domestic concept of a transfer 
of undertaking or where its effects and function are considered equivalent.877 
Although directive-compliant interpretation may also warrant application of 
substitute acquired rights provisions in outbound transfer scenarios this will 
prove difficult where acquired rights provisions similar to those in effect 
throughout Europe are inexistent or where the relevant substantive law does 
not allow substitution.878 In any case, the Member States will have to ensure 
the full application of the rights and obligations stemming from the Acquired 
Rights Directive whenever the undertaking to be transferred is located within 
EU territory as required by Article 1(2) of the directive.  In this sense, they 
may have to give overriding mandatory effect to their national acquired 
rights provisions, as lex fori, whenever the laws of a European Member State 
are not objectively applicable to a transfer of undertaking that falls within 
the remit of the Acquired Rights Directive.879    
 
                                                          
875 See Chapter 2, para. 3. 
876 Kania 2012, p. 344-345; Däubler 1994, p. 137. 
877 Kania 2012, p. 526.  
878 Kania 2012, p. 344-345; Däubler 1994, p. 137. 
879 Cf. Kania 2012, p. 345; For the classification of national acquired rights provisions as 
overriding mandatory provisions and the effects of such classification see paragraph 6. 
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5.2 Intentional circumvention of acquired rights provisions 
Since a change in the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking is likely to 
occur upon the relocation of the undertaking abroad, a farsighted transferor 
may decide to transfer the undertaking or part of the undertaking to be 
transferred abroad prior to the transfer in order to achieve a change in the 
applicable law, thus circumventing any existing acquired rights provisions. 
This process, which is known as ‘ship and fire’, is most effective in 
outbound transfer scenarios, insofar as the laws of the country of destination 
are absent of any equivalent acquired rights provisions.880 By carefully 
structuring the relocation and the transfer of undertaking the transferor may 
be able to manipulate the applicable employment law provisions. Doctrines 
such as the French doctrine of ‘fraude à la loi’ could potentially deal with an 
intentional evasion of the applicable law. The problem with such doctrines, 
however, is that it may be very difficult to determine whether there exists a 
purposeful evasion of the applicable law or a legitimate avoidance thereof.881 
As such, there may be several legitimate reasons for the transferor to transfer 
his business abroad prior to a transfer of undertaking, such as tax benefits, 
market seeking or other strategic considerations. In this, it may be difficult to 
establish whether there was a purposeful evasion of national acquired rights 
provisions or whether the undertaking was transferred abroad for wholly 
legitimate reasons.882  
 
5.3 Cumulative approach 
In order to counteract the problems arising from a possible change in 
applicable law, it has been suggested that, in cross-border transfer scenarios, 
national acquired rights provisions are only to apply if the laws in force in 
the country of destination, frequently the country of the transferee, also 
provide for the continuation of rights and obligations stemming from a 
contract of employment upon a transfer of undertaking.883 Although this 
approach is commonly known as the cumulative approach, it does not 
                                                          
880 Ebert 2008, p. 151-152. 
881 Siehr 2006, p. 58. 
882 In addition, an a posteriori exception to the applicable law may give rise to legal 
uncertainty on the part of the affected employees as well as transferee and transferor; Cf. 
Parra-Aranguren 2006, p. 132. 
883 Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 239; Mankowski 1994, p. 97; Junker 1992, p. 231 et seq.; 
Junker 2012, p. 15; Leuchten 2012, p. 411; Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 97-99; Deinert 2013, p. 343. 
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prescribe a strict accumulation of laws in the sense that it requires the 
application of the laws in force in the country of origin and the country of 
destination. Instead, national acquired rights provisions are applied if the 
country of destination is equally equipped with national acquired rights 
provisions. The Acquired Rights Directive, however, does not require the 
laws of both the transferor and transferee to ensure the transfer of rights and 
obligations stemming from the existing employment contracts or 
relationships to the transferee. This view, which is portrayed in legal 
literature,884 is contrary to both the aim of the directive, which is to safeguard 
the rights of employees employed in European based undertakings by reason 
of a transfer of undertaking, and Article 1(2) of the directive. Indeed, Article 
1(2) merely requires the undertaking to be transferred to be located within a 
European Member State prior to the transfer. The view that both the laws in 
force in the country of the transferor and that of the transferee require the 
continuation of the existing employment relationships is akin to the view that 
limits the application of national acquired rights provisions to domestic 
territory. Surely, if a cumulative approach should be adhered to, the lack of 
any acquired rights provisions, similar to those provided by the directive, 
would result in the non-application of national acquired rights provisions and 
as such prevent a transfer of undertaking from taking place. In this sense, the 
application of national acquired rights provisions does not surpass national 
borders, unless the laws in force in the country of destination or that of the 
transferor expressly provide for the transfer of the affected employees to the 
transferee.885 More so, requiring the laws of both the transferor and 
transferee to be equipped with provisions ensuring the automatic transfer of 
the employment contracts upon a transfer of undertaking conflicts with 
Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, according to which the 
application of the directive is solely dependent on the geographical location 
of the undertaking to be transferred. The conflict of laws may not be utilised 
to thwart the application of the Acquired Rights Directive, which applies to 
intra-European and outbound transfers alike. Requiring the application of the 
laws in force at the location of both transferor (origin) and transferee 
                                                          
884 Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 239; Mankowski 1994, p. 97; Junker 1992, p. 231 et seq.; 
Junker 2012, p. 15; Leuchten 2012, p. 411; Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 97-99; Deinert 2013, p. 343; 
Franzen 1994, p. 110 et seq.  
885 Franzen 1994, p. 107.  
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(destination) would result in the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive 
not being applied to outbound transfers of undertakings. Third countries 
likely do not possess any provisions similar or equal to those of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, rendering a cumulative application of laws ineffective to 
achieving a transfer of undertaking. In this regard, it is argued that the 
justified reliance of the affected employees on the continuance of their 
employment relationship may not be undermined by the application of 
foreign law.886 The cumulative approach to the conflict of laws in cross-
border transfer scenarios may additionally be rejected for a variety of 
reasons. First there is no reason why an employee should be deprived from 
the application of the Acquired Rights Directive or its national counterparts 
when an undertaking is transferred to a state that does not make provision for 
the transfer of acquired rights. Employees that are affected by national or 
cross-border transfers of undertakings without relocation should not be better 
protected than those who are affected by a transfer of undertaking that is 
accompanied by a cross-border relocation.887 Second, the idea of a 
cumulative approach is similar to and may be derived from the approach that 
exists in private international law to cross-border mergers and in general to 
cross-border transfers of (the seat of) companies. The success of a merger or 
cross-border seat transfer is generally reliant on the recognition of the 
merger or seat transfer and the continued existence of legal personality in the 
country of destination, whereas a transfer of undertaking occurs ope legis 
and applies to the effects of the transfer on the existing employment 
contracts and relationships and not the success of the merger or seat transfer 
in general.888 In addition, the notion of employment protection, which lies at 
the heart of the Acquired Rights Directive, speaks against a cumulative 
application of the laws of transferee and transferor. In this sense, it is 
inconceivable why employees should be deprived from the protection 
afforded by the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts, 
simply because of the nationality of the transferee or the relocation of the 
transferred undertaking upon or immediately after the transfer.889 From a 
conflict of laws perspective the notion that multiple, possibly conflicting, 
                                                          
886 Niksova, p. 99; Reichold 2008, p. 698, 702. 
887 Bittner 2000, p. 487.  
888 Bittner 2000, p. 487. 
889 Ebert 2008, p. 151; Bittner 2000, p. 487. 
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laws, i.e. legal systems, can simultaneously govern a single legal relationship 
cannot be justified either, as this would contradict with its very nature and 
purpose.890  
 
5.4 Postponed change in applicable law 
In an attempt to subvert the problems arising from a change in the applicable 
law to the employment contract and thus to the effects of a (cross-border) 
transfer of undertaking other authors have proposed to postpone the change 
in law for a period of one year.891 Däubler and Reichold believe postponing 
the change in applicable law for a period of one year is the easiest way to 
comply with the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive, which by 
reason of Article 1(2) does not limit the destination or location of the 
transferred undertaking after the transfer.892 This postponement of change in 
the applicable employment law does not follow automatically from the 
Acquired Rights Directive or the conflict of laws provisions contained in the 
Rome I Regulation nor can it be read into any of these existing provisions.893 
The proposed reservation, limiting the change in applicable law for a set 
period, will ensure that the transferee continues the employment relationship 
with the workforce existing at the time of the transfer and will not be 
allowed to subject the affected employees to dismissal.894 After the expiry of 
one year, the parties will be free to conclude differently. Before the 
reservation period has expired, the transferee as the new employer will 
possibly only be able to rely on the change in applicable law if he has validly 
concluded an agreement under the newly applicable law which corresponds 
to the employee protection offered by the acquired rights provisions in force 
in the country of origin, i.e. the place of establishment with the transferor.895 
In order to properly ensure the application of a one year reservation it has 
been proposed to alter the wording of Article 1(1) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive as to, in cross-border transfer scenarios, include an obligation for 
the transferee to continue the rights and obligations stemming from the 
                                                          
890 Deinert 2013, p. 343; Franzen 1994, p. 111. 
891 Däubler 1994; Reichold 2008.  
892 Däubler 1994, p. 137. 
893 Däubler 1994, p. 137. 
894 Niksova 2014, p. 96.  
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employment relationship with the transferor for a period of one year.896 To 
my mind however, the problems arising from the change in applicable law 
are an inevitable result of the conflict of laws connection to the individual 
contract of employment and the failure to limit the determination of the 
applicable law to the date of the transfer. As the conflict of laws 
consideration naturally precedes the application of substantive law I even 
wonder whether these problems can be remedied by a change in substantive 
law, i.e. the Acquired Rights Directive. From a conflict of laws perspective it 
would be difficult to effectuate a continued application of the existing 
employment provisions under the application of a different law. Surely a 
change in the Acquired Rights Directive requiring the transferee to, upon a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, continue rights and obligations 
stemming from a contract or employment for a period of one year, does not 
alter the application of the respective substantive law. The national acquired 
rights provisions that apply before the cross-border relocation of the 
undertaking, by reason of the location of the habitual place of employment, 
are not granted continuing effect simply by adding this reservation to the 
directive and its national counterparts. The respective substantive law will 
still be subject to change due to a change in the habitual place of 
employment. As such, the law applicable to (the effects of) the transfer of 
undertaking is altered ex nunc from the time of the change in the location of 
habitual employment, leaving the transferee unbound by the previous 
substantive law, including a provision which would require continued 
application of rights and obligations stemming from the employment 
contract for a period of one year. It seems to me that a solution to the 
problem of a change in the applicable law to (the effects of) a transfer of 
undertaking should be found in the conflict of laws rather than in substantive 
law.897 Additional arguments against including a time restriction for cross-
border transfers of undertakings into the Acquired Rights Directive may be 
                                                          
896 Reichold 2008, p. 770 et seq. 
897 To my mind such a ‘conflict of laws’ solution should be incorporated into the Acquired 
Rights Directive itself. See paragraph 8 of the current Chapter, which discusses my views on 
the appropriate conflict of laws approach for transfers of undertakings. In this paragraph I 
propose a conflict of laws solution for transfers of undertakings (to be incorporated into the 
Acquired Rights Directive) that does away with the problem of a conflit mobile. By seeking 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred upon or immediately before the 
transfer no change in applicable law will occur.  
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found in legislative history. The initial 1974 proposal for the Acquired 
Rights Directive,898 in Article 10, included a provision on the applicable 
labour law. It stated in paragraph 1, that the labour laws applicable to 
employment relationships prior to a merger or takeover should continue to 
apply after the merger or takeover has taken place. The premise of this 
paragraph however was that, in principle, an employee’s place of work does 
not change as a result of an international merger or takeover.899 More so, the 
first paragraph was rendered inapplicable in situations where a takeover or 
merger is accompanied by a cross-border relocation resulting in a valid 
transfer of the place of work to another Member State.900 Legislative history 
therefore shows that a change in the applicable labour laws has always been 
considered an inevitable result of a change in the place of work to another 
(Member) State.901 More so, the proposed restriction is not entirely in line 
with the aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive, which makes no 
distinction between domestic and cross-border transfers of undertakings. The 
directive, in Article 3(1) does not impose a restriction on the period of 
observance of rights and obligations stemming from the contract of 
employment. The directive merely ensures that the transferor’s rights and 
obligations arising from the employment contract or relationship are 
transferred to the transferee by reason of the transfer without subjecting the 
continuance of these rights and obligations to any time limit. Imposing such 
a time limit on the transferor in cross-border transfer situations would result 
in an inequality between domestic and cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, which is against the nature and aim of the Acquired Rights 
Directive. The directive seeks to protect the acquired rights of all those 
employees affected by the transfer of an undertaking that is situated within 
EU territory prior to the transfer irrespective of the location of the 
undertaking after the transfer. In conclusion, it appears that, when 
connecting the transfer of undertaking to the individual employment contract 
under the conflict of laws, a cross-border relocation of the undertaking will 
                                                          
898 COM(74) 351 final/2.  
899 COM(74) 351 final/2, p. 12-13. 
900 COM(74) 351 final/2, Art. 10(2)  
901 Although the 1974 proposal speaks of a change in the applicable labour laws, it is unclear 
whether these were to include the law that applies to the transfer of undertaking as such. In 
any event, the 1974 proposal did not explicitly include any conflict of laws provisions with 
respect to the transfer of undertaking as such.  
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almost inevitably result in a change in the applicable law. Inserting a 
provision into the Acquired Rights Directive requiring the transferee to 
continue the acquired rights of the affected employees for a period of one 
year provides no solution to this change in applicable law. Since the change 
in applicable law is due to the objective conflict of laws reference rather than 
a choice of law made by the parties, the limits on party autonomy contained 
in Articles 3(4) and 8(1) Rome I Regulation offer no solution either. As 
such, a final option may be, if continuing to strictly assimilate the transfer of 
undertaking under the conflict of laws category for individual contracts of 
employment, to attribute overriding mandatory effect to the national 
implementation provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
 
6. Overriding mandatory provisions 
Certain mandatory rules of law require application irrespective of the 
applicable law, i.e. irrespective of the choice of law made by the parties or 
the law assigned by the conflict of laws rules in the absence of such choice. 
These overriding mandatory rules or super-mandatory provisions ‘override’ 
the lex causae by virtue of their special nature and purpose. Primarily 
intended to protect public interests, they commonly bypass the result of the 
conflicts of laws reference. As such, the interests in applying these 
provisions outweigh the interests in upholding the result of the conflict of 
laws reference. The problem of overriding mandatory provisions is generally 
considered enthralling from a theoretical or dogmatic viewpoint rather than 
being of large practical importance.902 As discussed above, there are several 
theories on establishing the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking. 
Surely, if considered a special conflict of laws category, containing a conflict 
rule similar to the scope rule that exists within the directive, i.e. that the law 
that applies to a transfer of undertaking is the law of the country in which the 
undertaking, immediately prior to or on the date of the transfer, was located, 
the need for the classification of the provisions on transfers of undertakings 
as overriding mandatory rules becomes of little importance. In other words, 
the doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions only has an effect when 
these provisions override the law that would otherwise be applicable. If the 
provisions that may be considered overridingly mandatory are already 
applicable by reason of the general conflict of laws reference, which is e.g. 
                                                          
902 See Magnus & Mankowski 2002, p. 31.   
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the case under the Rome I Regulation,903 the need for their overriding 
mandatory nature surpasses.904 Under the Rome I Regulation, overriding 
mandatory rules are considered part of the lex causae. In this however, the 
question may arise whether the regulation allows for an exception to this 
notion in cases where an overriding mandatory provision is equipped with a 
distinct scope rule, allowing its non-application despite being part of the lex 
causae.905 
Still, in cases of transfers of undertakings, the doctrine of overriding 
mandatory provisions is most relevant where the lex causae differs from the 
law that includes a provision that requires application by reason of its special 
nature and purpose. Assimilated under the conflict of laws category for 
individual employment contracts the doctrine overriding mandatory 
provisions gains ever more importance. As stated in paragraph 5, due to the 
general application of the objective connecting factor of the place of habitual 
employment the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking is subject to 
change once a transfer of undertaking is accompanied by a cross-border 
relocation of the undertaking and the place of work. This change in 
applicable law may be remedied by the doctrine of overriding mandatory 
provisions. Hence, where it concerns the Acquired Rights Directive and the 
transfer of undertakings provisions that exists in national law the interest in 
the doctrine surpasses that of mere dogmatism and moves towards the 
practical applicability of national law provisions. Within this context 
questions arise such as whether the Acquired Rights Directive encompasses 
rules that are overridingly mandatory in nature or whether there (can) exist 
minimum harmonisation Community provisions with an overriding 
                                                          
903 Under the Rome I Regulation however, overriding mandatory provisions are considered 
applicable because they are part of the lex causae: Strikwerda 2015, p. 159; Wagner 2008, p. 
15. 
904 This view is not universally shared. In the Dutch opinion overriding mandatory rules do 
not necessarily require application simply because they are part of the lex causae. According 
to this view overriding mandatory rules require application by reason of their distinct nature 
and purpose and could, in principle, not apply even though they are part of the lex causae: HR 
5 June 1953, NJ 1953/613; HR 8 January 1971, NJ 1971/129; Van Hoek 2000, p. 454; 
Strikwerda 2015 I, p. 159.  
905 Strikwerda 2015 I,  p. 159. 
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mandatory component.906 In addition, there exists the question of whether 
provisions of weaker party protection can amount to overriding mandatory 
provisions within the prevailing definition. Thus the perpetual question of 
whether and under what conditions a provision is to be classified as 
internationally mandatory requires answering.907 In order to answer this 
question and the above, address must first be given to the definition of 
overriding mandatory provisions.   
6.1 Definition 
As set out above, there does not exist a special conflict of laws provision 
pertaining to the transfer of undertakings in the majority of the Member 
States or the Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation.908 Yet, the absence 
of such a provision has never passed doubt on the obligatory nature of the 
acquired rights provisions. As such it may even be argued that the mandatory 
nature of the acquired rights provisions requires their direct application thus 
rendering special conflict of laws rules superfluous. Whether the acquired 
rights provisions in effect amount to rules with an autonomous international 
scope is largely dependent on the definition awarded to overriding 
mandatory rules under the conflict of laws. Article 9 of the Rome I 
Regulation, comprises a special provision for overriding mandatory rules. 
Surely, the Rome I Regulation only applies in situations falling within its 
substantive scope, i.e. ‘situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters.’ To this end it should be noted 
that to my mind the provisions on transfers of undertakings, although closely 
connected to the existing employment contracts, do not constitute 
contractual obligations as they arise by operation of law, irrespective of the 
intentions of the affected parties. As such, I believe issues concerning 
transfers of undertakings to be outwith the scope of the Rome I Regulation. 
However, if assimilated under the conflict of laws category of individual 
                                                          
906 More so, if these questions require a positive answer the problem of conflicting rules of an 
overriding mandatory nature arises. Do the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori surpass 
those of other European Member States or third states where they are similar in nature or 
should a best or most beneficial law approach be deployed? 
907 Cf. Magnus & Mankowski 2002, p. 33.   
908 Such a special conflict of laws provision appears to exist in the United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg and Malta in the form of a unilateral conflict of laws provision requiring 
application of national acquired rights provisions whenever the undertaking to be transferred 
is located within the distinct territory of the respective Member States.  
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employment contracts issues arising from a transfer of undertaking may be 
subject to the provisions of the Rome I Regulation. In this sense, the 
application of the Rome I Regulation is either extended to transfers of 
undertakings by reason of the domestic conflict of laws or the Rome I 
Regulation is considered directly applicable due to the transfer’s close 
relation with the individual employment contract(s). In the latter view, the 
acquired rights provisions and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom 
are considered contractual by reason of their connectedness to the individual 
employment contract. As such, under the private international law of the 
Member States, the Rome I Regulation may be applied to issues concerning 
a transfer of undertaking. Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation,909 unlike its 
predecessor Article 7 of the Rome Convention which provides no definition 
of the concept,910 in paragraph 1 describes overriding mandatory provisions 
as ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic 
organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation 
falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable’. This 
definition, which stems from the ECJ’s judgment in Arblade911 appears to be 
modelled on the words of French author Francescakis, who defined 
overriding mandatory provisions as ‘lois dont l’observation est necessaire 
pour la sauvegarde de l’organisation politique, social ou économique du 
pays’.912  He labelled these rules ‘lois d’application immédiate’ or ‘lois de 
                                                          
909 The notion that overriding mandatory rules differ from mandatory rules within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, i.e. ‘rules that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement’, is encased in recital 37 of the Rome I Regulation according to which:‘ 
Considerations of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, 
in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and overriding 
mandatory provisions. The concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ should be 
distinguished from the expression ‘provisions which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ 
and should be construed more restrictively.’ 
910 In its 2002 Green paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization the 
Commission asked whether the application of Article 7 of the Rome Convention required 
definition, COM (2002) 654 final, p. 38.  
911 Art. 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation is directly based on the definition of mandatory rules in 
the decision of the ECJ in Arblade (Cases C-369/96 and C-374/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-
8453, ECLI:EU:C:1999:575, para. 30); Racine 2012, p. 62. 
912 Francescakis 1966, p. 1. 
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police’.913 The etymological origin of the latter wording shows the public 
law nature of these rules. The description ‘lois de police’ is derived from the 
Greek word politea [πολιτεία] which, although difficult to translate to our 
present understanding, finds its essence in the objective organisation of the 
functions of government.914 As such ‘lois de police’ or overriding mandatory 
rules include provisions that entail the organization of a state.915   These rules 
evidently include public law provisions with a direct effect on private legal 
relationships. As such, an overriding mandatory provision, is primarily 
intended to serve public, instead of private, interests and should be of such 
importance that a state requires its application to all persons within its 
territory.916 The Rome I Regulation, in Article 9, however, recognises that 
the scope of overriding mandatory provisions may go beyond national 
territories and merely refers to ‘situations falling within their scope’.917 In 
addition, the definition provided by Article 9, as is clear from the insertion of 
the words ‘as such’, does not limit the application of public interest 
provisions to those of a political, social or economic nature. In essence the 
provisions that are classified as overridingly mandatory involve public 
interests that transcend the contractual relationship existing between the 
parties.918 Even though provisions with a clear public interest are considered 
overriding mandatory provisions, the definition of overriding mandatory 
rules is subject to continuing debate with one of the most controversial 
issues being whether provisions of weaker party protection are encompassed 
by the definition provided in Article 9 Rome I Regulation.919 In fact, the 
position of provisions that are intended to protect socially or economically 
weaker parties still appears undetermined.920 As mentioned above, the 
controversy first and foremost extends to provisions that are primarily 
intended to safeguard the socially or economically disadvantaged, such as 
the acquired rights provisions.921 These provisions of weaker party 
                                                          
913 Francescakis 1958; Francescakis 1966. 
914 Wolff 2014, p. 801-802; McFarland 2015, p. 685; Kuipers 2012, p. 63. 
915 Kuipers 2012, p. 63. 
916 Magnus & Mankowski 2002, p. 33. 
917 Hellner 2009, p. 457. 
918 Cf. Solomon 2008, p. 1735; Beukler 2005, p. 29. 
919 Renner 2015, p. 250. 
920 See, inter alia, Kuipers & Vlek 2014, p. 202; Vonken 2012 (T&C Burgerlijk Wetboek), 
Art. 10:7 BW, note 4b; Van Hoek 2009, p. 79-81. 
921 See e.g. Kuipers & Vlek NIPR 2014, p. 202; Henckel 2012, p. 386. 
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protection have traditionally been considered as being overridingly 
mandatory if they are partly intended to protect certain communal 
interests.922 The mere intention of protecting socially or economically 
weaker parties does not justify the direct application of these provisions in 
spite of a choice of law or the law that would otherwise govern the contract. 
In order for a certain provision to override the lex causae it must inhabit 
certain public interests. For instance, in the  Sorensen/Aramco923 decision the 
Dutch Hoge Raad ruled on the application of a Dutch employment law 
provision to an employment contract governed by the laws of the state of 
Texas, USA. By reason of Article 6 Buitengewoon Besluit 
Arbeidsverhoudingen (hereinafter: BBA) an employer required prior consent 
from an employment office before proceeding to the termination of an 
existing employment contract or relationship. The aim of this provision was 
twofold: first the provision aimed to shield the affected employees against a 
socially unjustified termination of their employment contract, second it 
aimed to protect the Dutch labour market as a whole.924 The mere intention 
of protecting (the affected) employees was not considered to justify 
traversing the lex causae. Such justification can, according to the Hoge 
Raad, only be found therein that the socio-economic relations in the 
Netherlands are involved to such an extent that the interests protected by the 
provision outweigh the interests in fully applying the foreign law that applies 
to the employment contract.925 Thus, only in those situations where the 
socio-economic relations in the Netherlands are largely involved in the case 
will the interests protected by Dutch overriding mandatory provisions be 
able to prevail over the law that applies to the contract. Hence, in the case of 
Article 6 BBA it was the involvement of the Dutch labour market rather than 
the protection of the individual employee that justified giving overriding 
effect to this provision. It has been argued that the same reasoning should 
extent to European directives in the sense that the national implementation 
provisions of the Member States should only require application in situations 
involving the socio-economic relations within the EU to such an extent that 
                                                          
922 Strikwerda 1978, p. 67; Van Hoek 2014, p. 470; De Boer 1998; De Boer 2003, p. 466.  
923 HR 23 October 1987, NJ 1988/842 (Sorensen/Aramco). 
924 HR 23 October1987, NJ 1988/842 (Sorensen/Aramco); A.P.M.J. Vonken (Asser), 10-I 
Algemeen Deel IPR 2013, 495.  
925 HR 23 October 1987, NJ 1988/842 (Sorensen/Aramco), para. 3.2.2; HR 8 January 1971, 
NJ 1971, 129; Verhagen 2002, p. 144.   
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this involvement justifies surpassing the lex causae.926 Only when serving a 
purpose exceeding the interests of the individual will there be sufficient 
justification for attributing overriding effect to a mandatory provision of 
law.927 Giving effect to this statement a keen observer might argue that a 
large variety of employee protective provisions may be regarded as serving a 
higher interest and as such could bear the hallmark of overriding mandatory 
provision. Yet, in recent years this view has somewhat eroded due to the rise 
of the protection principle under the conflict of laws. Whilst the provisions 
protecting weaker parties, such as employees, have a semi-public law impact 
in the sense that the abuse of the socially disadvantaged threatens the legal 
community as a whole, the advent of the conflict of laws rules based on the 
protection principle appears to have rendered overriding mandatory rules of 
this category virtually redundant.928 Under the principle of protection, the 
conflict of laws reference is shaped in such a way as to best protect the 
weaker party. Thus, for individual employment contracts connection is 
sought to the place of habitual employment.929 Given the inherent protective 
nature of employment law this connection ensures that the employee is 
protected by the laws and standards of the place where he habitually carries 
out his work.930 A corresponding protection is afforded to the employee as 
against a choice of law clause under Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation, which 
provides that a choice of law may not deprive the employee of the protection 
afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement 
under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable.931 
As such a choice of law in the employment contract cannot deprive the 
affected employees from the protection of the mandatory provisions in force 
at their habitual place of employment.932 When the conflict of laws rule 
                                                          
926 Verhagen 2002, p. 145.  
927 Battifol & Lagarde, p. 428; Verhagen 2002, p. 145. 
928 Strikwerda 2012, p. 67; De Boer 2003, p. 466; Verhagen 2002, p. 145; Renner 2015, p. 
251. 
929 See Art. 6 Rome Convention and Art. 8 Rome I Regulation; See paragraph. 4.3.2 of this 
Chapter. 
930 Strikwerda 2012, p. 37; Van Lent  2000, p. 85. 
931 Cf. For consumer contracts: Solomon 2008, p. 1731. 
932 The law that applies to an employment contract is most frequently established by reason of 
the primary objective connecting factor of the place of habitual employment. If such a place 
cannot be readily determined the location of the engaging business is decisive in determining 
the applicable law. However, if  it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract 
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selects the legal system that is best qualified to apply its employee protective 
provisions, the concomitant application of the protective provisions of other 
legal systems on the basis of the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules is 
rendered superfluous.933 The latter doctrine therefore seems exclusively 
reserved for provisions that intervene in private legal relationships for the 
protection of public interests, frequently referred to by the German term 
Eingriffsnormen.934 Rules and regulations that are primarily intended to 
balance the interests of contractual parties with different bargaining powers 
are generally not encompassed by the abovementioned term. They serve 
private interests in the sense that they seek to strike a balance between the 
interests of the parties involved in the contract and are therefore primarily 
connected to the contract itself, justifying their conflict of laws connection 
by way of the general rules, making them subject to the lex causae.    
 
6.2 Overriding effect of national acquired rights provisions 
Since overriding mandatory provisions should be intended to serve a public 
interest in order for their overriding effect to be justified the classification of 
national acquired rights provisions as being overriding mandatory requires 
an examination of the nature and purpose of these provisions. In this sense, 
national acquired rights provisions may only be classified as overriding 
mandatory provisions under Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation if their 
interests surpass the protection of the individual employee. The provisions 
are therefore required to inhabit certain communal interests. In this context, 
the German Bundesarbeitsgericht has ruled against the application of the 
main German provision transposing the Acquired Rights Directive as 
Eingriffsnorm. In the so-called Amerikanische Piloten935 case, the BAG 
                                                                                                                                        
is more closely connected with another country then the law of that country shall apply. In 
any event, the mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law, either established by 
the habitual place of employment, the engaging place of business or by the existence of a 
closer connection to another country, apply irrespective of the existing choice of law.  
933 This is also true in relation to Art. 9 Rome I Regulation. Where certain provisions have 
other aims of protection than the individual employee Art. 9 may be applied, as is, e.g., the 
case with the Posted Workers Directive which seeks to prevent the European free movement 
of labour from causing social dumping and distortions to competition.  
934 U. Magnus, J. von Staudinger - Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Art. 9 Rom I Vo, para. 5; Mankowski 2006, p. 109-
110. 
935 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
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essentially held that § 613a BGB lacks the collective interest required for the 
classification as overriding mandatory as the central purpose of the provision 
is to secure that individual employees are protected against the loss of 
employment.936 According to the facts of this case the American plaintiffs 
were employed as pilots by Pan American World Airways (hereinafter: Pan 
Am). They primarily flew domestic German flights, operating from the Pan 
Am basis in Berlin. At a certain point the latter undertaking, i.e. the Pan Am 
basis in Berlin, was transferred to Berliner Lufthansa Airport Services 
GmbH (hereinafter: Lufthansa) with the aim of providing Lufthansa with the 
ability of performing domestic air traffic from Berlin. According to the 
agreement Lufthansa was obliged to take over the existing personnel with 
the exception of the pilots, flight engineers and the Pan Am US dollar 
payroll employees. In addition, a charter agreement enabled Lufthansa to 
temporarily operate the airplanes owned by Pan Am utilised in the Berlin air 
traffic with the existing cockpit crews, cabin crews and other services. As 
part of the charter agreement the plaintiffs were involved in the domestic air 
traffic to and from Berlin. After the termination of the charter agreement the 
plaintiffs did not become employed by Lufthansa and claimed their 
employment contracts had transferred to Lufthansa by reason of a transfer of 
undertaking on the basis of § 613a BGB. Since the employment contracts 
were subject to the laws of New York, both by choice of law and by reason 
of the objective conflict of laws connection of a closer connection, the 
German acquired rights provisions did not apply to the case. The BAG 
therefore had to decide whether overriding effect was to be attributed to its 
national acquired rights provision(s), i.e. § 613a BGB. In this, the aim of the 
provision is decisive. If the provision is primarily intended to protect the 
interests of the individual, by striking a balance between the interests of the 
employee and his employer, the provision is not eligible for overriding effect 
on the basis of Article 7 Rome Convention, the predecessor of Article 9 
                                                          
936 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 2 a; also see BAG 24 August 1989, 
IPRax 1991, 407. The judgment has been strongly criticised in legal literature. Some authors 
applaud the denial of overriding effect in view of the interests that the provision aims to 
protect, whereas others profusely disagree with the decision. They opine that provisions 
protecting employees often originate from public interests, which makes these provisions 
particularly suitable for application as overriding mandatory rules.  
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Rome I Regulation (in Germany transposed into Art. 34 EGBGB).937 As 
such, provisions that are aimed at protecting individual interests are subject 
to the lex causae. Only those provisions that are aimed at protecting interests 
that surpass those of the individual, i.e. that go beyond the interests of the 
parties to the contract, such as socio-economic interests, may be branded 
overriding mandatory under Article 7.938 In essence, provisions of merely 
mandatory (contractual) weaker party protection are considered part of the 
lex causae whereas rules or provisions that serve a public interest may have 
overriding mandatory effect.939 Both types of provisions are mutually 
exclusive in the sense that provisions that follow the general multilateral 
conflict of laws rule cannot be the subject of unilateral overriding 
application. In other words, there is exists no overlap between Articles 6 and 
7 of the Rome Convention940, since both provisions are aimed at different 
types of norms. According to the BAG the primary purpose of § 613a BGB is 
to protect the employees against a loss of employment by ensuring the 
continuance of their employment relationship and protecting them against 
dismissal. This protection against dismissal is intended to balance the 
interests of the employee and the interests of the employer in the contractual 
freedom to freely dispose of his undertaking without taking the existing 
relationships into account. An additional aim of the provision is to ensure the 
continuity of the existing workers council or representation, to determine the 
liability of the old and the new employer and to regulate the effects of the 
transfer on collective and company agreements. These collective elements 
however are subordinate to the protection of the employees and the 
continuance of the employment contract. As such, the acquired rights 
provision of § 613a BGB is part of individual employment law rather than 
collective in nature.941 Given the primary individual purpose the BAG ruled 
against the application of § 613a BGB as Eingriffsnorm within the meaning 
of Article 34 EGBGB, i.e. mandatory rule with overriding effect under 
                                                          
937 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 1; This reasoning is likely extended to 
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation.  
938 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 1; Cf.  Mankowski 1994, p. 94. 
939  Mankowski, p. 94; Van Hoek 2014, p. 166;  
940 The same reasoning will apply to Articles 8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation.  
941 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92, para. IV 2b. 
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Article 7 Rome Convention.942 The BAG concluded that neither § 613a BGB 
nor the national acquired rights provisions of another Member State were 
applicable, even though the undertaking transferred was situated in Germany 
both before and after the transfer.  
  
6.2.1 Critique 
In the prevailing opinion in both literature and case law the national 
provisions transposing the Acquired Rights Directive befall the general 
conflict of laws reference existing for the individual employment contract 
and do not constitute provisions with overriding mandatory effect.943 
However, the decision of the BAG  has also been met with resistance,944 
which is to be applauded since the ruling in this case abundantly conflicts 
with Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, according to which the 
national acquired rights provisions of a Member State should always apply 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated in European territory. 
More so, the BAG should have utilized a directive-compliant interpretation 
ensuring the application of Article §613a BGB, irrespective of the 
employment contract being governed by the laws of the State of New York 
both by reason of choice of law and as applicable law in the absence of 
choice (due to the law of the habitual place of employment being set aside 
by reason of the circumstances of the case making the contract more closely 
connected with the State of New York). Surely, the result of the conflict of 
laws reference (in this case connection is sought to the employment contract) 
should not be able to set aside the mandatory provisions arising from the 
Acquired Rights Directive. A fortiori, Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
                                                          
942 Since § 613a BGB codifies most of and the most important provisions of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive, according to the German 
view, do not encompass overriding mandatory provisions.  
943 See e.g. Niksova 2014, p. 89, 101; Däubler 1994, p. 126; Franzen, 1994, p. 124-125; 
Junker 1992, p. 293. Leuchten 2012, p. 411-416; Reiner 2010;  Gaul & Mückl 2011; Junker 
2014; Ebert 2008; Olbertz & Fahrig 2012; CMS report 2006; Veldmaat & van Assendelft de 
Coningh; Däubler 2013, p. 344-345; Von Alvensleben 1992; Cf. HR 1 december 1995 NJ 
1997, 716 m.nt. Strikwerda; Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259, 
ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2007:BB7066; Ktr. Zaandam (Vzr.) 26 July 2007, JAR 2008/67; Ktr. 
Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, JAR 2008/271, ECLI:NL:KTGEIN:2008:BG3811; Cf. 
Laagland 2011; Henckel 2012; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 
I; Bittner 2000; Fetsch 2002. 
944 Wimmer 1995 p. 207 et seq; Mankowski 1994. 
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Directive contains a scope rule, which holds an inherent conflict of laws 
implication that national acquired rights provisions will apply whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of a Member 
State.945 Leaving aside whether this rule should (naturally) translate to the 
Member States limiting the application of their national acquired rights 
provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being situated within their 
distinct territory,946 the national transposition measures should undoubtedly 
ensure the application of the laws of a Member State whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of the European 
Union. Where national implementation measures or judiciary fail to do so, a 
conflict with Community law, i.e. Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, arises.947 This failure to properly implement the Directive may be 
remedied first by legislative action and second by directive-compliant 
interpretation. In the Amerikanische Piloten case the BAG failed to utilise the 
second remedy, which wrongfully resulted in the application of the laws of 
the State of New York where it concerned the issue of transfers of 
undertakings. However, in determining whether the provisions stemming 
from the Acquired Rights Directive are to be classified as overriding 
mandatory rules the BAG correctly decided that the aim of the provision(s) is 
determinative. Since the acquired rights provisions are primarily intended to 
protect the interests of the individual employee,948 the conclusion that the 
German national acquired rights provisions do not amount to overriding 
mandatory provisions is not in itself erroneous. This however leaves us with 
the curious situation that, although not strictly befalling the definition of 
overriding mandatory rules, the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive 
and their national counterparts do appear to require such application in 
                                                          
945 Cf. Wimmer 1995, p. 209; Cf. Van Hoek, Arbeidsovereenkomst, artikel 7 EVO, note 6.2 
(2005). 
946 Cf. The implementation in the United Kingdom;  A.A.H. van Hoek, Arbeidsovereenkomst, 
artikel 7 EVO, note. 6.2 (2005), who believes that the Dutch implementation provisions in 
Article 7:662 BW et seq. qualify as overriding mandatory rules and require application 
whenever the undertaking or part of an undertaking to be transferred is situated within Dutch 
territory. 
947 Krebber 1998, p. 140. 
948 Surely the provisions do encompass the protection of certain collective interests that go 
beyond those of the individual employee. These collective interest and the internal market 
considerations underlying the Acquired Rights Directive however do not outweigh the 
protection of the individual employee that the directive seeks to ensure.   
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situations such as the one before the German courts. After all, the scope rule 
of Article 1(2) requires the application of Member State acquired rights 
provisions whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within 
European territory.     
 
In any event, where, upon the transfer of a European based undertaking, 
application of Member State acquired rights provisions is not guaranteed, a 
correction of the result of the conflict of laws reference should come to pass. 
Such a correction could be found in the doctrine and mechanism of 
overriding mandatory provisions. If the national provisions implementing the 
Acquired Rights Directive are classified as overriding mandatory provisions, 
they will require application regardless of the lex causae. As such, if the lex 
causae points towards the laws of a state that does not secure the transfer of 
employment relationships upon a transfer of undertaking, the overriding 
mandatory nature of the acquired rights provisions of the forum will secure 
that a transfer of undertaking occurs. In order to establish whether the 
national provisions implementing the Acquired Rights Directive may be 
considered overriding mandatory provisions it is interesting to examine 
whether the scope rule contained in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive holds any significance for the conflict of laws. After all, the 
existence of a scope rule delineating the (territorial) scope of application of 
certain provisions may form an indication of the overriding mandatory 
nature of these provisions.949 
 
6.2.2. Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
What is apparent from the preceding paragraphs is that the Acquired Rights 
Directive is not equipped with a clear and uniform conflict of laws provision 
that irrevocably determines the applicable law to a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. Thus where it is apparent that the Acquired Rights Directive 
remains wanting of any express conflict of law provisions, this paragraph 
seeks to examine whether the directive encompasses any implicit conflict of 
law provisions or implications. Surely, if it is established that the Acquired 
Rights Directive itself determines when it and its national counterparts, 
apply, the need to determine the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking 
by any other means disappears. A conflict of laws provision or implication 
                                                          
949 Basedow 2015, p. 244; Kuipers 2012, p. 71-72; Boele-Woelki & van Iterson 2010, p. 9. 
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may, possibly, be found in the scope rule confined in Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, which causes the Directive to ‘apply where and 
in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business 
to be transferred is situated within the territorial  scope of the Treaty’.950 This 
provision, which encompasses the territorial scope of the directive, ensures 
that, upon a transfer of undertaking, the rights of employees are safeguarded 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the EU territory 
of the Member States. In other words, the provision ensures that the directive 
applies whenever the business to be transferred is located within EU territory 
prior to its transfer. Under the conflict of laws, scope rules, i.e. rules 
determining the scope of application of a specific law, may be an indicator 
that the law in question is to be considered an overriding mandatory 
provision. Overriding mandatory provisions are frequently accompanied by 
scope rules, which unilaterally determine their scope of application 951 Scope 
rules however, may also be defined as rules delineating the scope of a 
specific rule of law without overriding the law that would otherwise apply to 
the legal relationship in question. As such, scope rules may be unilateral 
conflict of laws provisions or merely delineate the geographic application of 
certain legal provisions.      
         
6.2.2.1 Methodology 
Before discussing the nature of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
and its effects on the conflict of laws it is worth briefly examining a certain 
part of the conflict of laws methodology. Surely, under the conflict of laws a 
large variety of methodological approaches can be distinguished. The 
discussion in this subparagraph is limited to the methodological approaches 
of unilateralism and multilateralism, the dichotomy existing between them 
and their impact on cross-border transfers of undertakings. The differences 
existing between the theories of unilateralism and multilateralism are rooted 
                                                          
950 The term Treaty refers to the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/47. At the time of its adoption the term Treaty in Art. 1(2) 
Directive 2001/23/EC referred to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated version), OJ 2006 C, 321E. 
951 Overriding mandatory provisions are frequently accompanies by scope rules, which 
unilaterally determine their scope of application Cf. Basedow  2015, p. 477 et seq; Van 
Bochove & Kramer 2010, p. 12; Van Hoek 2000, p. 455; Strikwerda 2015, p. 158. 
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in the basis for and nature of the conflict of laws.952 The theory of 
unilateralism inextricably finds its basis in state sovereignty and counts as 
the earliest surviving view on private international law. In the unilateralist 
view the legal provision itself forms the starting point for the conflict of laws 
consideration. What is determined is whether and under which conditions a 
certain legal provision is to be applied. In the traditional Statutist view, the 
birth of the unilateralist approach  being attributed to the Italian Statutists of 
the 12th century,953 the territorial scope of national law forms a key 
consideration. Building on this traditional unilateralist approach twentieth 
century scholar Brainerd Currie developed the so-called ‘governmental 
interest analysis’, in which particular importance is attributed to legislative 
intentions and the purpose of substantive law.954 In this view the application 
of a particular legal provision is dependent on whether it, according to the 
underlying state interests, deserves application. Thus, according to the 
(modern) unilateralist theory each legal provision, bearing in mind its nature 
and purpose, delineates its own scope.  Under the theory of multilateralism, 
derived from the writings of 19th century German scholar Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny,955 the ideological father of the multilateral approach to private 
international law, the legal relationship forms the focal point of the conflict 
of laws consideration. Instead of unilaterally defining the scope of national 
law without any regard for the application of foreign law, the aim of this 
approach is to find the seat of the legal relationship, i.e. allocating the legal 
relationship in question to a particular legal system in order to escape 
incongruent treatment of the same legal question by the courts of different 
states.956 In this, a neutral connecting factor is to bring the legal relationship 
home and subject it to the legal system of its natural seat.957 In his 
development of the classic approach to the conflict of laws Von Savigny 
managed to find a neutral and objective standard of measure, resulting in 
                                                          
952 Cf. Rühl 2012. 
953 Cf. Strikwerda 2012, p. 15; Rühl 2006, p. 25; Rühl 2011, p. 288.  
954 Currie 1990; Symeonides 2005, p. 4.. 
955 Von Savigny 1849; Friedrich Carl von Savigny, rejecting the existing unilateralist views, 
developed a new approach to the conflict of laws. 
956 Von Savigny 1849, p. 129; Juenger, 1992, p. 138. 
957 To this end von Savigny distinguished several classes of legal relationships, each having 
their own ‘seat’. Each legal relationship is subject to the legal class to which it according to 
‘seiner eigenthümlichen Natur nach angehört oder unterworfen ist’;  Von Savigny 1849, p. 
28. 
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uniform conflict of laws rules unbound by substantive justice.958 The use of 
this uniform multilateral approach to the conflict of laws would ultimately 
result in so-called Entscheidungseinklang (decisional harmony) which is 
considered the aim of private international law.959 Upon achieving this ideal, 
each legal question is answered equally, irrespective of the place of 
assertion, i.e. the location of the court entrusted with answering this 
question. Thus, according to Von  Savigny, the aim of the conflict of laws is 
‘daβ die Rechtsverhältnissen in Fällen der Collision der Gesetze, dieselbe 
Beurtheilung zu erwarten haben, ohne Unterschied, ob in diesem oder jenem 
Staate das Urtheil gesprochen werde.´960 Even though this aim is, at present, 
still a remote ideal, especially on a global scale, the multilateral approach 
unmistakably forms the heart of modern day European private international 
law.  Still, unilateralism has not completely disappeared from the European 
private international law plane. First, overriding mandatory rules may 
unilaterally bypass the result of the multilateral conflict of laws reference.961 
These types of rules were already distinguished by Von Savigny, who 
believed that certain rules of a strictly positive and mandatory nature, 
carrying vital public interests cannot be set aside by foreign law.962 Second, 
unilateralism is advancing by the inclusion of a definition of the scope of, 
especially secondary, European Union law. Secondary European Union law, 
such as the Acquired Rights Directive, is increasingly equipped with 
provisions, either expressly or implicitly, defining the spatial or territorial 
scope of these instruments.963 Thus, although the theories of multilateralism 
and unilateralism from a dogmatic perspective appear mutually exclusive, 
they seem to (ill-fittingly) coexist within modern European private 
international law. 
                                                          
958 Thoms 1996, p. 70. 
959 Von Savigny 1849, p. 27, 129; Reaching international decisional harmony, although 
presently a remote ideal, is still considered the ultimate purpose of private international law. 
See e.g.  Goldt 2002, p. 116; Bernitt 2010, p. 36; Baarsma 2011, p. 95; Sonnentag 2001, p. 
116 et seq. 
960 Von Savigny 1849, p. 26-27. 
961  Rühl 2011, p. 290.  
962 Von Savigny 1849, p. 33 et seq.: ‚Gesetze von streng positiver, zwingender Natur, die eben 
wegen dieser Natur zu jener freien Behandlung, unabhängig von den Gränzen verschiedener 
Staaten, nicht geeignet sind.‘ (p.33); Cf. Nygh 1999, p. 199; Kuipers 2012, p. 56; Van 
Bochove 2014, p. 148. 
963 Francq 2006, p. 339 et seq.; Rühl, 2012, p. 7; Kuipers 2012, p. 180. 
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 The Acquired Rights Directive, a secondary European Union law 
instrument, in Article 1(2) holds an express scope rule stating that the 
‘directive shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part 
of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the 
territorial scope of the Treaty.’ As such, the directive applies whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU territory.964 Yet questions 
arise as to the interpretation of this specific scope rule and its interaction 
with the settled multilateral approach to the conflict of laws. Does the scope 
rule contained in the Acquired Rights Directive have direct conflict of laws 
implications? How does it translate to the application of national acquired 
rights provisions as the directive is not directly applicable to individual 
actors within the Member States? Does the scope rule take precedence over 
existing (multilateral) rules of the conflict of laws? Does it qualify as a 
provision of Community law laying down conflict of law rules relating to 
contractual obligations within the meaning of Article 23 of the Rome I 
Regulation?965 Answers to these questions are vital to determining the law 
that applies to a (cross-border) transfer of undertaking. These questions 
therefore play a central role in the present paragraph.     
 
6.2.2.2 Overriding mandatory provisions in European directives 
The questions posed in the preceding (sub)paragraph are essential to 
determining the law that applies to a cross-border transfer of undertaking. 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive finds its origin in European law, 
European law and the principles confined therein may be best suited to put 
an end to these questions and uniformly determine the law that governs a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking. Unfortunately, the questions mentioned 
above are not easily answered. The principles of primacy and territoriality 
existing in European law are designed to solve conflicts between national 
laws and European Union law and determine the scope of application of 
European law. These principles however, do not fully answer questions of 
conflicting national provisions transposing European directives; of the 
interrelationship between European directives and national conflict of laws 
                                                          
964 Cf. Chapter 2. 
965 Rühl and Francq pose similar questions. Rühl states that these will have to be answered in 
coming years: Rühl 2012, p. 8; Francq 2006, p. 337 et seq. 
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mechanisms and of the interrelationship between European directives and 
European conflict of laws instruments. 966   
 
By reason of the principle of territoriality all European legislation is to be 
applied within EU territory. In this sense European legislation applies to 
European territory to the same extent as national legislation applies 
throughout national territory. In discussing the problems arising in relation to 
cross-border transfers of undertaking the principle of territoriality is however 
insignificant as it does not solve the issue of which national acquired rights 
provisions are to apply in any given case. Still, in this context, one could ask 
whether Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, which references the 
territorial scope of the Treaty, qualifies as a scope rule in the traditional 
conflict of laws sense or whether it merely constitutes a reiteration of the 
territorial scope of European legislation.  
 
Under the principle of primacy, European law takes precedence over 
national law in case of a conflict existing between the two. This principle, 
which stems from the case law of the ECJ,967 has not been explicitly 
embodied in the European Treaties, i.e. the TEU and the TFEU. It follows 
from the non-binding declaration968 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon969 that 
‘in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis 
of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States (...).’970 The 
case law of the ECJ reiterates the autonomous character of European law and 
the Community legal order. Since the establishment of the primacy of 
European law over national law in the 1964 landmark case of Costa/ENEL, it 
has generally been considered that Community law, in terms of hierarchy, 
takes precedence over national law, which includes private international 
law.971 Surely where it concerns European regulations, which by their very 
                                                          
966 Francq 2006 p. 337 et seq. 
967 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 
968 Declaration concerning primacy (no. 17) OJ [2007] C 306/256; The content of this 
declaration was originally reflected in Art. I-6 of the rejected EU Constitution.  
969 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community OJ [2007] C 306/1. 
970 Declaration concerning primacy (no. 17) OJ [2007] C 306/256. 
971 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Heymann 2011 p. 559. 
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nature of direct application intervene in the legal systems of the Member 
States, such hierarchy is easily established. Directives however require 
implementation into national law.972 In addition, since directives, such as the 
Acquired Rights Directive, are not equipped with horizontal direct effect, 
private individuals are unable to rely directly on the provisions of the 
directive against other individuals.973 Their rights have to be ensured via a 
proper transposal of directives into national law. By transposing these 
directives into national law, they essentially become part of the existing 
body of domestic law, appearing no higher in hierarchy then any provision 
originating from the national legislator.974 Thus, the provisions stemming 
from a European directive and its national implementation provisions do not 
naturally possess overriding mandatory effect.975 In order to be classified as 
overriding mandatory provisions, provisions stemming from European 
directives, not unlike any other provision of domestic law, must inhabit a 
certain collective or public interest in the sense that these provisions 
intervene in private legal relationships for the protection of public interests. 
To this end, Köhler argues that internal market considerations alone will not 
constitute a sufficient public interest, since all European legislation to some 
extent is aimed at a proper functioning of the internal market.976 Touching 
upon the example of the Acquired Rights Directive, the question may be 
asked whether the provisions of the directive inhabit sufficient public 
interests to justify the classification of these provisions as overriding 
mandatory. The Acquired Rights Directive effectuates a harmonisation of 
the national law of the Member States. This type of harmonisation is 
generally aimed at eliminating obstacles to the internal market. In addition, 
the Acquired Rights Directive was originally adopted to counteract the 
                                                          
972 Per Article 288 TFEU directives are binding upon each Member State to which they are 
addressed; Article 14 Directive 2001/23/EC. The Member States of the EU and the EEA are 
required to transpose the Directive into their national law. 
973 Via the doctrine of direct effect private individuals are allowed to invoke the provisions of 
a directive against a State or a State body, provided that the provisions of the directive are 
unconditional and sufficiently precise and the state has failed to implement the directive in 
national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it fails to implement the directive 
correctly: Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, ECLI:EU:C:1986:84. 
974 Köhler 2013,  p. 149; Kuckein 2008, p. 61.   
975 Kuckein 2008, p. 61.   
976 Köhler 2013,  p. 149-150. 
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negative employment effects that would inevitably arise from the creation of 
a Common Market or internal market.977 As such, the directive seeks to 
protect both the individual and collective interests of the affected employees. 
Thus, the overall purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive seems to hold 
both individual and communal interests.978To my mind however, a vision 
that strokes with that of the BAG in the Amerikanische Piloten case979, the 
provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive are, although party 
rooted in internal market considerations, primarily intended to protect the 
employees that are individually affected by a transfer of undertaking. As 
such, even though the directive ensures the transfer of certain collective 
rights and obligations980, it does so in the interests of the affected employees. 
Since, there still appears to be some debate on this issue981 the ECJ could, in 
principle, elucidate the overriding mandatory position of the Acquired 
Rights Directive and its national counterparts by clearly establishing  or 
rejecting its supra-individual purpose, as it did with the Commercial Agents 
Directive in the case of Ingmar. 982     
 
6.2.2.3 Ingmar v Eaton 
The discussion of the problems arising in connection with overriding 
mandatory rules and European directives is inextricably linked to the 
judgment of the  European Court of Justice in the case of  Ingmar GB Ltd v 
Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.983 This judgment, which has been widely 
discussed throughout the legal community,984 is generally considered to give 
                                                          
977 De Witte 2015, p. 99; Wyatt 2005, p. 136. 
978 Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 88. 
979 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
980 Such as the observation ofterms and conditions stemming from collective agreements and 
the preservation of status and function of employee representatives. 
981 Francq 2007; Van Bochove 2014; Rühl 2012; Rühl 2011; Kuipers & Vlek 2014; Roth 
2000, p. 375-376. 
982 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605; Kuckein 2008, p. 61.   
983  Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605. 
984 Cf. Jayme 2000, p. 454-455; Jayme  2001, p. 190; Idot, 2001, p. 112-120: Freitag & Leible 
2001, p. 287-295; Staudinger  2001, p. 1974 et seq; Reichold 2008, p. 50; Martiny 2001, p. 
308, p. 330; Van Hoek, p. 195-197; Verhagen, 2001, p. 27–39; Verhagen 2002, p. 135-154. 
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rise to more questions than it answers.985 More so, the decision has provided 
new ammunition to those believing that overriding mandatory rules should 
encompass legal provisions involving weaker party protection.986 In Ingmar 
the ECJ addressed the scope of a European directive and its effects on the 
conflict of laws. In doing so, the court held that Member State legislation 
implementing Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive,987 
which guarantee certain rights to commercial agents after termination of 
agency contracts, requires application in situations where the commercial 
agent carried on his activity in a Member State for a non-European based 
principal and the contract contains a choice of law for the laws of a non-
Member State. In essence, the provisions of the Commercial Agents 
Directive require application whenever the agent has carried on his activity 
in a Member State, irrespective of the location of the principal or the law 
governing the contract. The reasons underlying this apparent overriding 
effect of the Commercial Agents Directive can be found in paragraphs 24 
and 25 of the judgment: 
 
’24. The purpose of the regime established in Articles 17 to 19 of the 
Directive is thus to protect, for all commercial agents, freedom of 
establishment and the operation of undistorted competition in the 
internal market. Those provisions must therefore be observed 
throughout the Community if those Treaty objectives are to be attained. 
 
25. It must therefore be held that it is essential for the Community legal 
order that a principal established in a non-member country, whose 
commercial agent carries on his activity within the Community, cannot 
evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law 
clause. The purpose served by the provisions in question requires that 
they be applied where the situation is closely connected with the 
Community, in particular where the commercial agent carries on his 
                                                          
985 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305, 
Jur. 2000, I-9305 opinion Th. De Boer, note. 1;  Beukler 2005,  p. 37; Martiny 2001, p. 308 et 
seq. 
986 Beukler Siebeck 2005,  p. 36-37; Jayme 2001, p. 190 et seq.; Jayme & Kohler 2000, p. 
454; Staudiger 2001, p. 1974 et seq. 
987 Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the 
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents OJ [1986] L 382, p. 17. 
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activity in the territory of a Member State, irrespective of the law by 
which the parties intended the contract to be governed.’988 
 
The judgment provides that Articles 17 to 19 of the Commercial Agents 
Directive are aimed at protecting the commercial agent after the termination 
of his contract989, however, the overriding effect of the provisions stemming 
from the directive appears to additionally find its basis in broader policy 
objectives, i.e. the freedom of establishment and the operation of undistorted 
competition in the internal market.990 The mere protection of private interests 
therefore appears insufficient for the classification of provisions stemming 
from a European directive as overriding mandatory.991 The ECJ bases the 
overriding effect of provisions stemming from European directives, in casu  
Articles 17 to 19 of the Commercial Agents Directive, on the importance of 
the mandatory nature of rules aimed at achieving the objectives of the 
European Community. It appears that these provisions of Community law by 
themselves may withstand a choice of law.992 Thus the judgment gives rise to 
the notion that provisions stemming from European directives aimed at 
protecting private individuals, whenever a situation is closely connected with 
the Community, may (partly) impede party autonomy. Although the 
Commercial Agents Directive is aimed at the protection of the commercial 
agent and finds its basis in internal market considerations the reasoning 
underlying the judgment in Ingmar may likely be extended to directives that 
                                                          
988 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305. 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, para. 24 and 25. 
989 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, para. 21. 
990 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, para. 25. 
991 Cf. Renner 2015, para. 20; Also see: Van Hoek 2001, p. 196 who believes that internal 
market considerations in the aims of European Directives cannot serve to provide overriding 
effect to the provisions of these directives since these considerations exhibit the distribution of 
power between the Member States and the EU rather then having an effect on the conflict of 
laws. More so, all directives based on Article 95 of the EC Treaty (partly) serve internal 
market objectives; it is desirable nor necessary to attribute overriding effect to all of these 
directives.    
992 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305, 
Jur. 2000, I-9305 opinion Th. De Boer note 2.  
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are intended to protect other Community objectives.993 The decision in 
Ingmar proves that harmonizsed private law, such as the national provisions 
implementing the Commercial Agents Directive, which according to prior 
Member State judgments was merely considered internally mandatory,994 
may be considered overriding mandatory law.995 In this sense, mandatory 
provisions of Community law based in European directives may not just 
bypass the choice of law made by the parties, but are also likely to be able to 
bypass the law designated by the objective conflict of laws reference. The 
reasoning in Ingmar especially applies to situations where the objective 
conflict of laws reference points towards the laws of a non-Member State. In 
these cases, the aim and purpose of European directives combined with a 
close connection to the European Community996 may warrant the mandatory 
application of European law, overriding the laws of the non-Member 
State.997 In relation to non-Member States, the provisions stemming from 
European directives may therefore be classified as overriding mandatory 
provisions with an independent international and territorial scope, derived 
from the aim and purpose of these directives.998 In other words, in giving full 
effect to the considerations of the judgment in Ingmar, the provisions 
stemming from European directives may bypass the lex causae, irrespective 
of whether the applicable law finds its basis in party autonomy or the 
                                                          
993 Renner 2015, para. 19-20; Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies 
Inc [2000] ECR I-09305, ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, opinion Th. De Boer note 2. 
994 Cass. Com., 28 November 2000, pourvoi n° 98-11.335, Bull. 2000, IV, n° 183: ‘Mais 
attendu que la loi du 25 juin 1991, codifiée dans les articles L. 134-1 et suivants du Code de 
commerce, loi protectrice d'ordre public interne, applicable à tous les contrats en cours à la 
date du 1er janvier 1994, n'est pas une loi de police applicable dans l'ordre international’; 
Rb. Arnhem, 10 July1991, NIPR 1992, 100: ‘Wél kan deze Richtlijn worden betrokken bij het 
onderzoek - dat hier aan de orde is - van de vraag of de klantenvergoedingsregel een 
bijzonder belang dient van zodanige aard dat die regel als voorrangsregel heeft te gelden. Uit 
de Richtlijn is af te leiden dat dit niet het geval is. Weliswaar verlangt art. 17 jo. art. 19 van 
de Richtlijn dat in het recht van de Lidstaten bij dwingende bepaling aan de handelsagent 
recht op een vergoeding na beëindiging van de agentuurovereenkomst wordt verleend, maar 
de Lidstaten kunnen daarbij in plaats van klantenvergoeding ook kiezen voor het verlenen van 
recht op herstel van nadeel. Bovendien verlangt de Richtlijn niet dat de desbetreffende 
dwingende bepaling in een internationaal geval voorrang heeft.’ 
995 Hauser 2012, p. 11. 
996 Nowadays the European Union.  
997 Van Hoek 2001, p. 196. 
998 Van Hoek, p. 196. 
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objective conflict of laws reference, provided that the case is sufficiently 
connected with the European Community.999 The fact that provisions 
stemming from European law may take precedence over national law, 
including private international law, is nothing new. It is commonly believed 
that scope rules contained in European directives may be construed as 
uniform provisions of private international law allowing them to bypass the 
commonly applicable multilateral conflict of laws rules whether from 
national or Community descend.1000 This reasoning equally applies to the 
Rome I Regulation, which in Article 23 makes provision for the priority of 
provisions of Community law laying down specific conflict of laws rules 
relating to contractual obligations. However, what is interesting about the 
case of Ingmar is that the Commercial Agents Directive itself is absent of 
any provisions regarding its international or territorial scope.1001 As such, the 
application of the directive and its national counterparts may either be 
decided on the basis of the private international law of the forum or inferred 
from the provisions of the directive. In both cases, either by application of 
overriding mandatory provision in the sense of Article 9 of the Rome I 
Regulation or by reason of direct application via the distinct scope of 
application inferred from the directive itself, it is the aim of the directive that 
determines whether overriding effect is to be attributed to its provisions and 
its national corollaries.1002 Since the purpose of the Commercial Agents 
Directive lies both in the protection of the commercial agent as a weaker 
party and in the protection of the freedom of establishment and the operation 
of undistorted competition in the internal market it is questioned whether the 
provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive, pursuant to the judgment in 
Ingmar, should be considered internationally overriding in the sense that 
                                                          
999 Kania 2012, p. 183; Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc 
[2000] ECR I-09305, ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, opinion Th. De Boer, note 2-3; earlier: Joustra 
1999, p. 669, 670.  
1000 Joustra 1999, p. 666; Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc 
[2000] ECR I-09305, ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, opinion Th. De Boer, note 3. 
1001 In addition, no reference was made to the provisions of the Rome Convention since, at the 
time of the judgment, the ‘First Protocol on the interpretation of the 1980 Convention by the 
Court of Justice (consolidated version) / 1980 Rome Convention’ OJ [1998] C 27/47-51 (OJ 
[2005] C334/20) had not yet entered into force. This protocol first became effective on 1 
august 2004.  
1002 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, opinion Th. De Boer note 3. 
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their application is of such importance that the lex causae may be set aside, 
irrespective of whether the applicable law to the contract is established by 
reason of a choice of law or by reason of objective conflict of laws 
provisions applying in the absence of such choice, or whether they are 
merely mandatory in the sense that their application may not be set aside by 
a choice of law (for the laws of a non-Member State). Thus the question 
arises whether the overriding effect given to the provisions of the 
Commercial Agents Directive in Ingmar is to interpreted akin to the conflict 
of laws protection afforded to other weaker contractual parties such as 
consumers and employees.1003   
 
The notion stemming from the judgment in Ingmar that mandatory rules 
contained in European directives may be considered internationally 
mandatory in relation to non-Member States whenever there is a sufficiently 
close connection with the European Community may blur the line between 
internally and internationally mandatory rules leaving Ingmar to serve as a 
gateway for the extension of this reasoning to all mandatory provisions 
stemming from European directives.1004 On the other hand it may be derived 
from Ingmar that overriding effect is only attributed to secondary European 
Union law if the provisions stemming from directives according to their 
purpose and aim require application irrespective of the choice of law made 
by the parties. A strict application of these requirements, thwarting the 
                                                          
1003 For these types of contractual parties there already exists a limited choice of law under the 
Rome I Regulation.  
1004 Schwarz 2002, p. 45 et seq.;  Kuipers 2012, p. 578-579; Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
Private and Private International Law, ‘Comments on the European Commission’s 
Greenpaper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations into a community instrument and its modernization’, p. 73-74, 
available online at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/rome_i/contributions/max_planck_institut
e_foreign_private_international_law_en.pdf>: the Max Planck Institute proposes to limit the 
reasoning of the judgment in Ingmar to the Commercial Agents Directive. More so, it feels 
that, since the main reasons underlying the ruling in Ingmar, in their belief, were in the 
interests of the commercial agent who required protection against a (possibly) stronger 
principal, commercial agents be given the same weaker party protection as employees and 
consumers by shaping the conflict of laws reference in their favour and allowing for party 
autonomy only insofar as a choice of law would not deprive the agent of the protection 
afforded to him by the laws in force in the state of his place of business.    
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continued precedence of the Community process of harmonisation, will thus 
prevent the erosion of party autonomy.1005  
 
6.2.2.4 Unamar      
In its recent decision in Unamar1006 the ECJ put the ruling in Ingmar in 
perspective with regard to intra-EU relationships. In doing so, it provided 
clarification to the concept of overriding mandatory provisions existing 
under Article 7 of the Rome Convention. In this case, brought before the 
Belgian courts1007, Belgian commercial agent Unamar sought application of 
the Belgian law transposing the Commercial Agents Directive against 
Bulgarian principal NMB, despite the existence of a choice of law for 
Bulgarian law and an arbitration clause in favour of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in Sofia, Bulgaria. Even though both Bulgaria and 
Belgium had properly transposed the provisions of the directive into their 
national legislation, the Belgian provisions went beyond the protection 
afforded to the commercial agent by the directive by offering a higher level 
of protection and operating a wider scope. In implementing the provisions of 
the Commercial Agents Directive Belgium had opted to introduce provisions 
that were more favourable to the commercial agent than the minimum 
protection afforded by the directive. Accordingly, Article 27 of the Belgian 
Wet betreffende de handelsagentuurovereenkomst1008 (Law on commercial 
agency contracts) subjects any activity of a commercial agent whose 
principal place of business is in Belgium to Belgian law and the jurisdiction 
of the Belgian courts, whereas Articles 18, 20 and 21 of said law extend the 
possible compensation awarded to commercial agents upon the termination 
of the agency contract. The question thus arose as to whether the Belgian 
implementation provisions, which were of a mandatory nature, could be 
awarded overriding mandatory effect, to the extent that they were able to 
bypass the (properly implemented) laws of another Member State. In Ingmar 
                                                          
1005 Staudinger 2001, p. 1976; Opinion Advocate General Léger Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton 
Leonard Technologies In Case C-381/98 [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:230, para. 72 et seq. 
1006 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663. 
1007 In this case the Rechtbank van Koophandel in Antwerp; upon appeal the Hof van Cassatie 
decided to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
1008 13 april 1995. Wet betreffende de handelsagentuurovereenkomst (F: 13 avril 1995 - Loi 
relative au contrat d'agence commerciale), published Justice 2 July 1995 no. 1995009425, p. 
15621.  
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the court had already ruled that overriding mandatory effect was to be 
awarded to the provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive and its 
national counterparts with respect to non-Member States. The question in 
Unamar was whether this reasoning could be extended to the mandatory 
rules of the lex fori in situations where the parties had chosen the laws of a 
Member State to govern their contract. One of the key considerations for 
affording overriding mandatory effect to the provisions of the Commercial 
Agents Directive in Ingmar was that through a choice of law for the laws of 
a non-Member State the parties in Ingmar would otherwise be able to evade 
the mandatory provisions of the directive. This risk of non-application of the 
provisions of the directive did not exist in Unamar since the parties had 
opted for the application of Bulgarian law. More so, it remained uncontested 
that Bulgaria had properly transposed the provisions of the directive into its 
national law. In light of this the question arises of the weight to be attributed 
to the existing minimum harmonisation and the proper implementation of the 
Commercial Agents Directive in the law chosen by the parties. The answer 
to this question lies in the application of Article 7 Rome Convention (and 
Article 9 Rome I Regulation).1009 On the basis of these articles it is for the 
national court to decide whether a provision qualifies as overriding 
mandatory. In this national assessment it must first be ensured that the 
choice freely made by the parties as regards the law applicable to their 
contractual relationship is respected in order to give full effect to the 
principle of the freedom of contract.1010 As party autonomy remains the 
cornerstone of the conflict of laws instruments for contractual relationships, 
the provisions on (overriding) mandatory rules are subject to strict 
interpretation.1011 In assessing whether a provision requires overriding 
mandatory effect the national court must take account of the general 
structure and circumstances under which the law was adopted in order to 
determine whether it is of such importance that the Member State concerned 
finds its application to be essential. Such essential interest may exist in cases 
where the national implementation provisions of the forum state offer greater 
protection to a certain group of individuals, such as commercial agents, due 
                                                          
1009 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 41;  Kuipers & Vlek 2014, p. 
200. 
1010 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 49.  
1011 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 49. 
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to the interest which the forum state attributes to that category of 
individuals.1012 In other words, according to the ruling in Unamar the 
Belgian implementation provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive may 
have overriding mandatory effect, even if these provisions go beyond the 
minimum protection afforded by the directive. However, in assessing 
whether the provisions possess overriding mandatory effect the national 
court must, according to the ECJ, in order not to compromise the 
harmonizing effect of European directives, take account of the precedence of 
the lex fori over the laws of another Member State that has properly 
transposed the directive. One would assume that such a condition is satisfied 
if the national provisions in question are considered crucial for the 
safeguarding of a Member State’s public interests.1013    
 
6.2.2.5 Effects on the Acquired Rights Directive 
The Ingmar decision, followed by the subsequent ruling of the ECJ in 
Unamar, has outlined that provisions stemming from European directives 
may be classified as overriding mandatory provisions within the meaning of 
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation if they serve the overriding interests of 
the European Union, for example if they are vital to the proper functioning 
of the internal market.1014 In this sense, the national provisions transposing a 
European directive may be classified and applied as overriding mandatory 
provisions if such application is imperative to fulfilling the aims of the 
directive.1015 Do the decisions in Ingmar and Unamar hold any significance 
for the Acquired Rights Directive? In answering this question, it should be 
noted that there exists several important differences between the Acquired 
Rights Directive and the Commercial Agents Directive, which was the 
directive under discussion in Ingmar and Unamar.  In seeking connection to 
the individual contract of employment the applicable law to a transfer of 
                                                          
1012 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 50. 
1013 Under Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation overriding mandatory provisions are defined 
as ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its 
public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that 
they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise 
applicable to the contract under this Regulation.’ 
1014 Freitag 2009, p. 109, p. 116; Kania 2012, p. 180. This reasoning only applies to provisions 
stemming directly from the directive and does not extent to, as is clear from the case of 
Unamar, national provisions extending the protection awarded by European directives. 
1015 Kania 2012, p. 181.  
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undertaking and its effects is generally determined on the basis of Article 8 
of the Rome I Regulation.1016 This special conflict of laws provision for 
individual employment contracts not only limits the choice of law to be 
made by the parties by reason of the preferential law approach enshrined in 
Article 8(1), the conflict of laws reference is also shaped in such a way as to 
protect the weaker party, i.e. the employee. Similar provisions exist for 
consumers and insurance policy holders in Articles 6 and 7 of the Rome I 
Regulation. A provision affording special protection to commercial agents 
however does not exist within the Rome regime. If the overriding effect 
given to the provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive in Ingmar is to 
be interpreted akin to the conflict of laws protection afforded to other weaker 
contractual parties such as consumers and employees, the reasoning in 
Ingmar holds no significance for the Acquired Rights Directive. After all, 
such protection is already awarded to the affected employees if the issue of 
transfers of undertakings is connected to the individual employment 
contract. Indeed, for the individual employment contract a specific provision 
aimed at protecting the employee under the conflict of laws already exists. In 
addition, in relation to the Acquired Rights Directive, the idea stemming 
from the judgment in Ingmar that mandatory rules contained in European 
directives may be considered internationally mandatory in relation to non-
Member States whenever there is a sufficiently close connection with the 
European Community,1017 loses some of its significance by reason of the 
inclusion of Article 3(4) into the Rome I Regulation and the protection 
principle enclosed in Article 8.  
 
The Rome I Regulation differs from the Rome Convention in the sense that 
Article 3(4) Rome I Regulation holds a new provision which provides a 
Community minimum standard ensuring that the applicability of the law of a 
non-Member State cannot result in the detriment of those protected by 
Community law. According to Article 3(4) ‘where all other elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more 
                                                          
1016 Except in situations where the case at hand falls outside the temporal scope of the Rome I 
Regulation or where it concerns Denmark, which does not apply the Rome I Regulation. 
1017 Schwarz  2002, p. 45 et seq.;  Kuipers, 2012 I, p. 578-579; Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign Private and Private International Law, Comments on the European Commission’s 
Greenpaper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations into a community instrument and its modernization, p. 73-74. 
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Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than that of a 
Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of 
the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.’ Thus, where the 
parties have made a choice for the laws of a non-Member State that choice of 
law may be set aside in order to apply mandatory provisions of Community 
law. If there is a abundant link with the territory of a Member State, 
Community law may therefore be applied regardless of a professio iuris for 
the laws of a non-Member State. Where it concerns directives, which due to 
their nature cannot be applied to individual actors within the Member States, 
the lex fori, i.e. the national implementation provisions of the forum, requires 
application by reason of Article 3(4) Rome I Regulation. Article 3(4) seeks 
to prevent a fraudulent evasion of Community law,1018 it does not, however, 
remedy the exact situation covered in Ingmar since it requires all other 
elements relevant to the situation to be located in one or more Member 
States.1019 As such, the situation in Ingmar would fall outside the scope of 
this specific Article.  
 
As stated above, the protection principle enshrined in Article 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation may also limit the effects of the decision in Ingmar with respect 
to the Acquired Rights Directive. Whereas the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules evidently includes provisions of public law with a direct 
effect on private legal relationships, the position of provisions that are 
primarily intended to protect the socially or economically disadvantaged is 
more undetermined.1020 These provisions have traditionally been considered 
as overriding mandatory in nature if they are partly intended to protect 
certain communal interests.1021 Yet, due to the advance of the protection 
principle under the conflict of laws this view has watered down significantly. 
For instance, it is assumed that Article 10:7 of the Dutch Civil Code, which 
deals with overriding mandatory provisions and was inspired by and based 
                                                          
1018 COM(2005) 650 final, p. 5. 
1019 Harris 2009, p. 341; Martiny, MüKO BGB 2015, Art. 3 Rom I-VO, No. 98; Freitag 2009, 
p. 112. 
1020 See inter alia: Vonken 2012 (T&C Burgerlijk Wetboek, Art. 10:7 BW, note 4b; Van 
Hoek 2009, p. 79-81; Henckel 2012, p. 386; Kania 2012, p. 190-191. 
1021 Freitag 2009, p. 112; Kania 2012, p. 190-191; Th.M. de Boer opinion  under Hoge Raad 
12 September 1997, NJ 1998, 688; De Boer 2003, p. 466.  
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on Article 9 Rome I Regulation, does not cover provisions that are primarily 
intended to safeguard employees.1022 As stated above in paragraph 6.1, due 
to the existence of the conflict of laws rules based on the protection principle 
overriding mandatory provisions of this category are left almost redundant, 
despite having a semi public law impact.1023 Owing to the principle of 
protection the conflict of laws reference is shaped in such a way as to best 
protect the weaker party. For individual contracts of employment connection 
is primarily sought to the place of habitual employment.1024 Given the 
inherent protective nature of employment law this connection ensures that 
the employee is protected by the laws and standards of the place where he 
habitually carries out his work.1025 When the conflict of laws provisions 
selects the legal system that is best qualified to apply its employee protective 
provisions, the concomitant application of the protective provisions of other 
legal systems on the basis of the doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions 
appears superfluous. The doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions 
therefore seems exclusively reserved for provisions that intervene in private 
legal relationships for the protection of public interests.  
 
In relation to the Acquired Rights Directive the question arises whether there 
is any need for a classification as overriding mandatory. Such a classification 
may have been a necessary requirement for the Commercial Agents 
Directive in Ingmar, however, unlike the Commercial Agents Directive, the 
Acquired Rights Directive is equipped with an explicit specific scope rule 
delineating its scope of application. As outlined numerous times above, 
Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive causes the directive to apply 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of 
the Treaty, i.e. the territory of any Member State. Due the existence of a 
scope rule the question arises as to the effects of this rule upon the conflict of 
                                                          
1022 Henckel 2012, p. 386; De Boer 2003, p. 466; Strikwerda 2012, p. 67; Cf. Staatscommissie 
voor het internationaal privaatrecht, Rapport aan de Minister van Justitie, Algemene 
Bepalingen Wet Internationaal Privaatrecht, Den Haag 2002, p. 39. 
1023 Strikwerda 2012, p. 67; De Boer 2003, p. 466.  
1024 Cf. Art. 6 Rome Convention, Art. 8(2) Rome I Regulation.  
1025 Strikwerda 2012, p. 37; Van Lent 2000, p. 85. In addition, the preferential law approach 
enshrined in Article 8(1) limits the choice of law made by the parties by requiring the 
application of the objectively applicable law, generally the laws in force at the habitual place 
of employment, whenever this law provides the employee with more or better protection. 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
312 
 
laws. Does the fact that the Acquired Rights Directive is equipped with an 
explicit scope rule, delineating its scope of application, mean that the 
provisions stemming from the directive, i.e. the national implementation 
provisions of the Member States, have an overriding effect on the lex 
causae?1026 In this the situation may arise that, regardless of whether the 
acquired rights provisions are classified as overriding mandatory provisions, 
the provisions stemming from the directive will set aside the law that would 
otherwise govern the issue in question. Where it e.g. concerns scope rules of 
Dutch descend, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch code on private 
international law (Book 10 BW) clarifies that insofar as a particular case 
falls within the ambit of a Dutch scope rule, the Dutch court is obliged to 
apply Dutch law, irrespective of the lex causae: 
 
‘Voor zover een bepaald geval binnen het toepassingsgebied van een 
Nederlandse scope rule valt, dient de rechter het Nederlandse recht toe 
te passen, ongeacht welk recht door de – anders toepasselijke – 
verwijzingsregel zou zijn aangewezen. Een onderzoek of de regel 
waarop de scope rule betrekking heeft als een voorrangsregel moet 
worden aangemerkt, is in een dergelijke situatie niet meer aan de orde, 
evenmin als uiteraard een onderzoek van de vraag tot welk resultaat 
toepassing van de verwijzingsregel zou hebben geleid.’1027    
 
Thus, under Dutch private international law, it appears that the dogmatic 
distinction of whether a provision is considered overriding mandatory or not 
is immaterial whenever a provision of national law is equipped with a 
specific scope rule. ‘In such a situation a study of whether the rule to which 
the scope rule applies is to be classified as an overriding mandatory 
provision should not be performed, nor is a study into the question what the 
result of the conflict of laws reference should have been.’1028 The provision 
of Article 10:7 BW is based on and inspired by Article 9 Rome I Regulation. 
As such, it is worth examining whether the same reasoning applies under the 
                                                          
1026 Cf. Van Hoek 2010 (T&C Arbeidsrecht), Art. 9 Rome I Verordening, note 2c. 
1027 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32137 no. 3, p. 16 (MvT). 
1028 Free translation of: ‘Een onderzoek of de regel waarop de scope rule betrekking heeft als 
een voorrangsregel moet worden aangemerkt, is in een dergelijke situatie niet meer aan de 
orde, evenmin als uiteraard een onderzoek van de vraag tot welk resultaat toepassing van de 
verwijzingsregel zou hebben geleid’, Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32137 no. 3, p. 16 (MvT).    
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Rome I Regulation. It is clear that the assumption that certain legal 
provisions may resist a choice of law by reason of their distinct scope of 
application also holds true under Article 9 Rome I Regulation.1029 After all, 
Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation expressly states that ‘nothing shall restrict 
the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum.’ As 
such, by reason of the distinct scope rule in the Acquired Rights Directive, 
national acquired rights provisions may require application whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of a Member 
State, irrespective of and without determination of the law that would 
otherwise govern the situation.1030 Thus whereas the national implementation 
provisions of the forum may require direct application whenever the 
situation under consideration falls within their distinct scope, the (non-) 
classification of overriding mandatory provisions becomes more problematic 
where it concerns overriding mandatory provisions of states other than that 
of the forum. The application of the acquired rights provisions of third 
countries, i.e. provisions that are not part of the lex fori, cannot merely be 
effectuated by means of an accompanying scope rule. Since the courts of a 
Member State are generally not formally bound by foreign scope rules they 
will have to determine whether the foreign provision to which the scope rule 
applies is to be classified as an overriding mandatory rule. The court will 
have to determine whether the nature and purpose of the provision as well as 
the consequences of its (non-)application require the lex causae to be 
bypassed. Article 9(3) significantly curtails the application of mandatory 
rules other than those of the lex fori by stating that:  
 
‘effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law 
of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to 
be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory 
provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful.’    
 
The application of the overriding mandatory provisions of third countries is 
limited to the above wording. Beyond the scope of this provision, foreign 
                                                          
1029 Cf. Van Hoek 2014, p. 470; Van Bochove 2014, p. 153. 
1030 Such classification still does not answers that question of which national acquired rights 
provisions are to be applied in situations involving a conflict of laws, see below.  
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overriding mandatory provisions should not be applied.1031 Article 9(3) 
allows for the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
country where the obligations out of the contract have to be or have been 
performed. In relation to a transfer of undertaking this place is likely to 
coincide with the place of habitual employment.1032 In order to give full 
effect to the overriding mandatory provisions of the place of habitual 
employment, these provisions must render the performance of the contract 
unlawful. It is this condition that prevents the application of Article 9(3) and 
of overriding mandatory provisions of third states in relation to a transfer of 
undertaking. After all, the (national) acquired rights provisions bestow 
certain rights upon the affected employees and result in an ex lege transfer of 
the existing employment relationships to the transferee. They do not, 
however, render the transfer or employment contract unlawful.1033 More so, 
the fact that Article 8(1) already provides for the application of the 
mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law, generally that of the 
place of habitual employment, irrespective of whether these provisions 
render the employment contract unlawful, means that Article 9 is 
superfluous when it comes to provisions protecting the rights of individual 
employees.  
 
The scope rule contained in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
may give overriding effect to national acquired rights provisions. Since such 
overriding effect stems directly from the directive, it is limited to the 
minimum level of employment protection contained therein.1034 Thus, where 
the Member States guarantee the minimum protection ensured by the 
directive, their laws may be applied as overriding mandatory provisions (of 
the lex fori). Assessing whether national acquired rights provisions have an 
overriding effect on the lex causae becomes more difficult where it concerns 
Member State provisions that exceed the minimum protection afforded by 
                                                          
1031 Kania 2014, p. 179; Freitag 2009, p.  115.  
1032 To this end, especially when considering a transfer of undertaking that is coupled with a 
simultaneous or subsequent relocation of the undertaking the question becomes whether there 
may only be one place of performance. If so, then the place of performance is likely the newly 
established workplace, rendering the application of the acquired rights provisions in force at 
the former place of work ineffective. Cf. Kania 2014, p. 177. 
1033 Kania 2014, p. 177. 
1034 Cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663 
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the Acquired Rights Directive, either by an extension of the scope of the 
directive or by offering more protection, i.e. so-called gold plating, as these 
provisions will not be classified as rules of overriding mandatory effect of 
European descent. As is clear from the judgment in Unamar Member State 
provisions that exceed the minimum level of protection afforded by 
European directives, may be considered overriding mandatory provisions if 
their application is considered essential to the Member State from which 
they originate.1035 Even so, in assessing whether national acquired rights 
provisions exceeding the protection afforded by the Acquired Rights 
Directive possess overriding mandatory effect the national court must, in 
order not to compromise the harmonizing effect of European directives, take 
account of the precedence of the lex fori over the laws of another Member 
State that has properly transposed the directive. All national legislation that 
surpasses the minimum standard cannot be assigned to European law but 
finds its basis in the national law of the Member States. Whereas this 
distinction between national acquired rights provisions stemming from EU 
law and those stemming from national law appears obvious from a 
theoretical perspective, the two are not as easily separated in practice. 
Regularly it will not be possible to separate the rules implementing certain 
minimum standards from those surpassing those standards as they will be 
part of a single legal provision. This is especially the case where, as with the 
Acquired Rights Directive, European directives not only provide a minimum 
standard of protection but also allow for partial harmonization in the sense 
that the Member States, in transposing the directive are given the option to 
apply certain rules of the directive.1036 For example, by reason of Article 5(1) 
of the Acquired Rights Directive the ex lege transfer of the rights and 
obligations stemming from the employment contract to the transferee does 
not extend to the situation where the transferor is subject to insolvency 
proceedings. The Member States however, have the option of extending their 
                                                          
1035 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 50. 
1036 The Member States may exceed by minimum protection offered by the directives by 
issuing three different categories of rules. First, the minimum protection of the directive may 
be extended by offering more and better protection, essentially gold-plating its provisions. 
Second, the scope of the directive may be extended, e.g. to different categories of persons. For 
example, the United Kingdom in 2006 extended the scope of its Acquired Rights Provisions 
to service provisions changes. Third and finally, the directive itself may provide certain 
optional provisions. Cf. Van Bochove 2014, p. 155; Remien 2011, p. 341.      
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national acquired rights provisions to these types of undertakings which 
follows from the wording ‘unless the Member States provide otherwise’ in 
Article 5(1). Once a Member State has decided to extend its national 
acquired rights provisions to insolvent undertakings Article 5(2) provides 
that this extension may be subject to certain, specifically mentioned, 
limitations. Where a directive is accompanied by a specific scope rule 
delineating its application, the purpose of the directive can, on occasion, 
only be achieved by affording overriding effect to its provisions. According 
to Kania it is in cases where the European legislator has provided several 
options for extending the scope of protection of the directive, that the 
existence of such gold-plating or optional provisions is likely to lead to their 
application as overriding mandatory provisions beyond the minimum 
protection offered by the directive. In this, the overriding effect of national 
implementation provisions does not occur by chance, but is effectuated, 
perhaps unwittingly, by the directive itself.1037 In essence this means that the 
overriding effect of national acquired rights provisions, even if offering more 
protection than provided by the directive, stems directly from the directive 
and the scope rule contained therein. To my mind however, this view is not 
to be endorsed. National acquired rights provisions exceeding the minimum 
protection standards set forth by the Acquired Rights Directive do not simply 
hitch a ride to the considerations underlying the overriding nature of 
provisions stemming directly from the directive. As is clear from the 
judgment in Unamar provisions exceeding the minimum protection afforded 
by a directive may be classified as overriding mandatory provision only if 
their application is considered essential by the Member State 
concerned.1038After all in Unamar the ECJ gave validity to the possible 
application of overriding mandatory provisions of national law that exceed 
the minimum protection offered by a directive. As such, a Member State 
may apply its provisions exceeding minimum harmonisation in spite of the 
lex causae. In order to establish whether these national provisions have 
overriding mandatory effect the national court must ´take account not only of 
the exact terms of that law, but also of its general structure and of all the 
circumstances in which that law was adopted in order to determine whether 
it is mandatory in nature in so far as it appears that the legislature adopted it 
                                                          
1037 Kania 2014, p. 206; Schwartz 2002, p. 70. 
1038 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663 
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in order to protect an interest judged to be essential by the Member State 
concerned.´1039 Even if the lex causae refers to the law of a Member State 
that has correctly transposed the provisions of a directive may the overriding 
gold plating or scope-extending provisions of the lex fori be applied if these 
provisions intend to protect essential interests.1040 The court in Unamar 
makes a clear distinction between national implementation provisions and 
provisions that that surpass the protection awarded by the directive.1041 It 
fails however to take account of the notion that these overriding mandatory 
provisions may be embedded into national legislation and entangled with the 
general implementation provisions of a directive in such a way that their 
separation may prove a burdensome, if not impossible, task. The question 
therefore arises whether accepting national overriding provisions offering a 
surplus to a directive necessarily entails the concomitant application of its 
general implementation provisions, if only for reasons of legal certainty and 
practicability.                         
 
Overall, in relation to the Acquired Rights Directive the effect of the 
judgment in Ingmar is somewhat limited. First, there exists a special 
protective conflict of laws provision for individual employees that does not 
exist for the commercial agent, limiting the effects of the judgment in 
Ingmar. Indeed Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation severely limits the 
choice of law in individual contracts of employment by securing the 
application of the mandatory provisions of the objectively applicable law 
whenever they are more beneficial to the employee. As such, the judgment 
in Ingmar may only have effect in situations where both the choice of law 
and the objectively applicable law do not point to the laws of a Member 
                                                          
1039 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663 
1040 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663para. 51; in applying the overriding 
extending provisions of the lex fori over those of the lex causae the court must take some 
caution in order not to compromise the harmonizing effect of the directive.  
1041 Another idea that stems from the judgments in Unamar and Ingmar is that certain 
provisions may be considered part of the lex causae as well as overriding mandatory 
provisions, thus putting an end to the notion that there exists a strict dichotomy between these 
types of rules. Thus, in relation to the Acquired Rights Directive, the application of Article 8 
Rome I Regulation does not necessarily exclude the application of Article 9. 
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State.1042 Second, the Acquired Rights Directive is equipped with an express 
scope rule delineating when it is to be applied, a scope rule that did not exist 
in the Commercial Agents Directive. Thus where it may be derived from 
Ingmar that overriding effect is only attributed to secondary European Union 
law if the provisions stemming from directives according to their purpose 
and aim require application irrespective of the choice of law made by the 
parties, this classification as overriding mandatory is superfluous if effect is 
directly given to the scope rule of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive.1043 In this, the question that arises is that of the effect of the scope 
rule on national implementation provisions. In other words, what is the effect 
of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive and how should it be 
implemented into national legislation?  
 
6.2.2.6 Translation of Art. 1(2) ARD into national law 
In essence there are two ways to translate Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive into national legislation. First, there may be a literal translation of 
the provision that will secure the application of national acquired rights 
provisions whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within a 
European Member State. Second, the Member States could translate the 
provisions to their own territories in the sense that national acquired rights 
provisions will only apply if the undertaking to be transferred is situation 
within the national territory of the affected Member State. The majority of 
Member State acquired rights provisions do not possess a scope rule similar 
to that of the Acquired Rights Directive. This is different only  for a handful 
of Member States, which have made use of either the first or the second 
option in translating the provision of Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
into their national legislation. Denmark and Greece have (almost) literally 
transposed Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive into their national 
legislation by limiting the application of their national acquired rights 
provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being situated within the 
                                                          
1042 This was the case in  the infamous ‘Amerikanische Piloten’ case in which the German 
Bundesarbeitsgericht ruled against the application of its national acquired rights provisions as 
overriding mandatory rules: BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92.  
1043 In this sense it should be noted that the provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights 
Directive are likely to be classified as overriding mandatory provisions since they are based in 
internal market interest in addition to protecting the interests of the individual and collective 
employee(s).  
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territorial scope of the Treaty1044 or to the transfer of an undertaking 
whenever it is situated within the area to which the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Area is applied.1045 By doing so, they have, in all 
appearances, complied with the Acquired Rights Directive and Article 1(2). 
When compared to the implementation measures that limit their application 
to national territory the application of Danish and Greek acquired rights 
provisions appears broader in nature. If a literal application of the scope rule 
in Article 1(2) is utilised to apply national legislation1046national acquired 
rights provisions will be applied whenever the undertaking to be transferred 
is situated within EU territory and the case falls within the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Member State concerned. The existing differences in the 
(perceived) territorial scope of national acquired rights provisions may result 
in different national laws applying in different Member States. This, to some 
extent, negates the primary purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive which 
is to harmonise the laws of the Member States in order to safeguard the 
rights of employees upon a transfer of undertaking. Conversely, it is this 
same harmonisation that should ensure minimum protection upon a transfer 
of undertaking throughout the Member States. Thus, the laws of the Member 
States, by complying with the directive, should all ensure that the rights of 
employees upon a transfer of undertaking are safeguarded to a minimum 
extent.   
 
With respect to the second option of transposition, it has on occasion, been 
stated that the Member States that apply this option do not comply with the 
Acquired Rights Directive by limiting the application of their national 
acquired rights provisions to the undertaking being transferred to be situated 
within their territory immediately prior to the transfer.1047 However, Article 
1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive clearly states that the provisions of the 
                                                          
1044 Greece. 
1045 Denmark. 
1046 Here a literal interpretation is intended only, since only the wording of existing legislation 
and not its interpretation in case law is studied.  
1047 McMullen 2005, p. 298; Laagland 2011, p. 19, who commenting on the acquired rights 
provisions of the UK suggests that TUPE applies whenever the transferred undertaking is 
situated in the United Kingdom, while surely meaning that the undertaking to be transferred 
has to be situated within the United Kingdom for TUPE to apply. She believes that employees 
suffering damages as a result of the, in her view, erroneous implementation of the Acquired 
Rights Directive can at best apply/ sue for damages.  
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directive ‘shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part 
of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the 
territorial scope of the Treaty’. This territorial scope could surely translate to 
the Member States applying their national acquired rights provisions where 
and insofar as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business to be transferred is situated within their territory. After all, the 
‘territorial scope of the Treaty’ mainly comprises the combined European 
territory of the EU Member States and as such, the territory of the European 
Union forms the sum of its constituent parts. Thus, if each Member State 
were to apply its national acquired rights provisions whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is located within its territory, the combined 
application of the national acquired rights provisions of the European 
Member States will comprise the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights 
Directive itself. In other words, the proper application of Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive is ensured by the European Member States 
limiting the application of their national acquired rights provisions to the 
undertaking being transferred being located within their territory. Surely, the 
individual European Member States are unable to apply their national 
legislation outside their national borders, save for the situations where the 
conflict of laws, in international situations, points to the application of their 
law(s), to the same extent as the European Union is unable to impose 
Community legislation on non-Member States. Limiting the application of 
national acquired rights provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being 
located within the territory of the Member State in question will surely result 
in the protection of employees involved in outbound transfers only. 
Countries that utilize this second approach are e.g. the United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg and  Malta.1048 In the example of the United Kingdom, this 
means that a business transfer from the United Kingdom to a country outside 
the United Kingdom, whether an EU Member State or a third country will 
result in the application of the United Kingdom’s national acquired rights 
provisions, i.e. the TUPE Regulations. In the reverse situation, involving an 
inbound transfer, i.e. where the business being transferred is transferred from 
a Member State to the UK, the provisions of TUPE will not protect the 
affected employees.1049 This situation is not irreconcilable with Article 1(2) 
                                                          
1048 See Chapter 2.  
1049 McMullen 2005, p. 298-299. 
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of the Acquired Rights Directive since in the event of an inbound transfer 
under which a business or undertaking is transferred from a Member State to 
the United Kingdom, the national acquired rights provisions of the Member 
State of origin will apply, resulting in compliance with the Acquired Rights 
Directive. Where it involves an inbound transfer according to which the 
undertaking being transferred is situated immediately before the transfer in a 
non-Member State the Member States are surely free to impose their national 
acquired rights provisions on the employees affected by the incoming 
business or undertaking.1050 The Acquired Rights Directive however, does 
not require them to do so, as the directive itself does not extend to these 
types of transfer scenarios. The directive merely ensures that the rights of 
workers employed in European based undertakings are safeguarded upon the 
transfer of such undertakings. In summary, although the territorial scope 
contained in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive does not require 
the Member States to limit the application of their national implementation 
measures whenever the undertaking, business or part of an undertaking of 
business to be transferred is located within their territory, it neither 
precludes the Member States from doing so. As such, the national acquired 
rights provisions may take the form of a unilateral scope rule with 
multilateral implications in the sense that the application of the national 
acquired rights provisions is dependent on the geographical location of the 
undertaking to be transferred. Insofar as it involves intra-European transfers 
of undertakings, or outbound transfers of undertakings from a Member State 
to a non-Member State the application of the Acquired Rights Directive 
through the actual application of its national counterparts is ensured.1051 
Thus, the UK’s acquired rights provisions, which apply to a transfer of an 
undertaking situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom, 
remain unapplied when, for example, a Dutch undertaking, situated in the 
Netherlands, is transferred from a Dutch transferor to an English transferee 
coupled with a simultaneous relocation to the United Kingdom. Article 
3(1)(a) of the UK’s TUPE Regulations unilaterally sets forth when the 
Regulations themselves apply and remains silent on the application of 
                                                          
1050 Article 8 of the Acquired Rights Directive permits the Member States ‘to apply or 
introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to 
employees or to promote or permit collective agreements or agreements between social 
partners more favourable to employees.’ 
1051 Cf. Henckel 2012, p. 376 et seq. 
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foreign law. The law applicable to such a transfer, from the Netherlands to 
the United Kingdom, will have to be determined by the English court, 
according to its own private international law. It is unclear which law, 
according to English private international law, applies to a transfer of 
undertaking in the absence of the TUPE regulations being applicable. What 
is clear however, that in these circumstances the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within Member State territory prior to the transfer, 
thus requiring the application of the laws of a Member State, i.e. national 
implementation measures corresponding to the provisions of the directive. In 
the aforementioned example, Article 1(2) does not require the UK (or any 
other European Member State) to apply its own implementation measures, 
rather Article 1(2) requires the application of Member State implementation 
measures irrespective of the method through which this is achieved. Thus the 
provisions of the Member States such as the United Kingdom, Malta and 
Luxembourg, which have limited the application of national law to the 
undertaking being transferred being situated within national territory is not 
incompatible with the directive as long as Member State acquired rights 
provisions are applied whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within EU territory.1052 Laagland, however, believes that the United 
Kingdom (and by extension likely all countries in the second category) has 
failed to properly transpose Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive.1053 
In her belief, limiting national acquired rights provisions to the location of 
the undertaking being transferred upon national territory is an unwarranted 
narrowing of the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. More so, she 
believes that employees suffering damages as a result are entitled to claim 
damages from the United Kingdom. This vision is at odds with the idea that 
the provisions of the directive are overridingly mandatory by virtue of a 
distinct scope rule (encompassed in Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive)  
which seeks connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred, 
which is a view also portrayed by Laagland.1054 Assimilated under the 
                                                          
1052 Such application would certainly be guaranteed if multilateral implications are attributed 
to the unilateral conflict of laws provisions of the Member States in the second group. In other 
words, if the application of Member State law were to be made dependent on the undertaking 
to be transferred being situated in that distinct Member State upon or immediately prior to the 
transfer.  
1053 Laagland 2011, p. 19 
1054 Laagland 2011, p. 18. 
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doctrine of overriding mandatory rules, the acquired rights provisions apply 
by virtue of their distinct scope and are in no need of a special conflict of 
laws rule determining their application where their protection is limited to 
the minimum level of employment protection offered by the Acquired Rights 
Directive.1055 The application of these national acquired rights provisions is 
dependent on the scope rule contained in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and in that sense tied to the territory of the Member States. The 
directive does not require the laws of the countries of both the transferor and 
the transferee to simultaneously apply in intra-European transfer 
scenarios,1056 leaving aside the likely impossibility of such cumulative 
application.1057 Sufficient is that the national acquired rights provisions of at 
least one Member State are applicable in cases involving an intra-European 
transfer of undertaking. As each Member State is obliged to comply with the 
minimum protection awarded by the directive, employees adversely affected 
by the non-application of the laws of the country of the transferee are by no 
means entitled to damages, at least not on the basis of European law. Surely, 
as mentioned above, the directive itself only states that it applies where and 
in so far as the business or undertaking to be transferred is situated within 
the territorial scope of the Treaty and remains silent on the territorial 
application of the national implementation measures. It follows from the 
wording of the Acquired Rights Directive that it applies to intra-European 
and outbound, i.e. outside the EU, transfers of undertakings alike. Whereas a 
literal interpretation may not warrant the limitation of national acquired 
rights provisions to the undertaking to be transferred being situated within 
their distinct national territory, a rational and teleological interpretation does. 
The EU has the authority to impose legislation on the (combined) EU 
territory, whereas the Member States have the ability to do so within their 
national territory (naturally save for situations where by reason of the 
conflict of laws their legislation is applied across national borders). 
Moreover, the Acquired Rights Directive is largely based in the idea of 
safeguarding the rights of employees in the event of a transfer of 
undertaking, thus ensuring to some extent equal competition throughout the 
                                                          
1055 Henckel 2012, p. 376 – 389; Cf. Symeonides 2014, p. 300; Van Bochove 2014, p. 153. 
1056 See paragraph 3.2.1. 
1057 The possible cumulative application of acquired rights provisions in force and the country 
of the transferor and that of the transferee is discussed above in paragraph 5.3. 
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Common Market. From a Common Market perspective, according to Fetsch, 
the location of the undertaking to be transferred is the most natural 
connecting factor in determining the application of the directive and its 
national counterparts.1058 As stated above,  the directive itself contains no 
direct conflict of laws provisions and leaves it to the Member States to 
determine the law that applies to a given transfer of undertaking. In doing so, 
the Member States appear free to utilise the connecting factor they feel is 
best suited to ensure the continuation of acquired employment rights upon a 
transfer of undertaking as long as this does not conflict with Article 1(2). 
 
In any event, the scope rule of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
is clear when it comes to the application of the directive itself but may be 
difficult to translate into national law. What is clear from the provision of the 
directive is that the provisions of a Member State have to be applied 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within European 
territory, whether this translates to national law applying to the combined 
EU territory or whether the application of national law could be limited to 
national territory remains unclear. Again, the directive secures the 
application of Member State legislation whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within the territory of a Member State, but remains 
silent on the method through which this application is to be achieved. Still, 
the Member States that have not transposed the scope rule into their national 
legislation are required to apply the so-called directive-compliant 
interpretation by reason of the lack of an express provision regarding the 
territorial scope of their national acquired rights provisions. Surely the 
Member States are free not to achieve implementation via legislative action. 
However, where they choose to do so, transferee, transferor and the affected 
employees must be able to easily determine when a transfer of undertaking 
occurs in order to determine their legal position. After all, the application of 
the national acquired rights provisions is not spontaneously limited to the 
undertaking to be transferred being situated within a Member State’s distinct 
                                                          
1058 As the next Chapter(s), in particular Chapter 5 and 6, will show, there are a variety of 
views and theories on the most appropriate conflict of laws method for determining the 
applicable law in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. Since this paragraph 
merely seeks to establish if, in principle, the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts apply to a cross-border transfer of undertaking a detailed discussion and 
overview of these views and methods will not be provided at this juncture. 
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territory. Thus, the Member States have to actively ensure that Article 1(2) 
of the Acquired Rights Directive is properly applied and transposed. In any 
event, they will have to ensure, that a Member State’s national acquired 
rights provisions are applied whenever the undertaking to be transferred is 
situated within European territory prior to the transfer. If their acquired 
rights provisions are not naturally applied in the aforementioned event, the 
Member States and national courts will have to apply directive-compliant 
interpretation to ensure compliance with the Acquired Rights Directive. 
Thus, for example, in the so-called Amerikanische Piloten-case1059 in which 
the German Bundesarbeitsgericht famously ruled against the application of 
§613a BGB as overriding mandatory rule, the German acquired rights 
provisions should have been applied irrespective of the affected employees’ 
employment contract being subject to the laws of New York. As mentioned 
above, the case involved the transfer of a Berlin based aviation business, 
involved in domestic German air travel, from Pan American World Airways 
to  Berliner Lufthansa Airport. In this case, the BAG1060 concluded that 
neither §613a BGB nor the national acquired rights provisions of another 
Member State were applicable, even though the undertaking transferred was 
situated in Germany both before and after the transfer.1061 The ruling in this 
case abundantly conflicts with Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, 
according to which the national acquired rights provisions of a Member State 
should always apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated in 
European territory. More so, the BAG should have utilized a directive-
compliant interpretation ensuring the application of § 613a BGB, 
irrespective of the employment contract being governed by the laws of the 
State of New York both by reason of choice of law and as applicable law in 
the absence of choice (due to the law of the habitual place of employment 
being set aside by reason of the circumstances of the case making the 
contract more closely connected with the State of New York). Surely, the 
result of the conflict of laws reference (in this case connection is sought to 
the employment contract) should not be able to set aside the mandatory 
provisions arising from the Acquired Rights Directive. A fortiori, Article 
                                                          
1059 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
1060 This conclusion was based on Articles 30 and 34 EGBGB (the German provisions 
transposing Articles 6 and 7 of the Rome Convention 1980). 
1061 BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
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1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive contains an express scope rule, which 
holds an inherent conflict of laws implication that national acquired rights 
provisions will apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within the territory of a Member State, but remains silent on which national 
acquired rights provisions are to be applied in any given case. Leaving aside 
whether Article 1(2) should (naturally) translate to the Member States 
limiting the application of their national acquired rights provisions to the 
undertaking to be transferred being situated within their distinct territory, the 
national transposition measures should undoubtedly ensure the application of 
the laws of a Member State whenever the undertaking to be transferred is 
situated within the territory of the European Union. Where national 
implementation measures fail to do so, a conflict with Community law, i.e. 
Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, arises.1062 This failure to 
properly implement the directive may be remedied first by legislative action 
and second by directive-compliant interpretation. In any event, where, upon 
the transfer of a European based undertaking, application of Member State 
acquired rights provisions is not guaranteed, a correction of the result of the 
conflict of laws reference should come to pass.1063 Such a correction may 
occur on the basis of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive, by giving 
overriding effect to the acquired rights provisions of the lex fori. Thus, 
although in my opinion a transfer of undertaking falls outside the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation and should form an independent conflict of laws 
category for which a connection to the individual contract of employment is 
wholly unsuited, if such a connection and application is assumed giving 
overriding effect to national acquired rights provisions1064 solves the 
situation when the applicable law does not point to the laws of a Member 
State despite the undertaking to be transferred being situated in a European 
Member State. Here the question arises whether this overriding effect is 
applied by way of the provision on overriding mandatory rules (Article 9) or 
through Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation.   
 
                                                          
1062 Krebber 1998, p. 140. 
1063 Such correction mechanisms can generally be found in the doctrines of public policy and 
overriding mandatory rules. For more on this and the relation of these mechanisms to the 
transfer of undertakings para. 6.2 and 6.2 of the current Chapter. 
1064 Such application cannot be afforded to the directive itself since it does not directly apply 
to private parties within the Member States.  
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6.2.2.7 Article 23 Rome I Regulation 
Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation lays down the maxim of lex specialis 
derogat legi generali, according to which priority is to be given to the 
conflict of laws provision that is most specific. As per Article 23: 
 
‘(…) this Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down 
conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations.’1065  
 
Surely, where conflict of laws rules are dispersed among several instruments 
of Community law, differences between these instruments should, as far as 
possible, be prevented.1066 However, the Regulation does not hold an 
exclusion preventing conflict of laws mechanisms from being contained 
within other instruments of Community law. Specific European law 
instruments on particular matters containing conflict of laws rules relating to 
contractual obligations take precedence over the Rome I Regulation and the 
conflict of laws provisions enclosed therein. In addition, the Rome I 
Regulation gives way to the application of particular instruments 
contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market and entailing the 
free movement of goods and services in the sense that the law designated by 
the regulation may not conflict with the application of these instruments. In 
other words, if these instruments cannot by applied in conjunction with the 
law designated by the conflict of laws provisions of the regulation, the 
regulation shall not be applied.1067    
 
According to the European Commission, in its Green Paper for a revision of 
the Rome Convention, the proliferation of rules determining their own 
scope, especially those designed to protect weaker parties, is cause for 
concern. This concern is furthered by the fact that the determination of the 
territorial scope of especially secondary European Union law has an impact 
                                                          
1065 The wording of this Article is similar to that of Article 20 of the Rome Convention. 
Article 20 Rome Convention: This Convention shall not affect the application of provisions 
which, in relation to particular matters, lay down choice of law rules relating to contractual 
obligations and which are or will be contained in acts of the institutions of the European 
Communities or in national laws harmonized in implementation of such acts.’ 
1066 Recital 40 Rome I Regulation.  
1067 Recital 40, paragraph 2 Rome I Regulation.  
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on the applicable law and may eventually ‘harm the consistency of the body 
of conflict rules applicable in the Union’.1068 Most of the directives and 
scenarios discussed in the Green Paper have to do with consumer 
protection1069 rather than employee protection. Although several directives 
comprising explicit scope rules are based in weaker party protection, the 
Acquired Rights Directive enjoys a special role due to the fact that a transfer 
of undertaking occurs by operation of law rather than being the result of 
party autonomy.1070 In the area of consumer protection party autonomy is an 
important factor. In this sector, directives are accompanied by scope rules in 
order to avoid their non-application by reason of a contractual choice of law 
for a third state. These specific scope rules, on occasion referred to as 
‘unwanted intruders into the realm of the Rome Convention’,1071 generally 
refer to a close connection with the territory of the European Union and thus 
hold unintelligible connecting factors compared to the uniform and easily 
determined conflict of laws connections utilized in the Rome Convention 
and the Rome I Regulation.1072 In addition, as stated above, the unilateral 
approach of these specific scope rules is dogmatically and practically at odds 
with the multilateral approach offered in the Rome Convention and the 
                                                          
1068 Green Paper, p. 17. 
1069 Cf. Art. 6(2) of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts (O.J. EC 1993 L 95, p. 29–34); art. 12(2) of the Directive 97/7/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in 
respect to distance contracts (O.J. EC 1997 L 144, p. 19–27); Art. 7(2) of the Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects 
of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (O.J. EC 1999 L 171, p. 12–16); Art. 
12(2) of the Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and 
amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (O.J. EC 
2002 L 271, pp. 16– 24); a slightly different approach is followed by Art. 9 of the Directive 
94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of 
purchasers in respect to certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use 
immovable properties on a timeshare basis (O.J. EC 1994 L 280, p. 83–87): “whatever the 
applicable law may be.” 
1070 In this sense one might even ask whether the a transfer of undertaking is within the scope 
of the Rome I Regulation. Still, if assimilated under the conflict of laws category for 
individual employment contracts, the employment contract may contain a choice of law that 
leads to the application of the laws of a non-Member State. 
1071 Magnus & Mankowski 2002;  Cf. Jayme & Kohler 1995, p.  11-36; Wilderspin & Lewis 
2002, p. 292-294, 307. 
1072 Magnus & Mankowski 2002. 
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Rome I Regulation. More so, additional conflict of laws rules in specific 
legislation may cloud the clear and easily accessible conflict of laws regime 
that is to be found in the Rome I Regulation.  
 
The provision of Article 23 Rome I Regulation applies to all provisions of 
Community law that hold a special implication for the conflict of laws, 
including those in directives. However, since directives are not directly 
applicable to private individuals the provision of Article 23 equally applies 
to the harmonized national law of the Member States. In this, the wording of 
Article 23 Rome I Regulation differs from that of its predecessor, Article 20 
Rome Convention, which clearly stipulated that the Convention does not 
affect ‘the application of provisions which, in relation to particular matters, 
lay down choice of law rules relating to contractual obligations and which 
are or will be contained in the acts of the institutions of the European 
Community or in national law harmonized in implementation of such acts’. 
As such, national acquired rights provisions implementing a specific choice 
of law provision stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive may 
supersede the application of the Rome I Regulation by reason of Article 23 
Rome I Regulation. The question then remains whether Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive qualifies as such a specific conflict of laws 
provision. Above, I have briefly mentioned that many acts of secondary 
European Union law include specific provisions regarding their scope of 
application, unilaterally determining when they are to be applied. Although 
Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive qualifies as such a scope rule it 
remains questionable whether it in itself constitutes a conflict of laws 
provision. In the sparse amount of legal literature on the matter it is assumed 
that this is not the case.1073 After all, the provision of Article 1(2) does not 
directly hold any express implications for the conflict of laws; it merely 
delineates its territorial application. The directive does not clarify which law 
is to be applied to a cross-border transfer of undertaking in situations 
involving a conflit of laws. More so, as the previous subparagraph has 
shown, the provision is somewhat ambiguous and the Member States share 
different views on how the provision is to be translated into national law, 
highlighting that ensuring the proper application of Community law by 
means of unilateral (conflict of laws) provisions or distinct scope rules, 
                                                          
1073 Kania 2012, p. 180. 
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especially when geared towards application within the EU territory as a 
whole, does not fit in well with the existing conflict of laws regime.   
 
6.2.2.8 Article 4(3) TEU 
On occasion, it is considered that the duty of sincere cooperation that is 
enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU has some bearing on the overriding 
application of national implementation provisions, especially where their 
application cannot be ensured by means of Article 9 Rome I Regulation.1074 
Article 4(3) TEU reads: 
 
‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the 
Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the 
Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union's objectives.’    
 
On the basis of the above Article it may be that overriding effect is to be 
given to national provisions implementing directives if this is the only way 
through which Union objectives (or the objectives of directives in general) 
can be achieved. It is this very question that was recently posed to the ECJ 
by the German Bundesarbeitsgericht.1075 One of the questions referred to the 
court was whether the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 
4(3) TEU is relevant ‘for legal purposes, for the decision of national courts 
on whether overriding mandatory provisions of another Member State are 
directly or indirectly applicable?’1076 This case, which does not involve the 
Acquired Rights Directive, but may have a direct effect on its application, 
has not yet been decided upon by the ECJ. Thus it remains to be decided 
whether Article 4(3) has some effect on how national courts are to deal with 
                                                          
1074 Kania 2012, p. 175, 176, 227; BAG 25 December 2015 – 5 AZR 962/13.  
1075 BAG 25 December 2015 – 5 AZR 962/13. 
1076 BAG 25 December 2015 – 5 AZR 962/13; Case C-135/15 Nikiforidis. 
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overriding provisions of other Member States that find their basis or origin 
in European Union law. To me however it seems contrary to the aim and 
purpose of the Rome I Regulation to allow the Member States to bypass 
Article 9 Rome I Regulation (and 23 Rome I Regulation) by directly 
applying national implementation provisions of third states. After all, Article 
9(3) severely limits the application of third state overriding mandatory 
provisions excluding their application when they are not part of the laws in 
force at the place of performance of the contract. In addition, Article 9(3) 
only gives effect to third state overriding mandatory provisions where these 
provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. As such certain 
provisions, such as national acquired rights provisions, are excluded from 
Article 9(3) by their very nature.1077 In this sense it seems inappropriate to, 
by reason of Article 4(3) TEU, circumvent Article 9(3) by applying the 
overriding provisions of third states that are beyond the scope of Article 9(3) 
and that do not possess any accompanying conflict of laws provisions in the 
sense of Article 23 Rome I Regulation. Thus an overriding mandatory 
application of foreign mandatory provisions on the basis of Article 4(3) TEU 
is incompatible with the regime of Rome and Article 9(3) Rome I 
Regulation.1078 A-G Maciej Szpunar in his opinion in the abovementioned 
case of Nikiforidis1079 reaches a similar conclusion by stating that the 
principle of sincere cooperation, as encompassed by Article 4(3), does not 
bestow upon the Member States a duty to apply the overriding mandatory 
provisions of other Member States, not even when such application would 
serve to fulfill this state’s obligations towards the European Union. This 
includes both the case in which a national court wishes to review these 
provisions in light of the application of the lex causae and the case of 
application of Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation.1080  
                                                          
1077 See above paragraph 6.2.2.5. 
1078 To this end it should be noted that certain Member States, such as Germany and Poland, 
within their national law allow foreign overriding mandatory provisions to be taken into 
account on a substantive level.  
1079 Opinion Advocate General Maciej Szpunar Nikiforidis Case C-135/15 [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:281; Cf. BAG 25 December 2015 – 5 AZR 962/13. 
1080 Opinion Advocate General Maciej Szpunar Case C-135/15 Nikiforidis [2016] ECLI EU 
C2016, 281, para. 125: ‘Angesichts dessen bin ich der Ansicht, dass man dem Grundsatz der 
loyalen Zusammenarbeit – wie ihn Art. 4 Abs. 3 EUV aufstellt – nicht die Pflicht entnehmen 
kann, Bestimmungen eines anderen Mitgliedstaats Wirkung zu verleihen, selbst dann nicht, 
wenn sie dazu dienen, die Verpflichtungen dieses Staates gegenüber der Union zu erfüllen. 
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Kania, however, believes that where it concerns cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, the overriding effect of national acquired rights provisions 
stems directly from Article 4(3) TEU requiring the Member States to apply 
the overriding mandatory acquired rights provisions of other Member States 
in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking.1081 Such application, 
according to Kania, would ensure the application of e.g. German acquired 
rights provisions in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking from 
Germany to another (Member) State to the extent that the German acquired 
rights provisions are classified as overriding mandatory provisions.1082  In 
this the Acquired Rights Directive is considered a lex specialis to the Rome I 
Regulation. The reasoning behind this special conflict of laws treatment of 
the Acquired Rights Directive (over Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation) lies in 
the notion that the overall purpose of the directive cannot be achieved 
without special overriding application of national acquired rights 
provisions.1083 Surely national acquired rights provisions fall outwith Article 
9(3) Rome I Regulation as they do not render any kind of contract 
unlawful.1084 However, to my mind the non-application of Article 9(3) in 
relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings does not necessarily 
conflict with the Acquired Rights Directive and the scope rule of Article 
1(2). Surely if full literal effect is given to Article 1(2) of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, national acquired rights provisions are applicable whenever 
the undertaking to be transferred is situated in a European Member State. 
Thus, by reason of Article 1(2) national acquired rights provisions may 
apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within EU 
territory, regardless of whether the undertaking is situated in national 
territory (i.e. the territory of the forum state) prior to or upon the transfer. 
The fact that in giving full effect to Article 1(2) the application of the law of 
                                                                                                                                        
Dies betrifft sowohl den Fall, in dem das Gericht die Berücksichtigung dieser Bestimmungen 
als tatsächliche Umstände im Rahmen der Anwendung der lex causae erwägt, als auch den 
Fall der Anwendung von Art. 9 Abs. 3 der Rom-I-Verordnung durch das Gericht.’ [not yet 
available in English] 
1081 Kania 2012, p. 176, 227; Contra Niksova 2014, p. 102-103. 
1082 Kania 2012, p. 176. 
1083 Kania 2012, p. 227; He comes to this conclusion in order to prevent a Statutenwechsel and 
to prevent transferee and transferee from taking advantage of such a change in law and 
purposely circumventing the application of acquired rights provisions (e.g. by letting the 
relocation preceed the transfer of undertaking).  
1084 See above, paragraph 6.2.2.5. 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
333 
 
the forum state, in some cases, does not correspond to the application of the 
law of the Member State from which the transferred undertaking originates 
may not be contrary to the meaning of the Acquired Rights Directive. After 
all, Article 1(2) of the directive requires the application of national acquired 
rights provisions whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within the territory of a Member State but does not designate which national 
acquired rights provisions are to be applied in this event. As such it appears 
that the Acquired Rights Directive itself makes no distinction between the 
national implementation laws of the Member States. Indeed, all Member 
States are to transpose the provisions of the directive into national law, thus 
ensuring a certain minimum level of employment protection throughout the 
European Union. In this, it may not matter whether the laws of a particular 
Member State are applied in a given case. As long as the provisions of a 
Member State are awarded application the minimum level of employment 
protection guaranteed by the directive is ensured. If the national acquired 
rights provisions are to be considered overriding mandatory provisions by 
reason of both their aim and purpose and the scope rule contained in Article 
1(2) Acquired Rights Directive the application of national acquired rights 
provisions is already ensured on the basis of Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation 
which facilitates the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of 
the lex fori Surely any Member State is free to argue that the exceeding 
protection offered by their acquired rights provisions requires overriding 
application over the laws of another Member State.1085 In the latter scenario 
however the overriding effect finds its basis in national law and cannot be 
granted by way of Article 4(3) TEU. More so, it appears that their 
application can neither be ensured by Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation.  
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, it appears that the doctrine of overriding mandatory 
provisions is exclusively reserved for provisions that surpass the interests of 
the individual. More so, provisions that are driven by socio-political 
interests, such as those involving weaker party protection, should not readily 
be presumed overriding mandatory by nature. In fact, these provisions are 
primarily intended to strike a balance between the interests of the parties 
involved in the contract. In these situations the protection principle inhabited 
                                                          
1085 Cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663.  
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by the conflict of laws reference encompassed in Article 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation generally offers sufficient protection. The provisions stemming 
from the Acquired Rights Directive, although party rooted in the interests 
underlying the establishment of the internal market,1086 are primarily 
intended to protect the employees affected by the transfer of undertaking. 
Even though the directive makes provision for the transfer of rights and 
obligations stemming from collective agreements and the preservation of 
function and position of employee representatives it does so, primarily in the 
interests of the affected employees. In case law and legal literature it is 
therefore largely assumed that the national provisions implementing the 
Acquired Rights Directive are not to be classified as overriding mandatory 
provisions.1087 Still, it may be argued that the internal market considerations 
and the collective employment aspects insert an interest into the Acquired 
Rights Directive that surpasses that of the individual allowing the national 
implementation provisions to act as overriding mandatory provisions in 
respect of the lex causae.1088 However, since the Acquired Rights Directive 
is equipped with a distinct scope rule one could also ask whether there is 
even a need for such a classification as overriding mandatory provisions. 
After all the dogmatic distinction of whether a provision is considered 
overriding mandatory or not is immaterial whenever a provision of national 
law is equipped with a specific scope rule. In such situations there need not 
be a study of whether the rule to which the scope rule applies is to be 
classified as overriding mandatory. In this the overriding nature of certain 
provisions may stem from their accompanying scope rule allowing their 
application as overriding mandatory provisions under Article 9 Rome I 
Regulation. After all, Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation clearly emphasizes that 
‘nothing shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions 
of the forum.’ It could therefore be argued that by reason of the scope rule in 
the Acquired Rights Directive, national acquired rights provisions may 
require application whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within the territory of a Member State, irrespective of and without 
                                                          
1086 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605 
1087 Däubler 2008, p. 126. Cf. Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8; Rehbahn, p. 234 (who 
argues that provisions should not easily be considered overriding mandatory provisions); 
BAG 29 October 1992 – 2 AZR 267/92. 
1088 Kania 2014, p. 186-187; Laagland 2011, p. 17-18.  
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determination of the law that would otherwise govern the situation.1089 
However, the classification as overriding mandatory cannot stem directly 
from the directive itself and is left to the Member States themselves. It is 
their national acquired rights provisions that may require overriding 
application since the directive itself is not directly applicable to individual 
actors within the Member States.1090 This classification of national acquired 
rights provisions as overriding mandatory by reason of Article 1(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive will prove difficult. After all, the Member States 
do not agree on the significance of Article 1(2) of the directive and the way 
in which it is to be implemented into national law. Whereas some Member 
States appear to apply their national acquired rights provisions whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within a European Member State,1091 
others have limited the application of their provisions to national 
territories1092 while the majority has refrained from awarding any 
significance to the scope rule of Article 1(2) at all.1093 By equipping the 
Acquired Rights Directive with a distinct scope rule the European legislature 
has not created a unilateral conflict of laws system that operates independent 
to the general conflict of laws regime that exists within European 
Regulations. If given overriding effect within the realm of the Rome I 
Regulation such effect can only come to pass on the basis of Article 9 or 
Article 23 Rome I Regulation. Yet the provisions of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and the scope rule contained therein are difficult to reconcile with 
either of these provisions. On the one hand the provisions of the Acquired 
Rights Directive may only apply if they are considered overriding mandatory 
provisions of the lex fori (a classification which in may prove difficult in 
practice)1094  whereas on the other hand the precise nature of the scope rule 
                                                          
1089 However due to its broad phrasing the scope rule of Article 1(2) does not solve issues of 
conflicting Member State laws as it does not determine which national acquired rights 
provisions are to apply in a given case. The classification of the Acquired Rights provisions as 
overriding mandatory due to the existence of Article 1(2) therefore does not solve the conflict 
of laws issues that exist for transfers of undertakings: see this paragraph, below.  
1090 Cf. Haanappel van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8. 
1091 Denmark and Greece. 
1092 United Kingdom, Malta, Luxembourg.  
1093 AU, BE, BG, CY, DE, EE, ES, F, FI, HR, HU,  I, IE, PL, PT, SE, SI, NL.  
1094 National acquired rights provisions fall outside the scope of Article 9(3) Rome I 
Regulation:  whereas the national implementation provisions of the forum may require direct 
application whenever the situation under consideration falls within their distinct scope, the 
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of Article 1(2) is uncertain, rendering its application on the basis of Article 
23 Rome I Regulation ineffective. To my mind, this again highlights the 
incompatibility of the Acquired Rights Directive with the conflict of laws 
regime that exists under the Rome I Regulation. The fact that, drawing from 
the scope rule in Article 1(2), national acquired rights provisions can only be 
classified as having overriding effect when they give effect to the minimum 
protection of the Acquired Rights Directive,1095 coupled with the inherent 
limitations of overriding mandatory rules as unilateral conflict rules, 
highlights the need for a complementary multilateral conflict of laws rule for 
transfers of undertakings. The scope rule of Article 1(2) only provides an 
overriding mandatory effect to national acquired rights provisions to the 
extent that these provisions form an implementation of the minimum 
protection ensured by the directive.1096 Provisions exceeding the protection 
of the Acquired Rights Directive are not as easily classified as rules of an 
overriding mandatory nature. This classification is left to the Member States 
themselves and requires an assessment of the general structure and 
circumstances under which the law was adopted in order to determine 
whether it is of such importance that the Member State concerned finds its 
application to be essential.1097 Thus, provisions exceeding the minimum 
protection offered by the directive will not be classified as rules with 
overriding mandatory effect of European descent.1098 The application of 
these provisions will thus have to be determined by other means. In this 
sense it should be noted that in practice provisions exceeding the protection 
of the directive will often be entangled with provisions implementing 
minimum protection to such an extent that it will prove difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the two. More so, the directive and its accompanying 
                                                                                                                                        
(non-)classification of overriding mandatory provisions becomes more problematic where it 
concerns overriding mandatory provisions of states other than that of the forum. 
1095 This only holds true when the scope rule is understood and applied in such a way in the 
national law of the Member States.  
1096 In this sense, a national acquired rights provision with overriding mandatory effect will 
most likely equal the lex causae where it concerns the laws of a Member State. Cf. Henckel 
2012, p. 388. 
1097 Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 50.  
1098 Surely the Member States are free to determine the effect to be given to their national 
provisions. Yet, it seems unlikely that national courts are eager to  allow Member State 
provisions offering more protection than the ARD to have an overriding effect on the lex 
causae. Cf. Pfeiffer 2002, p. 830-831, 834-835. 
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scope rule do not determine which national acquired rights provisions are to 
be applied in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking as it does 
not distinguish between the laws and territories of the Member States. As 
such, it remains undetermined which national acquired rights provisions are 
to be applied upon fulfillment of the scope of the directive. For the Member 
States that have limited the application of their acquired rights provisions to 
their distinct territory it remains undetermined which law or acquired rights 
provisions are to be applied whenever the undertaking to be transferred is 
situated beyond their territory. All these problems and ambiguities highlight 
the need for a complementary multilateral conflict of laws rule for transfers 
of undertakings. Before discussing the possibility and desired content of 
such a multilateral conflict of laws rule I will discuss two slightly alternate 
theories and solutions proposed in relation to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings and the conflict of laws.        
 
 
7. Alternate theories and solutions 
In addition to the conflict of laws theories discussed above, i.e. connection to 
the transfer agreement, the individual contract of employment, the location 
of the undertaking to be transferred or the direct application of national 
acquired rights provisions by reason of their distinct scope, there exist some 
additional views and theories on how to deal with the issue of transfers of 
undertakings under the conflict of laws. The purpose of this paragraph is to 
assess the value of these theories and the effect they may have on the 
preferred choice of law method in the event of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking.  
 
7.1 Change in scope 
In solving the conflict of laws problems relating to cross-border transfers of 
undertakings one author proposes to change the scope of the Acquired 
Rights Directive. In her doctoral thesis, Niksova argues for the limitation of 
the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts to domestic and 
intra-European transfers of undertakings. As such, she proposes that the 
undertaking to be transferred should be located within a European Member 
State both before and after the transfer. As such, she proposes the following 
change to Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive: 
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‘Der Geltungsbereich dieser Richtlinie ist erfüllt, wenn sich das 
Unternehmen, der Betriebs oder der Unternehmens- bzw Betriebsteil, 
das bzw übergeht, vo rund nach dem Übergang in einem Mitgliedstaat 
befindet. Beim grenzüberschreitenden Übergang aus einem 
Mitgliedstaat in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat gilt das gem. Art. 8 Rom I-
Vo anzuwendende Recht.’1099  
 
This provision, which is freely translated as ‘the scope of the directive is 
fulfilled, whenever the undertaking, business or part of a business or 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within a Member State before and 
after the transfer; for a cross-border transfer from a Member State to another 
Member State the applicable law in accordance with Art. 8 Rome I 
Regulation is decisive’, seeks to clarify that the application of the directive 
does not extend to inbound and outbound transfer scenarios. The proposed 
solution however does not solve all conflict of laws problems arising in 
relation to a cross-border transfer of undertaking nor does it do justice to the 
aim and purpose of the directive. In its present form, the Acquired Rights 
Directive applies to intra-European transfers and outbound transfers alike. 
This (extended) application to outbound transfers of undertakings already 
existed at the inception of the Acquired Rights Directive and in the earliest 
proposal of 1974. This is hardly surprising since the directive aims to protect 
all workers of European based undertakings upon a transfer of undertaking 
regardless of the destination of the transferred undertaking upon or 
immediately after the transfer.1100 Employees that are affected by national or 
cross-border transfers of undertakings without relocation should not be better 
protected than those who are affected by a transfer of undertaking that is 
accompanied by a simultaneous or subsequent cross-border relocation.1101 
The idea of requiring the undertaking to be situated to a in a Member State 
both before and after the transfer is akin to the cumulative approach to the 
conflict of laws that is discussed above. Here too, the notion of employment 
protection, which lies at the heart of the Acquired Rights Directive, speaks 
against a cumulative application of the laws of transferee and transferor and 
                                                          
1099 Niksova 2014, p. 107. 
1100 Proposal for a directive of the Council ‘harmonisation of the legislation of Member States 
on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers 
and amalgamations’, COM (74) 351 Final/2,  p. 5, 18. 
1101 Bittner 2000, p. 487.  
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the requirement of being situated within a Member State both before and 
after the transfer. In this sense, it is inconceivable why employees should be 
deprived from the protection afforded by the Acquired Rights Directive and 
its national counterparts, simply because of the nationality of the transferee 
or location of the transferred undertaking upon or immediately after the 
transfer.1102 Surely employees of European based undertakings should not be 
barred from (the application of) national acquired rights provisions simply 
because the undertaking in which they are employed is transferred to a non-
Member State instead of a Member State. Allowing such application would 
defeat the entire purpose of the directive which is to safeguard the 
employees from a transfer of undertaking which is entirely beyond their 
control and influence. In addition to my reservations regarding a constriction 
of the Acquired Rights Directive, the connection to the conflict of laws 
category for individual employment contracts remains unsuited for a transfer 
of undertaking.1103 Although an express provision in the Acquired Rights 
Directive does solve the problem of clearly establishing the proper conflict 
of laws regime and determining which national acquired rights provisions 
apply in a given case, it does not solve the problem of e.g. the Amerikansiche 
Piloten-case. Thus where both the choice of law and the objectively 
applicable law to the employment contracts do not point towards the laws of 
a Member State, even though the undertaking to be transferred is situated in 
a Member State both before and after the transfer the national acquired rights 
provisions of the Member State (and thus the directive) remain unapplied. 
More so, the connection to the individual employment contract and the 
habitual place of employment subjects the applicable law to change 
whenever the determination of that law is not fixed in time. A strict reliance 
on Article 8 Rome I Regulation will therefore result in a change of the 
applicable law upon the relocation abroad, a situation which is difficult to 
reconcile with the aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive. The 




                                                          
1102 Ebert 2008, p. 151; Bittner 2000, p. 487. 
1103 See below, paragraph 7 for an extended overview of my personal views in relation to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking.  




Haanappel-van der Burg proposes an alternate solution to the conflict of 
laws problems that arise in relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings 
that relies heavily on the Bündelungsmodell proposed by Schurig.1104 The 
Bündelungsmodell critiques the existing distinction between multilateral and 
unilateral conflict of laws provisions.1105 On the basis of this model every 
rule or norm can potentially be equipped with its own complementary 
conflict of laws provision. The essential and basic building blocks of this 
model are the so-called Elementkollisionsnormen.1106 Every legal norm in 
every legal system is equipped with such a complementary conflict of laws 
norm, which is inevitably unilateral in nature: the Elementkollisionsnorm can 
only state when the legal norm in question (one distinct norm within one 
legal system) requires application. Multilateral conflict of laws provisions 
only come in to existence upon the bundling of legal norms that seek to 
regulate the same or similar substantive issues and underlie the same conflict 
of laws interests. This bundling may occur either horizontally or vertically. 
Horizontal bundling includes the coupling of multiple legal norms from 
different legal systems whereas vertical bundling refers to the coupling of 
national legal norms. The existence of corresponding conflict of laws 
interests is essential to the bundling of legal norms: once a legal norm enjoys 
a different conflict of laws purpose it cannot be bundled.1107 These 
unbundled legal norms hold on to their complementary 
Elementkollisionsnorm and form unilateral conflict of laws provisions. In 
this, the existence of unilateral conflict of laws provisions does not imply a 
breach with the existing system of private international law that mostly relies 
on multilateral conflict of laws provisions. These unilateral conflict rules or 
overriding mandatory provisions only exists because their underlying 
substantive interests result in different conflict of laws interests that exclude 
the inclusion of these norms in an existing bundling or conflict of laws 
category.1108 Drawing from the notion that the substantive purpose and 
                                                          
1104 Schurig 1981, p. 89-108; Schurig 1990, p. 217-250. 
1105 Cf. e.g. Kuipers 2012, p. 142.  
1106 Mankowski 2012, p. 159. 
1107 Schurig 1990, p. 232; The interest and objectives of the legal norm or provision are only 
of secondary importance in the sense that they may influence the conflict of laws interest 
accompanying the legal norm. Cf.  Fetsch 2002, p. 38; Kuipers 2012, p. 142. 
1108 Schurig 1990, p. 233.  
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objectives of individual norms under the Bündelungsmodell only play a 
marginal role in the bundling of legal norms and the conflict of laws 
classification, Haanappel-van der Burg argues that the issue of transfers of 
undertakings comprises a separate category under the conflict of laws.1109 
This argument is supported by the idea that the employee protective nature 
of the Acquired Rights Directive and the internal market objectives 
contained in the directive do not justify the conflict of laws classification 
seeking connection to the individual employment contract or as overriding 
mandatory provisions, since such connections are not justified by the conflict 
of laws interests underlying the Acquired Rights Directive.1110 Under the 
separate conflict of laws category for transfers of undertakings connection is 
rightfully sought to the location of the undertaking or part of the undertaking 
or business. This undertaking forms the pivot of a transfer of undertaking 
and embodies the most natural connecting factor, an argument which is 
supported by the scope rule of Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive 
which, in the territorial application of the directive seeks connection to the 
location of the undertaking, business or part of the business or undertaking to 
be transferred.1111 In deciding upon a separate conflict of laws rule or 
provision for transfers of undertakings for which a connection to the seat of 
the undertaking appears most suitable, Haanappel-van der Burg argues for a 
multilateral approach in intra-EU situations. Since the Member States all 
have an obligation to transpose the directive, their legislation is placed on 
equal footing. Drawing from the notions of the Bündelungsmodell, it is in 
intra-European situations that there exist similar or shared conflict of laws 
interests underlying substantively similar provisions, allowing for a bundling 
of the national acquired rights provisions of the Member States. Such 
bundling however, according to Haanappel-van der Burg cannot occur in 
relation to third states since these regularly do not inhabit any acquired rights 
provisions. She therefore argues for what she calls ‘a unilaterally operating 
multilateral conflict of laws provision in relation to non-Member States.’1112 
                                                          
1109 Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 293; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8; Similarly: 
Birk 1982, p. 396; Birk 1978, p. 291-292; Bittner 2000, p. 464 et seq; Junker 1992, p. 234 et 
seq.; Junker1994, p. 40;  Reichold 2008, p. 697 et seq.; Henckel 2012, p. 389. 
1110 Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 293 
1111 Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 293-294. 
1112 Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9, she states that the multilateral reference rule 
operates unilaterally in relation to non-Member States – insofar as an EU law (obviously 
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This phrasing, which holds an inherent impossibility as multilateral conflict 
of laws provisions by their very nature cannot operate unilaterally, appears 
unintelligible. What she obviously intends to say is that she proposes two 
different conflict of laws approaches: a multilateral approach for intra-
European transfer scenarios and a unilateral approach with respect to non-
Member States, i.e. in outbound transfer scenarios. In essence, she proposes 
that, in relation to third states, Member State acquired rights provisions 
operate as overriding mandatory provisions on the basis of Article 9 Rome I 
Regulation.1113  
 
I have two reservations to this proposal. First, the generalization of all non-
Member States in relation to the bundling of their acquired rights provisions 
does not entirely stroke with the Bündelungsmodell. Surely the laws of most 
foreign states will not possess any provisions akin to those of the Acquired 
Rights Directive. However, there are those states that by drawing inspiration 
from the directive, e.g. Switzerland, South Africa or Aruba,1114 have enacted 
laws that bear great similarity to the provisions of the directive. The laws of 
these states could therefore easily be horizontally bundled allowing for a 
multilateral conflicts of laws approach in their regard. The fact that the 
assessment of a horizontal bundling of the law of all states (and the 
continuing monitoring of legislation) would prove an insurmountable task 
surely makes the decision to give overriding effect to Member State acquired 
rights provisions in relation to third states understandable, but not however, 
justified. Such a decision of a unilateral application of Member States 
acquired rights provisions in relation to non-Member States can only be 
achieved via a rejection (or very limited application) of the 
Bündelungsmodell. My second reservation lies with the notion that in 
relation to third states, Member State acquired rights provisions are to 
operate as overriding mandatory provisions on the basis of Article 9 Rome I 
                                                                                                                                        
meaning the law of an EU Member State) is held applicable: ‘de meerzijdige verwijzingsregel 
functioneert dan slechts eenzijdig – voor zover een EU recht van toepassing wordt verklaard.’ 
1113 Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 295. 
1114Art. 333 OR (Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen 
Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) (Switzerland); Section 197 Labour 
Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995) (South Africa); Art. 1615da BWA et seq. (Aruba); In 2013 
Aruba significantly modernised its employment law. One of the changes was the introduction 
provisions on transfers of undertakings modelled on Dutch law. 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
343 
 
Regulation. Regardless of whether such application is even warranted, it 
cannot be achieved within the realm of the Rome I Regulation. By 
introducing a separate conflict of laws category for transfers of undertakings 
these types of legal relationships fall outside the Rome I Regulation.1115 
Certainly, one could, although the need for such approaches appears 
limited,1116 operate different conflict of laws approaches in relation to 
Member States and non-Member States. If such differences in application 
are considered essential the proper place to make such distinction is within 
the special conflict of laws category and accompanying provision(s) existing 
for transfers of undertakings.  
 
In light of the above, the theory and solutions proposed by Haanappel- van 
den Burg should, at least in part, be rejected. The same goes for her proposal 
not to fixate the determination of the connecting factor (i.e. the location of 
the undertaking) in time, thus giving rise to a change in law, i.e. conflit 
mobile or Statutenwechsel, upon the relocation of the transferred 
undertaking. Her justifications for not introducing such a temporal fixation 
lie partly in the wish to effectuate a rapid integration into the legal system of 
the state to which the undertaking has been transferred.1117 Yet, the primary 
justifications are found in the classification of the obligations of the transfer 
for the transferee as open or continuing legal obligations.1118 This distinction 
between open and closed legal obligations stems from transitional law, 
which is one of the areas of law that is occasionally drawn upon to solve a 
conflit mobile.1119 There exist several views and ideas on how to remedy a 
                                                          
1115 To my mind the issue of transfers of undertakings already falls outside the scope of the 
Rome I Regulation. The notion that the issue of transfers of undertakings falls outside the 
scope of the Rome I Regulation only applies to the extent that a separate conflict of laws 
category is enacted for which a provision is introduced outside the Rome I Regulation. If one 
would argue that a special conflict of laws provision for transfers of undertakings should be 
included into the Rome I Regulation my above reservation subsides.  
1116 See below para. 8.7. 
1117 Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9;  Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 295-296. 
1118 Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 297; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9. 
1119 In drawing from another area of law one must be mindful of the differences existing 
between these areas and the area of private international law. As such it should be borne in 
mind  that transitional law neglects the international character of the ‘conflit mobile’ or 
‘Statutenwechsel’. Within private international law, the conflit mobile is a conflict between 
different national laws stemming from different national legislators resulting from a change in 
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conflit mobile, however if such a change does not occur there is no need for 
looking into its remedies. As such, the acceptance of a conflit mobile cannot 
be justified by its ensuing remedies. More so, the acceptance of a conflit 
mobile deviates from the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive which holds 
that the directive is applied ‘whenever the undertaking to be transferred is 
situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.1120 Here, the directive 
considers the geographic location of the undertaking to be transferred and 
not the location of the transferred undertaking to be decisive.  
 
8. Preferred choice of law method 
Reiterating the introduction to this Chapter, the ultimate aim of this Chapter 
is to assess and identify the present conflict of laws regime in relation to 
cross-border transfers of undertakings and to determine whether this regime 
should be upheld or is in need of revision. As appears from the previous 
paragraphs, there exist various views and ideas on how to deal with the issue 
of transfers of undertakings on a conflict of laws level. These views not only 
differ where it concerns the preferred choice of law method, but also where it 
concerns the existing conflict of laws application. As is apparent from 
preceding paragraphs many of these views are inconsistent with the aim and 
purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive and do not do justice to the rights 
that the directive seeks to ensure. This paragraph recognizes the inadequacy 
of the existing conflict of laws regime and many of the views and theories 
proposed as a solution to the enduring conflict of laws problems. In this, it 
will provide a digression of the conflict of laws solution I believe is best 
equipped to solve the existing conflict of laws problems relating to cross-
border transfers of undertakings.       
 
8.1 Effectiveness of existing legal instruments 
On a conflict of laws level, both the Rome I Regulation and the Acquired 
Rights Directive itself may be of value in determining the applicable law to a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking. Under the prevailing opinion, by 
seeking connection to the individual contract of employment, the Rome I 
                                                                                                                                        
the location of the object to which connection is sought under the conflict of laws. More so, 
the conflict mobile involves a conflict between two laws that are equally applicable and in 
force, instead of referring to the a conflict between a law that is repealed an one that is 
applicable. 
1120 Art. 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive.  
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Regulation, more specifically Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, is to 
decide on the law that governs a transfer of undertaking. In doing so, the 
idea that a transfer of undertaking as a separate legal concept falls outside 
the scope of the Rome I Regulation is often overlooked.1121 After all, all 
rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking are 
effectuated by operation of law rather than the result of contractual dealings. 
More so, the provision existing for individual employment contracts appears 
ill-equipped to deal with the more collective aspects of a transfer of 
undertaking and the determination of the applicable law may, at times, be 
difficult and constitute a lengthy process.1122 The connection to this conflict 
of laws category thus results in several problems and ambiguities in relation 
to a transfer of undertaking. For instance, a strict application of the conflict 
of laws provision for individual employment contracts results in a change of 
law upon the relocation of the undertaking abroad, which is incompatible 
with the aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts.1123 In addition, there exists considerable uncertainty on whether 
national acquired rights provisions may be applied as overriding mandatory 
provisions on the basis of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation whenever the 
connection to the individual employment contract does not point towards the 
laws of a Member State despite the case at hand falling within the scope of 
the Acquired Rights Directive. It is the ambiguity of the scope of the 
Acquired Rights Directive and the distinct scope rule of Article 1(2) that 
adds more fuel to the fire when it comes to assessing the proper conflict of 
laws path for transfers of undertakings. Due to its indistinctness the Member 
States have attributed different meanings to the scope rule of Article 1(2), 
with some Member States having ascribed conflict of laws implications to 
this particular provision. As such, there are Member States that deviate from 
the prevailing opinion that a transfer of undertaking is to be assimilated 
under the conflict of laws category for individual employment contracts. In 
this sense the United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg have imposed a 
unilateral conflict of laws provision seeking connection to the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred,1124 thus establishing a separate conflict of laws 
                                                          
1121 See above, para. 4.1 of the present Chapter. 
1122 See above, para. 4.3 of the present Chapter. 
1123 See below, paragraph 8.5. 
1124 These countries all apply their national acquired rights provisions whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within their territory.  
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connection for transfers of undertakings. All in all, the existing conflict of 
laws regime for transfers of undertakings is plagued by false assumptions, 
ambiguities and disparities which is only exacerbated by the different 
approaches of the Member States.  
 
8.2 Separate conflict of laws category 
The issue of transfers of undertakings falls outside the scope of the Rome I 
Regulation and has difficulty being applied merely on the basis of the scope 
rule existing in Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive. Since this 
scope rule stems directly from the directive it may only be applied to the 
minimum level of protection offered therein. More so, the scope rule 
requires unilateral application whenever the undertaking to be transferred is 
situated within the territory of a Member State; it does not directly determine 
which national acquired rights provisions are to apply in a given case. More 
so, as the directive itself is not directly applicable to private parties, there 
exists a need for determining when national acquired rights provisions are to 
apply and which national acquired rights provisions are to apply in a 
particular case. A way to secure such application is by limiting the 
application of national acquired rights provisions to national territory as was 
done in the United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg.1125 However, there 
exist certain inherent limitations to the application of these provisions. Due 
to their unilateral nature it is left undetermined which law is to be decisive in 
the event that a situation falls outside the ambit of the particular scope rule. 
Any conflict of laws provision for transfers of undertakings is therefore best 
served with a multilateral nature. A transfer of undertaking, which secures 
both collective and individual employment interests as well as inhabits 
certain internal market considerations, is to be subjected, as a whole, to a 
single law. In my belief, the issue of transfers of undertakings as such 
constitutes an independent reference category under the conflict of laws for 
                                                          
1125 Art. L. 127-1 (2) Code du Travail Luxembourg;; Art. 3(1)(d) Transfer of Business 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations, S.L. 452.85: Art. 3(1)(a) the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006 no. 246 (as amended 
by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014, S.I. 2014 No. 16). 
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which connection is to be sought to the seat of the undertaking to be 
transferred.1126  
 
8.3 Choice of law 
Party autonomy forms one of the cornerstones of modern private 
international law and allows the parties to subject their contractual dealings 
to a specific system of law, thus ensuring legal certainty.1127 Nevertheless, 
the issue of transfers of undertakings, which is not primarily a contractual 
issue since it occurs by operation of law, appears incompatible with a 
professio iuris.1128 It is the employee protective nature of the Acquired 
Rights Directive and its national counterparts that resists such a choice. The 
primary purpose of a transfer of undertaking is to, upon a transfer, secure the 
transfer (and continuance) of the acquired rights of the employees affected 
by the transfer. It should not be possible to negate the fulfillment of this aim 
by way of a choice of law, bypassing the application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts. After all, by reason of a mere choice 
of law, the parties would be able to circumvent mandatory provisions of 
employment law, such as those transposing the Acquired Rights Directive, 
and prevent the affected employees from transferring to the transferee. Thus, 
allowance of a professio iuris bears the risk that the employees will be 
deprived of the protection afforded to them by the Acquired Rights Directive 
and its national counterparts. For this very reason the conflict of laws 
reference in matters relating to a cross-border transfer of undertaking should 
not inhabit the possibility of a choice of law.1129 In this it is unimaginable 
                                                          
1126 Cf. Below paragraph 8.4; Henckel 2012, p. 389; This idea is shared by Haanappel-van der 
Burg 2016 I, p. 8 et seq. 
1127 Cf. e.g.  Flessner & Verhagen 2006, p. 21; Rühl 2007. 
1128 This view is aided by a decision of the EFTA court in which it held that: ‘the purpose of 
the Directive is to ensure that the rights arising from a contract of employment or employment 
relationship of employees affected by the transfer of an undertaking are safeguarded. Since 
this protection is a matter of public policy, and therefore independent of the will of the parties 
to the contract of employment, the rules of the Directive must be considered to be mandatory, 
so that it is not possible to derogate from them in a manner unfavourable to employees. It 
follows that employees are not entitled to waive the rights conferred on them by the Directive 
and that those rights cannot be restricted even with their consent.’ (Case E3/95 Torgeir 
Langeland v Norske Fabricom A/S [1995-1996] EFTA Ct. Rep. 36, para. 42-43)  
1129 Cf. Gamillscheg 1959, p. 237; Gamillscheg 1983, p. 359; Junker 1992, p. 233;  Pietzko 
1988, p. 216; Kronke 1981, p. 159; Kronke 1989, p. 9; Mankowski 1994, p. 96; Kania 2012, 
Chapter 4 – Conflict of laws 
348 
 
that the transferor and transferee should be able to choose the law that will 
govern the effects of the transfer in relation to the existing employment 
contracts or relationships without the knowledge or consent of the affected 
employees.1130 The application of national acquired rights provisions, should 
not be dependent upon a unilateral decision of the transferee and transferor. 
In essence, the mere fact that the employees cannot in any way influence 
such a choice of law makes that they as weaker parties are deserving of 
protection. To this end the interests of the affected employees outweigh 
those of the transferee.1131 Thus the possibility of a choice of law by the 
transferor and transferee should be rejected. The same goes for a professio 
iuris that is a consequence of contractual dealings between the 
transferor/transferee and the affected employees.1132 They too should not be 
able to themselves determine the law that will govern the transfer of 
undertaking. After all, there generally exists an inequality in bargaining 
power between the employee and his employer, allowing for a 
circumvention of national acquired rights provisions to be imposed upon the 
affected employees. Thus, in essence, any specific conflict of laws regime 
for transfers of undertakings should exclude party autonomy.  
 
8.4 Connecting factor 
In determining the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking connection 
should be sought to the location of the undertaking (to be transferred) as this 
embodies the most natural connecting factor.1133 Not only does the 
undertaking form the pivot of the Acquired Rights Directive, Article 1(2) of 
the directive attributes special meaning to the seat of the undertaking by 
causing the directive to apply ‘where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated 
                                                                                                                                        
p. 82-83, Franzen 1994, p. 70; Däubler 1994, p. 124; Niksova 2014, p. 70-71; Bittner 2000, p. 
460, footnote 20; Richter 1992, p. 70; Drobnig, Becker & Remien 1991, p. 68. 
1130 Kania 2012, p. 83; Richter 1992, p. 68; Haanappel-van der Burg, 2016 I, p. 8. 
1131 Niksova 2014, p. 71; Kania 2012, p. 83; Däubler 1994, p. 124.  
1132 Meaning e.g. a tripartite agreement that expressly covers the issue of transfers of 
undertakings and not contractual dealings under Article 8 Rome I Regulation (after all, the 
issue of transfers of undertakings falls outside the realm of the Rome I Regulation).   
1133 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 464 et seq.; Junker, 1992, p. 234 et seq.; Junker, 1994, p. 40;  Birk 
1982, p. 396; Reichold  2008, p. 697 et seq.; Birk 1978, p. 291-29; Henckel 2012, p, 389;  
Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 293; Haanappel-van der Burg  2016 I, p. 8; Cf.  Laagland 
2011, p. 17;  Junker 2012, p. 13. 
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within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.1134 The Acquired Rights Directive 
revolves around the undertaking to be transferred and the effects of this 
transfer upon the affected employees. More so, the effects of a transfer of 
undertaking are not confined to the individual employment relationship, but 
also concern operational, economic and collective employment interests.1135 
Keeping these additional effects in mind, the individual contract of 
employment forms an ill-suited connecting factor. A connection to the 
individual contract of employment not only ignores the aim and purpose of 
the directive, which lies in the protection of individual and collective 
employment rights as well as in internal market considerations, it also 
requires a, possibly lengthy assessment of seeking the habitual place of 
employment or failing that the location of the business through which the 
employee was engaged.1136 By comparison the geographic location of the 
undertaking to be transferred is easily determined. Still, the dichotomy 
between the law that applies to the employment contract and the law of the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred as possible connecting factors 
for the transfer of undertaking will generally not yield different results.1137 
Indeed, the habitual place of employment, which is the general connecting 
factor in determining the law that applies to the individual employment 
contract, will result in the application of the law in force at the location of 
the undertaking as the majority of employees is likely to habitually perform 
                                                          
1134 Emphasis added KCH.  
1135 Bittner 2000, p. 464; Birk 1982, p. 396; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 290. 
1136 Cf. Article 8 Rome I Regulation. Such a lengthy assessment will mostly take place where 
it concerns undertaking with a high level of mobility or an undertaking that is already geared 
towards several countries including the one in which it is situated. These type of undertakings 
may embody a larger number of cross-border transfers when compared to undertakings that 
that are solely conducting their business within one single country. Still, in most cases the 
employees of the undertaking to be transferred will habitually carry out their employment at 
the location of the undertaking to be transferred, allowing no difference between the 
application of the law that applies to the individual contract of employment and the laws in 
force at the seat of the undertaking to be transferred.   
1137 Where there does exist a difference in the law governing the employment contract and the 
law governing the transfer of undertaking such difference does not pose any problems. After 
all, the transfer of undertaking is an area of law that can be separated as a whole from the 
general body of employment law. As such there exists no overlap and therefore no conflict 
between the rules of employment law covered by the choice of law in the employment 
contract and the rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking.   
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their employment at the location of the undertaking to be transferred.1138 
However, a major advantage of the proposed connecting factor and one of 
the primary reasons to discard the connection to the individual contract of 
employment lies in the impossibility to make a choice of law in seeking 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred. As stated 
above, party autonomy is inconsistent with the very nature of the Acquired 
Rights Directive and the automatic transfer of the existing employment 
relationships to the transferee. The parties should not be able to, by means of 
a choice of law, negate the application of the acquired rights provisions in 
force at the location of the undertaking to be transferred, as this location, as 
demonstrated by Article 1(2), is essential to the application of the Acquired 
Rights Directive. More so, a connection to the location of the undertaking to 
be transferred would prevent a fragmentation of the laws that apply to the 
workforce. It is this connection that ensures that the entire workforce is 
subject to the same national acquired rights provisions, thus giving full effect 
to the Acquired Rights Directive by preventing that only part of the 
workforce is transferred to the transferee.1139 A connection to the seat of the 
undertaking marks the application of a neutral connecting factor that is 
closely connected to the transfer of undertaking itself. It is the transfer of the 
undertaking itself that forms the nexus of a transfer of undertaking, thus 
justifying the conflict of laws connection to the geographic location of the 
undertaking to be transferred.1140 More so, as stated above, the Acquired 
Rights Directive, in Article 1(2), attributes special meaning to the seat of the 
undertaking by applying the directive ‘where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’1141 Thus, the wording of 
this provision aides the notion that the situation or location of the 
undertaking to be transferred holds considerable meaning for the conflict of 
laws. As such, the seat of the undertaking to be transferred forms the 
preferred connecting factor under the conflict of laws.    
 
 
                                                          
1138 Junker 2012, p. 13. 
1139 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Bittner 2000, p. 464. This notion is somewhat undercut by the 
preferential law approach enshrined in Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation. 
1140 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Junker 1992, p. 235.  
1141 Emphasis added KCH.  
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8.5 Temporal fixation 
In seeking connection to the location of the undertaking (to be transferred) 
the applicable law should be fixed to the location of the undertaking upon or 
immediately prior to the transfer.1142 As such, in determining the applicable 
law to a transfer of undertaking, the time or date of the transfer is a factor of 
great importance; this is the time at which the employee relationships 
existing with the transferor will transfer to the transferee.1143 Unlike the 
individual employment contract, this transfer is not subject to continuity as it 
occurs by operation of law at a set moment in time.1144 A failure to impose a 
temporal fixation of the determination of the preferred connecting factor, i.e. 
the location of the undertaking to be transferred, would result in the 
emergence of an unwarranted conflit mobile upon the relocation of the 
transferred undertaking. Allowing such a conflit mobile or change in the law 
that governs a transfer of undertaking coinciding with the moment that the 
undertaking is transferred abroad does not do justice to the nature of a 
transfer of undertaking, which is fixated at a particular time. More so, 
allowing a change in the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking would 
defeat the entire purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive as it would result 
in the transfer only having some effect if the laws at the original location and 
the new location of the undertaking (depending on the time of the relocation) 
allow for an automatic transfer of the employment relationship and the rights 
and obligations stemming therefrom. Such a cumulative application of laws 
is contrary to both the aim of the Acquired Rights Directive, which is to 
safeguard the rights of employees employed in European based undertakings 
and Article 1(2) of the directive. Article 1(2) merely requires the 
                                                          
1142 In establishing a conflict rule determining the applicable law to any legal relationship the 
conflict of laws connection generally consists of three elements: a subject (transfer of 
undertakings), an attribute of this subject (location of the undertaking to be transferred) and a 
time of determination: See Kropholler 1990, p. 115. 
1143 Another argument against the change in applicable law may be found in the similarity to 
the conflict of laws assessment of contract acquisition or the assignment of debts, which is 
utilized as a justification for the assimilation of transfers of undertakings under the conflict of 
laws category of employment contracts.  Under the conflict of laws assessment of contract 
acquisition the transfer of a contract is governed by the law that governs the contract itself. 
This law continues to be decisive after the transfer. 
1144 It this context it should be noted that the rights and obligations stemming from a transfer 
of undertaking, although occurring ope legis at a set moment in time may have a continuing 
effect of the existing employment relationship.  
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undertaking, to be transferred to be located within an EU Member State 
prior to the transfer. Thus, as appears from the directive, its application is 
exclusively dependent on the geographical location of the undertaking to be 
transferred and not on the destination of the undertaking upon or after the 
transfer. In the protection of employees there should not exist a distinction 
between domestic, intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios. The 
conflict of laws may not be utilised to thwart the application of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, which applies to intra-European and outbound transfers 
alike. There is no reason why an employee should be deprived from the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive or its national counterparts 
when an undertaking is transferred to a state that does not make provision for 
the transfer of acquired rights. Employees that are affected by national or 
cross-border transfers of undertakings without relocation should not be better 
protected than those who are affected by a transfer of undertaking that is 
accompanied by a cross-border relocation.1145 Surely, in situations involving 
a transfer of undertaking that is accompanied by a cross-border relocation of 
that undertaking a swift integration into the legal system of the state to which 
the undertaking has been transferred is desired.1146 Such integration may 
come to pass by a change in the law that applies to the individual 
employment contract, which is to be distinguished from the law that applies 
to the (effects of) a transfer of undertaking. Upon the relocation of the 
transferred undertaking the applicable law to the individual contract of 
employment is likely to change due to a change in the objective connecting 
factor of the habitual place of employment. However, a change in the law 
that governs (the effects of) a transfer of undertaking would defeat the entire 
aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive and should be rejected for 
that very reason. After all, it is imperative that the conflict of laws allows the 
full application of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts. There are several means by which a conflict mobile may be 
forfended, most notably by a temporal fixation of the conflict of laws 
connection and the allowance of party autonomy, i.e. a professio iuris.1147 
Surely the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking would be immutable if 
that law were established by means of party autonomy. The employee 
                                                          
1145 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 487.  
1146 Cf. Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 295-296. 
1147 Van Hoek 2000, p. 67;  d’ Haeyer 2009, p. 108. 
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protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive however prevents the 
allowance of a choice of law. Thus there remains the temporal fixation of the 
conflict of laws connection as a means to prevent a conflit mobile. Once the 
conflict of laws norm imposes a temporal fixation on the (determination of 
the) conflict of laws connection that connection and the ensuing applicable 
law become immutable.1148 Once the conflict of laws connection for transfers 
of undertakings is fixated in time a conflit mobile is averted and there exists 
no need to explore the remedies of such a conflict.1149 The conflict of laws 
connection for transfers of undertakings is therefore to be inescapably 
fixated in time by applying the law of the country in which the undertaking 
to be transferred is situated upon or immediately prior to the transfer. This 
connection reflects the nature and aim of the Acquired Rights Directive by 
securing the continued application of the acquired rights provisions in force 
at the place from which the transferred undertaking originates, generally 
coinciding with the employees’ (original) working environment. More so, 
this connection is in line with or even equates to the scope rule of Article 
1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive and the legislation of the United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg and Malta, which, although unilaterally, all seek 
connection of to the location of the undertaking to be transferred.   
 
8.6 Overriding effect of provisions exceeding minimum protection 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive offers minimum protection to the 
employees affected by a transfer of undertaking the Member States are free 
to exceed this protection.1150 A Member State may extend the scope of its 
acquired rights provisions, the level of protection it offers or utilize the 
options provided by the directive by extending the application of national 
acquired rights provisions to e.g. insolvent undertakings or supplementary 
old-age, invalidity or survivor’s benefits. Whereas the law of the Member 
States in relation to the minimum protection offered by the directive are 
placed on equal footing, leaving no room for their overriding effect in 
relation to the laws of other Member States, national acquired rights 
                                                          
1148 Looschelders 2004, p. 35;  Rauscher 2009, p. 106-107; Henrich 2010, p .289. 
1149 Contra Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 295-296 who argues against a temporal fixation 
of the conflict of laws connection upon a transfer of undertaking, which she considers 
unjustified on the basis of certain arguments that are based in the remedies for a conflit 
mobile.  
1150 See Article 8 Acquired Rights Directive.  
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provisions that are more favourable to employees may be considered to have 
overriding mandatory effect. Thus if the application of national acquired 
rights provisions of exceeding protection is considered essential according to 
the general structure and circumstances under which the law was adopted1151 
they may have an overriding effect on the lex causae. Since the issue of 
transfers of undertakings falls outside the scope of the Rome I Regulation, 
there exists no European limitation on the application of foreign overriding 
mandatory provisions.1152 As such, it remains left to the private international 
law of the Member States to determine to which extent such provisions are 
to be taken into account. Although it is unlikely that such application is 
readily assumed, in relation to the overriding application of provisions 
exceeding the minimum protection offered by the Acquired Rights Directive 
one reflection should be considered. From a theoretical perspective there 
exists a strict dichotomy between provisions transposing the directive and 
provisions that exceed the protection awarded by the directive. From a 
practical standpoint however these provisions are not always as easily 
separated. It may be that the provisions of exceeding provision are entangled 
with the provisions of minimum protection to such an extent that parting 
them would be unmanageable, especially when they are part of a single legal 
provision. In situations where the exceeding protection awarded by the 
Member States results from a variety of options offered by the directive 
itself it seems peculiar that these provisions would be subject to a different 
conflict of laws regime than the provisions transposing the directive. To that 
extent the application of national provisions of exceeding protection may be 
dovetailed with the application of the provisions effectuating minimum 
protection.     
 
8.7 Proposed conflict of laws provision 
It is thus established that there should exist a separate conflict of laws 
category for transfers of undertakings under which connection is to be 
sought to the location of the undertaking to be transferred. In determining the 
exact content and wording of such a conflict of laws provision a multilateral 
approach appears most desirable. In this sense, the conflict of laws rule 
                                                          
1151 Cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, para. 50.  
1152 Article 9(3) severely limits the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of any 
state other than the lex fori.  
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should establish the law that governs (the effects of) a transfer of 
undertaking rather than determine the territorial reach of national acquired 
rights provisions, leaving the applicable law beyond this reach to remain 
undetermined. Especially at a European level, in intra-European transfer 
scenarios, there is no need for a unilateral approach to the conflict of 
laws.1153 After all, the legislation of all Member States, by reason of the 
minimum protection afforded by the Acquired Rights Directive, is equipped 
with national acquired rights provisions. When it comes to employee 
protection, the Member States thus share certain rights and values. Such 
values and acquired rights provisions may not be shared with third states, 
which could potentially justify a different conflict of laws approach in their 
regard. Here, the question becomes whether there is a need for a difference 
in the preferred conflict of laws approach between domestic, intra-European 
and outbound transfers scenarios. Since the Acquired Rights Directive 
applies to intra-European and outbound transfers alike the conflict of laws 
connection should ensure such application. After all, the underlying idea that 
all those employed in EU-based undertakings are protected upon the transfer 
of the undertaking in which they are employed should be guaranteed. Since 
the employees cannot exert any influence over the change in their employer 
they require a protection of their interests and the rights and obligations 
stemming from their employment contract. In this, the location of the 
undertaking after (completion of) the transfer should remain immaterial. The 
fact that the directive encompasses transfers of undertakings to non-Member 
States will, on occasion, undoubtedly result in the laws of the country of the 
transferee not being equipped with (similar) acquired rights provisions. This 
however should not prevent the employees of EU-based undertakings from 
being entitled to the protection of their rights and obligations, especially 
since, as stated above, they themselves cannot exert any influence on the 
location of the transferred undertaking after the transfer. The existence of 
acquired rights provisions in the country of destination therefore does not 
form a requirement for the application of the Acquired Rights Directive and 
its national counterparts. More so, the issue of enforcement of Member State 
law in non-Member States should have no bearing on the conflict of laws 
                                                          
1153 Cf. Ten Wolde 2011.  
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and the determination of the appropriate conflict of laws path.1154 This issue 
is the exclusive purview of the area of private international law that is 
concerned with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The 
most important factor in determining the application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and, more so, its national counterparts is the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred. As such the preferred conflict of laws 
reference for transfers of undertakings should read: 
   
‘a transfer of undertaking shall be governed by the law of the Member 
State in which the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or 
immediately prior to the transfer.’ 
 
This reference secures the application of the acquired rights provisions of a 
Member State whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated within 
EU territory. By doing so, it complements the scope rule enshrined in Article 
1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive. In essence, the national acquired 
rights provisions of the legal environment from where the undertaking 
originates apply and remain applicable after the transfer of undertaking has 
come into effect.1155 The same does not apply to undertakings situated in 
non-Member States. Since the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive is 
                                                          
1154 In some cases the enforcement of Member State acquired rights provisions in non-
Member States may not be an issue as the transferee may willingly subject to such law. For 
example in the UK case of Holis, involving a transfer from the United Kingdom to Isreal, 
Judge Ansell argued in this regard:  
‘I accept that enforcement may present a problem although I accept Mr Siddall’s 
argument that enforcement can present a problem even within the EU.  In these days 
of multi-national corporations and economic interdependency I would regard the 
issue of enforcement as less difficult then it used to be – witness the willingness of 
Holis to submit to the jurisdiction in this case.’ 
Here the judge obviously felt that the willingness of the transferee to submit to the jurisdiction 
of a foreign court presumed an equal willingness to comply with the judgment by this court 
and as such a willingness to comply with the application of the United Kingdom’s acquired 
rights provisions (It is noteworthy that this case the existence of a transfer of undertaking was 
not in dispute),. Although I do not agree with the judge’s underplay of the importance of 
issues of enforcement, these issues do not pose a problem if the transferee voluntarily 
complies with Member State law.  
1155 In this it should be noted that the interpretation of the proposed provision should include 
situations where the undertaking is transferred abroad prior to the transfer of undertaking in 
order to purposefully circumvent the application of acquired rights provisions.  
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limited to intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios, any conflict of 
laws provision enclosed in the directive is subject to such scope. As such, 
inbound transfers, i.e. transfers from a non-Member State to an EU Member 
State, are beyond the scope of the proposed conflict of laws provision. It 
seems to me that there is no need to complicate the conflict of laws reference 
by applying a different conflict of laws approach where it concerns inbound 
transfer scenarios, i.e. transfers from a non-Member State to a Member State. 
Not only would such a provision be superfluous, it would openly conflict 
with the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. The Member States are 
however free to impose, in their national laws, a similar rule with regard to 
inbound transfer scenarios.1156  
  
 
                                                          
1156 If they were to do so, an inbound transfer would be subject to the laws of a non-Member 
State. Affording the affected employees the protection of the undertaking’s state of origin.  
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Determined to reclaim Europe’s seafaring heritage, the European Union, in 
2007, established an integrated maritime policy through the so-called Blue 
Book.1158 This policy is aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the 
European shipping industry and enhancing the employment of European 
seafaring workers. In order to fulfill the objective of increasing employment 
throughout the maritime sectors the Commission revealed its intention to 
‘reassess, in close cooperation with social partners, the exclusions effecting 
maritime sectors in EU labour legislation’.1159 This call for reassessment 
found its basis in the 2006 Green Paper ‘Towards a future Maritime Policy 
for the Union’1160, which had already identified the exclusion of the maritime 
sector from European labour and social legislation.1161 Regardless of the 
reasons underlying these exclusions, seafaring workers should be able to 
enjoy the same level of protection as land-based workers where 
appropriate.1162 Dedicated to the improvement of the European social 
dimension and ensuring a level playing field for maritime employees, the 
European Commission launched a first phase consultation of social 
partners1163 concerning the reassessment of the position of seafaring workers 
                                                          
1157 This Chapter partly corresponds to an Article published in the journal Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht: K.C. Henckel, ‘Conflict of laws and the Acquired Rights 
Directive: the cross-border transfer of seagoing vessels’, NIPR 2012, p. 376-389. 
1158 COM (2007) 575 final. 
1159 COM (2007) 575 final, p. 9; Cf. COM (2012) 494 final.  
1160 Green Paper ‘Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European vision for the 
oceans and seas’, COM(2006) 275 final. 
1161 Ibid., p. 21; the Green Paper also called for the reassessment of this legislation in close 
cooperation with social partners.  
1162 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions – Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: 
a European vision for the oceans and the seas, TEN/255 – CESE 609/2007 fin, under 1.7; 
European Parliament resolution of 11th July 2007 on modernising labour law to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century, 2007/2023(INI), under 19.  
1163 COM(2007) 591 final. 
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within six directives in 2007.1164 Among the directives reviewed is the 
Acquired Rights Directive.1165 After completing the first phase consultation 
the Commission launched a second phase consultation in 20091166  and 
issued a proposal for a directive on seafarers in 2013, aiming to remove the 
exclusion of seagoing workers from several European social directives, 
including the Acquired Rights Directive.1167 In its proposal the Commission 
offers a repeal of Article 1(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive, which 
excludes seagoing vessels from the scope of the directive. In this proposal, 
the directive is made to apply to the transfer of seagoing vessels that are 
registered in or fly the flag of a Member State regardless of their geographic 
location at the time of the transfer.1168 In addition, the directive is to offer the 
Member States the option to apply their national acquired rights provisions 
to single vessel transfers. By doing so, it appears that seagoing workers are 
                                                          
1164 Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 amending Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer, OJ 2004, L 270/10; Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the 
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings 
and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, OJ 1994, L 254/64; Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community – Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on employee representation, OJ 2002, L 80/29; Council 
Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies, OJ 1998, L 225/16; Council Directive (EC) 2001/23/EC 
of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or 
parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ 2001, L 82/16 and Directive 96/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ 1996, L 18/1. 
1165 COM(2007) 591 final, p. 12. 
1166 Reassessing the regulatory social framework for more and better seafaring jobs in the EU: 
Second consultation of the European social partners on the revision of exclusions concerning 
seafaring workers contained in Directives 2008/94/EC, 94/45/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/56/EC, 
2001/23/EC and 96/71/EC [2009] available online at: <ec.europa.eu/social> <search: 
seafaring> <no. 3>. 
1167 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final. 
1168 Unclear whether this reference to the state of registration and the flag state involves the 
undertaking or seagoing vessel to be transferred, as is the case with land-based undertakings. 
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to enjoy a position equal to that of land-based workers and crews of inland 
navigation vessels.1169 In 2015, following an agreement reached in 
trialogue,1170 a revised directive on seafarers, amending several social policy 
directives including the Acquired Rights Directive, was adopted.1171 This 
directive amends the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive by repealing 
Article 1(3) and including seagoing vessels that are part of a transfer of 
undertaking within the scope of the directive. This inclusion is made 
dependent upon the location of the transferee or the location of the 
undertaking upon completion of the transfer. In addition, the application of 
the directive is precluded where ‘the object of the transfer consists 
exclusively of one or more seagoing vessels.’1172  
 
The primary aim of the present Chapter is to discuss the merits of the new 
directive where it concerns transfers of undertakings. In this, an important 
question is whether the change in the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive 
holds any implications for the conflict of laws and deserves a revision of or 
addition to the conflict of laws rule proposed in the previous Chapter in so 
far as it concerns seagoing vessels. This proposed provision reads: 
 
‘a transfer of undertaking shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or immediately 
prior to the transfer.’ 
 
Thus, the purpose of this Chapter is to establish whether the special 
characteristics of the maritime sector, its inherent cross-border and 
international features, combined with the recent revision of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, give rise to a special conflict of laws consideration of 
seagoing vessels in relation to transfers of undertakings. The global nature of 
                                                          
1169 See e.g. Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, JAR 1996/198, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891. 
1170 Cf. Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Draft report on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers amending Directives 
2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC (COM(2013)0798 – C7-
0409/2013 – 2013/0390(COD)), p. 15. 
1171 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, as regards 
seafarers, OJ [2015] L 263/1.  
1172 Article 5 Directive (EU) 2015/1794. 
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the shipping industry and the fierce competition therein coupled with its 
inextricable link to maritime transport make that the transfer of seagoing 
vessels, by means of sale or charter, forms an everyday activity in 
international shipping. Ships are transferred between shipping companies on 
a global scale. Time and again such transfers are coupled with a 
simultaneous or subsequent reflagging of the vessel.1173 Many legal systems 
may be connected to a single vessel transfer, such as the legal system of (the 
state of nationality, location or incorporation of) the transferor, transferee, 
former flag state, subsequent flag state, the vessel’s place of registration 
prior to and after the transfer and so on. For this reason it is important to 
establish which regulatory regime applies to the transfer and its effects. As 
international transfers of ships and fleets are commonplace in today’s 
globalised economy, it is vital to establish whether the inclusion of seagoing 
vessels into the Acquired Rights Directive requires a revision of the conflict 
of laws rule for transfers of undertakings proposed in the previous Chapter.  
 
 
2. Inclusion of seagoing vessels 
In its former Article 1(3), the Acquired Rights Directive explicitly excluded 
seagoing vessels from its scope of application. This exclusion pertained only 
to the transfer of single vessels and did not extend to the transfer of shipping 
companies and undertakings including, inter alia, a seagoing vessel.1174 The 
rationale behind the exclusion remains unclear as it was already part of the 
original directive of 1977 and neither the initial proposal of 19741175 nor the 
                                                          
1173 In order to maintain the overall competitiveness of the European fleet on world markets 
and to protect and promote employment for European seafarers, the European Commission is 
encouraging the reflagging to Member State’s registers: Commission Communication 
C(2004)43 – Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ [2004] C 13/5; 
Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy, 
Recommendations to the European Commission, 2011, p. 5, available online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/seafarers/seafarers_en.htm>. In its report, the 
taskforce additionally stresses the importance of the repeal of the provision excluding 
seagoing vessels from the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
1174 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary papers) 1979/80, 15940, no. 3, p. 5 (MvT); Kamerstukken 
II 1979/80, 15940, no. 7, p. 3 (MvA): ‘De uitzondering omvat niet tevens de onderneming 
(rederij) welke een zeeschip exploiteert’; Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 5, p. 3; Christe 
2010 (Arbeidsrecht), Art. 7:666 BW, note 3; Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 74, 77. 
1175 COM(74) 351. 
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amended proposal of 19751176 specifically mentioned the maritime sector.1177 
The international particularities of maritime navigation, i.e., the heightened 
mobility of seagoing vessels and the global competitiveness of the maritime 
sector, may have prompted the exclusion.1178 Efforts by the European 
Commission to reverse the exclusion in 1994 proved futile.1179 In its 
proposal for the revision of directive 77/87/EEC the Commission considered 
the provisions of the directive to be ‘in no way incompatible with the special 
nature of the contract of employment or employment relationships of crews 
of seagoing vessels’. Considerations of flexibility were thought to justify the 
exclusion of seagoing vessels from the scope of the section concerning 
information and consultation, but not from other, more fundamental, 
provisions of the directive.1180 Even though seagoing vessels, until recently, 
remained excluded from the Acquired Rights Directive, the directive did not 
prevent its national counterparts from excluding workers in the seagoing 
professions.1181 Since Article 8 of the directive allows the introduction of 
national laws that are more favourable to employees, national 
implementation provisions apply to seagoing vessels in a significant part of 
the European Member States.1182 These include some of the world’s largest 
shipping nations, such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Thus, the 
question arises whether the inclusion of seagoing vessels in the revised 
Article 1(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive meets its aim of placing the 
laws of the Member States on equal footing and establishing a more of a 
level playing field for the seagoing professions. In this it is important to note 
                                                          
1176 COM(75) 429. 
1177 Cf. COM(2007) 591 final, p. 7. 
1178 Glockauer 2003, p. 49; to this end, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch 
implementation provisions of directive 77/187/EC (Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 3, p. 
5 (MvT)) states that the rules applying to the crews of seagoing vessels in maritime law make 
it extremely difficult for the directive to apply to those vessels. 
1179 COM(94) 300 final.  
1180 See COM(94) 300 final, OJ 1994, C 274/08 et seq. 
1181 Cf. Castle View Services Ltd v. Howes & Ors [2000] ScotCS 49; Numast & Anor v. P&O 
Scottish Ferries & Ors [2005] EAT S/0060/04. 
1182 Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, cf. COM(94) 300 final, para. 31; Cf. 
Impact assessment, p. 51 (infra note 73); Commission Report on Council Directive 
2001/23/EC of 12 March on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or 
parts of undertakings or businesses, SEC(2007) 812; COM(2007) 334 final.  
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that the implementation of the directive is not considered to justify ‘any 
regression in relation to the situation which already prevails in each Member 
State’.1183      
 
2.1 Recent developments 
During the review of the social directives in light of the maritime sector, the 
Acquired Rights Directive, a staple of European social legislation, was 
considered among to most important:  
 
‘Of particular concern are the rights of seagoing workers to protection 
in the case of insolvency of their employer or transfer of undertakings, 
where a coherent approach should be promoted in order to enable them 
to exercise their rights effectively both at national level and in 
Community-scale undertakings.’1184  
 
Due to the exclusion of seagoing vessels from the scope of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, the acquired rights of seafaring workers were generally not 
safeguarded upon the transfer of a seagoing vessel. Whereas land-based 
workers and crews of inland navigation vessels1185 enjoyed the automatic 
transfer of the employment relationship from the transferor to the transferee 
as well as protection against dismissal and the right to information and 
consultation,1186 seagoing workers frequently found themselves without 
employment as a result of the transfer of the undertaking in which they were 
engaged. In a preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of 
EU social legislation it was concluded that the transfer of a vessel often 
counts as grounds for redundancy.1187 The study shows that upon the sale or 
transfer of a vessel the existing crew is commonly paid the balance of their 
                                                          
1183 Recital 13, Directive (EU) 2015/1794. 
1184 COM(2007) 591 final, p. 12. 
1185 See, e.g., Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, JAR 1996/198, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891. 
1186 These three aspects of a transfer of undertaking are considered the three pillars of the 
Acquired Rights Directive.  
1187 MRAG, ‘European Commission. Preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the current exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of EU social 
legislation’, Framework Service Contract, No. FISH/2006/09-LOT2, April 2010, p. 54, para. 
313. 
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contracts.1188 As such, vessels are usually acquired without crew.1189 
Bringing seagoing vessels within the ambit of the Acquired Rights Directive 
may change this practice since it would ensure the automatic transfer of the 
rights and obligations stemming from the employment contracts or 
employment relationships of the existing crew to the transferee. In 2011, the 
Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competiveness, established to, 
among others, develop recommendations on striking a just balance between 
the employment conditions of European seafarers and the competitiveness of 
the European fleet,1190 concluded that the elimination of the exclusion of 
seagoing workers from European social directives would ‘help eliminate the 
impression that seafarers are less well protected by European Union labour 
law than other employees’1191, ‘particularly when no clear justification’1192 
for the exclusions exists. As such, it proposed the elimination of the 
exclusion of seagoing workers from four European social directives, 
including Directive 2001/23/EC.1193 In its 2013 proposal for a directive the 
European Commission extended this elimination to five social directives.1194 
                                                          
1188 1188 MRAG, ‘European Commission. Preparatory study for an impact assessment 
concerning a possible revision of the current exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope 
of EU social legislation’, Framework Service Contract, No. FISH/2006/09-LOT2, April 2010, 
p. 54, para. 314.  
1189 MRAG, ‘European Commission. Preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the current exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of EU social 
legislation’, Framework Service Contract, No. FISH/2006/09-LOT2, April 2010, p. 54, para. 
314. 
1190 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 1, available online at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/seafarers/doc/2011-06-09-tfmec.pdf>. 
1191 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 14, available online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/seafarers/doc/2011-06-09-tfmec.pdf>. 
1192 Report of the Task Force on Maritime Employment and Competitiveness and Policy 
Recommendations to the European Commission, p. 14. 
1193 In addition the task force proposed the removal of exclusion provisions from Council 
Directive 2008/94 EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to the 
protection of employees in the event of insolvency of their employer; Council Directive 
2009/38/EC on European Works Councils and Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community.  
1194 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final. 
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Where it concerns the Acquired Rights Directive the proposal extended the 
scope of the directive to include seagoing vessels registered in or flying the 
flag of a Member State, 1195  whereas the final, adopted, directive brings 
transfers of seagoing vessels that are part of a transfer of undertaking within 
the ambit of the directive, provided that the transferee is situated, or the 
transferred undertaking remains situated, within a Member State.1196 The 
following paragraphs will show the path towards the removal of the 
exclusion for seagoing vessels and discuss the merits of the newly inserted 
Article 1(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
2.1.1 Eliminating the exclusion 
In eliminating the exclusion of seagoing vessels from the Acquired Rights 
Directive, the preparatory study for an impact assessment identifies three 
options: (1) amending existing legislation requiring a guarantee of the same 
level of protection for seafaring workers by means of national legislation, (2) 
suppressing the exclusion and extending the general scope of the directive to 
seagoing vessels, and (3) providing specific legislation or specific provisions 
covering seagoing vessels or seagoing workers within the existing 
directive.1197 The first two options maintain the existing territorial scope of 
the directive. As extensively discussed in previous Chapters the Acquired 
Rights Directive, by reason of Article 1(2), applies whenever the business to 
be transferred is located within EU territory prior to its transfer. According 
to Article 1(2) the directive ‘shall apply where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.1198 Thus, the application 
                                                          
1195 Article 5 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
seafarers amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 
2001/23/EC, COM (2013) 798 final. 
1196 Article 5 Directive (EU) 2015/1794. 
1197 MRAG, ‘European Commission. Preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning a 
possible revision of the current exclusions of seafaring workers from the scope of EU social 
legislation’, Framework Service Contract, No. FISH/2006/09-LOT2, April 2010, p. 83-84; the 
other option presented in the report, which is: no action, is not covered in this paragraph as 
this option would not result in the elimination of the current exclusion.  
1198 The term Treaty refers to the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/47. At the time of its adoption the term Treaty in Art. 1(2) 
Directive 2001/23/EC referred to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated version), OJ 2006 C, 321E. 
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of the directive is entirely contingent on the geographical situation of the 
undertaking to be transferred. This geographical contingency additionally 
exists in the conflict of laws solution provided for transfers of undertakings 
in the previous Chapter. On the basis of this solution national 
implementation provisions are to apply whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within a Member State upon or immediately prior to 
the transfer. Upon the inclusion of seagoing vessels in the Acquired Rights 
Directive, if opted for policy options 1 or 2 and maintaining the present 
geographical scope of the directive, it is important to establish which 
maritime areas belong to the territory of a Member State.1199 In recent 
history, seagoing vessels were considered floating territories of the state that 
determined their nationality.1200 In other words, vessels were assimilated to 
the territory of the flag state. Nowadays, however, they are merely thought to 
enjoy the nationality of the flag state, causing them to be subject to that 
state’s jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters.1201 Since seagoing vessels are no longer considered part of the 
territory of the flag state, the application of the directive will become entirely 
dependent on the geographical location of the vessel to be transferred 
immediately prior to its transfer.1202 After all, the territorial application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive is contingent upon the location of the undertaking 
to be transferred. Under policy option 1 and 2 no change to the territorial 
scope of the Acquired Rights Directive is proposed. This may prove 
problematic where it concerns the transfer of seagoing vessels if they by 
                                                          
1199 This includes both the Member States of the EU and the Member States of the European 
Economic Area.  
1200 Cf. Ludewig 2012, p. 92-93; Franzen 1994, p. 91-92; Junker 2006, p. 407; Jensen 2006. 
1201 Art. 94 UNCLOS, this jurisdiction extends to the vessel’s master, officers and crew (Art. 
94(2)(b) UNCLOS); Art. 5 of the Convention on the High Seas 1958, UNTS, vol. 450, p. 11, 
p. 82, available online at:  
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf>. 
In light of the position of the ECJ under the Habitats Directive, an environmental protection 
directive with a scope similar to that of the Acquired Rights Directive, it can be argued that 
the ARD requires direct application to seagoing vessels by virtue of the sovereign powers that 
the flag state is allowed to exercise in social matters, despite the fact that these vessels are no 
longer considered part of a Member State’s territory. A comprehensive explanation of this 
argument is beyond the scope of this article.  
1202 I.e. if the repeal of the provision excluding seagoing vessels from the Acquired Rights 
Directive is not coupled with a change in the current scope rule. 
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themselves are considered an undertaking within the meaning of the 
directive. In these cases, for a transfer of a seagoing vessel to take effect, the 
vessel must be located within the territory of a European Member State as 
otherwise the Acquired Rights Directive will not be applicable. To this end, 
the question will arise as to what parts of the sea belong to a Member State’s 
territory. As the territory of the Member States is limited to areas where they 
can assert full sovereignty, their maritime territory includes their internal 
waters, territorial waters, international straits and archipelagic waters.1203 
Hence, it appears that the application of the Acquired Rights Directive will 
be restricted to these waterways, which may also warrant the conclusion that 
the Acquired Rights Directive cannot be applied beyond the territorial seas 
to the areas of the ocean in or over which a state can uphold limited 
sovereign rights or exercises jurisdiction, e.g., the Continental Shelf and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone.1204 This conclusion is supported by a judgment in 
a case involving a change in the provider of manning services of North Sea 
oil vessels before the English Employment Appeal Tribunal. Here, the 
tribunal questioned whether the application of the Acquired Rights Directive 
extended to undertakings situated within the UK area of the Continental 
Shelf prior to their transfer.1205 The maritime crew of several North Sea 
flotels1206 were considered to have been unfairly dismissed upon the takeover 
of their former employer’s business. In deciding on this matter, the EAT 
rejected the idea that EU law applies to all economic activities undertaken in 
an area under the jurisdiction of a Member State and concluded that the 
                                                          
1203 Tanaka 2012, p. 6. 
1204 In the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf the Member States merely possess sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources (Art. 56(1)(a) in 
conjunction with Art. 77 UNCLOS). In addition, where it concerns the EEZ, the sovereign 
rights of the Member States extend to ‘activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone, such as the production of energy from water, currents and wind’ (Art. 56(1)(a) 
UNCLOS). Likewise, the Member States have jurisdiction with regard to the establishment 
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures (Art. 56(1)(b)(i) UNCLOS), marine 
research and the protection (Art. 56(1)(b)(ii) UNCLOS) and preservation of the marine 
environment (Art. 56(1)(b)(iii) UNCLOS). 
1205 Addison and others v. Denholm Ship Management (UK) Ltd & Ors [1997] ICR 770; this 
included the question whether the UK Continental Shelf formed part of UK territory and/or 
the territorial scope of the Treaty.  
1206 These flotels provided accommodation for the large number of workers required during 
the construction and hook-up of fixed offshore oil and gas installations. 
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Continental Shelf is not within the territorial scope of the Treaty and that the 
directive can therefore not be extended to cover activities therein. In a 
comparable case before the EFTA court,1207 involving the transfer of 
maintenance tasks on a fixed offshore gas production installation situated in 
the Norwegian and British part of the Continental Shelf,1208 the applicability 
of the Acquired Rights Directive to undertakings situated outside territorial 
waters was not called into question. Here, the court held that the directive 
may ‘be applicable in the situation of a transfer of maintenance tasks on a 
fixed offshore installation for gas production’.1209 Although a strict 
interpretation of Article 1(2) of the directive would advocate against the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive outside the territories of the 
Member States, ‘the preparatory study for an impact assessment concerning 
a possible revision of the present exclusions of seafaring workers from the 
scope of EU social legislation’1210 does consider the Acquired Rights 
Directive to apply to undertakings situated within the EEZs of the Member 
States.  
 
In light of the territorial scope of the directive, the freedom of navigation 
combined with the mobility of seagoing vessels forms an important concern 
with regard to the applicability of the Acquired Rights Directive. Since the 
directive applies whenever the undertaking or part of the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated within the territory of the EU, the high mobility of 
seagoing vessels might prevent application of the directive1211 whenever the 
vessel is located outside European waters1212 upon or immediately prior to its 
transfer. Where the applicability of the Acquired Rights Directive is 
                                                          
1207 Case E-2/04 Reidar Rasmussen, Jan Rossavik, and Johan Käldman v. Total E&P Norge 
AS, v/styrets formann [2004] EFTA CR 54. 
1208 This case differs from Addison v. Denholm Ship Management in the sense that here it 
concerned a fixed installation. 
1209 Case E-2/04 Reidar Rasmussen, Jan Rossavik, and Johan Käldman v. Total E&P Norge 
AS, v/styrets formann [2004] EFTA CR 54, para. 43. The judgment in this case can be 
constructed as arguing in favour of applying the Acquired Rights Directive to undertakings 
situated on the area of the Continental Shelf belonging to the Member States.  
1210 European Commission, ‘Preparatory Study for an Impact Assessment Concerning a 
Possible Revision of the Current Exclusions of Seafaring Workers from the Scope of EU 
Social Legislation’, Framework Service Contract No. FISH/2006/09 – LOT2 [2010]. 
1211 I.e. the various national provisions transposing the directive. 
1212 I.e. the combined internal waters and territorial waters of the Member States. 
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contingent upon physical presence within EU territory a vessel can easily 
avoid application by venturing outside European waters. By the same token, 
vessels that are merely passing through European waters may unintentionally 
be captured by the provisions of the directive. Since the purpose of the 
reform of the Acquired Rights Directive is to better protect those working in 
the European seafaring industry, the aforementioned occurrences are 
undesirable. In order to prevent intentional circumvention of the provisions 
of the directive and to enhance legal certainty, policy option 3, i.e. providing 
specific legislation or specific provisions covering seagoing vessels or 
seagoing workers within the existing directive, appears to hold the desired 
course of action. On a previous occasion, I have advocated a revision of the 
scope of the directive to the extent that the Acquired Rights Directive is to 
apply to European seagoing vessels irrespective of their location at the time 
of the transfer, e.g., by the assertion that the directive is to apply to (the 
crews of) seagoing vessels whenever the vessel to be transferred is 
controlled and operated from a Member State.1213 Given the risk of flagging 
out this approach is to be preferred over the application of the directive 
whenever the vessel to be transferred is registered in a Member State. The 
latter approach however, was the exact course taken by the European 
Commission in its original proposal for a directive.  
 
2.1.2 Proposal for a Directive 
The proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on seafarers amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 
98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC1214 of 2013 aims ‘to improve the level of 
protection of the rights protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in EU labour law and to ensure a level playing field at EU level’ 
where it concerns seagoing workers.1215 In order to achieve this aim the 
proposal advocates the repeal of Article 1(3) of the Acquired Rights 
Directive and replacement by a provision that fully secures the application of 
                                                          
1213 Henckel 2012.  
1214 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final. 
1215 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final, p. 3. 
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the directive to seagoing vessels that are registered in and/or flying the flag 
of a Member State. As such, the proposal, in Article 5, suggests the 
following changes to Directive 2001/23/EC: 
 
‘Directive 2001/23/EC is amended as follows: 
Article 1 is amended as follows: 
 
(1) Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 
‘2. This Directive shall apply, without prejudice to paragraph 3, where 
and insofar as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business to be transferred situated within the territorial scope of the 
Treaty.’ 
 
(2) Paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 
‘3. This Directive shall apply to the transfer of a seagoing vessel 
registered in and/or flying the flag of a Member State and constituting 
an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business for the 
purposes of this Directive, even when it is not situated within the 
territorial scope of the Treaty.’ 
 
(3) The following paragraph 4 is added: 
‘4. Member States may, after consulting the social partners, provide that 
Chapter II of this Directive does not apply in the following 
circumstances: 
(a) the object of the transfer consists exclusively of one or more 
seagoing vessels, 
(b) the undertaking or business to be transferred operates only one 
seagoing vessel.’1216 
 
If the proposal for a directive would have been adopted the Acquired Rights 
Directive would have, by reason of the new Article 1(3) applied to the 
transfer of a seagoing vessel registered in and/ or flying the flag of a 
Member State, regardless of its geographical location at the time of the 
transfer. As such, the proposal deservedly proposes a different territorial 
                                                          
1216 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers 
amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, 
COM (2013) 798 final, p. 16-17. 
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scope for the transfer of seagoing vessels than it does for land-based 
undertakings. Where it concerns land-based undertakings the directive, on 
the basis of Article 1(2), applies whenever the undertaking to be transferred 
is situated within EU territory. For seagoing vessels however, the flag or 
state of registration is decisive. Seeking connection to the flag state or the 
state of registration bears the risk that ship owners will subject the vessel to a 
purposeful reflagging in order to prevent the occurrence of a transfer of 
undertaking and application of the Acquired Rights Directive. This ease of 
flagging out is a means of substituting the existing workforce for low wage 
workers subject to the laws and regulations of countries with lower or 
difficultly enforced labour standards, a means of lowering labour standards 
and effectuating cost reduction which is considered unparalleled on shore.1217 
It is this risk of flagging out that constituted the main reservation of the 
European Economic and Social Committee to the proposed changes to the 
Acquired Rights Directive.1218 In its opinion on the proposal the European 
Economic and Social Committee pointed to the special features of the 
transfer of seagoing vessels, especially pertaining to a change of flag upon or 
after the transfer.1219 According to the Committee, a change in flag may 
result in a considerable deterioration of the economic position and 
employment conditions of the affected employees. In light of this the 
Committee urged the Commission to ensure that transfers of undertakings 
involving a simultaneous or subsequent change in flag would fall within the 
remit of the Acquired Rights Directive as otherwise the rights of seagoing 
workers might be eroded.1220 Applying the provisions of the Acquired Rights 
                                                          
1217 Marsh & Ryan 1989; Kahveci & Nichols 2006, p. 16; Dimitrova 2010, p. 17. 
1218 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a 
Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 
2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, OJ [2014] C226/39.  
1219 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a 
Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 
2009/38/EC, 
2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, OJ [2014] C226/39, para. 5.15. 
1220 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a 
Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on seafarers amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 
2009/38/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, OJ [2014] C226/39, para. 5.15.  It is 
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Directive and its national counterparts to the transfer of a seagoing vessel 
registered in and/or flying the flag of a Member State even when it is not 
situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty, allows for the purposeful 
circumvention of acquired rights provisions by means of a simultaneous of 
subsequent reflagging of the vessel. As such, the proposed revision of the 
Acquired Rights Directive does not fully meet its aim of equating the 
transfer of seagoing vessels to the transfer of land-based undertakings and 
securing a level playing field for maritime employees. During the discussion 
of the proposal many Member State delegations therefore expressed concern 
over the proposed Article 5 of the directive concerning the revision of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. In their view this Article should be ‘substantially 
improved to take due account of the particular features of the shipping sector 
such as its worldwide dimension and the risk of flagging out.’1221 In light of 
these considerations a revised draft proposal was issued. This draft proposal 
corresponds to the adopted Directive (EU) 2015/1794 and severely 
minimizes the revision to the Acquired Rights Directive.       
2.2 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 
Aiming to improve the working conditions of seafarers and their information 
and consultation, Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 October 2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 
2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC,1222 as regards seafarers 
was adopted in 2015. The adopted directive, in Article 5, alters the scope of 
the Acquired Rights Directive by ensuring its application to seagoing 
vessels:   
 
‘3. This Directive shall apply to a transfer of a seagoing vessel that is 
part of a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking 
                                                                                                                                        
unclear in which transfer-related cases a reflagging may be justified or how much time should 
pass between the reflagging and the subsequent transfer for the reflagging not to be 
considered a purposeful evasion of acquired rights provisions.  
1221 Report from the Presidency to the Council 4 December 2014, 16148/1/14, 2013/0390 
(COD) available online at: <register.consilium.europa.eu> 
1222 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, as regards 
seafarers, OJ [2015] L 263/1. 
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or business within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2, provided that the 
transferee is situated, or the transferred undertaking, business, or part of 
an undertaking or business remains, within the territorial scope of the 
Treaty. 
 
This Directive shall not apply where the object of the transfer consists 
exclusively of one or more seagoing vessels.’ 
 
Compared to the earlier proposal the directive severely limits the application 
of the Acquired Rights Directive to seagoing vessels. Whereas the proposal 
suggested a different territorial scope for seagoing vessels, directive (EU) 
2015/1794 holds firm to the existing territorial scope of Article 1(2). In this 
sense, the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated 
within a Member State and includes the transfer of a seagoing vessel. The 
directive further reduces the territorial scope of the directive for seagoing 
vessels by requiring the transferee to be situated or the undertaking to remain 
situated within the territory of a Member State. By doing so, there exists a 
different scope of application for transfers of undertakings that include 
seagoing vessels than there exists for the transfer of wholly land-based 
undertakings. Where the transfer of land-based undertaking may include 
domestic, intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios, the transfer of an 
undertaking including a seagoing vessel is limited to domestic and intra-
European transfer scenarios as the directive requires the transferred 
undertaking to be situated within a European Member State both before and 
after the transfer.1223 I wonder whether the directive, which set out to 
ameliorate the position of seagoing personnel and create a level playing field 
for the maritime professions, has brought any significant change to the 
Acquired Rights Directive. The directive now applies to the ‘transfer of a 
seagoing vessel that is part of a transfer of an undertaking, business or part 
of an undertaking or business’1224, thus ensuring the automatic transfer of the 
rights and obligations stemming from the employment relationship of the 
crew of a seagoing vessel upon a change in the person responsible for 
                                                          
1223 The only deviation from this territorial scope may exist where the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated in a Member State along with the transferee, but the undertaking is 
transferred to a non-Member State upon or immediately after the transfer of undertaking.  
1224 Article 5 Directive (EU) 2015/1794. 
Chapter 5 – Seafaring workers 
374 
 
carrying on the business.1225 However, even though the directive, in its 
previous wording, excluded seagoing vessels from its scope, it was assumed 
that the exclusion did not pertain to the transfer of an undertaking that 
involved a seagoing vessel, allowing its application to the transfer of e.g. 
shipping companies and situations where the seagoing vessel merely 
constituted a tangible asset.1226 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 reiterates that the 
Acquired Rights Directive does not apply to single vessel transfers where the 
object of the transfer consists exclusively of one (or more) seagoing vessels. 
Here, the directive differs from the prior proposal, which in principle applied 
to such types of transfers, but allowed the Member States the option to 
exclude the application of their national acquired rights provisions if the 
object of the transfer consisted exclusively of one or more seagoing vessels 
or if the undertaking or business to be transferred only operated one 
vessel.1227 The Committee of Regions opposed the latter option as it believed 
that undertaking should be treated equally irrespective of whether they 
operate one or more vessels.1228 The newly adopted directive in some respect 
relieves some of the uncertainty provided by the proposal in the sense that it 
no longer provides the Member States with the option of excluding certain 
vessel transfers, rather it includes an exclusion itself. This exclusion, 
entailing that the Acquired Rights Directive does not apply to single vessel 
transfers where the object of the transfer consists exclusively of one (or 
more) seagoing vessel(s) appears superfluous. After all, in establishing 
whether a transfer of undertaking has occurred the deciding factor is whether 
that undertaking has retained its identity, requiring a consideration of 
whether the vessel was transferred as a going concern, indicated by the 
resumption or continuation of its operation(s) by the new employer.1229 In 
this sense it is undeniable that the transfer of a single (or more) seagoing 
vessel(s) as a mere tangible asset does not in itself constitute a transfer of 
                                                          
1225 Cf. Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive. 
1226 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 3, p. 5 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 
7, p. 3 (MvA); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 5, p. 3; Christe 2010 (Arbeidsrecht), Art. 
7:666 BW, note 3; Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, JAR 1996/198,  
ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891; Drobnig & Puttfarken 1989, p. 74, 77. 
1227 Article 5(3) COM (2013) 798 final.  
1228 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions — Amendment of the directives on exclusions 
for seafarers OJ [2014] C 174/53-54. 
1229 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127. 
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undertaking, an echo of this notion within the wording of the directive is 
needless. In other words, the the wording that the directive ‘shall not apply 
where the object of the transfer consists exclusively of one or more seagoing 
vessels’ may have been included to avert the notion that the transfer of a 
single vessel (or multiple vessels) by itself constitutes the transfer of an 
undertaking. For an undertaking to be transferred under the directive that 
undertaking needs to retain its identity. As such, the mere transfer of a vessel 
will in most cases not be sufficient to effectuate the application of the 
directive. As such, in addition to the vessel the transferee will have to 
continue the business in a similar fashion as operated by the transferor, such 
continuation may require the additional transfer of e.g. certain transport and 
charter contracts, shipping routes and client base. As outlined above, 
although the inclusion of the wording is understandable, it is meaningless in 
the sense that the retention of identity-test applies to seagoing vessels and 
land-based undertakings alike. The exact reasons underlying the original 
exclusion from the directive remain unclear, it appears to me that the 
exclusion to some extent must have been preempted by the notion that a 
single vessel may be operated as an undertaking.1230 A repeal of the 
exclusion should therefore hold true to this notion.1231 In this sense, the new 
Article 1(3) Acquired Rights Directive should be interpreted as applying to 
single vessel transfers that constitute the transfer of an undertaking.  
3. Cross-border transfer of seagoing vessels                                                                 
As extensively discussed in the previous Chapters, the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts apply whenever the ‘transfer of an 
undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business to another 
employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger’ occurs.1232  Consequently, 
a transfer of undertaking constitutes ‘a change in the natural or legal person 
responsible for carrying out the business, who by virtue of this change 
acquires the obligations of an employer vis-à-vis employees of the 
undertaking, regardless of whether or not ownership has been 
                                                          
1230 Similar: Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 15. 
1231 The new Article 1(3) should not be interpreted as merely applying where the seagoing 
vessel merely constitutes a single asset in the transfer of a larger undertaking.   
1232 Art. 1(a) Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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transferred.’1233 In order for the provisions of the directive to apply there 
needs to be a transfer of an ‘economic entity which retains its identity, 
meaning an organised grouping of resources which has the objective of 
pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that activity is central or 
ancillary’1234, this equally applies to the transfer of seagoing vessels that are 
part of the transfer of an undertaking. The aim of the present paragraph is to 
assess whether a transfer of a seagoing vessel, most notably a single 
seagoing vessel can result in the transfer of a going concern that retains its 
identity. In aiding this assessment, the ECJ has set forth an ever-growing set 
of guidelines regarding the interpretation of the concept of undertaking. 
Decisive is whether the business was disposed of as a going concern, 
indicated by the resumption or continuation of its operation(s) (with the 
same or similar activities) by the new employer. In determining whether the 
transferred undertaking has retained its identity the court has to weigh the 
factors outlined in the flagship judgment of Spijkers.1235 The court has to 
take into account all the circumstances that characterise the undertaking in 
question such as the type of undertaking or business, the transfer of tangible 
assets, the value of intangible assets, the transfer of the majority of the 
employees, the transfer of customers as well as the degree of similarity 
between the activities carried on before and after the transfer and the period, 
if any, for which the activities were suspended.1236 All of these 
circumstances are single factors in an overall assessment and cannot be 
considered in isolation.1237 It is for the national court to take these factors 
into account in its overall assessment of whether a transfer of undertaking 
has taken place and whether the transfer of a (single) seagoing vessel may 
constitute a transfer of undertaking.   
 
3.1 Concept of undertaking and seagoing vessels 
As mentioned above, the former express exclusion of (single) seagoing 
vessels from the Acquired Rights Directive suggests that the transfer of these 
vessels could entail a transfer of undertaking had it not been for this 
                                                          
1233 Case C-234/98 Allen v Amalgamated Construction [1999] ECR I-8643, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:594. 
1234 Art. 1(b) Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC). 
1235 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127.  
1236 For a more extensive discussion of these factors see Chapter 2.  
1237 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127, para. 13.  
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exclusion.1238 Even though the exclusion has now been repealed, the mere 
sale or charter of a vessel does not readily constitute a transfer of 
undertaking under the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts as is clear from the wording of the newly inserted Article 1(3), 
which states that the directive is not to apply to the mere transfer of a 
seagoing vessel.In order for the provisions of the directive to apply, the 
vessel needs to be ‘part of a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business’ and thus constitute an ‘economic entity which 
retains its identity’.1239 Originally, the application of the Dutch acquired 
rights provisions did not extend to the transfer of single seagoing vessels.1240 
The provisions, however, did cover the transfer of inland navigation 
vessels1241 and shipping companies in their entirety.1242 Inspiration for the 
practical application of the acquired rights provisions to seagoing vessels 
may therefore be drawn from the application of the Dutch acquired rights 
provisions to inland navigation vessels. In a decision by the district court of 
Dordrecht the sale of an inland navigation vessel was considered a transfer 
of undertaking.1243 The court held that the vessel was disposed of as a going 
concern and that its operation was resumed by the transferee with the same 
or similar activities. In fact, after the transfer, the transferee carried the same 
cargo over the same routes for the same single charterer. The takeover of the 
charter contract and the continuation of the vessel’s prior route were of 
material importance in the conclusion that a transfer of undertaking had 
occurred.1244 Surely, seagoing vessels differ from inland navigation vessels 
not only in size, but also in that they often carry cargo for different 
charterers, do not have a fixed home port or operate on different 
international routes. In light of the importance attributed to the transfer of the 
charter agreement and the continuation of the existing shipping route in the 
abovementioned case, combined with the fact that Article 1(3) only allows 
                                                          
1238 Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 15. 
1239 Art. 1(b) Acquired Rights Directive. 
1240 Art. 7:666(2) expressly states that the acquired rights provisions do not apply to the crews 
of seagoing vessels. 
1241 Beltzer (T&C Arbeidsrecht), Art. 7:666 BW, note 3. 
1242 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 3, p. 5 (MvT); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 
7, p. 3 (MvA); Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15940, no. 5, p. 3; Christe 2010 (Arbeidsrecht), Art. 
7:666 BW, note 3. 
1243 Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, JAR 1996/198, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891. 
1244 Rb. Dordrecht 24 April 1996, JAR 1996/198, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:1996:AM1891, para. 9. 
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for the application to seagoing vessels where that vessel is part of a transfer 
of undertaking it seems unlikely that Dutch law would consider a seagoing 
vessel per se to constitute an undertaking under its acquired rights 
provisions. Here, Germany, the world’s third largest ship-owning nation,1245 
can serve as an example as it has already extended the application of its main 
national acquired rights provision, § 613a BGB, to single seagoing vessels. 
In German case law it is well established that a seagoing vessel does not 
constitute a single asset, but concerns a whole variety of items that, with the 
help of the division of labour amongst a group of workers, is utilised to 
realise a permanently invested independent employment-technical 
purpose.1246 In this view, a seagoing vessel equals neither a machine that is 
used for production nor a truck utilised for freight transport. In this view, due 
to its unique nature, a seagoing vessel can only be compared to a factory.1247 
The work aboard a seagoing vessel is carried out by a variety of 
departments1248 including, but not limited to, the deck department,1249 marine 
engineering department,1250 the stewards’ department,1251 and the medical 
department. In addition, the vessel is comprised of individual substantive 
assets amounting to one whole, such as marine electronics, navigation, 
communication and fish-finding equipment, sonar and the engine(s). As 
such, a seagoing vessel cannot merely be characterised as a floating marine 
structure, since it forms a complicated and highly organised assembly of 
individual assets creating an organisational autonomy which forms the basis 
for the employees’ performance.1252 In conjunction with this assembly of 
                                                          
1245 Together with Greece, Japan and China, Germany controls half of the world fleet. 
1246 BAG 18 March 1997 – 3 AZR 729/95; BAG 2 March 2006 – 8 AZR 147/05; LAG 
Hamburg 7 March 1995 – 6 Sa 53/94; LAG Hamburg 7 April 2005 – 7 Sa 65/04; LAG 
Hamburg 3 March 2005 – 1 Sa 35/04; ArbG Hamburg 27 April 2004 – 1 Ca 71/04.  
1247 Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 21.  
1248 Reid, Nichols & Williams 2009, under <certifications>.  
1249 This department is in charge of the vessel’s navigation and operation. 
1250 The engineering department is centred on ship propulsion and the maintenance of 
machinery.  
1251 This includes catering and cleaning services, Cf. ILO Food and Catering (Ships’ Crews) 
Convention (C68), 1946, available online at: <www.ilo.org>.  
1252 Cf. Case C-466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg v Ferroton Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-
803, ECLI:EU:C:2009:85 in which the ECJ held that the retention of organisational autonomy 
is no longer wholly required for the application of the Acquired Rights Directive. The 
preservation of a functional link between the various elements of the transferred undertaking 
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assets, the workforce is paramount in realising the vessel’s distinct nautical 
purpose, i.e. traversing the high seas and coping with the concomitant 
risks.1253 Since, in this view, a seagoing vessel per se bears organisational 
autonomy, a mere transfer of the vessel combined with its usage by the 
transferee – which can be characterised as the continuation of the vessel’s 
principal activity – may result in a transfer of undertaking. Whereas the 
German courts frequently base their decisions on the distinct nautical 
purpose of a seagoing vessel, some legal authors argue that the principal 
purpose of the vessel, being the transport of cargo or persons, should not be 
lost in the decision-making process.1254 In this context, the question is raised 
as to which of the Spijkers factors should be taken into account where it 
concerns the transfer of a seagoing vessel.1255 It is argued that a vessel, e.g., a 
cargo vessel, does not constitute an undertaking under the German acquired 
rights provision(s) if none of the charter and cargo carriage contracts have 
been transferred.1256 The transfer of these charter contracts is considered 
equally important as the type of business being transferred and the transfer 
of the majority of the employees.1257 It surely depends on the circumstances 
of the individual case as well as the type of vessel being transferred whether 
a transfer of undertaking has occurred. In this sense, the sale of a seagoing 
vessel on international routes without a home port will vastly differ from the 
contracting out of catering services aboard a ferryboat ferrying passengers 
between fixed harbours. In establishing whether an undertaking has been 
transferred, seagoing vessels are placed on equal footing with land-based 
undertakings, meaning that the Spijkers factors will have to be utilised to 
determine whether an undertaking has been transferred. To me it seems an 
unlikely scenario that all vessels amount to undertakings under the directive. 
Although seagoing vessels may be more akin to a factory than to a lorry, it 
must be remembered that where it concerns land-based undertakings 
                                                                                                                                        
enabling the transferee to pursue an identical or analogous economic activity will likewise 
suffice.  
1253 Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 21. 
1254 Steffan 2000, p. 689; Kania 1994, p. 874; Cf. Glockauer 2003, p. 76 ; Athanassopoulou 
2005, p. 26-27. 
1255 Steffan 2000, p. 689.  
1256 Kania 1994, p. 874. 
1257 Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 26-27; Steffan 2000, p. 687, 689; Kania 1994, p. 874; Cf. 
Glockauer 2003, p. 76. 
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factories do not per se constitute undertakings within the meaning of the 
directive either.1258 After all, a transfer of undertaking requires a certain 
degree of similarity between the activities carried out before and after the 
transfer.1259 In some cases, depending on the activities carried on by the 
factory, the transfer of mere tangible assets may therefore not be sufficient. 
Additionally, the transfer of e.g. intellectual property and client base may be 
required. Until the ECJ has ruled that all vessels amount to undertakings 
under the directive, which to me seems highly improbable, it is up to the 
court adjudicating the case to determine, on the basis of the applicable 
national implementation provisions, bearing in mind the guidelines set forth 
by the European Court and considering all the facts characterising the 
transaction in question, whether a transfer of undertaking has taken place. 
The continuation of the employment relationships with the new employer is 
therefore wholly dependent on the applicable national implementation 
provisions and the interpretation of the facts of the case in light of European 
case law.  
 
3.2 Bareboat charter 
Within the international shipping industry transfers of undertakings may take 
many different guises. As the Acquired Rights Directive applies where there 
is a change in the legal or natural person responsible for carrying on the 
business regardless of whether or not ownership has been transferred,1260 a 
transfer under the directive may include the transfer of a single vessel if that 
vessel is considered part of an undertaking. As such, it is worth examining 
whether the sale and charter of a vessel as well and the outsourcing of ship 
management may constitute such a transfer of undertaking.1261 In this 
context, it is appropriate to cast a glance at a specific maritime transaction 
under which the transfer of the workforce is not anticipated, i.e. the bareboat 
                                                          
1258 Cf. Chapter 2, paragraph 4. 
1259 Case C-24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127.  
1260 Cf. Case 287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 5465, ECLI:EU:C:1987:573, para. 12; Joined 
Cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Securicor [2005] ECR I-11237, ECLI:EU:C:2005:778, para. 
31. In addition, a contractual relation between transferor and transferee is not required (Case 
C-51/00 Temco Service Industries [2002] ECR I-969, ECLI:EU:C:2002:48).  
1261 In German case law ship management agreements under which the owner outsources the 
management of the ship to a specific ship management company, have been considered 
transfers of undertakings where there has been a change in employer, i.e., where the ship 
management company forms the new employer.  
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charter. A bareboat charter1262 constitutes the transfer of a vessel in its purest 
form. A bareboat charter or charter by demise is a contract for the usage of a 
‘bare’ vessel for a stipulated period of time. The ship is transferred from the 
shipowner to the charterer without captain or crew. As owner pro hac vice 
the charterer assumes final responsibility over the operation of the vessel for 
the duration of the charter.1263 In effect, the charterer has full control over the 
management of the vessel as well as which crew to appoint, whilst the ship 
owner is solely entitled to payment of the charter hire and to the return of the 
vessel upon completion of the charter.1264 Because a bareboat charter 
essentially amounts to the transfer of a single seagoing vessel without a 
workforce it is of vital importance to establish whether such a charter 
constitutes the transfer of an undertaking under the Acquired Rights 
Directive and its national counterparts. Indeed, if it is considered a transfer 
of undertaking the employment relationships of the entire workforce 
employed on the vessel prior to the charter will transfer to the charterer by 
operation of law. This, in turn, might impair the continuance of the bareboat 
charter within Europe now that the exclusion of seagoing vessels from the 
ambit of the Acquired Rights Directive has been repealed.1265  
 
If a bareboat charter were to amount to a transfer of undertaking under the 
Acquired Rights Directive, captain and crew would automatically transfer to 
the charterer, regardless of the intentions of the parties. This transfer could 
undermine the very nature and purpose of the bareboat charter, being the 
transfer of a bare vessel. Rather than a bareboat charter, the charter 
agreement will thus degenerate into a simple time charter. The question 
whether a bareboat charter constitutes a transfer of undertaking therefore 
                                                          
1262 NL: rompbevrachting, D: Bareboatvercharterung, F: affrètement coque nue. 
1263 Cf. definitions of the concept of bareboat charter in Dutch legislation: Art. 1 chapeau and 
under b Wet nationaliteit zeeschepen in rompbevrachting), Stb. 1992, 541: ‘In deze wet wordt 
verstaan onder: rompbevrachting: de overeenkomst, waarbij de ene partij, de 
rompvervrachter, zich verbindt een zeeschip zonder bemanning voor een bepaalde tijd ter 
beschikking te stellen van haar wederpartij, de rompbevrachter, zonder daarover nog enige 
zeggenschap te houden, en de rompbevrachter het schip exploiteert’, also see: Art. 8:530(1) 
BW, Stb. 1991, 126, Art. 8:990(1) BW, Stb. 1991, 126.  
1264 See Ademuni-Odeke 1998, p. 44; Athanassopoulou 2005, p. 106; Oostwouder 2001, p. 
37. 
1265 This concern has not been identified in the impact assessment.  
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forms an important concern for the European shipping industry and its global 
competitiveness.  
 
In German case law, the quintessential provision stemming from the 
Acquired Rights Directive, § 613a BGB, has been applied to bareboat 
charters on numerous occasions.1266 Although not exclusively deciding 
against it, the Bundesarbeitsgericht has placed some reservations on the 
application of § 613a BGB in bareboat charter situations in the sense that the 
simple handover of a vessel does not fulfill the requirements of § 613a 
BGB.1267 Here too, the essential criterion is whether the charterer has taken 
possession of a going concern enabling him to continue or pursue the same 
or similar activities. The mere transfer of the vessel into the care of the 
charterer makes that the he can utilise the vessel in its distinct purpose, being 
the transport of cargo and persons. However, the opinions differ when it 
comes to the effects to given to the possible continuation of this purpose. 
Whereas some believe that the continuance of the transport function is 
sufficient for the classification of a single vessel as transfer of 
undertaking,1268 others posit that the acquired rights provisions will only 
apply to the charter if it concerns the transfer of an existing transport 
function, for instance in the case of cruise ships.1269 Whether a bareboat 
charter per se forms a transfer of undertaking is therefore not easily decided. 
However, I would argue, especially given the inclusion in Article 1(3) that 
the transfer of seagoing vessels is only captured by the directive where they 
are part of an undertaking, that a the mere charter of a vessel does not 
(readily) amount to a transfer of undertaking. Although this inclusion is 
superfluous in the sense that any transfer under the directive is subject to the 
retention of identity test,  it does appear to reiterate that a mere transfer of a 
vessel as a tangible asset does not constitute a transfer of undertaking. In this 
                                                          
1266 LAG Hamburg 21 June 1989 – 8 Sa 24/89; LAG Hamburg 17 February 1995 – 6 Sa 
41/94; ArbG Hamburg 29 January 1988 – S 1 Ca 199/86; LAG Hamburg 26 January 1989 – 7 
Sa 28/88. 
1267 BAG 26 April 1990 – 2 AZR 170/89; in that sense, the charter of a bare vessel can be 
compared to the sale of a single tangible asset, which doesn’t constitute a transfer of 
undertaking, cf. LAG Hamburg 26 January 1989 – 7 Sa 28/88.  
1268 Franzen 1994, p. 43-44. 
1269 Glockauer 2003, p. 75. These sorts of vessels will rarely be eligible for a bareboat charter 
as they are fully dependent on the skills and qualifications of the existing workforce. 
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sense the bareboat charter may be compared to the rental of a lorry or the 
lease of factory machinery. Although the charter allows the charterer to 
continue the vessel’s distinct nautical purpose, a transfer of undertaking 
should not easily be assumed if e.g. the cargo contracts and client base are 
not continued. More so, from a maritime perspective, the inclusion of 
bareboat charter situations within the Acquired Rights Directive is not 
desired. It may signify the end of bareboat situations throughout Europe, as 
under the directive the employees transfer to the transferee by operation of 
law. Such an employee transfer abundantly conflicts with the purpose of the 
bareboat charter, which is to acquire the vessel without captain or crew. If 
due to the inclusion of seagoing vessels the practice of bareboat chartering 
(at least throughout Europe) will cease to exist this may cripple the 
competitiveness of the European seafaring industry.  Again, it will be up to 
the court adjudicating the case to determine, on the basis of the applicable 
national implementation provisions and European guidelines, considering all 
the facts characterising the bareboat charter in question whether a transfer of 
undertaking has taken place. The continuation of the employment 
relationships upon a bareboat charter as well as the future of bareboat 
situations within Europe is therefore entirely dependent on whether a 
bareboat charter is captured by the Acquired Rights Directive. Even though 
it is unlikely and highly undesirable that a mere bareboat charter, 
encompassing nothing more than the transfer of a vessel, is covered by the 
Acquired Rights Directive, as such inclusion would be detrimental to the 
entire maritime sector, the directive does not prevent the Member States 
from offering extended employment protection.1270 More so, directive (EU) 
2015/1794, in Article 7, elucidates that the implementation of the directive 
shall under no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the 
general level of protection of persons covered by this directive, already 
afforded by the Member States in the fields covered by, among others, the 
Acquired Rights Directive. As such, it appears that the Member States that 
already apply their national acquired rights provisions to seagoing vessels 
and different transfer scenarios associated with the maritime industry are 
encouraged to uphold these extensions of their national law.  
 
 
                                                          
1270 Article 8 Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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4. Conflict of laws 
Upon the transfer of an immobile or land-based undertaking to a foreign 
transferee, without relocation of the undertaking both the actual and legal 
position of the employees will often remain virtually unaffected.1271 This is 
because, in most cases, neither the place of habitual employment nor the seat 
of the transferred undertaking is subject to change as a result of such a 
transfer.1272 Consequently, the primary focus of the present research lies in 
transfers of undertakings that are coupled with a cross-border relocation of 
the undertaking to be transferred.1273 It is in these situations, as outlined in 
previous Chapters, that issues of conflicting laws are bound to transpire. As 
such, upon a cross-border transfer of undertaking, it is for the conflict of 
laws to determine which legal system’s acquired rights provisions are to be 
applied. Since the highly mobile nature of seagoing vessels might complicate 
the conflict of laws connection for transfers of undertakings, this Chapter 
seeks to assess whether the conflict of laws solution proposed in the previous 
Chapter requires adaptation now that seagoing vessels have become subject 
to the Acquired Rights Directive. After all, in addition to the inherently 
mobile nature of a vessel, the transfer of seagoing vessels is frequently 
coupled with a simultaneous reflagging of the vessel.1274 To that effect, a 
Dutch vessel may for example be sold to a Danish shipping company which 
reflags the vessel under the Greek or Liberian flag. Such a change in 
ownership and flag may give rise to, e.g., a change in the applicable law to 
the employment contract, a change in home port, maritime transport routes, 
collective employment law, pension entitlements or fiscal law. In light of 
                                                          
1271 In the sense that the applicable law to their employment contract or the place/country of 
their habitual employment does not change. 
1272 Still, there is to be a conflict of laws assessment into which of the laws connected with the 
case is to be applied.  
1273 See Chapter 2. 
1274 Surely, the transfer of land-based undertakings can likewise be coupled with a 
simultaneous relocation of the undertaking (see, e.g. Ktr. Eindhoven (vrz.) 9 September 2008, 
JAR 2008/271; Ktr. Tilburg 26 July 2007, JAR 2007/259; Ktr.  Zaandam (vrz.) 26 September 
2007, JAR 2007/67; LAG Baden-Württemberg 17 September 2009 – 11 Sa 40/09; BAG 26 
May 2011 – 8 AZR 37/10; LAG Baden-Württemberg 15 December 2009 – 22 Sa 45/09; LAG 
Hamburg 22 May 2003 – 8 Sa 29/03; BAG 20 April 1989 – 2 AZR 431/88; Cass. soc. 23 
October 1974, RDIP 1976, p. 87; Holis Metal Industries Limited v. (1) GMB (2) Newell 
Limited [2008] IRLR 187), however this situation is more common where it concerns highly 
mobile undertakings.  
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these considerations a question that may arise is whether a change in 
ownership or flag has any bearing on the applicable law to the effects of a 
transfer of undertaking.  
4.1 Effect of flagging out 
In determining the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking the question 
arises whether a simultaneous or subsequent reflagging of the seagoing 
vessel (to be) transferred has any effect on the law that governs (the effects 
of) the transfer of undertaking. The answer to this question surely depends 
on the conflict of laws and the connecting factor utilised to determine the 
applicable law to the transfer. As follows from the previous Chapter, a 
change in the applicable law or the allowance of a conflit mobile is 
incompatible with the nature and aim of the Acquired Rights Directive, 
which is to safeguard the rights of employees employed in European based 
undertakings. More so, where it concerns land-based undertakings, allowing 
a change in the applicable law to a transfer of undertaking would negate the 
entire purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive as it would result in the 
transfer only having some effect if the laws at the original location and the 
new location of the undertaking (depending on the time of the relocation) 
allow for an automatic transfer of the employment relationship and the rights 
and obligations stemming therefrom. In addition, such an approach is 
contrary to the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights Directive, reflected in 
Article 1(2). Article 1(2) merely requires the undertaking to be transferred to 
be located within an EU Member State prior to the transfer. Thus, as appears 
from the directive, its application is exclusively dependent on the 
geographical location of the undertaking to be transferred and not on the 
destination of the undertaking upon or after the transfer. This differs where it 
concerns seagoing vessels as the new Article 1(3) limits the territorial scope 
of the directive for seagoing vessels by requiring the transferee to be situated 
or the transferred undertaking to remain situated within a Member State. The 
latter requirement may be easily fulfilled where it concerns the transfer of 
shipping companies or the transfer of another type of undertaking where the 
seagoing vessel is merely part of a larger undertaking to be transferred. 
However, in situations involving the transfer of a single seagoing vessel that 
in itself constitutes an undertaking, that undertaking, save for its flag and 
place of registration, due to its inherent mobility cannot be pinpointed at an 
exact geographic location, leaving only the requirement that the transferee 
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must be situated within a Member State. As such, by reason of Article 1(2) 
and 1(3), in order for the Acquired Rights Directive to apply to the transfer 
of single seagoing vessels, the undertaking to be transferred as well as the 
transferee must be situated within a Member State. Here, the continued 
application of Article 1(2) in relation to seagoing vessels is problematic and 
underlines the idea that the directive is only intended to apply to seagoing 
vessels where they are part of the transfer of a larger land-based undertaking, 
thus excluding the application of the Acquired Rights Directive to single 
vessel transfers. If this is the case, the repeal of the provision excluding 
seagoing vessels does not meet its aim of ameliorating the position of 
seagoing workers since the transfer of shipping companies was already 
believed to be included in the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive prior to 
the repeal of the provision excluding seagoing vessels. The new Article 1(3) 
however clearly refers to the application of the directive to seagoing vessels 
that are part of the transfer of an undertaking within the meaning of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1. As such, seagoing vessels are not exempt 
from the existing territorial scope of the directive. In this regard, the freedom 
of navigation combined with mobility of seagoing vessels forms important 
concern when it comes to the application of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
Since the directive applies whenever the undertaking or part of the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of a Member 
State, the high mobility of seagoing vessels might prevent application of the 
directive1275 whenever the vessel is located outside European waters1276 upon 
or immediately prior to its transfer. Where the applicability of the Acquired 
Rights Directive is contingent on physical presence within EU territory a 
vessel, in cases where it is considered part of a (non-land-based) 
undertaking, can easily avoid application by venturing outside European 
waters. By the same token, vessels that are merely passing through European 
waters may unintentionally be captured by the provisions of the directive, if 
their transfer constitutes the transfer of an undertaking. Since the purpose of 
the reform of the Acquired Rights Directive is to better protect those 
working in the European seafaring industry, the aforementioned occurrences 
are undesirable. In order to prevent intentional circumvention of the 
                                                          
1275 I.e. the various national provisions transposing the directive. 
1276 I.e. the combined internal waters, territorial waters and EEZs, including the Continental 
Shelf, of the Member States. 
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provisions of the directive and to enhance legal certainty, it would therefore 
be advisable to amend the present scope of the directive to the extent that it 
applies to European seagoing vessels irrespective of their location at the time 
of the transfer. In this a connection to the flag state or the Member State of 
registration may offer a solution. In earlier times, seagoing vessels were 
considered part of the territory of the state that determined their 
nationality.1277 Even though this is no longer the case, the flag holds a firm 
connection to a particular state. However, given the risk of flagging out the 
flag or the place of vessel registration holds an ill-suited connecting factor in 
determining the application of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national 
counterparts. Despite certain states imposing strict conditions on vessel 
registration, there still exist many jurisdictions that make it surprisingly easy 
to fly their flag.1278 In fact, shipowners oftentimes utilize these so-called 
‘flags of convience’ a means to cut cost and lower labour standards.1279 Such 
flagging out allows them to compete with vessels from developing countries, 
where labour standards, taxes and crew costs are significantly lower.1280 As 
such, it is not unimaginable that abusive reflagging is utilized as a means to 
avoid vessels (that constitute part of a non-land-based undertaking) from 
being subject to the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts. 
If in cases of a cross-border transfer of seagoing vessels connection were 
sought to the flag state the transferor and/or transferee could purposely 
circumvent the application of the Acquired Rights Directive by subjecting 
the transferred vessel to the flag of a country with lower or difficultly 
enforced labour standards. To this end, a prior, simultaneous or subsequent 
reflagging of the seagoing vessel (to be) transferred should have no bearing 
on the application of the provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights 




                                                          
1277 Cf. Ludewig 2012, p. 92-93; Franzen 1994, p. 91-92; Junker 2006, p. 407; Jensen 2006, p. 
11. 
1278 Cf. Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I 10779, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772; Saydé 2014, p. 
166; Hendrickx & Pecinovsky 2015 p. 132. 
1279 Barnard 2006, p. 274. 
1280 Dimitrova 2010, p. 17; OECD, International Regulatory Co-operation and International 
Organistations. The cases of the OECD and the IMO, OECD Publishing [2016] p. 87. 
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4.2 Preferred conflict of laws approach 
In the previous Chapter, I have established that the issue of (cross-border) 
transfers of undertakings requires a separate category under the conflict of 
laws for which connection should be sought to the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred. In doing so I held that the preferred conflict of 
laws reference for transfers of undertakings should read: 
   
‘a transfer of undertaking shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or immediately 
prior to the transfer.’ 
 
The primary aim of the present Chapter is to assess whether this proposed 
conflict of laws reference requires any change due to the recent revision of 
Article 1(3) Acquired Rights Directive and the inclusion of seagoing vessels. 
The proposed conflict of laws provision is, in part, derived from the 
territorial scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. This scope equally applies 
to the transfer of seagoing vessels that are part of the transfer of an 
undertaking. In relation to seagoing vessels however, as outlined in the 
previous paragraph, the dependency on the geographical situation of the 
undertaking to be transferred appears unsuited. To this end, problems will 
arise especially in situations where a single vessel constitutes an undertaking 
within the meaning of the Acquired Rights Directive. Due to the inherent 
mobility of seagoing vessels and the concomitant ease with which acquired 
rights provisions may purposefully be circumvented a different connecting 
factor should determine the applicable law to the transfer of seagoing 
vessels. Such a connecting factor should only apply in situations where the 
vessel is not considered part of a larger, land-based undertaking. Where this 
is the case the conflict of laws solution proposed in the previous Chapter is 
to prevail. As such, where a seagoing vessel is transferred as part of a land-
based undertaking the location of this land-based undertaking upon or 
immediately prior to the transfer is decisive in determining the applicable 
law to the (effects of a) transfer of undertaking.  
 
Instead of determining the territorial scope of national acquired rights 
provisions, the conflict of laws reference for the transfer of seagoing vessels 
should in itself designate the law that governs (the effects of) a transfer of 
undertaking. The notion that, due to the inherent mobility of seagoing 
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vessels, the application of national acquired rights provisions may not be 
contingent upon the location of the vessel to be transferred, was recognized 
by the European Commission in its second consultation of social partners on 
the revision of the exclusion of seagoing workers in the Acquired Rights 
Directive.1281 The Commission held that the existing scope rule should not 
be applied to seagoing vessels, ‘which may be transferred while they are 
outside the territorial scope of the Treaty.’ In its original proposal, the 
Commission therefore proposed a different scope for seagoing vessels by 
making the application of the directive dependent on the seagoing vessel 
being registered in and/or flying the flag of a Member State, regardless of 
the location of the seagoing vessel upon the transfer. As such, the proposed 
directive was to apply to the transfer of a seagoing vessel ‘even when it is 
not situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty.’1282 The proposed 
provision equals the view that seagoing vessels flying an EU flag, regardless 
of their location at the time of the transfer should be included in the 
Acquired Rights Directive, as portrayed in the impact assessment for the 
European Commission.1283 However, the risk of flagging out forms a major 
downside to predicating the applicability of acquired rights provisions on the 
flag. This downside is not outweighed by the flag’s easy determination or its 
significance in maritime law. It should therefore be preferred to revise the 
scope of the directive as to include seagoing vessels (that are part of an 
undertaking) that are operated and controlled from a Member State (prior to 
their transfer).1284 Whilst navigating the legal limbo of the high seas the state 
from which the vessel is actually operated and controlled forms the one true 
continuous connection to any particular state. In addition, connection to that 
state would hold true to the approach proposed for on shore undertakings; 
                                                          
1281 Reassessing the regulatory social framework for more and better seafaring jobs in the EU: 
Second consultation of the European social partners on the revision of exclusions concerning 
seafaring workers contained in Directives 2008/94/EC, 94/45/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/56/EC, 
2001/23/EC and 96/71/EC [2009], p. 8.  
1282 Article 5 COM (2013) 798 final. 
1283 Cf. Impact assessment, p. 83. It is curious that in the final adopted directive the existing 
scope of the directive (seeking connection to the location of the undertaking) is maintained 
where it concerns the transfer of seagoing vessels that are part of an undertaking, especially 
since the Commission in its earlier proposal recognized the downsides of predicating the 
application of the directive on the geographic location of the undertaking (i.e. vessel) to be 
transferred.  
1284 Cf. Henckel 2012. 
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whereas the locus or geographic situation of the vessel is subject to constant 
change, the place from which the vessel is operated and controlled is easily 
determined. Moreover, this connecting factor sits well with the directive as it 
applies whenever there is a change in the natural or legal person responsible 
for carrying on the business.1285 The application of this criterion will often 
lead to a similar outcome as the application of the criterion of the habitual 
place of performance in the determination of the law applicable to the 
employment contract, resulting in a certain congruence between the law that 
governs the employment contract and the law that governs the effects of a 
transfer of undertaking. The preference of a separate conflict of laws 
category under which connection is sought to the place from where the 
undertaking is operated and controlled over the assimilation under the 
individual employment contract lies first in the fact that a transfer of 
undertaking occurs by operation of law rather than being the result of 
contractual negotiations between the transferee and the affected employees. 
Second, the effect of a transfer of undertaking surpasses the individual 
employment relationship, which therefore holds an ill-suited connection 
under the conflict of laws.  The connection to the individual employment 
contract is at odds with the nature and aim of the Acquired Rights Directive 
as the latter seeks to ensure the continuance of individual and collective 
employment rights as well as inhabits certain internal market considerations. 
In effect, the reasons for rejecting the connection to the individual 
employment contract for transfers of seagoing vessels that are part of an 
undertaking are the same as the reasons underlying this rejection for land-
based undertaking. However, as appears from the previous Chapter, where it 
concerns land-based undertakings an additional argument for the rejection of 
the connection to the individual employment contract was found in the 
possible lengthy assessment of seeking the habitual place of employment. 
This reasoning does not apply to the conflict of laws solution proposed for 
seagoing vessels. In effect, the proposed conflict of laws solution bears 
similarity to the tools provided by the ECJ in establishing the habitual place 
of employment for highly mobile undertakings.1286 Yet, the proposed conflict 
                                                          
1285 Cf. Case 287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 5465, ECLI:EU:C:1987:573, para. 12; Joined 
Cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Securicor [2005] ECR I-11237, ECLI:EU:C:2005:778, para. 
31. 
1286 Cf. Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer Sa [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:842, para. 40.  
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of laws solution for the transfer of seagoing vessels that are part of an 
undertaking is slightly more easily determined as the aim is not to find the 
place where the employee habitually discharges his tasks towards his 
employer, but to locate the place from where the undertaking (not the 
employee) is operated and controlled. Still, one could argue that the 
connection to the flag state would prove a more easily determined 
connecting factor. However, given the real risk of abusive reflagging tactics 
such connection appears undesirable. In order to avoid this undesired effect 
one could, akin to Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, establish a genuine link-test in the sense that if the flag state does 
not provide a genuine link to the place from where the undertaking is 
operated and controlled the latter should prevail. Such a solution may seem 
preferable in light of the ease of determination of the flag state, in reality 
however this solution requires a continued factual assessment of whether 
such a genuine link exists.1287 More so, disguised behind the connection to 
the flag state, such a conflict rule still requires the application of the laws of 
the place from where the undertaking is operated and controlled, which in 
relation to seagoing vessels forms the one continuous link to any single 
country.  
 
Since the employees cannot in any way influence the change in the person of 
their employer they require their interests and the rights and obligations 
stemming from their employment contract to be protected. In this, the 
location of the undertaking after (completion of) the transfer should remain 
immaterial. The fact that the directive encompasses transfers of undertakings 
to non-Member States will, on occasion, undoubtedly result in the laws of 
the country of the transferee not being equipped with (similar) acquired 
rights provisions. The existence of these provisions therefore does not form a 
requirement for the application of the Acquired Rights Directive and its 
national counterparts. Where it concerns seagoing vessels the dependency 
upon the location of the transferee puzzles me. I see no reason why the 
Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts should be prevented 
                                                          
1287 See for the problems surrounding the genuine link requirement under UNCLOS: R. 
Churchill, ‘The meaning of the ‘genuine link’ requirement in relation to the nationality of 
ships. A study prepared for the international transport worker’s federation’ [2000], not only 
is there is no consensus as to what is meant by a genuine link, there is also no single criterion 
by which the genuineness of a link can be established (p. 4).  
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from applying in situations involving the outbound transfer of a seagoing 
vessel. After all, the entire notion underlying the directive is to protect those 
who are employed in the European seafaring industry and to secure the 
continuation of the rights and obligations arising from their employment 
relationship. Here, the idea is to secure the application of the existing 
employment rights and not to better the position of the affected employees. 
More so, the reasons underlying the repeal of the exclusion of seagoing 
vessels are based in creating a level playing field for maritime employees 
and allowing them a position equal to that of on shore employees. By 
requiring a dependency upon the location of the transferee for situations 
involving the transfer of seagoing vessels only, the directive fails to secure 
this aim. 
 
In light of the foregoing, due to the special nature of seagoing vessels, the 
conflict of laws solution proposed in the previous Chapter requires an 
addition rather than a revision. Such an addition could take the following 
shape: 
 
‘a transfer of a seagoing vessel that constitutes a transfer of an undertaking, 
business or part of an undertaking or business shall be governed by the law 
of the Member State from which the undertaking to be transferred is 
actually operated and controlled upon or immediately prior to the transfer.’ 
 
In order for this provision to have full effect, the territorial scope of the 
Acquired Rights Directive should additionally be amended, likening the 
territorial scope for land-based undertakings, to the extent that the directive 
applies in so far as the seagoing vessel to be transferred is operated and 
controlled from a Member State, i.e. a location within the territorial scope of 
the Treaty. Another solution would be to repeal the provision on the 
territorial scope of the Acquired Rights Directive and instead allowing the 
conflict of laws reference for the transfer of (seagoing) undertakings to 
designate the law that governs (the effects of) a transfer of undertaking. 
After all, the proposed conflict of laws provisions do justice to the preferred 






Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
 
In recent history, globalisation and market integration1288 have shaped the 
economic climate in such a way as to give rise to a considerable increase in 
cross-border mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings. On a 
European plane, continued integration serves as a catalyst to the incessant 
enhancement of corporate mobility.1289 In light of this rise in corporate 
mobility, the employment effects of cross-border corporate mobility, 
especially where it concerns cross-border mergers, acquisitions and 
corporate restructurings may be considered issues of significant practical 
relevance.1290 It are issues of employment protection in the event of a change 
in employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger that lie at the heart of the 
present research. More precisely, the present research holds a strong focus 
on the employment effects of a cross-border transfer of undertaking coupled 
with a cross-border relocation and, even more specifically, on the applicable 
law and appropriate court in the event of a dispute arising from such a 
transfer. Throughout Europe, the Acquired Rights Directive1291 provides for 
the safeguarding of employees rights upon a transfer of undertaking. In 
essence, the directive, through e.g. the ope legis transfer of rights and 
obligations stemming from the employment contract to the new 
employer,1292 seeks to ensure that employees do not forfeit vital rights 
acquired prior to the change in employer.1293 Although the directive applies 
throughout the Member States of the European Union, it only aims to 
effectuate partial and minimum harmonization and is not established to 
provide a uniform level of employment protection on the basis of common 
criteria.1294 As an inevitable result of partial and minimum harmonization, 
the laws of the Member States naturally differ, resulting in issues of 
                                                          
1288 E.g. capital, labour and services markets.  
1289 Commission services’ working document. Memorandum on rights of workers in cases of 
transfers of undertakings [2004]. 
1290 See Chapter 1.  
1291 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16 
1292 Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive.  
1293 COM(74) 351, p. 3. 
1294 C‑105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A/S Danmols Inventar  [1985] ECR 
331, ECLI:EU:C:1985:331, para. 16. 
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conflicting laws in the event of a cross-border transfer of undertaking.1295 
After all, as is its nature, the directive is not directly applicable between 
private actors within the Member States, rather its application is secured by 
means of transposition into national law. It are national implementation 
provisions, not the directive itself, that are to apply in situations involving a 
transfer of undertaking. These provisions tend to be geared towards domestic 
transfers of undertakings rather than dealing with cross-border transfer 
scenarios.1296 More so, the directive facilitates significant differences in the 
laws of the Member States by leaving several key concepts, such as 
employee, to be defined by national law.1297 In addition, the optional nature 
of several (parts) of the provisions stemming from the directive, such as 
those on collective agreements,1298 supplementary pension schemes1299 and 
insolvency,1300 aids the divergence in national laws.1301 Any cross-border 
transfer of undertaking may consequently give rise to an excess of questions 
of a preponderantly private international law nature. In cross-border transfer 
scenarios, it is essential to establish which national acquired rights 
provisions are to prevail in situations involving a conflict between the 
acquired rights laws existing in the country of origin, at the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred and in the country of relocation. Since, the 
place of adjudication holds the key to determining the applicable law, an 
additional question of importance is which courts are competent to 
adjudicate a transfer-related dispute. These questions are closely related to 
the aim of the present dissertation, which is to establish the necessity, 
desirability and (possible) shaping of private international law provisions, in 
the areas of jurisdiction and the conflict of laws, for (cross-border) transfers 
of undertakings. In pursuing this aim, the bulk of the present work is 
dedicated to providing a critical evaluation of the Acquired Rights Directive 
and the existing private international law instruments for (disputes arising 
from) transfers of undertakings. This critical evaluation has shown that the 
existing private international law regime does not sufficiently cater for issues 
arising from cross-border transfers of undertakings and oftentimes fails to do 
justice to the nature and purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive. Building 
                                                          
1295 See Chapter 2. 
1296 Reiner 2010. 
1297 Art. 2(1), Art. 2(2) Acquired Rights Directive; See Chapter 2, paragraph 3.  
1298 Art. 3(3) Acquired Rights Directive 
1299 Art. 3(4)Acquired Rights Directive 
1300 Art. 5 Acquired Rights Directive. 
1301 See Chapter 2.  
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on this, the purpose of the present Chapter is to provide an overview and 
captious assessment of the findings in the previous Chapters in addition to 
providing recommendations of a private international law nature.  
  
 
1. Cross-border transfers of undertakings 
A proper understanding of the present research requires a clear working 
definition of the term cross-border transfer of undertaking. Several types of 
cross-border transfer scenarios can be distinguished. In essence, any cross-
border transfer of undertaking requires some foreign element. This foreign 
element may either lie in the person of the transferee1302 or the location of the 
undertaking upon or after the transfer. For the purposes of this research 
however, cross-border transfers of undertakings are characterized as 
transfers of undertakings involving a cross-border relocation of the 
transferred undertaking. To this end, three types of transfer scenarios are 
identified: the intra-European transfer, the outbound transfer and the inbound 
transfer. The intra-European transfer scenario involves a transfer between 
EU Member States, whereas an outbound transfer scenario sees to the 
situation in which an undertaking is transferred and relocated from a 
Member State to a non-Member State. The inbound transfer scenario deals 
with the reverse situation, i.e. where an undertaking is transferred and 
relocated from a non-Member State to a Member State of the European 
Union. Since the Acquired Rights Directive by reason of Article 1(2) only 
applies only to intra-European and outbound transfer scenarios, they hold the 
emphasis of the present research. In other words, upon a transfer of 
undertaking, the Acquired Rights Directive seeks to safeguard the rights of 
employees (previously) employed in European based undertakings; 
undertakings that transfer from a third state to a European Member State are 
outside the remit of the directive. Thus, the territorial scope of the directive 
                                                          
1302 This type of transfer scenario is however not included in the current research. After all, 
under this scenario there will be little to no change in the working conditions due to the 
nationality (or lex societatis) of the transferee. In fact, the transfer of undertaking does not 
differ from a transfer to a domestic transferee; the transferred employees will continue their 
employment on the exact terms and conditions that existed with the transferor, this includes 
the location of the performance of their obligations towards their employer, i.e. their place of 
work. Although in these cases, the parties may rely on the instruments of private international 
law since the internationality requirement is fulfilled, the actual and legal position of the 
affected employees is unlikely to change. 
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ensures that its provisions apply in both intra-European and outbound 
transfer scenarios. In considering the application of the directive, the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred is paramount. If the undertaking 
to be transferred is located within the territory of the European Union1303 the 
Acquired Rights Directive will yield application.  
 
A transfer of undertaking is not precluded from the application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts by reason of its 
cross-border nature.1304 In this sense, cross-border transfers of undertakings 
do not differ from transfers of undertakings that are effectuated within 
national borders. The application of the directive is primarily contingent 
upon the transfer of a stable economic entity1305 that retains its identity.1306 
This transfer comprises any change in the natural or legal person responsible 
for carrying on the business1307 and does not require the existence of a 
contractual agreement between transferor and transferee. A transfer therefore 
includes a wide variety of cross-border commercial transactions including 
e.g. a simple contractual business sale, service provision changes, 
outsourcing transactions, mergers, demergers, court decisions and leasing 
                                                          
1303 See Article 1(2) of the Acquired Rights Directive (Directive 20001/23/EC), according to 
which the undertaking to be transferred must be situated within the territorial scope of the 
Treaty, i.e. the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (cf. Article 52 TEU and Article 355 TFEU). As a rule of thumb, EU law 
governs the entire European territory of the Member States.  
1304 As is clear from Article 1(2), which predicates the application of the directive upon the 
geographic situation of the undertaking to be transferred. For an undertaking to be captured by 
the provisions of the directive this undertaking must be situated within the territorial scope of 
the Treaty.  
1305 The matter of financing or legal status of the undertaking are immaterial to this equation: 
Case CV-108/10 Scattalon [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:542, para. 42; Joined cases C-127/96, C-
229/96 and C-74/97 Hernández Vidal [1998] ECR I-8179, ECLI:EU:C:1998:594, para.26- 27; 
Case C‑175/99 Mayeur [2000] ECR I‑7755, ECLI:EU:C:2000:505, para.32; see also, with 
regard to Article 1(1) Acquired Rights Directive: Case C‑458/05 Jouini and Others [2007] 
ECR I‑7301, ECLI:EU:C:2007:512, para. 31, and Case C-151/09 Federación de Servicios 
Públicos de la UGT (UGT-FSP) v Ayuntamiento de La Línea de la Concepción, María del 
Rosario Vecino Uribe en Ministerio Fiscal [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:452, paragraph 26. 
1306 Article 1(1)(a) Acquired Rights Directive. 
1307 Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94  Albert Merckx and Patrick Neuhuys v Ford Motors 
Company Belgium SA [1996] ECR I – 1267, ECLI:EU:C:1996:87, para. 28; Case C 29/91 Dr. 
Sophie Redmond Stichting v Hendrikus Bartol and others [1992] ECR I-3189, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:220, para. 10-11.  
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
397 
 
agreements.1308 An important difference between domestic transfers and 
transfers of undertaking coupled with a cross-border relocation of the 
undertaking is that the latter type of transfer will generally subject the 
affected employees to a different social, economic and legal environment. 
Such a change however, does not per se prevent a transfer of undertaking 
from taking effect. In cross-border transfer scenarios, the question of 
whether a transfer has occurred is to be assessed on the basis of the same 
factors that apply to domestic transfer situations: the retention of identity-test 
applies to domestic and cross-border transfer scenarios alike. Under this 
seven-headed test, relying on the so-called Spijkers-factors1309 it has to be 
determined whether the business or undertaking was transferred as a going 
concern and has retained its identity after the transfer. In its seminal 
judgment in Spijkers the ECJ ruled that in deciding whether an undertaking 
has retained its identity the national court has to take into account all the 
circumstances that characterise the undertaking in question such as (a) the 
type of undertaking or business, (b) the transfer of tangible assets, (c) the 
value of intangible assets, (d) the transfer of the majority of the employees, 
(e) the transfer of customers as well as (f) the degree of similarity between 
the activities carried on before and after the transfer and (g) the period, if 
any, for which the activities were suspended. All of these circumstances are 
single factors in an overall assessment and cannot be considered in 
isolation.1310 This seven-factor test, which does not require the cumulative 
application of all factors, applies to cross-border transfers of undertakings in 
the same way as it does to domestic transfers. The relocation to a different 
social, economic and legal environment does not affect the application of the 
retention of identity-test. The notion that such a change in environment may 
cause an undertaking to lose its identity does not fit in well with the existing 
regime and would defeat the entire purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive.1311 A ‘change in environment-test’ is uneasily reconciled with the 
strictly applied Spijkers-factors. The Acquired Rights Directive does not 
presently give rise to a distinction between domestic and cross-border 
transfers of undertakings resulting in a justification for adopting additional 
                                                          
1308 Case 135/83 Arie Botzen en anderen v Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV [1985] 
ECR 519, ECLI:EU:C:1985:58. 
1309 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127. 
1310 Case 24/85 Spijkers v Benedik [1986] ECR 1119, ECLI:EU:C:1986:127., para. 13.  
1311 Contra CMS report 2006, p. 17, Cf. Cass. soc., 5 April 1995, n° 93-42.690; Cour de Lyon, 
Ch. Soc. 11 May 1993, Dr. Soc. 1993, p. 650 ; See Chapter 2, para. 4 ; Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 
25. 
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tests in relation to cross-border transfer scenarios. Moreover, it would be 
inequitable to deprive the affected employees of the protection afforded by 
the directive simply due to the fact that, without their control, the transfer 
takes place across national borders. If the Spijkers-factors have been 
fulfilled, there is a transfer of a going concern and the undertaking 
transferred retains its identity.1312 Still, in cross-border transfer scenarios an 
undertaking may, on occasion, due to the cross-border relocation of the 
undertaking, be prevented from retaining its identity. This may for example 
be the case in situations where an undertaking is location-dependent or relies 
heavily on a particular client base that is inextricably linked to the location 
of the undertaking. Even though the retention of identity-test applies to 
domestic and cross-border transfer scenarios alike, it appears that it will be 
more difficult to satisfy the Spijkers factors upon a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking, since the transfer of key factors such as employees are likely to 
be amiss.1313 Still, once a retention of identity has been assumed, which is 
not improbable in cross-border transfer scenarios, the employees will be 
entitled to the protection afforded by the directive and its national 
counterparts. Once it has been established that there has been a transfer, by 
reason of legal transfer or merger, of an undertaking that has retained its 
identity, the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts will take 
effect, provided that the territorial1314 and personal scope of the directive1315 




At a certain point, cross-border transfers of undertakings are bound to give 
rise to disputes. A matter that is intrinsically linked to such disputes is that of 
                                                          
1312 The fact that the affected employees, as a result of a relocation may become subject to a 
different environment that is detrimental to their working conditions should however not be 
overlooked. In these situations, the employees should be able to rely on Article 4(2) of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, allowing them to treat their objection to the transfer as a dismissal 
by their employer. 
1313 In many cases employees may not wish to transfer to continue their employment with the 
transferee and will as such object to the transfer of their employment relationship. This may 
be different where it concerns transfers of undertakings in areas near national borders, See 
Chapter 2, para. 4.  
1314 Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive: the undertaking to be transferred must be situated 
within the Member State. 
1315 Article 2(1), 2(2) Acquired Rights Directive: those who are protected as employees under 
the laws of the Member State in question.  
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international jurisdiction. In the event of a dispute arising from a transfer of 
undertaking all actors involved in the transfer must be able to turn to a 
particular court in order to enforce the rights and obligations stemming from 
the transfer. The choice for any such court, should such a choice exist, is one 
of particular importance as it is the court seised of the matter that, on the 
basis of its own rules of private international law, determines the applicable 
law. Due to the nature of the Acquired Rights Directive, being one of partial 
harmonisation, there does not exist a uniform level of employment 
protection throughout the Member States. Consequently, even in intra-
European transfer scenarios, it is of considerable importance for the plaintiff 
to, from his perspective, be able to secure adjudication in the courts of the 
Member States that will provide the most advantageous outcome to the 
dispute. Thus, although the question of international jurisdiction is one that 
is frequently overlooked when discussing cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, its importance should not be ignored. Where it concerns cross-
border transfer scenarios, it is vital to establish the court that has 
international jurisdiction in the event of a dispute arising from the transfer.  
 
2.1 Effectiveness of existing instruments 
The Acquired Rights Directive itself holds no provisions on international 
jurisdiction. As a result, the competent court, in disputes arising from a 
cross-border transfer of undertaking, throughout the Member States, has to 
be established on the basis of the Brussels I Recast. While the classification 
of all claims stemming from a transfer of undertaking as civil and 
commercial matters1316 may prove troublesome at times, these claims 
generally befall the substantive scope of the regulation, except where they 
pertain to the exercise of public authority. Since the Brussels I Recast does 
not include a special jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings, all 
claims arising therefrom are accommodated within the existing provisions of 
the regulation. In other words, the Brussels I Recast does not offer a single 
jurisdictional basis for all transfer-related claims, but instead, divides them 
among several Articles on jurisdiction on the basis of the instituted claim. To 
this end, the concurrence of the claims arising from a transfer of undertaking 
under a single rule or category of jurisdiction might be preferred, however, 
the Brussels I Recast leaves no room for such concurrence of claims other 
                                                          
1316 The problem with this classification lies in the semi-public nature of some parts of a 
transfer of undertaking, especially where it concerns the preservation of status and function of 
employee representatives, since in some Member States, e.g. Belgium, the application of such 
provisions is enforced by administrative fines. 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
400 
 
than under the general rule which attributes jurisdiction to the forum rei. 
Subsuming all transfer-related claims under this general category would 
conflict with the protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive and 
would defy procedural efficiency and fairness by conceivably resulting in a 
loss of proximity between the adjudicating court and the dispute and the loss 
of a multiplicity of competent courts for the affected employees. Subsuming 
all transfer-related claims under the category for individual employment 
contracts, which is a common argument within the area of the conflict of 
laws, does not offer a solution either. After all, in addition to individual 
interests the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts inhabit 
certain operational, economic and collective employment interests which are 
difficult to reconcile with the special rules on jurisdiction for disputes 
relating to individual employment contracts. Under the Brussels I recast, the 
various claims that might arise from a transfer of undertaking are therefore 
subject to different rules on jurisdiction. Whereas some plaintiffs will have 
to make due with the general rule of Article 4, awarding jurisdiction to the 
domicile of the defendant, others can seek refuge in the variety of 
jurisdictional bases offered by the special jurisdictional category for 
individual contracts of employment.1317 In most cases, although a 
classification of transfer-related claims may prove difficult, these 
jurisdictional bases offer sufficient access to justice and do not require an 
alternative or additional jurisdictional path for claims arising from cross-
border transfers of undertakings. In some cases however, the existing regime 
does not appear satisfactory in light of procedural efficiency and the nature 
and aim of the Acquired Rights Directive. After all, the directive seeks to 
secure the acquired rights of employees working in European-based 
undertakings upon the transfer of the undertaking in which they are 
employed. Under application of the Brussels regime, claims arising from the 
transfer of a European-based undertaking may be outside the scope of the 
Brussels I Recast despite the existence of a sufficiently close connection 
between the dispute and a Member State court.  
 
In outbound transfer scenarios it may be impossible to initiate proceedings 
against a foreign transferee before a Member State court on the basis of the 
Brussels I Recast. This is the case where the transferee is domiciled in a non-
                                                          
1317 See Chapter 3. 
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Member State1318  and neither the new habitual place of employment1319 nor 
the undertaking as a secondary establishment1320 is situated in a Member 
State. In addition, employees will not be able to sue both transferor and 
transferee in composite proceedings as Article 8 Brussels I Recast requires 
co-defendants to be domiciled in a Member State. As such, in outbound 
transfer scenarios the Brussels I Recast is unable to provide a competent 
court. Where it concerns claims arising from a transfer of a European-based 
undertaking the absence of jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State is an 
entirely unacceptable result. After all, in outbound transfer scenarios the 
undertaking to be transferred is located within a Member State. Prior to the 
cross-border transfer of undertaking the affected employees are likely to 
habitually carry out their employment within the Member State of origin.1321 
It are the transferor and transferee who by reason of the transfer, have 
willingly subjected themselves to the legal sphere of another Member 
State.1322 The employees however cannot exert any influence over the 
effectuation of the transfer, the person of the transferee or the location of the 
transferred undertaking upon or immediately after the transfer. On the date 
of the transfer all rights and obligations stemming from the employment 
contract transfer to the transferee by operation of law.1323 Such a transfer is 
initiated within the Member State where the undertaking to be transferred is 
located. In the absence of a Member State court having jurisdiction there 
exists no geographic proximity to the undertaking being transferred as pivot 
of the Acquired Rights Directive, which conflicts with the latter’s employee 
protective nature. In conclusion, although impervious at times, the Brussels I 
Recast in most transfer-related cases provides sufficient access to justice. 
However, in certain specific cases, most notably in relation to non-Member 
                                                          
1318 The application of the Regulation is formally contingent on the defendant being domiciled 
in a Member State, except in a few distinct situations where a sufficient connection to a 
Member State exists on the basis of another factor, e.g. where it concerns individual contracts 
of employment.  
1319 Article 20(2) Brussels I Recast 
1320 Article 21(2) Brussels I Recast.  
1321 This former habitual place of performance does provide a ground for jurisdiction against 
the transferor, but holds no significance in establishing the competent court in situations 
involving a claim against the transferee. In the latter case the new habitual place of 
employment is to be decisive.  
1322 Generally, the transferor will have agreed to the (foreign) person of the transferee or the 
cross-border relocation that accompanies the transfer, whereas the transferee has voluntarily 
acquired a European-based undertaking. 
1323 Article 3(1) Acquired Rights Directive. 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
402 
 
State defendants (in all likelihood the transferee), the provisions of the 
Brussels I Recast provide a highly unsatisfactory result. These cases do not 
go along with the existing jurisdictional regime.  
 
2.2 Preferred jurisdictional path 
In light of the problems relating to the absence of jurisdiction of Member 
State courts in outbound transfer scenarios and other difficulties relating to a 
lack of proximity existing between the competent court and the transfer-
related dispute, the present research proposes an additional ground for 
jurisdiction. Although, under the Brussels I Recast, it may be difficult to 
allocate the appropriate jurisdictional rule for specific transfer-related 
claims, the Brussels regime generally provides sufficient access to justice. 
Therefore, rather than providing a new, separate jurisdictional category for 
transfers of undertakings, it is preferred to provide an additional ground for 
jurisdiction within the Acquired Rights Directive. This rule should serve as a 
single (additional) jurisdictional base for all claims seeking to enforce rights 
and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking. The added benefit 
of such a single jurisdictional basis for transfer-related claims lies in the fact 
that it, in some cases, alleviates the strenuous task of classifying each 
transfer-related claim as belonging to a specific jurisdictional category under 
the Brussels I Recast. Claims arising from a transfer of undertaking would 
benefit from a jurisdictional rule that is not plagued by complexity and 
ambiguity, that has the advantage of being easily applicable and of providing 
legal certainty and predictability. Since the undertaking to be transferred is 
pivotal to a cross-border transfer of undertaking, it is desirable to attribute 
jurisdiction to the courts at the location of this undertaking. Leaving these 
courts as sole adjudicators in the event of a transfer-related dispute would 
however result in the loss of the multiplicity of jurisdictional bases presently 
available to the affected employees and may as such result in a deterioration 
of their legal position, which would be contrary to the employee protective 
nature of the Acquired Rights Directive. As such, the Acquired Rights 
Directive should, akin to the Posting of Workers Directive,1324 include a rule 
                                                          
1324 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services OJ [1997] 
L18/1, which in Article 6 provides a specific provision on jurisdiction; Cf. the upcoming 
revision of the Posting of Workers Directive: Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services COM(2016) 128 final.  
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3. Conflict of laws 
The emphasis of the present research lies in the establishment of the 
applicable law to a transfer of undertaking. Given the absence of EU 
competence in effectuating a unification of the labour laws of the Member 
States1325 the Acquired Rights Directive seeks to establish an approximation 
of laws by means of partial and minimum harmonisation.1326 As a result, 
Member State laws provide minimum standards of employment protection 
that may only be departed from in melius.1327 In effect, the Acquired Rights 
Directive has facilitated legal diversity by allowing the Member States to 
impose more favourable measures and to choose from several optional 
measures within the directive. In addition, the directive leaves key concepts, 
such as employee, to be defined by national law. Consequently, there exist 
wide variations in the national employment protection regimes, leaving the 
conflict of laws rules to play a crucial role in establishing the appropriate 
legal regime in cross-border transfer situations. The issue of cross-border 
transfers of undertakings is therefore inextricably linked to the conflict of 
laws.  
 
3.1 Views and theories 
There exist many different views and theories on the proper conflict of laws 
path for transfers of undertakings, none of which are universally accepted. 
While some of the conflict of laws views hold obvious merits, others are 
easily rejected. For example, the view seeking connection  to the transfer 
                                                          
1325 The founding treaties did not confer any competence on the EU to enact legislation in the 
field of labour law save for the free movement of workers. Labour law legislation was 
therefore enacted on the basis of the competence existing for the internal market. The Single 
European Act provided the EU with the power to establish legislation with regard to 
employment health and safety in Article 118a EC whereas Article 153(1) TFEU, introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides the EU with a supportive and complementary 
competence allowing the enactment of directives effectuating partial harmonization. See: 
Mańko 2015, p. 9-10; Riesenhuber 2012, p. 141.  
1326 Cf.  Hepple 2005, p. 190. 
1327 Article 8 Directive 2001/23/EC allows the Member States to apply or introduce laws that 
are more favourable to the affected employees; Article 7 Directive 77/187/EEC; Guibboni 
2006, p. 235 et seq. 
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agreement clearly conflicts with the aim and purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive as it makes the application of acquired rights provisions contingent 
on the will of transferor and transferee. Another view, which seeks to 
conflictually divide the rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of 
undertaking appears to frustrate legal certainty. Both these views should be 
discounted in the search for the most befitting conflict of laws solution in 
cases of transfers of undertakings. In essence there exist two main views on 
the preferred conflict of laws connection for transfers of undertakings:1328 the 
connection to the individual employment contract and the connection to the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred. In the prevailing opinion a 
transfer of undertaking and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom 
are to be governed by the law that governs the individual contract of 
employment.1329 The rationalization of this connection is primarily found in 
the employee-protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive.1330 The 
main purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive, which is to secure a 
continuance of the rights and obligations stemming from an employment 
contract or relationship, is considered to justify the conflict of laws 
connection to the individual employment contract. A connection to the 
location of the undertaking to be transferred is however better suited to deal 
with issues of conflicting laws in the event of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. While primarily intended to protect the individual employee, 
the effects of a transfer of undertaking surpass the individual employment 
relationship and extend to operational, economic and collective employment 
interests as well as internal market considerations. Where it concerns these 
interests the individual employment contract forms an unsuitable conflict of 
laws connection. It is not the individual employment relationship, but the 
undertaking to be transferred that forms the pivot of the Acquired Rights 
Directive. The seat of this undertaking therefore holds the most sensible 
connecting factor. It is the directive that centers around this undertaking with 
its provisions only becoming operative if the transfer of an undertaking is to 
take effect. A connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred 
is additionally supported by the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights 
Directive. It is Article 1(2) of the directive that attributes special meaning to 
the seat of the undertaking by causing the directive to apply ‘where and in so 
far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
                                                          
1328 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 460. 
1329 See case law Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium Contra: UK, Luxembourg, 
Malta. 
1330 Junker 2012, p. 13. 
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transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.1331 Contrary 
to a connection to the individual employment contract the seat of the 
undertaking to be transferred is easily determined and entails a neutral 
connection that is closely connected to the transfer of an undertaking.  
 
3.2 Effectiveness of existing instruments 
Under the prevailing opinion, which seeks connection to the individual 
employment contract,  
the Rome I Regulation by reason of Article 8 is considered to determine the 
applicable law to a cross-border transfer of undertaking. This, however, is a 
false assumption, since the Rome I Regulation does not substantively apply 
to transfers of undertakings as these are effectuated by operation of law 
rather than being the result of contractual dealings.1332 A transfer of 
undertaking constitutes a separate legal concept that falls outside the scope 
of the Rome I Regulation.1333 More so, the provision existing for individual 
employment contracts is ill-equipped to deal with the more collective aspects 
of a transfer of undertaking and the determination of the applicable law on 
the basis of Article 8 Rome I Regulation may, at times, be a difficult and 
time-consuming process.1334 The connection to this conflict of laws category 
thus results in numerous difficulties and ambiguities in relation to a transfer 
of undertaking. One of the primary problems being that a strict application of 
the conflict of laws provision for individual employment contracts gives rise 
to a conflit mobile upon the relocation of the undertaking abroad. Such a 
change in applicable law is entirely incompatible with the aim and purpose 
of the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts.1335 The 
problems arising from such a conflit mobile are not solved by the doctrine of 
overriding mandatory provisions or the scope rule contained in Article 1(2) 
of the Acquired Rights Directive. In fact there exists significant uncertainty 
on whether national acquired rights provisions may be applied as overriding 
mandatory provisions on the basis of Article 9 or Article 23 of the Rome I 
Regulation whenever the connection to the individual employment contract 
does not point towards the laws of a Member State despite the undertaking to 
be transferred falling within the ambit of the directive. The provisions 
                                                          
1331 Emphasis added KCH.  
1332 See above, para. 4.1 of Chapter 4. 
1333 Under the prevailing opinion, however, the Rome I Regulation determines the applicable 
law to a transfer of undertaking.  
1334 See above, para. 4.3 of Chapter 4. 
1335 See para. 8.5 of Chapter 4. 
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stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive to not appear to be caught by 
the strict definition of overriding mandatory provisions that exists within the 
Rome I Regulation. After all, these provisions, although partly rooted in 
internal market considerations1336 and collective interest, primarily seek to 
protect the employees affected by a transfer of undertaking.1337 The dogmatic 
distinction of whether a provision is considered overriding mandatory may 
appear immaterial whenever a provision is equipped with a distinct scope 
rule such as the one encompassed by Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive. 
However, it is the ambiguity of this scope rule that aggravates the difficulty 
of assessing the proper conflict of laws path for transfers of undertakings. 
Since the classification as overriding mandatory cannot stem from the 
directive itself,1338 it is left to the Member States to determine whether their 
national acquired rights provisions require application on an overriding 
mandatory basis.1339 Such national classification will prove difficult. Due to 
its indistinctness the Member States have attributed different meaning to the 
scope rule included in Article 1(2). While the majority has refrained from 
awarding any significance to the rule, some Member States have ascribed 
conflict of laws implications to this distinct provision. The latter group of 
Member States, which include the United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg, 
do not appear to share the prevailing opinion that a transfer of undertaking is 
to be assimilated under the conflict of laws category for individual contracts 
of employment. Instead, their national acquired rights provisions include a 
unilateral conflict of laws provision that seeks connection to the location of 
the undertaking to be transferred, giving rise to a separate conflict of laws 
connection for transfers of undertakings.1340  Consequently, the existing 
conflict of laws regime for transfers of undertakings is not only ineffective, 
but plagued by false assumptions, ambiguities and disparities. These 
problems surrounding the determination of the applicable law for transfers of 
undertakings appear to be worsened by the different conflict of laws 
approaches existing throughout the Member States. All these problems and 
                                                          
1336 Cf. Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-
09305,  
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605. 
1337 See Chapter 4, paragraph 6.  
1338 After all, as is its nature, the directive is not directly applicable to private actors within the 
Member States. Cf. Haanappel van der Burg 2016, p. 8. 
1339 See Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation.  
1340 See Chapter 2, para. 3. 
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ambiguities highlight the need for a uniform multilateral conflict of laws rule 
for transfers of undertakings. 
 
3.3 Seafaring workers 
In 2015, seagoing vessels, which for long were excluded from the scope of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, entered into the Acquired Rights Directive by 
way of a revision of Article 1(3).1341 The underlying aim of this inclusion 
was to ameliorate the employment of European seafaring workers. Since the 
high mobility of seagoing vessels might complicate the conflict of laws 
connection for transfers of undertakings, the present research attributes 
special meaning to these types of undertakings. Given the highly mobile 
nature of seagoing vessels it is surprising that the newly inserted Article 
1(3)1342 subjects their transfer to the existing territorial scope, which seeks 
connection to the geographic location of the undertaking to be transferred. 
By doing so, it appears that seagoing vessels that constitute a non-land-based 
undertaking may be captured by the directive whenever they are located 
within Member State territory or are outwith the directive whenever they are 
located outside Member State territory; a highly unsettling situation that 
allows the purposeful evasion of acquired rights provisions by simply 
venturing outside European waters as well as leaves acquired rights 
provisions to unintentionally capture transfers of undertakings that are 
merely passing through Member State waters. It appears that the drafters of 
Article 1(3) were aware of these possibilities as the provision imposes an 
additional requirement on the transfer of seagoing vessels demanding the 
transferee to be situated or the transferred undertaking to remain situated 
within the territory of an EU Member State. The latter requirement is 
entirely incompatible with the heightened mobility of seagoing vessels and 
therefore seems geared towards land-based undertakings involving the 
                                                          
1341 Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC, as regards 
seafarers, OJ [2015] L 263/1.  
1342 This provision reads: ‘This Directive shall apply to a transfer of a seagoing vessel that is 
part of a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business within the 
meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2, provided that the transferee is situated, or the transferred 
undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business remains, within the territorial 
scope of the Treaty. This Directive shall not apply where the object of the transfer consists 
exclusively of one or more seagoing vessels.’ For the reservations I have to the last sentence 
of this provision see Chapter 5.  
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transfer of a seagoing vessel as a mere tangible asset.  These transfer 
scenarios however, were already covered by the previous wording of the 
directive and have now become unwantedly limited to the extent that the 
directive no longer applies to outbound transfer scenarios, save for the 
situation where the transferee is located within an EU Member State.1343  
Although for seagoing vessels that are part of a non-land-based undertaking 
the location of the transferee has become an additional requirement for 
application of the directive,1344 this contingency does not resolve the 
problems arising from subjecting the transfer of seagoing vessels to the 
existing territorial scope of the directive. Due to the inherent mobility of 
seagoing vessels and the concomitant ease with which acquired rights 
provisions may purposefully be circumvented, the existing territorial scope 
should not be upheld nor should the geographic location of the undertaking 
serve as a connecting factor in determining the applicable law.  
 
3.4 Preferred conflict of laws path 
Since cross-border transfers of undertakings are outside the remit of the 
Rome I Regulation, and the scope rule of Article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive does not directly resolve any issues of conflicting laws, there exists 
a need for determining when national acquired rights provisions are to apply 
and which national acquired rights provisions are to apply in any given case. 
Given the inherent one-sided nature of a unilateral conflict of laws 
connection, any conflict of laws provision for transfers of undertakings is 
best served with a multilateral connection. A transfer of undertaking, which 
secures both collective and individual employment interests as well as  
                                                          
1343 The application of the directive in the event of a transfer of land-based undertakings 
including inter alia the transfer of a seagoing vessel has therefore become limited to intra-
European transfer scenario’s, save for the situation where the transferee is located within a 
Member State. I see no reason why the Acquired Rights Directive should be prevented from 
applying in situations involving the outbound transfer of a seagoing vessel that is part of an 
undertaking. After all, the entire notion underlying the revision of the directive is to protect 
those who are employed in the European seafaring industry by securing the continuation of 
their acquired rights upon a transfer of undertaking. The reasons underlying the repeal of the 
exclusion of seagoing vessels are additionally based in creating a level playing field for 
maritime employees and allowing them a position equal to that of on shore employees. By 
requiring a reliance upon the location of the transferee for situations involving the transfer of 
seagoing vessels only, the directive fails to meet this aim. 
1344 The insertion of this requirement is striking since the location of the transferee or the 
transferred undertaking after the transfer is of no relevance for the transfer of land-based 
undertaking; See Chapter 5.  
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inhabits certain internal market considerations, is to be subjected, as a whole, 
to a single legal system. The issue of transfers of undertakings to my mind 
should consitute an independent reference category under the conflict of 
laws. In determining the law that applies to a transfer of undertaking 
connection should be sought to the location of the undertaking (to be 
transferred) as this embodies the most natural connecting factor.1345 A 
connection to the seat of this undertaking signifies the application of a 
neutral conflict of laws connection that is closely connected to the pivot of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, i.e. the undertaking to be transferred.1346 A 
choice for this connecting factor is supported by the wording of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, which in Article 1(2) attributes special meaning to the seat 
of the undertaking by causing the directive to apply ‘where and in so far as 
the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’.1347 A 
connection to the location of the undertaking to be transferred additionally 
prevents a fragmentation of laws, by subjecting the entire workforce to the 
same national acquired rights provisions, thus preventing that only part of 
the workforce is transferred to the transferee.1348  
  
The effects of a transfer of undertaking are not limited to the individual 
employment relationship, but extend to operational, economic and collective 
employment interests. A connection to the individual contract of 
employment therefore forms an unbecoming connecting factor,1349 as it 
ignores the aim and purpose of the directive and may require a lengthy 
assessment of the applicable law.1350 By comparison, the seat of the 
                                                          
1345 Cf. Bittner 2000, p. 464 et seq; Junker 1992, p. 234 et seq.; Junker 1994, p. 40;  Birk 
1982, p. 396; Reichold 2008, p. 697 et seq; Birk 1978, p. 291-29; Henckel 2012, p, 389; 
Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 293; Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 8; Cf. Laagland 
2011, p. 17; Junker 2012, p. 13. 
1346 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Junker 1992, p. 235.  
1347 Emphasis added KCH.  
1348 Niksova 2014, p. 72; Bittner 2000, p. 464. In this, the law that governs the individual 
employment contract of the affected employees (which may be a cause for a fragmentation of 
laws) is immaterial.  
1349 Bittner 2000, p. 464; Birk 1982, p. 396; I.A. Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 290. 
1350 See Chapter 5, paragraph 5; paragraph 8; Cf. Article 8 Rome I Regulation. Such a lengthy 
assessment will mostly take place where it concerns undertakings with a high level of 
mobility or an undertaking that carries out activities in several countries including the one in 
which it is situated. These type of undertakings may embody a larger number of cross-border 
transfers when compared to undertakings that that are solely conducting their business within 
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undertaking to be transferred is easily located. Still, the law that applies to 
the employment contract and the law of the location of the undertaking to be 
transferred as possible connecting factors for the transfer of undertaking will 
generally provide similar results.1351 After all, the seat of the undertaking to 
be transferred is likely to coincide with the habitual place of employment.1352 
The primary advantages of the proposed connecting factor and main reasons 
for renouncing the connection to the individual contract of employment lie in 
the exclusion of a choice of law and the avoidance of a conflit mobile1353. 
 
3.4.1 Choice of law 
Even though party autonomy constitutes a cornerstone of modern day private 
international law it is entirely incompatible with the issue of transfers of 
undertakings.1354 The predominant aim of a transfer of undertaking, which is 
not primarily a contractual issue since it occurs by operation of law, is to 
                                                                                                                                        
one single country. Still, in most cases the employees of the undertaking to be transferred will 
habitually carry out their employment at the location of the undertaking to be transferred, 
allowing no difference between the application of the law that applies to the individual 
contract of employment and the laws in force at the seat of the undertaking to be transferred.  
See Chapter 5, paragraph 5; paragraph 8.  
1351 Where there does exist a difference in the law governing the employment contract and the 
law governing the transfer of undertaking such difference does not pose any problems. After 
all, the transfer of undertaking is an area of law that can be separated as a whole from the 
general body of employment law. As such there exists no overlap and therefore no conflict 
between the rules of employment law covered by the choice of law in the employment 
contract and the rights and obligations stemming from a transfer of undertaking.   
1352 Junker 2012, p. 13. 
1353 A strict connection to the individual employment contract results in a possible change in 
the applicable law since Article 8 Rome I Regulation does not impose a temporal fixation on 
the applicable law. Surely, in applying the conflict of laws rules for individual employment 
contracts to transfers of undertakings one could impose such a temporal fixtation, however, 
this is not possible within the existing Rome I Regulation. Such temporal fixation would 
therefore require a separate conflict of laws rule or application for transfers of undertakings. 
(Cf. Niksova 2014, p. 89; Deinert 2013, p. 341; Junker 2005, p. 735) 
1354 This view is aided by a decision of the EFTA court in which it held that: ‘the purpose of 
the Directive is to ensure that the rights arising from a contract of employment or employment 
relationship of employees affected by the transfer of an undertaking are safeguarded. Since 
this protection is a matter of public policy, and therefore independent of the will of the parties 
to the contract of employment, the rules of the Directive must be considered to be mandatory, 
so that it is not possible to derogate from them in a manner unfavourable to employees. It 
follows that employees are not entitled to waive the rights conferred on them by the Directive 
and that those rights cannot be restricted even with their consent.’ (Case E3/95 Torgeir 
Langeland v Norske Fabricom A/S [1995-1996] EFTA Ct. Rep. 36, para. 42-43)  
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secure the transfer (and continuance) of the acquired rights of the employees 
affected by the transfer. It should not be possible to negate this employee-
protective aim by reason of a choice of law. Since the allowance of a 
professio iuris bears the risk that the employees will be deprived of the 
protection afforded to them by the Acquired Rights Directive the conflict of 
laws reference in matters relating to a cross-border transfer of undertaking 
should not inhabit the possibility of such a choice of law.1355 Transferee and 
transferor should not be able to bypass the provisions stemming from the 
Acquired Rights Directive by a ‘unilateral’ choice of law decision outside 
the influence of the affected employees.1356 Any conflict of laws regime for 
transfers of undertakings should therefore exclude party autonomy.1357  
 
3.4.2 Temporal fixation 
In establishing a conflict rule determining the applicable law to any legal 
relationship the conflict of laws connection generally consists of three 
elements: a subject (transfer of undertakings), an attribute of this subject 
(location of the undertaking to be transferred) and a time of 
determination.1358 In seeking connection to the seat of the undertaking to be 
transferred this time of determination should equate to the time of the 
transfer. As such, the applicable law should be fixed to the location of the 
undertaking upon or immediately prior to the transfer. In determining the 
applicable law to a transfer of undertaking, the time or date of the transfer is 
a factor of great significance as this is the time at which the existing 
employment relationships will transfer to the transferee.1359 This transfer is 
                                                          
1355 Cf. Gamillscheg 1959, p. 237; Gamillscheg 1983, p. 359; Junker 1992, p. 233; Kronke 
1981, p. 159; Kronke 1989, p. 9; Mankowski 1994, p. 96; Kania 2012, p. 82-83, Franzen 
1994, p. 70; Däubler 1994, p. 124; Niksova 2014, p. 70-71; Bittner 2000, p. 460, footnote 20; 
Richter 1992, p. 70; Drobnig, Becker & Remien, 1991, p. 68. 
1356 Niksova 2014, p. 71; Kania 2012, p. 83; Däubler 1994, p. 124.  
1357 This is an advantage over the connection to the individual employment contract, which 
allows the parties to subject their contract to a choice of law (subject to some limitations).  
1358See e.g. Kropholler 1990, p. 115. 
1359 Another argument against the change in applicable law may be found in the similarity to 
the conflict of laws assessment of contract acquisition or the assignment of debts, which is 
utilized as a justification for the assimilation of transfers of undertakings under the conflict of 
laws category of employment contracts.  Under the conflict of laws assessment of contract 
acquisition the transfer of a contract is governed by the law that governs the contract itself. 
This law continues to be decisive after the transfer. 
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not subject to continuity as it occurs ope legis at a set moment in time.1360 A 
failure to impose a temporal fixation on the determination of the preferred 
connecting factor would result in the occurrence of an needless conflit 
mobile upon the relocation of the transferred undertaking. Allowing such a 
conflit mobile or change in the law that governs a transfer of undertaking 
does not do justice to a transfer of undertaking, which occurs at a distinct 
moment in time. More so, allowing a change in the applicable law to a 
transfer of undertaking obviously conflicts with the aim of the Acquired 
Rights Directive, which is to protect the rights of workers employed in 
European-based undertakings regardless of the destination of those 
undertakings upon or after the transfer. A failure to impose a temporal 
fixation upon the conflict of laws connection would result a transfer only 
having some effect if the laws at the original location and the new location 
of the transferred undertaking allow for an automatic transfer of the 
employment relationship and the rights and obligations stemming therefrom. 
Such a concurrence of laws is at odds with Article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive, which merely requires the undertaking to be transferred to be 
located within an EU Member State prior to the transfer, thus providing no 
significance to the country of destination. Setting such a requirement would 
needlessly thwart the application of the Acquired Rights Directive, which 
applies to intra-European and outbound transfers alike.  
 
In situations involving a transfer of undertaking that is accompanied by a 
cross-border relocation a swift integration into the legal system of the state 
of relocation is surely desired.1361 Such integration should not be ensured 
through allowing a conflit mobile for transfers of undertakings. Instead 
integration into the legal system of the state of relocation may come to pass 
by a change in the law that applies to the individual employment contract. 
Due to a change in the objective connecting factor of the habitual place of 
employment the applicable law to an individual employment contract is 
likely to change upon the relocation of the transferred undertaking, which is 
consistent with the enduring nature of the employment relationship. By 
contrast, allowing a change in the law that governs (the effects of) a transfer 
of undertaking would unwantedly limit the application of the Acquired 
                                                          
1360 It this context it should be noted that the rights and obligations stemming from a transfer 
of undertaking, although occurring by operation of law at a set moment in time may have a 
continuing effect on the existing employment relationship. In this sense the employment 
relationship, which is subject to continuity, differs from a transfer of undertaking.   
1361 Cf. Haanappel-van der Burg 2016 I, p. 9; Haanappel-van der Burg 2015, p. 295-296. 
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Rights Directive as well as defeat its aim and purpose.1362 Consequently, it is 
imperative that the conflict of laws allows the full application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts. Once the conflict of 
laws norm imposes a temporal fixation on the (determination of the) conflict 
of laws connection a conflit mobile is averted and the applicable law 
becomes immutable.1363  
 
3.4.3 Overriding effect of provisions exceeding minimum protection 
The Acquired Rights Directive only effectuates minimum harmonisation, 
leaving the Member States free to utilize national law to exceed the 
protection awarded the directive.1364 A Member State may extend the scope 
of its acquired rights provisions and the level of protection offered to the 
employees affected by the transfer. In addition, Member States may choose 
to utilize one or more of the options provided by the directive by extending 
the application of national acquired rights legislation to e.g. insolvent 
undertakings or supplementary old-age, invalidity or survivor’s benefits. 
Since the directive only ensures a minimum level of employment protection 
the national acquired rights provisions of the Member States are placed on 
equal footing insofar as it concerns this minimum level of harmonisation. 
However, Member State provisions that exceed the level of protection 
secured by the directive may enjoy overriding mandatory effect in relation to 
other Member States1365 If the application of national acquired rights 
provisions of exceeding protection is considered essential according to the 
general structure and circumstances under which the law was adopted1366 
these provisions could have an overriding effect on the lex causae. Since 
transfers of undertakings are beyond the remit of the Rome I Regulation, the 
application of foreign overriding mandatory provisions is not limited by 
European legislation.1367 As a result, it is left to the Member States, to 
                                                          
1362 In outbound transfer scenario’s allowing a conflit mobile would limit the application of 
the Acquired Rights Directive, which clearly extends to these types of transfers. Due to the 
existence of a conflit mobile however, the transfer of the acquired rights of employees 
involved in an outbound transfer, upon relocation, becomes dependent upon the laws of the 
country of relocation, which is at odds with the Acquired Rights Directive.  
1363 Looschelders 2004, p. 35; Rauscher 2009, p. 106-107; Henrich 2010, p .289. 
1364 See Article 8 Acquired Rights Directive.  
1365 Cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663. 
1366 Cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663., para. 50.  
1367 Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation severely limits the application of the overriding 
mandatory provisions of any state other than the lex fori.  
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determine on the basis of their own private international law, whether and to 
what extent such provisions are to be reckoned with.  
 
3.4.4 Preferred connecting factor for seagoing vessels  
The preferred connecting factor for transfers of undertakings is the location 
of the undertaking to be transferred. This undertaking, as pivot of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, embodies the most natural connection. For 
seagoing vessels that are part of a non-land-based undertaking, such a 
connection, however, does not yield a satisfactory result. A connection to the 
location of the vessel to be transferred would invite abusive tactics on the 
part of ship owners seeking to evade the application of the directive in 
addition to allowing vessels to accidentally be captured by the directive. As 
such, the inherent mobility of seagoing vessels and the ease with which 
acquired rights provisions may be avoided call for a different connecting 
factor for seagoing vessels. In seeking a connecting factor for seagoing 
vessels, a connection to the flag state should be rejected in favour of a 
connecting factor that ensures a genuine connection to a particular state. 
Given the ease of flagging out and the risk of abusive reflagging tactics the 
flag does not form a suitable connection for transfers of undertakings. It is 
therefore preferred to seek connection to the state from where the seagoing 
vessel (that is part of an undertaking) to be transferred is operated and 
controlled.1368 Whilst navigating the high seas as a locus sine lege the state 
from which the vessel is actually operated and controlled forms the one true 
continuous connection to any particular state. Moreover, this connecting 
factor fits in well with the directive, which applies whenever there is a 




The purpose of the present research is to establish the necessity, desirability 
and (possible) shaping of private international law provisions, in the areas of 
jurisdiction and the conflict of laws, for (cross-border) transfers of 
undertakings. A critical evaluation of the existing private international law 
instruments has shown that this regime does not fully accommodate issues 
arising from cross-border transfers of undertakings. More so, existing views 
                                                          
1368 Cf. Henckel 2012. 
1369 Cf. Case 287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 5465, ECLI:EU:C:1987:573 para. 12; Joined 
Cases C-232/04 and C-233/04 Securicor [2005] ECR I-11237, ECLI:EU:C:2005:778, para. 
31. 
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and theories do not provide an entirely satisfactory solution to any of the 
problems within the realm of private international law. As a result, the 
present research deems it necessary and desirable to alter the existing private 
international law regime for transfers of undertakings by suggesting the 
inclusion of private international law provisions within the Acquired Rights 
Directive. The inclusion of such provisions would serve a dual aim: first it 
would resolve the existing problems of private international law, and second, 
it would clearly and unequivocally establish that cross-border transfers of 
undertakings are within the ambit of the Acquired Rights Directive.  
 
4.1 Jurisdiction 
In the area of jurisdiction, a subject that is sparsely discussed in relation to 
transfers of undertakings, the Brussels I Recast does not provide a separate 
jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings. Instead, the rights and 
obligations arising from a transfer of undertaking are accommodated under 
the existing Articles of the regulation. Although transfers of undertakings are 
within the remit of the regulation, the classification of these rights and 
obligations as belonging to a specific jurisdictional rule may at times 
constitute a difficult task. In addition, in situations where the affected 
employees, employees representatives and trade unions would have to rely 
on the forum rei, there may not be sufficient proximity between the 
competent court and the transfer-related dispute. Moreover, in outbound 
transfer scenarios where the transferee is not domiciled within a Member 
State, the Brussels I Recast does not provide a ground for jurisdiction despite 
the existence of a genuine connection to Member State territory. In light of 
these issues the present research proposes an additional ground for 
jurisdiction. Since the Brussels regime generally provides sufficient access 
to justice, save for e.g. situations where it involves a non-Member State 
transferee, a separate jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings is 
not proposed. The introduction of such a separate category would conflict 
with the employee-protective nature of the Acquired Rights Directive by 
depriving the employees of the multiplicity of jurisdictional bases offered 
under the regulation. Instead, the Acquired Rights Directive should, akin to 
the Posting of Workers Directive,1370 include a rule on jurisdiction additional 
                                                          
1370 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services OJ [1997] 
L18/1, which in Article 6 provides a specific provision on jurisdiction; Cf. the upcoming 
revision of the Posting of Workers Directive: Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and 
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to those existing within the Brussels regime. I therefore recommend the 
inclusion of a single rule on jurisdiction for all rights and obligations arising 
from a transfer of undertaking. Such a rule should, in light of procedural 
efficiency and proximity, designate the courts of the Member State in which 
the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or immediately prior to the 
transfer.  
 
4.2 Conflict of laws 
The area of the conflict of laws in relation to transfers of undertakings is 
plagued by false assumptions, ambiguities and disparities. Not only do there 
exist a variety of views on the appropriate conflict of laws path, the laws and 
approaches of the Member States vary in this regard. Whereas most Member 
States seek connection to the individual contract of employment, some abide 
by a unilateral conflict of laws provision requiring application whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated within the territory of the Member 
State concerned. Both of these approaches possess obvious flaws. Under the 
connection to the individual employment contract, application is often 
sought of the Rome I Regulation. This regulation however, does not cover 
transfers of undertakings, as these occur by operation of law rather than 
being the result of contractual negotiations. More so, the connection to the 
individual employment contract is ill-suited to deal with issues of transfers 
of undertakings. Not only does it neglect the operational, economic and 
collective interests of the regulation, it also allows party autonomy and is 
considered to give rise to a conflit mobile, both of which are incompatible 
with a transfer of undertaking. As a result, a connection to the individual 
employment contract fails to do justice to the nature and purpose of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. 
 
To my mind, transfers of undertakings should constitute a separate conflict 
of laws category for which connection is to be sought to the nexus of the 
transfer: the (location of) undertaking to be transferred. This conflict of laws 
reference should point towards the law that governs (the effects of) a transfer 
of undertaking rather than determine the territorial scope of national acquired 
rights provisions akin to the approach utilized by Luxembourg, the United 
Kingdom and Malta. At a European level, in intra-European transfer 
scenarios, there is no need for a unilateral approach to the conflict of 
                                                                                                                                        
of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services COM(2016) 128 final.  
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laws.1371 After all, the Member States, by reason of their implementation of 
the minimum protection secured by the Acquired Rights Directive, share 
certain rights and values on the preservation of acquired rights. Even though 
such rights and values may not be shared with non-Member States, the aim 
of the Acquired Rights Directive does not allow for a different conflict of 
laws approach in their regard.1372 The notion underlying the directive that all 
those employed in European based undertakings require a continuance of 
their acquired rights upon the transfer of the undertaking in which they are 
employed should be guaranteed.1373 The location of the transferred 
undertaking after relocation should therefore play no part in the conflict of 
laws equation. Consequently, I recommend the inclusion of a conflict of 
laws provision into the Acquired Rights Directive, thus securing the creation 
of a separate conflict of laws category for (all rights and obligations 
stemming from) transfers of undertakings. This conflict of laws provision 
should designate the applicable law in intra-European and outbound transfer 
scenarios alike by designating the laws of the country of the location of the 
undertaking to be transferred.  
 
4.3 Seagoing vessels 
With the inclusion of seagoing vessels into the Acquired Rights Directive, 
these types of undertakings have become subject to the provisions contained 
therein. Any conflict of laws provision included into the directive would 
therefore extend to seagoing vessels that are part of an undertaking. Where 
these vessels are part of a land-based undertaking the connection to the 
location of the undertaking does not pose a problem. However the proposed 
conflict of laws connection for land-based undertakings is incompatible with 
the highly mobile nature of seagoing vessels where seagoing vessels are part 
of a non-land-based undertaking.1374 For these types of transfers, a 
connection to the location of the undertaking would invite abusive evasion 
tactics. Seagoing vessels therefore require a different connecting factor. 
Given the ease of flagging out a connection to the flag state should not be 
preferred. Instead a connection to the state from where the seagoing vessel 
                                                          
1371 Cf. Ten Wolde 2011.  
1372 See Chapter 4, para. 8.  
1373 Since the employees cannot exert any influence on the change in their employer they 
require a protection of their interests and the rights and obligations stemming from their 
employment contract. In this, the location of the undertaking after (completion of) the transfer 
should remain immaterial. 
1374 E.g. where the vessel, cargo contracts and client base are transferred to the transferee. 
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(that is part of an undertaking) to be transferred is operated and controlled as 
the one true continuous connection to any particular state should be 
preferred. Such a connection, however, does not solve all problems arising in 
relation to the transfer of seagoing vessels. Under the existing directive the 
transfer of seagoing vessels is subject to the directive’s existing territorial 
scope, making the application of the directive contingent upon the location 
of the undertaking to be transferred.  Given the heightened mobility of 
seagoing vessels and the risk of purposeful evasion tactics the existing 
territorial scope should not be upheld. More so, the additional requirements 
conflict with the nature and aim of the Acquired Rights Directive and fail to 
create a level playing field for maritime employees, thus defeating the aim of 
the revision of the directive. I therefore recommend a revision of the existing 
Article 1(3) of the Acquired Rights Directive comprising of the introduction 
of a different territorial scope for seagoing vessels and a repeal of the 
requirements demanding the transferee to be situated or the transferred 
undertaking to remain situated within a Member State. With regard to 
seagoing vessels that are part of non-land-based undertaking the territorial 
scope of the directive should be amended to the extent that the directive 
applies insofar as the seagoing vessel to be transferred is operated and 
controlled from a Member State, i.e. a location within the territorial scope of 
the Treaty. Where it concerns the conflict of laws I recommend that the 
directive includes a separate conflict of laws provision for the transfer of 
seagoing vessels. This conflict of laws provision should designate the law of 
the country from where the undertaking (seagoing vessel) is actually 
operated and controlled.  
 
4.4 Final recommendations 
In conclusion, I recommend the inclusion of private international law 
provisions in a new Chapter IV1375 of the Acquired Rights Directive, which 




In order to enforce the rights and obligations stemming from this 
directive, proceedings may be instituted in the Member State in 
which the undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or 
immediately prior to the transfer without prejudice, where 
                                                          
1375 In such a case the final provisions of the directive would move to a new Chapter V.  
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applicable, to the right, under existing international conventions and 
regulations on jurisdiction, to institute proceedings in another State.  
Applicable law 
1. A transfer of undertaking shall be governed, without prejudice to 
paragraph 2, by the law of the Member State in which the 
undertaking to be transferred is situated upon or immediately 
prior to the transfer. 
 
2. A transfer of a seagoing vessel that constitutes a transfer of an 
undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business shall 
be governed by the law of the Member State from which the 
undertaking to be transferred is actually operated and controlled 






Continued globalisation and market integration have shaped the current 
economic climate in such a way that it facilitates and has facilitated an 
increase in cross-border mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings. 
In coming years, corporate mobility is likely to carry on to increase. The 
employment effects of such cross-border corporate mobility lie at the heart 
of the present book. In light of the existing and expected rise in corporate 
mobility, the employment effects of cross-border corporate mobility, where 
it concerns cross-border mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings, 
are issues of substantial practical relevance. Throughout the European 
Union, the Acquired Rights Directive provides for the safeguarding of 
employees rights in the event of a change in employer as a result of a legal 
transfer or merger. It is this directive that forms the object of this book. The 
Acquired Rights Directive, through e.g. the automatic transfer of rights and 
obligations stemming from the employment contract to the new employer 
seeks to ensure that employees do not forfeit essential rights acquired prior 
to a change in employer. The directive, which applies throughout the 
Member States of the European Union, only aims to provide partial and 
minimum harmonization, resulting in an inevitable divergence of the laws of 
these Member States. As an inescapable result of partial and minimum 
harmonization, the laws of the Member States naturally differ, resulting in 
issues of conflicting laws in the event of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. Any cross-border transfer of undertaking may therefore give 
rise to issues of conflicting laws and other questions of a private 
international law nature. This book primarily deals with cross-border 
transfers of undertakings that are coupled with the cross-border relocation of 
such undertakings. In cross-border transfer scenarios, it is essential to 
establish which national acquired rights provisions are to prevail in 
situations involving a conflict between the acquired rights laws of the 
countries connected to such a transfer, e.g. the acquired rights provisions 
existing in the country of origin, at the location of the undertaking to be 
transferred, and in the country of relocation. Since, the place of adjudication 
is key in determining the applicable law, an additional question of 
importance is which courts are competent to adjudicate a transfer-related 




establish the necessity, desirability and (possible) shaping of private 
international law provisions for (cross-border) transfers of undertakings.  
 
The book,  which consists of six separate Chapters, in its first Chapter, 
outlines the research aims and methodology and contains a preliminary 
introduction into the general subject matter of the book. In essence, the 
present research makes use of an eclectic research method, combining 
several approaches to legal research, such as e.g. a comparative, legal 
historical and black letter approach. This research methodology is utilized in 
fulfilling the three primary aims of the book. The present research: 
 
1. Seeks to analyse the existing rules on international jurisdiction and 
the conflict of laws relating to (cross-border) transfers of 
undertakings and their deficiencies; 
2. Seeks to outline and critically evaluate the views on overcoming 
these dificiencies and their merits and demerits; 
3. Intends to suggest the most appropriate and desired private 
international law path, possibly by offering suggestions for the 
shaping of coherent legislative rules on private international law in 
relation to cross-border transfers of undertakings.   
 
The second Chapter starts to fulfill these aims by providing an overview of 
the substantive effects of a transfer of undertaking. In essence, this Chapter 
deals with the larger substantive issues that may arise in situations involving 
a cross-border transfer of undertaking. In addition, Chapter 2 addresses the 
definition of a cross-border transfer of undertaking. Several types of cross-
border transfer scenarios can be distinguished. In essence, any cross-border 
transfer of undertaking requires some foreign element, which may either lie 
in the person of the transferee or the location of the undertaking upon or 
after the transfer. Throughout this book however, cross-border transfers of 
undertakings are characterized as transfers of undertakings involving a cross-
border relocation of the transferred undertaking. To this end, three types of 
transfer scenarios are identified: the intra-European transfer, the outbound 
transfer and the inbound transfer. Since the Acquired Rights Directive, by 
reason of its Article 1(2), only applies only to intra-European and outbound 





Since the application of the directive is primarily contingent upon the 
transfer of a stable economic entity that retains its identity the question of 
whether an undertaking involved in a cross-border transfer is able to retain 
such identity is one of critical importance. Transfers of undertakings that are 
coupled with a cross-border relocation will generally result in the affected 
employees becoming subject to a different social, economic and legal 
environment. Such a change however, does not per se prevent a transfer of 
undertaking from taking effect. In cross-border transfer scenarios, the 
question of whether a transfer has occurred is to be assessed on the basis of 
the same factors that apply to domestic transfer situations: the retention of 
identity-test applies to domestic and cross-border transfer scenarios alike. 
Under this seven-headed test, established by the ECJ in its seminal judgment 
in the case of Spijkers, it has to be determined whether the business or 
undertaking was transferred as a going concern and has retained its identity 
after the transfer. A relocation to a different social, economic and legal 
environment does not affect the application of this test. A ‘change in 
environment-test’ is uneasily reconciled with the strictly applied Spijkers-
factors. Once the Spijkers-factors are fulfilled, there is a transfer of a going 
concern and the transferred undertaking retains its identity. When a transfer 
of undertaking by legal transfer or merger and a retention of identity have 
been established, the Acquired Rights Directive and its national counterparts 
will take effect, provided that the territorial and personal scope of the 
directive are additionally satisfied.   
 
As an instrument of partial and minimum harmonization, the directive is not 
directly applicable to individual actors within the Member States, instead, it 
are national acquired rights provisions that apply to any given case. Chapter 
2 of this book signals that these national provisions differ in certain key 
areas, e.g. where it concerns the definition of employee, the effects awarded 
to the employees’ objection to transfer, the observance of terms and 
conditions existing in collective agreements, the observance of 
supplementary pension schemes and the application of national acquired 
rights provisions to insolvent undertakings. As a result, in cross-border 
transfer scenarios, issues of conflicting laws are likely to arise. It therefore 





When cross-border transfers of undertakings give rise to disputes the issue of 
international jurisdiction inevitably arises. In these cross-border transfer 
scenarios it is vital to establish the court that has international jurisdiction. 
This issue is addressed in Chapter 3 of this book.  The aim of this Chapter is 
twofold:  first, it seeks to outline the rules on jurisdiction pertaining to cross-
border transfers of undertakings existing in the EU Member States and 
second, it intends to assess whether these rules on jurisdiction are in need of 
revision.  
 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive itself does not contain any provisions on 
international jurisdiction this issue, throughout the EU Member States, is to 
be resolved on the basis of the Brussels I Recast. This regulation does not 
offer a special jurisdictional category for transfers of undertakings. Instead, 
the claims arising from a cross-border transfer are divided among several 
Articles on jurisdiction existing in the regulation. Although the classification 
of transfer-related claims may prove difficult, these Articles on jurisdiction 
generally offer sufficient access to justice. However, in some cases the 
Brussels regime does not offer a satisfactory result in light of procedural 
efficiency and the objectives of the Acquired Rights Directive. Under 
application of the Brussels I Recast, claims arising from the transfer of an 
undertaking established in the European Union may be outside the scope of 
the regulation despite the existence of a sufficiently close connection 
between the dispute and the courts of a European Member State. For these 
situations, Chapter 3 argues for an additional ground of jurisdiction to be 
included into the Acquired Rights Directive. This additional ground of 
jurisdiction, which provides jurisdiction to courts of the seat of the 
undertaking to be transferred, should serve as a single (additional) 
jurisdictional basis for all claims seeking to enforce rights and obligations 
stemming from a transfer of undertaking. 
 
Chapter 4 forms the heart of this book and concerns the issue of the conflict 
of laws. This fourth Chapter seeks to assess and define the rules that 
determine the applicable law in the event of a cross-border transfer of 
undertaking. In doing so, the Chapter critically evaluates the large variety of 
views and ideas on the method through which the law applicable to a transfer 
of undertakings is and should be obtained. One of the most important 
findings of this Chapter is that the Member States deal with the issue of the 
conflict of laws in different ways. A plea is therefore made for the 




transfers of undertakings. In establishing the proper conflict of laws 
connection for this new conflict of laws provision a connection to the 
employment contract and the transfer agreement are rejected in favour of a 
connection to the undertaking to be transferred. The choice for the latter 
connecting factor lies in the fact that this factor embodies the most natural 
connecting factor for transfers of undertakings. A connection to the seat of 
the undertaking signifies the application of a neutral conflict of laws 
connection that is closely connected to the pivot of the Acquired Rights 
Directive, i.e. the undertaking to be transferred. Additional support for the 
use of this connecting factor may be found in Article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive which causes the directive to apply ‘where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred 
is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’. As such, the Chapter 
establishes the preferred method through which the law applicable to a cross-
border transfer of undertaking is to be determined. The proposed conflict of 
laws connection should be fixated in time in order to prevent a conflit mobile 
and should, in light of the mandatory and employee protective nature of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, exclude the option of a choice of law.  
 
Chapter 5 addresses the recent inclusion of seagoing vessels into the 
Acquired Rights Directive and the effects of this inclusion upon the conflict 
of laws. The primary purpose of Chapter 5 is to assess whether the special 
characteristics of the maritime sector, i.e. its inherent cross-border and 
international features, give rise to a special conflict of laws consideration for 
seagoing vessels in relation to transfers of undertakings. Where seagoing 
vessels are part of a land-based undertaking the connection to the location of 
the undertaking does not pose a problem. However, the proposed conflict of 
laws connection for land-based undertakings does not fit in well with the 
highly mobile nature of seagoing vessels that are part of a non-land-based 
undertaking. Where it concerns the transfer of these types of undertakings, a 
connection to the location of the undertaking would invite abusive evasion 
tactics. As such, Chapter 5 proposes a different connecting factor for seaoing 
vessels. Giving the ease of flagging out the flag state is rejected as a possible 
connecting factor. Instead, Chapter 5 advocates a connection to the state 
from where the seagoing vessel (that is part of an undertaking) to be 
transferred is operated and controlled as this location embodies one true 





The final Chapter concludes the book by outlining the preferred private 
international law path for transfers of undertakings and by offering 
recommendations and suggestions for private international law provisions to 
be included into the Acquired Rights Directive. In essence the Chapter 
provides the final, most important recommendation in the form of a 
suggestion for the amendment of the Acquired Rights Directive. This 
recommendation suggests the inclusion of private international provisions 







Voortschrijdende globalisering en marktintegratie hebben het huidige 
economische klimaat zodanig gevormd dat dit klimaat een toename van 
grensoverschrijdende fusies, overnames en herstructureringen faciliteert. In 
de komende jaren zal de ondernemingsmobiliteit waarschijnlijk verder 
stijgen. De arbeidsrechtelijke gevolgen van dergelijke grensoverschrijdende 
ondernemingsmobiliteit staan centraal in dit boek. In het licht van de huidige 
en verwachte stijging in ondernemingsmobiliteit, in het bijzonder waar het 
grensoverschrijdende fusies, overnames en herstructureringen betreft, zijn de 
arbeidsrechtelijke gevolgen van dergelijke mobiliteit van aanmerkelijke 
praktische relevantie.  Binnen de Europese Unie zorgt de richtlijn overgang 
van onderneming voor het behoud van rechten van werknemers in het geval 
van een wijziging in werkgever tengevolge van een overdracht krachtens 
overeenkomst of fusie. Deze richtlijn vormt het primaire onderwerp van dit 
boek. Door bijvoorbeeld de automatische overgang van de rechten en 
verplichtingen uit de arbeidsovereenkomst zorgt de richtlijn overgang van 
onderneming ervoor dat werknemers essentiële rechten die voorafgaand aan 
de wijziging in werkgever zijn verkregen niet verliezen. De richtlijn, die van 
toepassing is in de lidstaten van de Europese Unie, beoogt slechts 
gedeeltelijke en minimum harmonisatie, hetgeen resulteert in 
onvermijdelijke verschillen in de wetgeving van de lidstaten. Dergelijke 
verschillen in wetgeving leiden in geval van een grensoverschrijdende 
overgang van onderneming onontkoombaar tot vragen van internationaal 
privaatrecht. Elke grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming kan 
aanleiding geven tot vragen betreffende het toepasselijk recht en tot andere 
vragen van internationaal privaatrechtelijke aard. Dit boek betreft in de 
eerste plaats de grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming die 
gepaard gaat met de grensoverschrijdende relocatie van desbetreffende 
onderneming. In grensoverschrijdende gevallen is het van belang om vast te 
stellen welke nationale bepalingen betreffende de overgang van 
onderneming van toepassing zijn, in het bijzonder wanneer er verschil 
bestaat tussen het recht van bijvoorbeeld het land van herkomst, zijnde de 




bestemming. Aangezien de plaats van berechting een sleutelrol vervult bij 
het bepalen van het toepasselijk recht is het aanvullend van belang om vast 
te stellen welke rechters bevoegd zijn om van een aan de 
grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming gerelateerd geschil kennis 
te nemen. Het belangrijkste doel van dit boek is om de noorzaak, 
wenselijkheid en mogelijke vormgeving van bepalingen betreffende het 
internationaal privaatrecht met betrekking tot de overgang van onderneming 
te onderzoeken.  
 
Het boek, dat bestaat uit zes afzonderlijke hoofdstukken, schetst in het eerste 
hoofdstuk de doelstellingen van het onderzoek en de gebruikte 
methodologie. Daarnaast bevat het een eerste algemene inleiding in het 
onderzoeksonderwerp. In het onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van een 
eclectische onderzoeksmethode, welke verschillende methoden van juridisch 
onderzoek combineert, zoals bijvoorbeeld de rechtsvergelijkende, historische 
en traditionele methode. Deze onderzoeksmethode wordt gebruikt om de 
drie primaire doelstellingen van dit onderzoek te vervullen: 
 
1. Het onderzoek poogt bestaande regels van internationaal 
privaatrecht, op het terrein van het internationale bevoegdheidsrecht 
en het conflictenrecht, met betrekking tot de grensoverschrijdende 
overgang van onderneming en hun tekortkomingen te analyseren; 
2. Het onderzoek tracht de verschillende visies op het overwinnen van 
deze tekortkomingen in kaart te brengen en de voor- en nadelen 
daarvan te evalueren; 
3. Het onderzoek is voornemens de meest geschikte en gewenste 
internationaal privaatrechtelijke oplossing te wijzen, mogelijk door 
suggesties voor de vormgeving van samenhangende regels van 
internationaal privaatrecht met betrekking tot de 
grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming op te werpen.   
 
Het tweede hoofdstuk begint deze doelstellingen te vervullen door inzicht te 
geven in de materieelrechtelijke gevolgen van een overgang van 
onderneming. Dit hoofdstuk behelst in hoofdzaak de grotere 
materieelrechtelijke kwesties die rijzen in het kader van een 
grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming. Daarnaast verstrekt het 




onderneming. In dit kader worden verschillende grensoverschrijdende 
scenario’s onderscheiden. In de kern vereist iedere grensoverschrijdende 
overgang van onderneming enig internationaal element. Dit internationale 
element kan gelegen zijn in de persoon van de verkrijger of the locatie van 
de onderneming na de overgang. In dit boek wordt de grensoverschrijdende 
overgang van onderneming echter gekenmerkt als een overgang van 
onderneming die gepaard gaat met een grensoverschrijdende relocatie. 
Hiertoe worden drie categorieën onderscheiden: de intra-Europese overgang 
van onderneming; de uitgaande overgang van onderneming en de inkomende 
overgang van onderneming. Doordat de richtlijn overgang van onderneming, 
op basis van art. 1(2), enkel betrekking heeft op intra-Europese en uitgaande 
overgangen van onderneming(en) wordt daarop in het huidige onderzoek de 
nadruk gelegd.  
 
Aangezien de toepassing van de richtlijn overgang van onderneming in de 
eerste plaats afhankelijk is van de overdracht van een economische eenheid 
die haar identiteit behoudt is de vraag naar identiteitsbehoud in het kader van 
de grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming van bijzonder belang. 
De overgang van onderneming die gepaard gaat met een 
grensoverschrijdende relocatie zal voor de getroffen werknemers, zo zij al 
bereid zijn om hun arbeid in het buitenland voort te zetten, in het algemeen 
resulteren in wijziging van hun sociale, juridische en economische 
omgeving. Een dergelijke wijziging voorkomt echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
dat een overgang van onderneming plaatsvindt. In grensoverschrijdende 
situaties dient de vraag of een overgang van onderneming heeft 
plaatsgevonden te worden beantwoord aan de hand van dezelfde criteria als 
die welke gelden in het kader van een nationale overgang van onderneming: 
de test naar identeitsbehoud geldt zowel voor de nationale als voor 
grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming. Op basis van deze 
zevenkoppige test, die door het Hof van Justitie is vastgesteld in zijn arrest 
in de zaak Spijkers, dient te worden vastgesteld of er sprake is van de 
vervreemding van een lopend bedrijf dat zijn identiteit behoudt. Een 
relocatie naar een andere sociale, economische en jurisdische omgeving 
heeft geen invloed op de toepassing van deze test. Een ‘wijziging in 
omgevingstest’ is niet te verzoenen met de strikte toepassing van de 
Spijkers-factoren. Zodra aan de Spijkers-factoren is voldaan, is er sprake van 




haar identiteit. Wanneer het de overgang van onderneming ten gevolge van 
een overdracht krachtens overeenkomst of een fusie betreft en er sprake is 
van identiteitsbehoud zijn de richtlijn overgang van onderneming en diens 
nationale tegenhangers van toepassing, onder voorwaarde dat ook aan de 
territoriale en personele werkingssfeer van de richtlijn is voldaan.  
 
Doordat de richtlijn slechts gedeeltelijke en minimum harmonisatie beoogt is 
deze niet rechtstreeks van toepassing op private partijen in de lidstaten; in 
plaats daarvan zijn het de nationale overgangsbepalingen die in de praktijk 
toepassing  vergen. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit boek geeft aan dat deze nationale 
bepalingen op een aantal belangrijke punten verschillen, bijvoorbeeld waar 
het de definitie van werknemer betreft of het bezwaar van werknemers tegen 
de overgang van hun arbeidsrelatie, de toepassing van aanvullende 
pensioenregelingen, de toepassing van rechten en verplichtingen uit 
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst of de toepassing van nationale bepalingen 
op insolvente ondernemingen. Tengevolge van deze verschillen dreigen zich 
in gevallen betreffende de grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming 
problemen van conflictenrechtelijke aard voor te doen. Het dient daarom 
duidelijk te (kunnen) worden vastgesteld welk recht van toepassing is op de 
overgang van onderneming.  
 
Wanneer uit een grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming een 
geschil voortvloeit geeft een dergelijk geschil ongetwijfeld aanleiding tot 
internationale bevoegdheidsvragen. In zaken betreffende een 
grensoverschrijdende overgang van onderneming is het van essentieel belang 
om vast te stellen welke rechter internationaal bevoegd is. Het onderwerp 
bevoegdheid wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 3 van dit boek. Het doel van dit 
hoofdstuk is tweeledig: ten eerste wordt ernaar gestreeft om de bestaande 
Europese regels betreffende bevoegdheid in kaart te brengen en ten tweede 
wordt beoordeeld of deze regels betreffende bevoegdheid herziening 
vereisen. 
 
Aangezien de richtlijn overgang van onderneming zelf geen bepalingen 
betreffende internationale bevoegdheid bezit wordt de bevoegdheid in dit 
kader, binnen de lidstaten van de Europese Unie, geregeld door de Brussel I-
bis Verordening. Deze verordening biedt geen speciale 




daarvan worden de vorderingen uit hoofde van een grensoverschrijdende 
overgang van onderneming ondergebracht bij de bestaande 
bevoegdheidsartikelen van de verordening. Hoewel de kwalificatie van aan 
de overgang van onderneming gerelateerde vorderingen gecompliceerd kan 
blijken, bieden de betreffende artikelen over het algemeen voldoende 
toegang tot de rechter. Echter, in sommige gevallen wordt door de Brussel I-
bis Verordening, in het licht van de proceseconomie en de doelstellingen van 
de richtlijn overgang van onderneming, geen bevredigend resultaat geboden. 
Onder de  Brussel I-bis Verordening kunnen vorderingen die voortvloeien 
uit de overgang van een in de Europese Unie gevestigde onderneming buiten 
het toepassingsbereik van de verordening vallen ondanks het bestaan van een 
voldoende nauwe band tussen het geschil en de rechter van een Europese 
lidstaat. In het kader van deze situaties pleit hoofdstuk 3 voor de invoering 
van een alternatieve bevoegdheidgrond in de richtlijn overgang van 
onderneming. Deze alternatieve bevoegdheidsgrond, die bevoegdheid 
verschaft aan de gerechten in de lidstaat van de plaats waar de overgaande 
onderneming is gevestigd, dient te gelden als een aanvullende 
bevoegdheidsgrond voor alle vorderingen die rechten en verplichtingen die 
voortvloeien uit een overgang van onderneming trachten af te dwingen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 vormt de kern van dit boek en heeft betrekking op het 
conflictenrecht. Dit vierde hoofdstuk tracht de regels die het toepasselijke 
recht op de overgang van onderneming bepalen te beoordelen en te 
definiëren. Daarbij vindt een kritische evaluatie plaats van de grote 
verscheidenheid aan meningen en ideeën over de manier waarop het 
toepasselijk recht in het kader van de overgang van onderneming dient te 
worden vastgesteld. Een van de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk 
is dat de Europese lidstaten op dit punt verschillende conflictenrechtelijke 
oplossingen hanteren. Daarom wordt gepleit voor de invoering van een 
nieuwe, uniforme, multilaterale conflictenrechtelijke regeling voor de 
overgang van onderneming. Bij het vastellen van de juiste 
conflictenrechtelijke aanknopingsfactor voor deze nieuwe regeling zijn een 
aansluiting bij de arbeidsovereenkomst en de overnameovereenkomst ten 
voordele van de locatie van de overgaande onderneming van de hand 
gewezen. De keuze voor deze laatste aanknopingsfactor is gelegen in het feit 
dat deze factor het meest natuurlijke aanknopingspunt voor de overgang van 




onderneming resulteert in de toepassing van een neutrale aanknopingsfactor 
die nauw verbonden is met de overgaande onderneming als spil van de 
richtlijn overgang van onderneming. Een extra argument voor toepassing 
van deze aanknopingsfactor kan gevonden worden in art. 1(2) van de 
richtlijn overgang van onderneming, welk artikel bewerkstelligt dat de 
richtlijn van toepassing is ‘indien en voorzover de ondernemingen, 
vestigingen of onderdelen van ondernemingen of vestigingen welke 
overgaan, zich binnen de territoriale werkingssfeer van het Verdrag 
bevinden.’ Welbeschouwd bepaalt het hoofdstuk de gewenste methode aan 
de hand waarvan het toepasselijk recht op de overgang van onderneming 
dient te worden vastgesteld.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 betreft de toevoeging van zeeschepen aan het toepassingsbereik 
van de richtlijn overgang van ondernemning en de effecten van deze 
toevoeging op het toepasselijk recht. Het belangrijkste doel van hoofdstuk 5 
is om te beoordelen of de specifieke kenmerken van de maritieme sector, dat 
wil zeggen diens inherente grensoverschrijdende en internationale 
karakteristieken, aanleiding geven tot een bijzondere conflictenrechtelijke 
behandeling van zeeschepen in het kader van de overgang van onderneming. 
Wanneer zeeschepen deel uitmaken van een aan land gevestigde 
onderneming is de voorgestelde conflictenrechtelijke oplossing weinig 
problematisch.  Dit is echter anders waar het gaat om zeeschepen die deel 
uitmaken van een zeevarende onderneming. Gezien het uiterst mobiele 
karakter van dit soort ondernemingen is aansluiting bij de locatie van de 
overgaande onderneming ongewenst. Een dergelijke aansluiting zou 
misbruik in de hand kunnen werken. Dientengevolge wordt in hoofdstuk 5 
een andere aanknopingsfactor voorgesteld voor zeeschepen die deeluitmaken 
van een mobiele onderneming. Gezien het gemak waarmee schepen kunnen 
worden uitgevlagd wordt een aanknoping bij de vlaggenstaat afgewezen. In 
plaats daarvan wordt in hoofdstuk 5 gepleit voor aansluiting bij de staat van 
waaruit de overgaande onderneming wordt geëxploiteerd en aangestuurd, 
aangezien deze plaats de enige continue verbinding met een bepaalde staat 
belichaamt.  
 
Het boek eindigt met een laatste hoofdstuk waarin het gewenste 
internationaal privaatrechtlijke pad voor de overgang van onderneming 




suggesties voor de introductie van bepalingen betreffende het internationaal 
privaatrecht in de richtlijn overgang van onderneming. Feitelijk biedt het 
hoofdstuk de laatste, belangrijkste aanbeveling in de vorm van een suggestie 
voor de invoeging van bepalingen aangaande bevoegdheid en het 
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ANNEX I – Acquired Rights Directive 
 
Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
and in particular Article 94 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee(2), 
Whereas: 
(1) Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses(3) 
has been substantially amended(4). In the interests of clarity and 
rationality, it should therefore be codified. 
(2) Economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both national and 
Community level, changes in the structure of undertakings, through 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses to other employers as a result of legal transfers or 
mergers. 
(3) It is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the 
event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their 
rights are safeguarded. 
(4) Differences still remain in the Member States as regards the 
extent of the protection of employees in this respect and these 
differences should be reduced. 
(5) The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers adopted on 9 December 1989 ("Social Charter") states, in 
points 7, 17 and 18 in particular that: "The completion of the 
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internal market must lead to an improvement in the living and 
working conditions of workers in the European Community. The 
improvement must cover, where necessary, the development of 
certain aspects of employment regulations such as procedures for 
collective redundancies and those regarding bankruptcies. 
Information, consultation and participation for workers must be 
developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the practice in 
force in the various Member States. Such information, consultation 
and participation must be implemented in due time, particularly in 
connection with restructuring operations in undertakings or in cases 
of mergers having an impact on the employment of workers". 
(6) In 1977 the Council adopted Directive 77/187/EEC to promote 
the harmonisation of the relevant national laws ensuring the 
safeguarding of the rights of employees and requiring transferors 
and transferees to inform and consult employees' representatives in 
good time. 
(7) That Directive was subsequently amended in the light of the 
impact of the internal market, the legislative tendencies of the 
Member States with regard to the rescue of undertakings in 
economic difficulties, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 
February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies(5) and the legislation 
already in force in most Member States. 
(8) Considerations of legal security and transparency required that 
the legal concept of transfer be clarified in the light of the case-law 
of the Court of Justice. Such clarification has not altered the scope 
of Directive 77/187/EEC as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
(9) The Social Charter recognises the importance of the fight against 
all forms of discrimination, especially based on sex, colour, race, 
opinion and creed. 
(10) This Directive should be without prejudice to the time limits set 
out in Annex I Part B within which the Member States are to 
comply with Directive 77/187/EEC, and the act amending it, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
 
 





Scope and definitions 
 
Article 1 
1. (a) This Directive shall apply to any transfer of an undertaking, 
business, or part of an undertaking or business to another employer 
as a result of a legal transfer or merger. 
(b) Subject to subparagraph (a) and the following provisions of this 
Article, there is a transfer within the meaning of this Directive 
where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its 
identity, meaning an organised grouping of resources which has the 
objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that 
activity is central or ancillary. 
(c) This Directive shall apply to public and private undertakings 
engaged in economic activities whether or not they are operating for 
gain. An administrative reorganisation of public administrative 
authorities, or the transfer of administrative functions between 
public administrative authorities, is not a transfer within the 
meaning of this Directive. 
2. This Directive shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is 
situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty. 
3. This Directive shall not apply to seagoing vessels. 
 
Article 2 
1. For the purposes of this Directive: 
(a) "transferor" shall mean any natural or legal person who, by 
reason of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), ceases to be 
the employer in respect of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business; 
(b) "transferee" shall mean any natural or legal person who, by 
reason of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), becomes the 
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employer in respect of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business; 
(c) "representatives of employees" and related expressions shall 
mean the representatives of the employees provided for by the laws 
or practices of the Member States; 
(d) "employee" shall mean any person who, in the Member State 
concerned, is protected as an employee under national employment 
law. 
2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to national law as 
regards the definition of contract of employment or employment 
relationship. 
However, Member States shall not exclude from the scope of this 
Directive contracts of employment or employment relationships 
solely because: 
(a) of the number of working hours performed or to be performed, 
(b) they are employment relationships governed by a fixed-duration 
contract of employment within the meaning of Article 1(1) of 
Council Directive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at 
work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a 
tempory employment relationship(6), or 
(c) they are temporary employment relationships within the meaning 
of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/383/EEC, and the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business transferred is, or is 
part of, the temporary employment business which is the employer. 
 
CHAPTER II 
Safeguarding of employees' rights 
 
Article 3 
1. The transferor's rights and obligations arising from a contract of 
employment or from an employment relationship existing on the 
date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to 
the transferee. 
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Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer, the 
transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in 
respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer from a 
contract of employment or an employment relationship existing on 
the date of the transfer. 
2. Member States may adopt appropriate measures to ensure that the 
transferor notifies the transferee of all the rights and obligations 
which will be transferred to the transferee under this Article, so far 
as those rights and obligations are or ought to have been known to 
the transferor at the time of the transfer. A failure by the transferor 
to notify the transferee of any such right or obligation shall not 
affect the transfer of that right or obligation and the rights of any 
employees against the transferee and/or transferor in respect of that 
right or obligation. 
3. Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the 
terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the 
same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until 
the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the 
entry into force or application of another collective agreement. 
Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and 
conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year. 
4. (a) Unless Member States provide otherwise, paragraphs 1 and 3 
shall not apply in relation to employees' rights to old-age, invalidity 
or survivors' benefits under supplementary company or 
intercompany pension schemes outside the statutory social security 
schemes in Member States. 
(b) Even where they do not provide in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) that paragraphs 1 and 3 apply in relation to such 
rights, Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to protect 
the interests of employees and of persons no longer employed in the 
transferor's business at the time of the transfer in respect of rights 
conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to old age 
benefits, including survivors' benefits, under supplementary 








1. The transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds for 
dismissal by the transferor or the transferee. This provision shall not 
stand in the way of dismissals that may take place for economic, 
technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the 
workforce. 
Member States may provide that the first subparagraph shall not 
apply to certain specific categories of employees who are not 
covered by the laws or practice of the Member States in respect of 
protection against dismissal. 
2. If the contract of employment or the employment relationship is 
terminated because the transfer involves a substantial change in 
working conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer 
shall be regarded as having been responsible for termination of the 
contract of employment or of the employment relationship. 
 
Article 5 
1. Unless Member States provide otherwise, Articles 3 and 4 shall 
not apply to any transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business where the transferor is the subject of 
bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings 
which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor and are under the supervision of a competent 
public authority (which may be an insolvency practioner authorised 
by a competent public authority). 
2. Where Articles 3 and 4 apply to a transfer during insolvency 
proceedings which have been opened in relation to a transferor 
(whether or not those proceedings have been instituted with a view 
to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor) and provided that 
such proceedings are under the supervision of a competent public 
authority (which may be an insolvency practioner determined by 
national law) a Member State may provide that: 
(a) notwithstanding Article 3(1), the transferor's debts arising from 
any contracts of employment or employment relationships and 
payable before the transfer or before the opening of the insolvency 
proceedings shall not be transferred to the transferee, provided that 
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such proceedings give rise, under the law of that Member State, to 
protection at least equivalent to that provided for in situations 
covered by Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer(7), and, or alternatively, that, 
(b) the transferee, transferor or person or persons exercising the 
transferor's functions, on the one hand, and the representatives of the 
employees on the other hand may agree alterations, in so far as 
present law or practice permits, to the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment designed to safeguard employment 
opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking, business 
or part of the undertaking or business. 
3. A Member State may apply paragraph 20(b) to any transfers 
where the transferor is in a situation of serious economic crisis, as 
defined by national law, provided that the situation is declared by a 
competent public authority and open to judicial supervision, on 
condition that such provisions already existed in national law on 17 
July 1998. 
The Commission shall present a report on the effects of this 
provision before 17 July 2003 and shall submit any appropriate 
proposals to the Council. 
4. Member States shall take appropriate measures with a view to 
preventing misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to 
deprive employees of the rights provided for in this Directive. 
 
Article 6 
1. If the undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business 
preserves its autonomy, the status and function of the 
representatives or of the representation of the employees affected by 
the transfer shall be preserved on the same terms and subject to the 
same conditions as existed before the date of the transfer by virtue 
of law, regulation, administrative provision or agreement, provided 
that the conditions necessary for the constitution of the employee's 
representation are fulfilled. 
The first subparagraph shall not supply if, under the laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions or practice in the Member 
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States, or by agreement with the representatives of the employees, 
the conditions necessary for the reappointment of the representatives 
of the employees or for the reconstitution of the representation of 
the employees are fulfilled. 
Where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any 
analoguous insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with 
a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and are under 
the supervision of a competent public authority (which may be an 
insolvency practitioner authorised by a competent public authority), 
Member States may take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
transferred employees are properly represented until the new 
election or designation of representatives of the employees. 
If the undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business 
does not preserve its autonomy, the Member States shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that the employees transferred who 
were represented before the transfer continue to be properly 
represented during the period necessary for the reconstitution or 
reappointment of the representation of employees in accordance 
with national law or practice. 
2. If the term of office of the representatives of the employees 
affected by the transfer expires as a result of the transfer, the 
representatives shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by 




Information and consultation 
 
Article 7 
1. The transferor and transferee shall be required to inform the 
representatives of their respective employees affected by the transfer 
of the following: 
- the date or proposed date of the transfer, 
- the reasons for the transfer, 
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- the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for the 
employees, 
- any measures envisaged in relation to the employees. 
The transferor must give such information to the representatives of 
his employees in good time, before the transfer is carried out. 
The transferee must give such information to the representatives of 
his employees in good time, and in any event before his employees 
are directly affected by the transfer as regards their conditions of 
work and employment. 
2. Where the transferor or the transferee envisages measures in 
relation to his employees, he shall consult the representatives of this 
employees in good time on such measures with a view to reaching 
an agreement. 
3. Member States whose laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions provide that represenatives of the employees may have 
recourse to an arbitration board to obtain a decision on the measures 
to be taken in relation to employees may limit the obligations laid 
down in paragraphs 1 and 2 to cases where the transfer carried out 
gives rise to a change in the business likely to entail serious 
disadvantages for a considerable number of the employees. 
The information and consultations shall cover at least the measures 
envisaged in relation to the employees. 
The information must be provided and consultations take place in 
good time before the change in the business as referred to in the first 
subparagraph is effected. 
4. The obligations laid down in this Article shall apply irrespective 
of whether the decision resulting in the transfer is taken by the 
employer or an undertaking controlling the employer. 
In considering alleged breaches of the information and consultation 
requirements laid down by this Directive, the argument that such a 
breach occurred because the information was not provided by an 
undertaking controlling the employer shall not be accepted as an 
excuse. 
5. Member States may limit the obligations laid down in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3 to undertakings or businesses which, in terms of the 
ANNEX I – Acquired Rights Directive 
491 
 
number of employees, meet the conditions for the election or 
nomination of a collegiate body representing the employees. 
6. Member States shall provide that, where there are no 
representatives of the employees in an undertaking or business 
through no fault of their own, the employees concerned must be 
informed in advance of: 
- the date or proposed date of the transfer, 
- the reason for the transfer, 
- the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for the 
employees, 






This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to apply or 
introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are 
more favourable to employees or to promote or permit collective 




Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such 
measures as are necessary to enable all employees and 
representatives of employees who consider themselves wronged by 
failure to comply with the obligations arising from this Directive to 
pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to 








The Commission shall submit to the Council an analysis of the 
effect of the provisions of this Directive before 17 July 2006. It shall 
propose any amendment which may seem necessary. 
 
Article 11 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which they adopt 
in the field covered by this Directive. 
 
Article 12 
Directive 77/187/EEC, as amended by the Directive referred to in 
Annex I, Part A, is repealed, without prejudice to the obligations of 
the Member States concerning the time limits for implementation set 
out in Annex I, Part B. 
References to the repealed Directive shall be construed as references 
to this Directive and shall be read in accordance with the correlation 
table in Annex II. 
 
Article 13 
This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th day following its 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
 
Article 14 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
 
Done at Brussels, 12 March 2001. 
For the Council 
The President 
B. Ringholm 
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